MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 135
Docket: And-15-147
Argued: March 1, 2016
Decided: August 16, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ALI M. MAHMOUD
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Ali M. Mahmoud appeals from a judgment of conviction of one
count of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2015), entered by the
Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Warren, J.) after a jury trial. On appeal,
Mahmoud contends that the court committed prejudicial error by failing to
give his proposed jury instructions on eyewitness identification. We affirm
the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record
establishes the following facts. State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 2, 118 A.3d 805.
On July 22, 2013, the victim, a tow-truck driver, and his friend were looking
for illegally parked cars in Lewiston. Around 11 p.m., the victim began loading
2
an illegally parked car onto his tow truck when the car’s owner returned to
the car and a verbal confrontation arose. Multiple people in the neighboring
area gathered around, including Mahmoud. To assist with a language barrier
between the victim and the car’s owner, Mahmoud acted as a translator for
about five minutes to facilitate a discussion about whether the “drop fee”
would be reduced. After the confrontation began to escalate, the victim asked
his friend to call 9-1-1. Mahmoud then attempted to punch the victim but
missed, and the victim grabbed a six-foot-long metallic pole to defend himself,
at which point Mahmoud walked away. The victim bent down to finish
affixing the tow dolly to the vehicle when Mahmoud returned and kicked the
victim in the face, fracturing his eye socket. The victim stood up and saw
Mahmoud standing nearby “ready to fight.”
[¶3] Immediately thereafter, police approached the area and Mahmoud
ran a short distance away. Several police officers arrived at the scene and
spoke with the victim, who described Mahmoud as a tall, Somali man wearing
an orange hat, a gray shirt, and gray shorts. The victim then pointed to
Mahmoud, who at that time was standing outside a building a short distance
away. Contemporaneous with the victim’s identification, a bystander gave the
same description of the suspect to a different officer and also gestured toward
3
Mahmoud. As the officers approached Mahmoud, he started taking off
running and ran out of sight into a nearby apartment building.
[¶4] Two officers gave chase, and upon entering the apartment building
the officers heard someone upstairs say something to the effect of “[w]ho are
you, I don’t know you . . . [g]et out of my apartment . . . I’m not letting you in.”
The police then encountered Mahmoud descending the stairs. Notably,
Mahmoud was no longer wearing an orange hat and had some facial hair—an
attribute that the victim and the bystander had not mentioned in describing
the assailant. Mahmoud did, however, match the description in all other
respects, and both police officers later identified Mahmoud as the same
person that had run away from them into the apartment building. Mahmoud
was arrested, and while being taken into custody spontaneously said to the
officers, “I didn’t punch him.”
[¶5] The officers escorted Mahmoud out of the apartment building to a
police cruiser that was parked near the victim and his friend. As officers
approached the cruiser with Mahmoud in custody, the victim and his friend
each identified Mahmoud as the assailant. At trial the victim’s friend testified
that she identified Mahmoud after being asked by a police officer whether he
was the assailant, but an officer testified to the contrary, saying, “I did not ask
4
[the victim or his friend] if that was the subject. They both without being
asked identified [Mahmoud] as the subject.” No identification procedures,
such as a lineup, were conducted after the positive identifications that night.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶6] In August 2014, Mahmoud was charged by complaint with one
count of refusing to submit to arrest (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B(1)(B)
(2015), and one count of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A). The court
held a jury trial on February 17−18, 2015. At no point either before or during
the trial did Mahmoud seek to exclude his identification by any of the
witnesses.
[¶7] At trial, Mahmoud’s proposed jury instructions included, “You may
consider the following in evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification: risks of cross-racial identification, risks of identification under
stress, at best, weak correlation between the witness’s confidence and
accuracy of the identification, [and] the influence of any suggestive
identification circumstances.”
[¶8] The State opposed Mahmoud’s proposed instructions, contending
that jury instructions on eyewitness identification are improper as a matter of
law based on State v. Lavoie, 561 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1989), discussed infra,
5
among other precedents. The court rejected the State’s argument, reasoning
that courts “generally seem to be evolving toward at least telling jurors they
ought to consider carefully eye witness testimony and [listing] some of the
factors that they might want to consider.” Although the court agreed to give
an instruction on eyewitness identification, the court did not give Mahmoud’s
proposed instructions verbatim, stating,
[B]ut I’m not going to go as far as the [proposed] instruction for
some of the reasons mentioned in Justice Alexander’s
commentary [see Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual
§ 6-22A at 6-38−6-42 (2016 ed.)] and for some other reasons,
which is I don’t think I should be mentioning to a jury . . . studies
that are not before the jury and are not subject to
cross-examination and that I actually haven’t conducted and can’t
vouch for their accuracy. I don’t think I should be announcing as a
matter of judicial notice that . . . certain sociolog[ical] studies are
correct or are worth considering.
[¶9] The court gave the following jury instruction, in pertinent
part:
[Y]ou should carefully consider any testimony relating to eye
witness identification. For instance, you should consider the
following in determining the accuracy of any eye witness
identification[:] whether the accuracy of an eye witness
identification may be affected by the fact that the person
identified is of a different race, which may make it more difficult
to identify an individual, whether the accuracy of an eye witness
identification may be affected by the circumstances under which
it was made, how much weight, if any, you should give to the
amount of certainty expressed by a witness given that there may
not be a correlation between the reliability of an eye witness
6
identification and the amount of certainty expressed by the
witness in making that identification. It’s up to you to consider
those issues and evaluate whether those affect any eye witness
identification.
The jury found Mahmoud not guilty of refusing to submit to arrest, but
delivered a verdict of guilty on the charge of assault. The court sentenced
Mahmoud to ninety days’ imprisonment, with all but twenty days suspended,
followed by one year of administrative release and a $300 fine. This appeal
followed.
III. DISCUSSION
[¶10] “We review jury instructions as a whole for prejudicial error, and
to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary
respects of the governing law.” State v. Tucker, 2015 ME 68, ¶ 11,
117 A.3d 595 (quotation marks omitted). “We will vacate a judgment based
on a denied request for a jury instruction if the appellant demonstrates that
the requested instruction (1) stated the law correctly; (2) was generated by
the evidence; (3) was not misleading or confusing;1 and (4) was not
sufficiently covered in the instructions the court gave.” State v. Hanaman,
2012 ME 40, ¶ 16, 38 A.3d 1278. Additionally, a “court’s refusal to give the
requested instruction must have been prejudicial to the requesting party.” Id.
1 The State concedes that the requested jury instruction was not misleading or confusing, and
we do not discuss this issue further.
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A. Whether the Requested Instruction Stated the Law Correctly
[¶11] Pursuant to the first prong of the Hanaman analysis, the first
question is whether Mahmoud’s proposed jury instructions stated the law
correctly. Id. The State contends that Mahmoud’s proposed instructions
stated the law incorrectly because, inter alia, jury instructions on eyewitness
identifications would amount to a departure from precedent.
[¶12] We last considered the propriety of jury instructions on
eyewitness identification in State v. Lavoie, 561 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1989). In
Lavoie, we concluded that jury instructions regarding eyewitness
identification are improper as a matter of law because they have the effect of
“singl[ing] out the testimony of an eyewitness for special scrutiny.” Id. at
1023; see State v. McDonough, 507 A.2d 573, 575-76 (Me. 1986) (concluding
that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s proposed jury
instruction because it singled out testimony for “special scrutiny”).
[¶13] Over the course of the nearly thirty years since our holding in
Lavoie, a significant body of scientific research has emerged concerning the
mechanics of human memory and the reliability of eyewitness identifications
generally.2 These extensive scientific studies have provided new insights into
2 Courts across the country have recently acknowledged and relied on the tremendous growth
in the body of scientific research in this area. See, e.g., State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012)
8
the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, and as a result many state and
federal courts now instruct jurors accordingly.3 In light of these scientific
(“Since 1979 . . . there have been more than 2,000 scientific studies conducted on the reliability of
eyewitness identification.”); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1035 (Haw. 2012) (“Since the first
cases addressing the reliability of eyewitness testimony were decided in the 1970s, a robust body
of research in the area of eyewitness identification has emerged.”); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872,
877 (N.J. 2011) (“In the thirty-four years since the United States Supreme Court announced a test
for the admission of eyewitness identification evidence . . . a vast body of scientific research about
human memory has emerged. That body of work casts doubt on some commonly held views
relating to memory.”); see also State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720 & n.9 (Conn. 2012) (collecting
studies reflecting “a near perfect scientific consensus” that eyewitness identifications are
potentially unreliable); Mass. Supreme Judicial Court Study Grp. on Eyewitness Evidence, Report
and Recommendations to the Justices (2013) (Study Group Report),
[https://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN].
3 In Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012), the United States Supreme Court cited
numerous examples of jury instructions on eyewitness testimony adopted by state and federal
courts:
See Model Crim. Jury Instr. No. 4.15 (CA3 2009); United States v. Holley,
502 F.2d 273, 277-278 (CA4 1974); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. No. 1.29 (CA5 2001);
Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. No. 7.11 (CA6 2011); Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. No. 3.08
(CA7 1999); Model Crim. Jury Instr. for the District Courts No. 4.08 (CA8 2011);
Model Crim. Jury Instr. No. 4.11 (CA9 2010); Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. No. 1.29
(CA10 2011); Pattern Jury Instr. (Crim. Cases) Spec. Instr. No. 3 (CA11 2010);
Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 39 (3d ed. 2008); 1 Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury
Instr. No. 315 (Summer 2011); Conn. Crim. Jury Instr. 2.6-4 (2007); 2 Ga. Suggested
Pattern Jury Instr. (Crim. Cases) No. 1.35.10 (4th ed. 2011); Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.,
Crim., No. 3.15 (Supp. 2011); Pattern Instr., Kan. 3d, Crim., No. 52.20 (2011);
1 Md. Crim. Jury Instr. & Commentary §§ 2.56, 2.57(A), 2.57(B) (3d ed. 2009 and
Supp. 2010); Mass. Crim. Model Jury Instr. No. 9.160 (2009); 10 Minn. Jury Instr.
Guides, Crim., No. 3.19 (Supp. 2006); N. H. Crim. Jury Instr. No. 3.06 (1985);
N. Y. Crim. Jury Instr. “Identification--One Witness” and “Identification--Witness
Plus” (2d ed. 2011); Okla. Uniform Jury Instr., Crim., No. 9-19 (Supp. 2000);
1 Pa. Suggested Standard Crim. Jury Instr. No. 4.07B (2d ed. 2010); Tenn. Pattern
Jury Instr., Crim., No. 42.05 (15th ed. 2011); Utah Model Jury Instr. CR404
(2d ed. 2010); Model Instructions from the Vt. Crim. Jury Instr. Comm. Nos. CR5-601,
CR5-605 (2003); W. Va. Crim. Jury Instr. No. 5.05 (6th ed. 2003).
Id. at 246 n.7. The widespread judicial endorsement of jury instructions on eyewitness reliability
reflects the improved scientific understanding in this field. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes,
22 N.E.3d 897, 900 (Mass. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that there are scientific principles regarding
eyewitness identification that are ‘so generally accepted’ that it is appropriate in the future to
instruct juries regarding these principles so that they may apply the principles in their evaluation of
eyewitness identification evidence.”), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873
9
studies, some courts have expressed a preference for jury instructions rather
than expert testimony addressing the eyewitness identification issue.
For example, in United States v. Jones, the First Circuit concluded that “[t]he
judge was fully entitled to conclude that this general information [pertaining
to eyewitness reliability] could be more reliably and efficiently conveyed by
instructions rather than through dueling experts.” 689 F.3d 12, 20
(1st Cir. 2012).
[¶14] The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, among others, have conducted comprehensive analyses of the
science relating to eyewitness reliability.4 Embedded in this research
(Mass. 2015) (building on Gomes by specifying when evidence warrants a cross-racial identification
instruction); Cabagbag, 277 P.3d at 1038 (“[T]he impetus for a change in our approach lies in the
empirical research that reveals that people generally do not understand all of the factors that affect
the reliability of an eyewitness identification.”); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 878, 910 (concluding that the
then-current “standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence . . . overstate[d] the jury’s
inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony
is accurate,” and stating that studies demonstrate that “laypersons are largely unfamiliar with
scientific findings and often hold beliefs to the contrary” (quotation marks omitted)). The use of
these instructions is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement of such instructions.
See Perry, 565 U.S. at 233 (“When no improper law enforcement activity is involved, we hold, it
suffices to test reliability through . . . jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness
identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
4 In 2009, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to evaluate and analyze the
scientific evidence relating to eyewitness identifications. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877, 884. After
scrutinizing the testimony of seven experts resulting in over 2,000 pages of transcripts, and
reviewing hundreds of scientific studies, the Special Master concluded that “[t]he science
abundantly demonstrates the many vagaries of memory encoding, storage, and retrieval; the
malleability of memory; the contaminating effects of extrinsic information; the influence of police
interview techniques and identification procedures; and the many other factors that bear on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.” Id. at 877, 916 (alteration in original) (quotation marks
omitted). The research presented to the Special Master in Henderson included “more than
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concerning eyewitness reliability is the generally accepted notion that a
witness may have increased difficulty identifying persons of another race.5 In
light of the voluminous body of scientific research that has emerged regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identification, and the subsequent evolving trend
among both state and federal courts to instruct juries on this matter, we
twenty-five meta-analyses,” id. at 893, and was described as “represent[ing] the gold standard in
terms of the applicability of social science research to the law,” id. at 916 (quotation marks
omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court detailed the findings of the Special Master, including a
thorough discussion of the mechanics of human memory and how a host of system and estimator
variables can adversely affect memory. Id. at 892-912. As a result of the Special Master’s findings,
the court revised its framework for evaluating eyewitness testimony by instructing courts to
“develop and use enhanced jury charges.” Id. at 919.
In 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court convened the Supreme Judicial Court Study
Group on Eyewitness Evidence (the Study Group). See Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 900 & n.3;
Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 n.16 (Mass. 2011). The Study Group was tasked
with determining “whether existing model jury instructions provide adequate guidance to juries in
evaluating eyewitness testimony.” See Walker, 953 N.E.2d at 208 n.16. In assessing the state of the
science, the Study Group relied in part on the Report of the Special Master to the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Henderson, see Study Group Report at 15 n.17, and additionally conducted its own
extensive survey of the available scientific research, see Study Group Report at 15-32. In 2013, the
Study Group issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that the Massachusetts jury
instructions on eyewitness identification were inadequate, among other model jury instructions
that were also based on the model jury instructions set forth in United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Study Group Report at 3-4 & n.4, 51-58, 117-146.
5 We have not previously addressed the issue of cross-racial identification. See State v. Kelly,
2000 ME 107, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d 188. The current state of the science strongly suggests that
cross-racial identifications tend to be less accurate than same-race identifications. See, e.g.,
Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d at 880-81 (“The existence of the ‘cross-race effect’ (CRE)—that people are
generally less accurate at identifying members of other races than they are at identifying members
of their own race—has reached a near consensus in the relevant scientific community and has been
recognized by courts and scholars alike. We remain convinced that jurors who are asked to
evaluate the accuracy of an identification should be informed of the CRE.” (footnotes omitted));
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 703 (“Studies also indicate that witnesses are significantly better at identifying
members of their own race than those of other races.”); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 907
(“A meta-analysis . . . involving thirty-nine studies and nearly 5,000 identifications[] confirmed the
[New Jersey Supreme] Court’s prior finding” that a witness may have more difficulty identifying
members of another race).
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conclude that it is permissible, where relevant, to instruct jurors on the
reliability of eyewitness identification.6 We do not, however, conclude that
the use of an eyewitness identification instruction is required in every case
involving an eyewitness identification. For example, the eyewitness
identification instruction would not ordinarily be generated in instances when
the identified person is already known to the witness.
[¶15] Prior to our decision today, the jury instructions in this case, both
as proposed and as given, did not reflect our previous jurisprudence.
However, as the trial court explicitly reasoned, the instructions were
consistent with the evolution of the law regarding eyewitness identification.
Thus, contrary to the State’s contention, the jury instructions that the court
gave are a correct statement of the law as we confirm it today.
B. Whether the Requested Instruction Was Generated by the Evidence
[¶16] Having concluded that jury instructions on eyewitness reliability
are permissible, we next decide whether the requested instruction was
generated by the evidence in this case. Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 16,
38 A.3d 1278. Mahmoud sought an instruction on four distinct issues relating
to eyewitness reliability: (1) suggestive identification circumstances;
6 To the extent that our decision today is in conflict with our previous precedents, this decision
overrules them.
12
(2) cross-racial identification; (3) the stress experienced by the person
making the identification; and (4) the uncertain relationship between witness
confidence and accuracy. The State concedes on appeal that the evidence
generated three of the issues, contesting only whether the evidence presented
at trial provided a basis for an instruction as to suggestive identification
circumstances, which the court declined to give.
[¶17] Mahmoud contends that an instruction was warranted because
he was “paraded” before the victim and the victim’s friend and was the only
suspect shown to them. We note that there was no challenge pursuant to
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), or its progeny7 seeking to exclude
identification evidence at trial, and therefore the scope of our review is
limited to whether a jury instruction on suggestive identification procedures
was raised by the evidence here.
7 In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967), the Court held that a defendant may claim that
“the confrontation conducted . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.” See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
196 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 4 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968). The determination of whether an identification
was “unnecessarily suggestive,” the Court explained, is based on a totality of the circumstances,
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302, and among the factors to be considered are “the opportunity of the witness
to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation,” Biggers, 409 U.S. at
199-200.
13
[¶18] Contrary to Mahmoud’s contention, the evidence presented at
trial did not generate an instruction as to suggestive identification
circumstances. Mahmoud was first identified to the police by the victim
shortly after the police arrived at the scene and before Mahmoud fled into a
nearby apartment building. Although there is no dispute that Mahmoud was
brought near the victim and his friend as officers were escorting him to the
police cruiser, there is no evidence that the officers conducted a show-up
procedure. The only evidence in the record potentially establishing a
suggestive identification practice was a statement by the victim’s friend that
the police had asked her to identify the assailant. The friend’s testimony,
however, conflicted with the officer’s earlier testimony that he had not asked
any witness to identify the suspect. Despite the conflicting testimony, there
was no follow-up questioning or cross-examination relating to the
identification procedure. Additionally, Mahmoud concedes that he did not
attempt to exclude the identifications at any point before or during trial.8 In
8 Even if such a challenge had been made, it is unlikely that the identification would have been
excluded because the accuracy of the identification is supported by indicia of reliability. See
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. The victim had ample time to observe Mahmoud because Mahmoud
acted as a translator between the victim and the car owner for more than five minutes. After the
opportunity to observe his assailant, the victim offered a description of Mahmoud that was
corroborated by his friend’s 9-1-1 call offering the same description, which was further
corroborated by the bystander’s description of Mahmoud to another officer. The victim also
identified Mahmoud prior to any alleged suggestive circumstances, and two officers testified that
the man apprehended inside the building—that is, Mahmoud—was the same man the victim
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this light, we conclude that the evidence did not generate an instruction on
suggestive identification circumstances. See supra n.8.
C. Whether the Requested Instruction Was Sufficiently Covered by the
Instructions Given
[¶19] We turn next to the fourth prong of the Hanaman analysis, which
is whether the jury instructions sought were sufficiently covered by the
instructions actually given. Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, ¶ 16, 38 A.3d 1278.
Mahmoud sought an instruction on four distinct factors relating to eyewitness
identification: (1) suggestive identification circumstances; (2) cross-racial
identification; (3) stress; and (4) the uncertain relationship between witness
confidence and accuracy. Mahmoud does not challenge the sufficiency of the
cross-racial identification instruction, and we have concluded that an
instruction concerning suggestive identification circumstances was not
generated by the evidence. We now address the two remaining factors in
turn.
[¶20] Mahmoud’s requested instructions concerning the effects of
stress on the person making the identification and the minimal correlation
between that person’s confidence in making the identification and its actual
identified before the apprehension. Finally, the victim again identified his assailant immediately
after his apprehension, which took place very shortly after the initial attack.
15
accuracy were covered by the court’s instructions as given. With regard to
stress, Mahmoud proposed the following instruction: “You may consider the
following in evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness identification . . . risks of
identification under stress.” The instruction that the court gave stated that
“you should consider the following in determining the accuracy of any
eye witness identification . . . whether the accuracy of an eye witness
identification may be affected by the circumstances under which it was made.”
Although the court’s instruction did not use the word “stress,” its broad
statement that “an eye witness identification may be affected by the
circumstances under which it was made” encapsulates the concept of stress,
among myriad other factors. At trial, the jury heard extensive testimony
about the significant injury to the victim’s eye shortly before he identified
Mahmoud, and photos were published to the jury depicting the injury. Thus,
the court’s more generalized instruction covered the concept of stress, and the
jury could have readily deduced that stress was among the factors potentially
influencing a witness’s identification of Mahmoud.
[¶21] With regard to accuracy, Mahmoud’s proposed instruction stated
that “[y]ou may consider the following in evaluating the accuracy of an
eyewitness identification . . . at best, weak correlation between the witness’s
16
confidence and accuracy of the identification.” The instruction that the court
gave stated that
you should consider the following in determining the accuracy of
any eye witness identification . . . how much weight, if any, you
should give to the amount of certainty expressed by a witness
given that there may not be a correlation between the reliability
of an eye witness identification and the amount of certainty
expressed by the witness in making that identification.
[¶22] The court’s instruction sufficiently covered the proposed
instruction because, unlike Mahmoud’s proposed “at best, weak correlation”
language, the court’s instruction suggested that there could be no correlation
at all. Because the jury was presented with the possibility that there may be
no correlation between confidence and accuracy, the court’s instruction
sufficiently covered Mahmoud’s proposed instruction.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
17
On the briefs:
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant
Ali M. Mahmoud
Lisa Bogue, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Michael Dumas, Stud. Atty.,
Prosecutorial District III, Auburn, for appellee State of
Maine
At oral argument:
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., for appellant Ali M. Mahmoud
Michael Dumas, Stud. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CR-2014-858
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY