In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐2833
DAWAIN BELL and ALICE SPINKS,
on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 14 C 7382 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 30, 2016
____________________
Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. In September 2012, Chicago Police
Department officers arrested Plaintiff Dawain Bell for posses‐
sion of a controlled substance. At the time, Bell was driving
Plaintiff Alice Spinks’s vehicle. Chicago Police impounded the
vehicle after Bell’s arrest pursuant to Chicago Municipal Code
§ 7‐24‐225, which permits police to impound a vehicle when
2 No. 15‐2833
officers have probable cause to believe it contained a con‐
trolled substance or was used in an illegal drug transaction.
Spinks challenged the impoundment two days later at a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in the City
of Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings. The
ALJ determined that probable cause existed to impound the
vehicle because at the time of impoundment it contained “un‐
lawful drugs” in violation of § 7‐24‐225. Less than a month
later, an ALJ found Spinks liable for violating § 7‐24‐225 and
ordered that she pay the prescribed penalty of $2,000 plus
$180 in storage and towing fees.1 There is no evidence that
Spinks challenged the ALJ’s determination in Cook County
Circuit Court, which she had the right to do.
Spinks and Bell (“Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit against De‐
fendant City of Chicago (“City”) in Cook County Circuit
Court in 2014, alleging, amongst other theories, that the City’s
impoundment‐related ordinances violated Illinois law and
were facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The City removed the action to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based on Plaintiffs’ allegations
that the impoundment ordinance violated the Fourth Amend‐
ment. The City then moved to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. After allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, the
district court deemed the City’s previously filed motion to dis‐
miss applied to the amended complaint and granted the mo‐
tion. In doing so, the district court only dismissed Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice and remanded
1 Bell was later convicted in Cook County Circuit Court for possession of
cocaine and received a sentence of 18 months’ probation.
No. 15‐2833 3
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims to state court. This ap‐
peal followed.
I. ANALYSIS
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2014). In eval‐
uating a complaint’s sufficiency, “we construe it in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept well‐pleaded
facts as true, and draw all inferences in [the party’s] favor.”
Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir.
2010). While a plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual alle‐
gations” to survive a motion to dismiss, she still must provide
more than mere “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recita‐
tion of the elements of a cause of action” for her complaint to
be considered adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐
dure 8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quo‐
tation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs’ two principal arguments are that the City’s im‐
poundment‐related ordinances (“Ordinances”) are facially in‐
valid under the Fourth Amendment because the Ordinances:
(1) permit warrantless seizure of vehicles in all instances and
(2) allow for a non‐judicial officer—a City ALJ—to determine
whether probable cause exists to allow the vehicle to remain
seized. Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments are frivolous and do
not warrant further discussion.
There is no categorical bar to mounting a facial challenge
under the Fourth Amendment, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135
S. Ct. 2443, 2449 (2015), but, in doing so, Plaintiffs assume a
demanding burden—“establish[ing] that a ‘law is unconstitu‐
tional in all of its applications,’” id. at 2451 (quoting Wash.
4 No. 15‐2833
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
(2008)). Although “such challenges are the most difficult ... to
mount successfully,” the Supreme Court has recently clarified
that the proper inquiry under this “exacting standard” should
be “only [on] applications of the statute in which it actually
authorizes or prohibits conduct.” Id. at 2449, 2451 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A. Warrantless Seizure of Vehicles
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, for
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable … seizures ….”2 (em‐
phasis added). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]
‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property” caused by a government actor. United States v. Ja‐
cobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In evaluating such a challenge,
we must determine whether the “seizure” of property was
“unreasonable,” a determination that requires a “balancing of
governmental and private interests.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 341 (1985). Generally, “seizures of personal property
are unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend‐
ment, without more, unless … accomplished pursuant to a ju‐
dicial warrant.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)
(alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
But because “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard un‐
der the Fourth Amendment,” Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S.
2 Like several other amendments, the Fourth Amendment has been made
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1963).
No. 15‐2833 5
56, 71 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), there are ex‐
ceptions that allow for warrantless seizures, see McArthur, 531
U.S. at 330–31.
Plaintiffs argue that the City’s Ordinances—§§ 2‐14‐101
(Seized/unclaimed property), 2‐14‐132 (Impoundment), and
2‐14‐135 (Impoundment—Towing and storage fee hearing)—
are facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the
Ordinances allow for warrantless seizures of vehicles in all
cases. Because Plaintiffs have mounted a facial challenge, “the
proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is [seizures] that the
law actually authorizes, not those for which it is irrelevant.”
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2451. Under this demanding standard,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Ordinances are unconsti‐
tutional in all the seizures that the Ordinances “actually au‐
thorize[].” Id. Stated differently, Plaintiffs must show the Or‐
dinances’ “actual applications” are unconstitutional. Id. We
need not proceed very far in our inquiry, however, to deter‐
mine that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge fails, as the Ordinances’
“actual application[]” in their case does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Section 2‐14‐132 is the general provision that allows a po‐
lice officer or authorized City agent to impound a vehicle in‐
volved in a “status‐related offense” and a “use‐related of‐
fense.” A “status‐related offense” is an offense related to a vi‐
olation of a registration‐related ordinance whereas a “use‐re‐
lated offense” is one where the vehicle is used in an illegal
manner or in connection with an illegal act, such as possession
of illegal drugs in a vehicle, drag racing, or solicitation of a
prostitute. Regardless of the type of substantive offense, the
Ordinances require that the officer or authorized City agent
have probable cause to believe that an enumerated ordinance
6 No. 15‐2833
violation has occurred before the vehicle can be seized and
impounded. 3
One such enumerated violation, incorporated by reference
into § 2‐14‐132, is Chicago Municipal Code § 7‐24‐225, which
is the provision used by police to seize and impound Spinks’s
vehicle. This “use‐related offense” provision states in relevant
part that “[w]henever a police officer has probable cause to be‐
lieve that a vehicle is subject to seizure and impoundment
pursuant to this section, the police officer shall provide for the
towing of the vehicle to a facility controlled by the city or its
agent.” § 7‐24‐225(b) (emphasis added). Vehicles are only
“subject to seizure and impoundment” under § 7‐24‐225 if the
vehicle “contains any controlled substance or cannabis” or “is
used in the purchase, attempt to purchase, sale or attempt to
sell such controlled substances or cannabis.” Under this pro‐
vision then, the officer seizing the vehicle without a warrant
must have probable cause to believe it has illegal drugs in it or
has been used in an illegal drug transaction.
We can divine no difference between the warrantless sei‐
zures authorized by § 7‐24‐225 and those permitted by the Su‐
preme Court in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) and in
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), as well
as in our decision in United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th
Cir. 1990). In White, the Supreme Court held a police officer
3 There are two authorizations for impoundment that do not explicitly in‐
corporate the requirement that a police officer have probable cause to sus‐
pect a violation before seizure. See Chicago Mun. Code §§ 9‐12‐090, 9‐92‐
035. Those sections, however, provide for impoundment of a vehicle in‐
volved in drag racing, § 9‐12‐090, or whose driver fled from a police officer
and could not be apprehended at the time of flight and is inapplicable to
Plaintiffs’ case, § 9‐92‐035.
No. 15‐2833 7
did not need a warrant to seize a vehicle for possible forfeiture
when the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle it‐
self was contraband, which, under Florida law, meant that the
vehicle had been used in connection with an illegal drug of‐
fense. The Supreme Court expressly rejected an argument
similar to Plaintiffs’, namely that there is some difference “be‐
tween permitting the immediate search of a movable automo‐
bile based on actual knowledge that it then contains contra‐
band [and] the discretionary seizure of a citizen’s automobile
based upon a belief that it may have been used at some time
in the past to assist in illegal activity.” White, 526 U.S. at 564
(alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
In G.M. Leasing, the Supreme Court held that Internal Rev‐
enue Service agents could seize a vehicle without a warrant if
they had probable cause to believe the vehicle was subject to
seizure and the seizure occurred “on public streets, parking
lots, or other open places.” 429 U.S. at 351–52. Similarly, in
Pace, after we determined that an Illinois forfeiture statute
permitted warrantless seizures of vehicles, we joined several
other circuits in holding that under the Fourth Amendment,
police “may seize a car without a warrant pursuant to a for‐
feiture statute if they have probable cause to believe that the
car is subject to forfeiture.” Pace, 898 F.2d at 1218. There, the
Illinois forfeiture statute was remarkably similar to § 7‐24‐225
in that it permitted police to seize a vehicle if police had prob‐
able cause to believe the vehicle had been used in connection
with or facilitated illegal drug activity.
Taken together, we read these three opinions as permitting
the type of warrantless seizures authorized by § 7‐24‐225, the
ordinance used to seize Spinks’s vehicle. In other words, these
8 No. 15‐2833
three opinions when read together find that an ordinance au‐
thorizing a warrantless seizure is not “unreasonable” under
the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable
cause to believe that a vehicle is subject to seizure because it
was used in some violation of law, here for having illegal
drugs in it.
Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent White and G.M. Leasing by
arguing that even if those cases authorize the seizure in their
case, the City’s Ordinances authorize impoundment for a va‐
riety of other ordinance violations. True. But in making a fa‐
cial challenge, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular
law is unconstitutional in all its actual applications, including
its application to them. Plaintiffs make no real effort to do so,
other than arguing that the law at issue in White was a forfei‐
ture statute, not an impoundment ordinance. That fact is a
distinction without a difference. The fact that the statute at is‐
sue in White was called a forfeiture statute does not change
that the Supreme Court deemed constitutional the warrant‐
less seizure of a vehicle supported by probable cause to be‐
lieve that the vehicle was used in a violation of the law.
Plaintiffs also read Patel as standing for the proposition
that a law that permits warrantless seizures in all instances is
facially unconstitutional. Patel does not stand for such a prop‐
osition. It was not a seismic shift in Fourth Amendment juris‐
prudence that wiped away the exceptions to the warrant re‐
quirement created by White, G.M. Leasing, and those cases’
progeny. Rather, Patel considered whether a municipal ordi‐
nance allowing for searches of hotel registries without a war‐
rant violated the Fourth Amendment. The ordinance at issue
there, unlike the ordinance at issue in our case, allowed the
search to occur without probable cause. That is why the Court
No. 15‐2833 9
evaluated whether the ordinance was permitted under the
“administrative search exception to the warrant requirement”
and determined it did not. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2452. Patel did
not, however, call into question the constitutionality of the
City’s Ordinances or similar forfeiture statutes, which only al‐
low for seizure of a vehicle after the officer or state actor de‐
veloped probable cause of a violation of the law.
B. Post‐Seizure Procedures
Plaintiffs argue the post‐seizure procedures provided by
the City’s Ordinances facially violate the Fourth Amendment
because the Ordinances fail to provide a neutral officer from
the judicial branch to determine whether probable cause ex‐
ists to continue possessing the vehicle after it is seized.
There is a fundamental flaw with Plaintiffs’ argument
though. Plaintiffs cannot explain how their challenge to the
post‐seizure procedure process implicates the Fourth Amend‐
ment, as the seizure in Plaintiffs’ case and all others under the
Ordinances is complete when the officer or agent seizes and
impounds the vehicle. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466
(7th Cir. 2003). As we explained in Lee, “[o]nce an individual
has been meaningfully dispossessed, the seizure of the prop‐
erty is complete, and once justified by probable cause, that
seizure is reasonable. The amendment then cannot be invoked
by the dispossessed owner to regain his property. Therefore,
[the plaintiff’s] car was seized when it was impounded.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint is with the individual and the
process for reviewing whether the police or City agent had suf‐
ficient probable cause to initially seize the vehicle. Their com‐
plaint is that this reviewing individual is: (1) not a judicial of‐
10 No. 15‐2833
ficer and (2) cannot be unbiased in reviewing whether the po‐
lice officer or City agent had probable cause in the first in‐
stance to seize the vehicle. In other words, they challenge the
procedures allowing for the City’s continued possession of a
vehicle, not the initial seizure of the vehicle.
Plaintiffs are not without a remedy, however, as the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be used to
challenge post‐seizure procedures and the City’s continued
retention of Spinks’s vehicle. See United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) (holding that the gov‐
ernment’s continued retention of property after seizure must
comply with the Due Process Clause); Towers v. City of Chicago,
173 F.3d 619, 626–29 (7th Cir. 2009) (evaluating a substantive
and procedural due process challenge to same use‐related or‐
dinance used to impound Spinks’s vehicle).
Despite the availability of this challenge, Plaintiffs have
made the conscious decision not to pursue a substantive or
procedural due process challenge. Indeed, Plaintiffs have as‐
serted that “[t]o suggest that these Plaintiffs should have at‐
tacked this Fourth Amendment defect on due process
grounds is absurd.” (Appellant Br. 13.) Color us absurd then,
but such a clear statement amounts to a waiver of any due
process argument on appeal. Hojnacki v. Klein‐Acosta, 285 F.3d
544, 549 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A party waives any argument that it
does not raise before the district court or, if raised in the dis‐
trict court, it fails to develop on appeal.”).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.