Case: 15-15726 Date Filed: 08/31/2016 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15726
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00386-CM
JAY RANCEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(August 31, 2016)
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jay Rancel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Social Security Administration (SSA)’s denial of his application for disability
insurance benefits (DIB). Rancel argues that, contrary to the determination of the
administrative law judge (ALJ), he qualified for DIB between May 31, 2005, and
September 30, 2006. After review, we affirm. 1
The ALJ determined that Rancel was ineligible for DIB because he failed to
demonstrate disability on or before September 30, 2006, the last date for which he
was insured. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A]
claimant is eligible for [DIB] where she demonstrates disability on or before the
last date for which she were insured.”). Substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that Rancel failed to meet his burden in this respect. See Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We review the
[ALJ’s] decision to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence and based
on proper legal standards.”); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (explaining that the claimant
bears the burden of establishing a qualifying disability). Although medical records
show a diagnosis of schizophrenia as of July 2008, there are no records showing a
medical diagnosis—or even any medical evaluations—for schizophrenia or any
another potentially qualifying disability prior to that date. The only relevant
records for purposes of the DIB determination were school records dating prior to
1
Because we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our
decision.
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the alleged onset date of Rancel’s disability. Although the school records indicate
emotional and behavioral problems from a young age, they are insufficient to
establish that Rancel had a severe and medically determinable impairment. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (“[A]n individual shall be considered to be
disabled . . . if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a) (“[An] impairment must result from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”). Nor is
Rancel’s own description of his mental state during the relevant time period
sufficient to establish an impairment. See id. § 404.1528(a) ( explaining that
“[s]ymptoms . . . alone are not enough to establish that there is a physical or mental
impairment.).
The ALJ applied the proper legal standards in reaching her determination
that Rancel is ineligible for DIB. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158. She engaged in
the appropriate five-step analysis and concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to find that Rancel had a medically determinable impairment. See
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (the SSA
applies a five-step evaluation analyzing, inter alia, whether the claimant has a
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severe and medically determinable physical or mental impairment); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (explaining that a person who does not have a severe
impairment, or who can make an adjustment to other work, is not disabled.). And
she appropriately evaluated the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings pertinent
to the determination of whether Rancel had a medically determinable mental
impairment on or before September 30, 2006. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(a)-(b),
404.1528. Thus, the ALJ applied proper legal standards, and substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that Rancel did not show he was disabled during
the relevant time frame. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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