IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1024
Filed August 31, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF J.W.G., J.M.G.,
J.J.G., and J.S.G.,
Minor children,
A.R., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Julie A.
Schumacher, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four
children. AFFIRMED.
Judith Garnos Huitink (until withdrawal), Sioux City, Matthew R. Metzgar
(until withdrawal), Sioux City, and Zachary S. Hindman of Mayne, Arneson, Hisey
& Daane, Sioux City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Marchelle M. Denker of the Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four
children, born in 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2012. She contends: (I) “clear and
convincing evidence” does not support “termination under Iowa Code [section]
232.116 [(2015)],” (II) “reasonable efforts were [not] made on [her] behalf,” (III)
termination was not in the children’s best interests, (IV) “the [district court]
violated [her] due process rights,” and (V) “the rules of evidence . . . were
violated.”
I. The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the children
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (requiring proof of several
elements including proof the children cannot be returned to the parent’s custody)
and (i) (requiring proof of several elements involving abuse or neglect). The
mother does not identify which ground she is challenging. This omission could
be construed as a waiver of her argument. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d
864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur review is confined to those propositions relied upon
by the appellant for reversal on appeal.”). Nonetheless, we proceed to the
merits. We may affirm if we find clear and convincing evidence to support any of
the grounds cited by the district court. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1999). On our de novo review, we are persuaded termination is warranted
under subsections (f) and (h).
The district court adjudicated the children in need of assistance in January
2014, based on the father’s severe and long-term domestic abuse of the mother,
resulting in imminent neglect of the children and a failure to supervise them. The
3
court allowed the children to remain with their mother under the protective
supervision of the department of human services.
Five months later, the court ordered the children removed from the
mother’s custody based on allegations that the father remained in the home and
both parents dealt drugs from the home. The district court confirmed these
findings, as well as the mother’s use of drugs and alcohol, following a hearing.
The court also issued a no-contact order prohibiting interaction between the
mother and father.
The mother cooperated with reunification services and actively
participated in visits with the children. As a result, the department allowed her to
take the older two children to and from school and have overnight visits in her
home at least two weekends per month. In time, the department placed the
children on an extended home visit and, shortly thereafter, the court ordered
them returned to the mother’s home.
The reunification was short-lived. Within two months, the district court
removed the children again and ordered them placed in foster care based on the
mother’s arrest for driving offenses that appeared to have compromised the
safety of one of the children and a subsequent arrest on an out-of-state felony
warrant. The State moved to modify the disposition. Following a hearing at
which the mother admitted consuming alcohol to the point of intoxication on the
date of the driving incident1 and admitted to ongoing contact with the father, the
district court granted the State’s motion. The children remained out of the
mother’s care for approximately eleven months.
1
She also tested positive for marijuana.
4
Meanwhile, the mother entered an inpatient substance-abuse treatment
facility, where she participated in therapy and programming for several months.
A month before the termination hearing, the mother relapsed. She was
discharged from the facility for consuming alcohol and being dishonest about it.
According to a professional, her ongoing relapse potential was high, given the
absence of a “sober” support system.
We conclude the children could not be returned to the mother’s custody.
The department became involved with the family more than two years before the
termination hearing, supported leaving the children with the mother, and
supported reunification with her after the first removal. The mother squandered
these opportunities to remain with her children. After the second removal, the
mother commendably began treatment but relapsed at a crucial time in the
proceedings. We affirm the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h).
II. The mother contends the department failed to make reasonable
reunification efforts. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The
record summarized above belies this assertion. As the district court found,
[T]he mother has been provided with a myriad of services since the
inception of this case. The fact that they are not necessarily the
services the mother believes are appropriate does not equate to a
lack of reasonable efforts. Point in fact, during the last five months
of the case, the mother was provided an intense level of services in
being placed at Women’s and Children’s center, receiving
substance abuse treatment, mental health therapy, and therapy
regarding co-dependency and gambling addiction. Despite the
same, [the mother] has been unable to maintain sobriety and has
been unable to address the issues which brought the children to the
attention of the Court.
We fully concur in this assessment.
5
III. The mother argues termination was not in the children’s best interests.
See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). While there is no question the
mother loved her children, she was not in a position to keep them safe. The
oldest child understood this. Her therapist testified the child had a “[v]ery
negative” reaction to the prospect of joining her mother at the inpatient facility, let
alone permanent reunification, and a “very negative” reaction to joint therapy
sessions with her mother. The therapist also noted that “[t]he children were very
resistant at times for visitations and were not having a good outcome after some
of them.” Given the plethora of services afforded the mother over a two-and-a-
half-year period and the failed reunification attempt, we conclude the children’s
best interests were served by termination of the mother’s parental rights.
IV. The mother contends her due process rights were violated. She
premises her argument on the district court’s claimed failure to “set down for
hearing” and “rule on” her motions for inpatient treatment and participation in
family treatment court. See In re S.R., 548 N.W.2d 176, 177-78 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982)) (requiring
State to provide parents with “fundamentally fair procedures” when it petitions to
terminate parental rights). In fact, the court addressed these issues following the
modification hearing. First, the court found inpatient treatment was
recommended, and the court “order[ed] . . . the same.” Second, the court noted
the mother’s request to participate in family treatment court and stated she would
have “to initiate a request . . . through the Family Treatment Coordinator.” The
court explained, “Acceptance into that program would be determined by the
6
Family Treatment Court Judge.” That judge sent a letter stating, “I do not believe
that the best interests of these children would be served by their mother’s
involvement in the Woodbury County Family Treatment Court program.”
The district court went to great lengths to accommodate the mother’s right
to a hearing and presentation of evidence. The court scheduled four days for the
termination hearing,2 allowed the mother to cross-examine the State’s witnesses
extensively, and permitted her to call multiple witnesses of her own. Due
process was served.
V. The mother contends the district court violated the rules of evidence by
disallowing “rebuttal witnesses.” As the district court explained, the witnesses
she listed were not rebuttal witnesses because neither the State nor the
children’s guardian ad litem called additional witnesses following the mother’s
presentation of evidence. The mother characterized the individuals as “rebuttal”
witnesses to circumvent her failure to designate them on her witness lists. The
district court disallowed this end-run around the witness-designation deadline.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the ruling. In re J.M., No. 00-1122, 2001
WL 194993, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001) (stating court did not abuse its
broad discretion in allowing rebuttal testimony).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to her four
children.
AFFIRMED.
2
The district court afforded the parties significant leeway in presenting their cases, as
reflected in the 1114-page termination transcript.