Case: 15-11364 Date Filed: 09/09/2016 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11364
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03155-WSD
WILLIAM JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF GEORGIA,
and Certain Agents for Such,
CITY OF KENNESAW,
and certain agents for such,
CITY OF HIRAM,
and certain agents for such,
CITY OF NEWNAN,
and certain agents for such,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 9, 2016)
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Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff William Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his claims against the City of Kennesaw, the City of Hiram, and the
City of Newnan, Georgia (collectively, “City Defendants”), in Plaintiff’s civil
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). No reversible error has been shown;
we affirm. 1
Plaintiff filed a 135-page complaint against the State of Georgia and the City
Defendants, purporting to allege violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights and common
law tort claims arising from Plaintiff’s three arrests and the resulting revocation of
Plaintiff’s probation. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against
Georgia as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2 The district court also
granted the City Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement -- ordering
1
Plaintiff has filed a petition for an initial hearing en banc, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35. No Judge in regular active service on this Court has requested that the Court be
polled about en banc consideration. Plaintiff’s petition for hearing en banc is DENIED.
2
On appeal, Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his claims against
Georgia on sovereign immunity grounds; that claim is abandoned. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, because the district court dismissed properly
Plaintiff’s claims against Georgia as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, we will not consider
Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal about Georgia’s alleged due process violations. For background,
see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
2
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Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, setting forth “in a short and plain manner,
the facts showing he is entitled to relief against City Defendants.”
Although untimely, Plaintiff ultimately filed a 73-page first amended
complaint; it was similar in form and in content to Plaintiff’s initial complaint.
The City Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint as an
impermissible shotgun pleading.
By a thorough written opinion, the district court dismissed with prejudice
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The district court described Plaintiff’s first
amended complaint, which consisted of “long, rambling” paragraphs, as a “classic
shotgun pleading.” The district court concluded that dismissal was warranted
because Plaintiff had been given ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his
original complaint and still failed to comply with federal pleading requirements.3
The district court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. The
court concluded that, to the extent Plaintiff sought release from the Spalding
County Jail, Plaintiff was required to file a petition for habeas relief. And, to the
extent Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Spalding County Trial
Court to hold a bail hearing or to otherwise grant Plaintiff unrestricted access to the
3
Although Plaintiff filed a 105-page “More Definitive Statement of Plaintiff’s Complaint,”
which the district court construed as a second amended complaint, the district court refused to
consider it because Plaintiff failed to obtain the court’s permission to file a second amended
complaint. The district court noted also that Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint
constituted another shotgun pleading and, thus -- had Plaintiff sought leave to amend -- the
district court would have denied Plaintiff’s request as futile.
3
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courts and to his legal files, the district court lacked authority to issue a writ of
mandamus against non-federal actors.
We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a complaint with
prejudice, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605
F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we construe liberally pro se
pleadings, pro se litigants must still conform to procedural rules. Albra v. Advan,
Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
To comply with federal pleading standards, Plaintiff is required to, among
other things, provide “a short and plain statement” of his claims showing that he is
entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff is also required to present
each of his claims in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited
as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
A complaint that fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 may be classified as a
“shotgun pleading.” See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1129-30 (11th Cir.
2001). When faced with a shotgun pleading, a district court must order a litigant to
replead for a more definite statement of the claim. Id. at 1133. When the amended
complaint still fails to cure the deficiency, the complaint may be subject to
dismissal. See id.
4
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As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff raises arguments about his federal
and state habeas proceedings or about his child custody proceedings, those issues
were not part of the underlying complaint and, thus, are outside the scope of this
appeal. 4 In addition, because Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed as a shotgun
pleading, we consider only whether Plaintiff’s first amended complaint satisfied
the federal pleading requirements. Thus, we will not consider Plaintiff’s
substantive arguments about the constitutionality of his arrests, the force used
during his arrests, his guilty plea, or the revocation of his probation.
Here, the district court described Plaintiff’s initial complaint as “rambling
and unfocused” and “composed mainly of conclusory statements.” The district
court was correct to grant the City Defendants’ unopposed motion for a more
definite statement and to order Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. See id.
Despite the court’s instructions, however, Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint still failed to provide a “short and plain statement” of his claims
showing that Plaintiff was entitled to relief.
Instead, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (like Plaintiff’s original
complaint) was composed of long, rambling paragraphs and conclusory statements
unsupported by factual allegations. Given that each count of Plaintiff’s first
4
On appeal, Plaintiff raises no challenge to the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motions to
amend his complaint to add new claims against new defendants in connection with Plaintiff’s
child custody proceedings.
5
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amended complaint incorporated by reference the allegations of the proceeding
counts, the district court characterized it accurately as a “classic shotgun pleading.”
See Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293,
1295 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts,
each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a
situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual
allegations and legal conclusions.”). In the light of Plaintiff’s continued failure to
comply with federal pleading requirements, the district court committed no error in
dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
The district court also committed no error in denying Plaintiff’s motion for
injunctive relief. The district court concluded correctly that it lacked jurisdiction to
issue a writ of mandamus to direct the Spalding County Trial Court in the
performance of the state court’s duties. See, e.g., Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County
Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the
general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial
officers in the performance of their duties.”). And, to the extent Plaintiff sought
release from the Spalding County Jail, the district court concluded properly that
Plaintiff’s “sole federal remedy [was] a writ of habeas corpus.” See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1973).
AFFIRMED.
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