IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0670
Filed September 14, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MYRON D. HANSON IV,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jeffrey L.
Harris, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction claiming his motion to suppress
evidence was wrongly denied. AFFIRMED.
John Mossman of Mossman & Mossman, L.L.P., Vinton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Myron Hanson appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated,
asserting the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.
Hanson claims there was no basis to stop his vehicle, thereby violating his right
to be free from illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. We
conclude reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop of Hanson’s vehicle.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Hanson’s motion to suppress.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
While on patrol just after midnight on February 23, 2014, La Porte City
Police Department Officer Jordan Ehlers received a phone call from an
unidentified caller. The caller told the officer that an older model Chevrolet
pickup truck appeared to be all over the road on Highway 218 near Miller Creek
Road, just outside La Porte City. Within about one minute, Officer Ehlers located
an older model Chevrolet pickup truck traveling on Highway 218.
Officer Ehlers followed the truck as it traveled on Highway 218 and
observed the truck touch the center line twice but not cross it. Officer Ehlers then
observed the truck take a wide right turn, which entered the oncoming lane of
traffic, onto West Main Street. The truck entered downtown La Porte City and
swayed into the oncoming lane of traffic. Officer Ehlers initiated a traffic stop.
Officer Ehlers then approached the truck, asked the driver for his driver’s
license, and identified the driver as Hanson. The officer noted Hanson had
blood-shot, watery eyes and slow, slurred speech. Officer Ehlers also detected
the odor of alcohol. Hanson acknowledged he had been drinking earlier in the
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evening. The officer administered several field sobriety tests, including a
preliminary breath test, which showed Hanson’s blood alcohol concentration
exceeded the legal limit. Officer Ehlers then placed Hanson under arrest.
On March 20, 2014, Hanson was charged with operating while intoxicated,
first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2013). On July 24, 2014,
Hanson filed a motion to suppress, which claimed Officer Ehlers lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop Hanson’s vehicle and therefore, the stop was illegal
and the subsequently obtained evidence must be suppressed. After a hearing on
the issue, the district court denied Hanson’s motion on the merits and also found
the motion to be untimely. On January 23, 2015, the district court found Hanson
guilty in a stipulated trial on the minutes of evidence. Hanson appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review motions to suppress based on federal and state constitutional
grounds de novo. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007). “This review
requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown
by the entire record.’” Id. (quoting State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa
2001)). Although we give deference to the factual findings of the district court,
we are not necessarily bound by those findings. Id.
III. Motion to Suppress
A. Reasonable Suspicion
Hanson argues the district court erred in determining Officer Ehlers had
reasonable suspicion to stop his truck. Hanson claims the deviations in his
driving were due to the potholes on the route he was traveling. The State asserts
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Hanson’s driving deviations, along with the anonymous tip Officer Ehlers
received, provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of Hanson’s truck.
“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures
by the government.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2013). Claims
under the Iowa Constitution may be evaluated independently from federal claims.
Id. However, typically, we “apply the general standards as outlined by the United
States Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge under the
Iowa Constitution.”1 Id. at 291–92.
Generally, law enforcement must have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation occurred in order to stop a vehicle. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d
767, 774 (Iowa 2011). Yet, if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion to
believe criminal activity is occurring, a stop is justified even without probable
cause. Id. Reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred must be
based on “specific and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational
inferences.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004). Whether
reasonable suspicion existed is determined based on the totality of the
circumstances and information facing law enforcement at the time of the stop. Id.
We believe Officer Ehlers articulated sufficient specific facts and rational
inferences to demonstrate reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
occurring. Officer Ehlers received an anonymous tip that identified the make,
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See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 291–92 (“Where a party raises both state and federal
constitutional claims but does not argue that a standard independent of the federal
approach should be employed under the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the
substantive federal standards but reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion
different from federal precedent.”).
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type, and relative age of the vehicle; described behavior consistent with possible
traffic violations; and provided information based on personal observations. See
State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208–09 (Iowa 2013). The tipster also
provided the location of the vehicle. Officer Ehlers used both the description of
the vehicle and the location provided by the tipster to identify Hanson’s truck.
Officer Ehlers then observed Hanson make several irregular driving motions,
including touching the center line, crossing into the oncoming lane of traffic while
making a turn, and swaying into the opposite lane of traffic. Officer Ehlers’s
observations are supported by the video recording from his patrol car. While one
rational inference could have been that these movements were related to the
potholes in the road, it was also rational to infer, based on the tip and Officer
Ehlers’s observations, that the driver may be impaired. Based on the totality of
the circumstances and information facing Officer Ehlers at the time of the stop,
we conclude reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring existed
and the stop was valid under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8.
See Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204.
B. Timeliness of Hanson’s Motion
In addition, we also agree with the district court’s conclusion the motion
was untimely and the reasons given by defense counsel were inadequate to
have the court find the untimeliness to be “for good cause shown.” See Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.11(3).
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IV. Conclusion
As we conclude the State had reasonable suspicion to stop Hanson’s
vehicle, we affirm the district court’s ruling and Hanson’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.