UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4710
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRACY ALAN MCDONALD, a/k/a T-Mac,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00053-CCE-5)
Submitted: September 9, 2016 Decided: September 16, 2016
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, P.C., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Clifton T. Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Lauren D.
Emery, Third Year Law Student, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The district court sentenced Tracy Alan McDonald to 59
months’ imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to
possess pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).
McDonald argues on appeal that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court should have imposed a
probationary sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because McDonald does not
assert on appeal any procedural sentencing error, we review only
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances,” id. at 51, and
considering “whether the sentencing court abused its discretion
in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)],” United States v.
Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). “An appellate court owes ‘due deference’ to a
district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors, and mere
disagreement with the sentence below is ‘insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.’” United States v. Howard, 773
F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51);
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see id. at 529 n.8; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52. “Any
sentence that is within or below a properly calculated
[Sentencing] Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
After reviewing the district court’s thorough explanation
of McDonald’s sentence, we conclude that it did not abuse its
discretion in declining to impose a probationary sentence. The
district court rejected McDonald’s characterization of the
offense conduct and seriousness of the offense, noting the
danger in which McDonald placed the public through his
manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A). The district court considered McDonald’s
prior criminal history but noted that it was appropriately
reflected in the calculation of his Guidelines range. See id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (4)(A). Moreover, the district court recognized
that it had the discretion to impose, and did impose, a below-
Guidelines sentence. See id. § 3553(a)(3).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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