UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2472
ROXANNE R. JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District
Judge. (1:15-cv-00871-AJT-MSN)
Submitted: September 8, 2016 Decided: September 26, 2016
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher E. Brown, THE BROWN FIRM PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellant. Jonathan S. Hubbard, Sarah Warren Smith, TROUTMAN
SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Jason E. Manning, TROUTMAN
SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roxanne R. Jackson appeals the district court’s order
granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss her amended complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have reviewed the record and the
parties’ briefs on appeal, and we find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
In reviewing the dismissal, we “may consider additional documents
attached to the complaint or the motion to dismiss so long as they
are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Id. at 212 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Bare
legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth and
are insufficient to state a claim.” King, 825 F.3d at 214
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Jackson seeks to retain possession of real property in
Virginia after she defaulted on her mortgage loan and the property
was sold at a foreclosure sale to Appellee. Appellee was not the
original lender on Jackson’s deed of trust, but prior to her
default, an assignment of mortgage was executed and recorded that
2
assigned the lender’s rights in the deed of trust to Appellee.
After Jackson defaulted on her loan, Appellee appointed substitute
trustees, and the property was sold.
In this action, Jackson seeks to challenge the assignment to
Appellee. However, under Virginia law, only a party or intended
beneficiary of a contract or instrument has standing to sue on the
contract or instrument. See Va. Code Ann. § 55-22; Kelley v.
Griffin, 471 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Va. 1996); see also Buzbee v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 84 Va. Cir. 485 (2012) (holding borrowers lacked
standing to challenge assignment of deed of trust). Because
Jackson does not allege that she was a party or intended
beneficiary of the assignment, we conclude that she lacks standing
to challenge the assignment in this case.
Notwithstanding Virginia precedent, Jackson argues that we
should apply the rule announced by the California Supreme Court in
Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 365 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2016),
that when a challenged assignment is void as opposed to merely
voidable, the borrower does not lack standing to sue for wrongful
foreclosure. However, even if we were inclined to apply another
state’s rule, we conclude that Jackson fails to allege facts
showing a “void” assignment.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
3
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4