in Re: Michael Gibb

ACCEPTED
05-15-00088-CV
05-15-00088-CV FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
1/22/2015 12:29:22 PM
LISA MATZ
CLERK

NO. ___________________
_______________________________________________________
FILED IN
5th COURT OF APPEALS
In the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of DALLAS, TEXAS
Texas at Dallas 1/22/2015 12:29:22 PM
_____________________________________________ LISA MATZ
Clerk

IN RE MICHAEL GIBB,

Relator.
___________________________________________

Original Proceeding for Writ of Mandamus to the
366th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas
Cause No. 366-55837-2009
_______________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
_______________________________________________________

Charles “Chad” Baruch
THE LAW OFFICE OF CHAD BARUCH
Texas Bar No. 01864300
3201 Main Street
Rowlett, Texas 75088
Telephone: (972) 412-7192
Facsimile: (972) 412-4028
Email: baruchesq@aol.com

Counsel for Relator
 Identity of Parties and Counsel

Relator Michael Gibb

Appellate Counsel Trial Counsel
Charles “Chad” Baruch Howard Shapiro
Texas Bar No. 01864300 Texas Bar No. 18110800
THE LAW OFFICE OF CHAD BARUCH THE SHAPIRO LAW FIRM
3201 Main Street P.O. Box 861720
Rowlett, Texas 75088 Plano, Texas 75086

Real Party in Interest Emily Stephens

Charles C. Philips
Texas Bar No. 00784760
PHILIPS & EPPERSON, LP
2301 Virginia Parkway
McKinney, Texas 75071

Respondent The Honorable Raymond G. Wheless
Judge, 366th Judicial District Court (Collin County)
2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 30146
McKinney, Texas 75071

i
 Table of Contents

Identity of Parties and Counsel..................................................................................i

Table of Contents .....................................................................................................ii

Index of Authorities................................................................................................. iv

Statement of the Case............................................................................................... 1

Statement of Jurisdiction .......................................................................................... 1

Issues Presented ....................................................................................................... 1

1. Is mandamus relief warranted by the trial court’s abuse of discretion in
signing temporary orders―
• without any pleading requesting them,
• without any notice they were being considered,
• without any supporting evidence,
• under a habeas corpus provision inapplicable to this SAPCR
enforcement proceeding, and
• where they impermissibly modify a final judgment?

Statement of Facts ....................................................................................................2

Argument .................................................................................................................8

1. The trial court abused its discretion in entering temporary orders
without any supporting pleading, notice, or opportunity for an
adversary hearing. .....................................................................................8

2. The trial court abused its discretion in entering the Order under a
provision limited to habeas corpus proceedings. ..................................... 10

3. The trial court abused its discretion in signing the order without
any supporting evidence. ......................................................................... 11

4. The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the Judgment. ............ 14

Prayer ..................................................................................................................... 15

ii
Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................... 16

Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 16

Rule 52.3(j) Certification ........................................................................................ 17

Appendix:

Tab 1: Order Concerning Visitation
Tab 2: Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship
Tab 3: Texas Family Code § 157.374
Tab 4: Texas Family Code § 105.001

iii
 Index of Authorities

Cases:

Dancy v. Daggett,
815 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) ............................................................. 8

In re A.B.P.,
291 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) .............................................. 11

In re Bustos,
No. 04-14-00755-CV, 2014 WL 7339259 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Dec. 23,
2014, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) .............................................................................9-10

In re Herring,
221 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding) ..................... 8

In re Lee,
411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013)........................................................................... 10, 15

McElreath v. Stewart,
545 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1977) ............................................................................12, 13

Moroch v. Collins,
174 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) ................................. 11-12

Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) ................................................................................. 8

Whatley v. Bacon,
649 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1983) ............................................................................ 9, 10

iv
Statutes, Rules, and Regulations:

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §105.001 (West 2014) ................................................ 8, 9, 11

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §157.374 (West 2014) .................................................. 10, 12

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §22.221 (West 2004) ........................................................ 1

TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b................................................................................................ 14

v
 Statement of the Case

Underlying Proceeding: Enforcement motion in SAPCR.

Respondent: Hon. Raymond G. Wheless, 366th Judicial
District Court, Collin County, Texas.

Respondent’s Action: Granted temporary orders under habeas
corpus provision of Texas Family Code §
157.374 (App. 1).

Date of Order: December 22, 2014.

Statement of Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a district

court judge under Section 22.221(b)(1) of the Texas Government Code.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(b)(1) (West 2004).

Issue Presented

Is mandamus relief warranted by the trial court’s abuse of discretion in

signing temporary orders―

• without any pleading requesting them,

• without any notice they were being considered,

• without any supporting evidence,

• under a habeas corpus provision inapplicable to this SAPCR
enforcement proceeding, and

• where they impermissibly modify a final judgment?

1
 Statement of Facts

Mother and Father are the parents of a six-year-old child.1 This

mandamus proceedings arises from temporary orders for visitation signed by

the trial court on December 19, 2014.2 The trial court signed the temporary

orders nearly two months after signing a final judgment in the case.3

Entry of Final Judgment and Subsequent Temporary Orders

On October 28, 2014, the trial court signed a final order (referred to in

this petition as the Judgment) in a suit between Mother and Father to modify

the parent-child relationship.4 The Judgment incorporated a mediated

settlement agreement.5

The Judgment required that Mother undergo random drug testing for

two years, setting forth a four-stage process (Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4) by which

Mother could―through compliance with these testing requirements―gain

increased possession and access rights.6 Possession rights for all 4 steps were

“subject to the drug testing requirements” of the MSA and Judgment.7 Step

4 was the first stage in which Mother could have unsupervised overnight

1
App. 2 at 3; R.036.
2
App. 1; R.121.
3
App. 2; R.034-100.
4
App. 2; R.034-100.
5
R.022-032.
6
App. 2 at 12-31; R.045-064.
7
App. 2 at 15, 19, 21, 23; R.048, 052, 054, 056.

2
possession of the child. But under the Judgment, Mother could not possibly

reach Step 4 in less than eight months.

The Judgment designated SurScan as the testing facility, required

Mother to submit to monthly random tests as noticed by SurScan, and

mandated that the first test occur by February 5, 2014. Father was to receive

all test results. A positive finding on any test (including a “no show”) would

“return [Mother] to the beginning of Step 1 possession rights . . . .”8

The Judgment required that all Step 1 visitation was to be supervised.9

It further required that Mother “be present with the child during the entire

visit during” for all weekend visits during both Step 1 and Step 2.10

The Judgment became final on November 28, 2014. Thereafter,

Mother filed a motion for enforcement claiming that she was in Step 2 under

the Judgment, but that Father “refused to allow Step 2 possession.” Mother

asked that Father be held in contempt as a result.11 Mother did not request

temporary orders in the motion,12 and the hearing notice made no mention of

temporary orders.13

8
App. 2 at 13-15; R.046-048.
9
App. 2 at 15; R.048.
10
App. 2 at 16, 19; R.049, 052.
11
R.102-113.
12
R.102-113.
13
R.119.

3
 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing (discussed in the

following section) on Mother’s contempt motion. Midway through the

hearing, the trial court told the parties that the MSA (which formed the basis

for the Judgment) was “a terrible agreement” and “not in the best interest

of the child.”14

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced that it was

denying the contempt action but was, sua sponte, entering temporary orders

“declaring” Mother to be in Step 4 (thus permitting her unsupervised

overnight possession)—even though Mother had not claimed to be in Step

4.15

The trial court stated it was acting under authority of Section 157.374

of the Texas Family Code, authorizing temporary orders in habeas corpus

proceedings where there exists a “serious immediate question concerning

the welfare of the child.” The trial court stated that a serious immediate

question existed under the MSA upon which it had entered the Judgment

two months earlier:

The Court denies the Motion for Contempt. However,
the Court finds that the present arrangement under this
Order agreed to by the parties is—the MSA—raises a

14
R.273.
15
R.300.

4
 serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the
child.

Whatever harm might befall this child because of the
mother not showing up for a drug test or not—or being 15
minutes late or not sending 24 hours’ notice is far offset
by the damage caused to the emotional and mental
stability of this child because of the ongoing continuous
serious conflict between the mother and the father.

Therefore, under section 157.374 of the Family Code, the
Court is authorized to enter a Temporary Order, and the
Court is going to enter a Temporary Order, to the effect
that we are now in Step 4 of the Order that was entered
on October 28th.

That means that [Mother] now has unsupervised
possession pursuant to the standard possession order.16

The trial court signed an order (referred to in this petition as the

Order) stating that Mother’s visitation with the child “shall be in accordance

with Step 4 visitation” under the Judgment.17 Mother now has unsupervised

overnight possession without having completed the conditions precedent set

by the MSA and Judgment.

Evidence at the Hearing

Evidence of Step 2. Mother testified that she was in Step 2 under the

Order18 and that she had advised Father of that fact.19 She testified that

16
R.300
17
App.1; R.121.
18
R.139.

5
Father refused to permit her possession rights under Step 2.20 No one

testified that Mother was in Step 4.

Evidence of Child Welfare. No one testified that there existed any

“serious immediate concern” about with the child’s welfare. Indeed, no one

testified to any real concern with the child’s welfare. A visitation supervisor

testified that the child was “torn” between the parents—but said nothing

linking this to the Judgment or mentioning any serious immediate concern

about it.21

Evidence of Testing Compliance. Mother initially testified that she had

taken and passed “many” random drug tests, both at SurScan and other

places,22 and that she had complied with the testing requirements.23 But on

cross-examination, Mother could not say when she first took any drug test or

confirm that it was by the deadline set in the Judgment.24 Indeed, Mother

could not say when she ever had taken any drug test.25

Despite her original testimony about passing unspecified drug tests at

unspecified times, Mother admitted to using drugs until entering rehab in

19
R.132-34.
20
See, e.g., 134-35, 143-44.
21
R.221.
22
R.141.
23
R.142, 177.
24
R.177-78.
25
R.178.

6
June 2014—nearly six months after she was to start mandatory testing under

the Judgment.26 Mother admitted to using drugs “in January, February,

March” of 2014.27 In an earlier hearing, Mother’s own lawyer confirmed

that Mother did not take her first drug test under the Judgment until June

2014.28

Ultimately, when asked directly, Mother confirmed that she had not

taken the random drug tests required by the Judgment:

Q: No. Did you do random monthly tests at SurScan?

A: No.29

This confirmed an earlier statement by Mother’s lawyer that Mother had not

taken the required random drug tests.30

Finally, Father testified to never having seen the results of any test at

SurScan, or any evidence of Mother’s compliance with the testing

provisions.31

26
R.181-83, 187.
27
R.183.
28
R.314.
29
R.189.
30
R.316.
31
R.293.

7
 Argument

Mandamus issues to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which the

relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d

833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992). “A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining

what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the

trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of

discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.” Id. at

840 (citations omitted).

Because temporary orders in a suit affecting a parent child relationship

are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a trial court

abuses its discretion. See Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991)

(per curiam) (citation omitted); In re Herring, 221 S.W.3d 729, 730 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding) (citation omitted).

1. The trial court abused its discretion in entering temporary orders
without any supporting pleading, notice, or opportunity for a
hearing.

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court is

authorized to make temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the

children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §105.001(a) (West 2014). But except in

specified situations not present here, such orders may not be rendered

8
“except after notice and a hearing.” Id. § 105.001(b). A trial judge may not

issue temporary orders without the required notice. See, e.g., Whatley v.

Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. 1983) (discussing predecessor statute).

Here, Father lacked any notice concerning entry of temporary orders.

Mother’s pleading did not request temporary orders and the notice of

hearing made no reference to temporary orders. Even during the hearing,

neither Mother nor the trial court made any mention of the possibility of

temporary orders until the conclusion of the evidence. Under these

circumstances, Father simply had no idea that he needed to present evidence

weighing against temporary orders. To the contrary, Father was on notice

only of the need to disprove the enforcement allegations.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered a similar situation

recently in In re Bustos, No. 04-14-00755-CV, 2014 WL 7339259, at *1 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio, Dec. 23, 2014, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citation

omitted). There, the trial court, sua sponte, entered temporary orders without

any pleadings requesting or supporting such relief, and without any advance

notice. The court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief,

concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the temporary

9
orders “without proper notice to [Father] and an opportunity for a full

adversary hearing.” Id. at *3 (citation omitted).

This case is similar. Neither Mother’s pleadings nor the notice of

hearing informed Father of the need to put on evidence in opposition to

temporary orders. So far as Father knew, the only thing he needed to rebut

was a contempt finding. The trial court abused its discretion by signing the

Order without any pleadings to support it, without any notice to Father that

it was contemplated, and without Father being afforded the opportunity for

an adversary hearing on it.

2. The trial court abused its discretion in entering the Order under a
provision limited to habeas corpus proceedings.

The trial court signed the Order under Section 157.374 of the Family

Code, authorizing a court to “render an appropriate temporary order if there

is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child.” TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §157.374 (West 2014). But Section 157.374 is part of

Chapter 157, Subchapter H of the Family Code, concerning habeas corpus

proceedings. It authorizes a trial judge to issue a temporary order “in a

habeas corpus proceeding . . . .” Whatley, 649 S.W.3d at 299; see generally In

re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 457-57 (Tex. 2013) (referencing a trial court’s ability

10
to protect the safety and welfare of a child “through habeas corpus

proceedings”).

Nothing in Section 157.374 suggests that it applies to non-habeas

proceedings. Instead, Section 105.001 of the Family Code governs temporary

orders in a SAPCR proceeding. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §105.001 (West

2014). The trial court abused its discretion by granting temporary orders

under the habeas corpus provisions of the Family Code in a SAPCR.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in signing the order without
any supporting evidence.

To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in a family

law case, this court considers whether the trial court (1) had sufficient

evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its exercise of

that discretion. In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2009, no

pet.) (citations omitted). Traditional sufficiency standards of review are part

of this assessment, coming into play with regard to the first question. Moroch

v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2005, pet. denied)

(citations omitted). This court then determines whether, based on the

elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id.

In examining legal sufficiency, this court reviews the evidence in the

light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether the trier of fact

11
could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was

true. Id. at 858 (citation omitted). In examining factual sufficiency, this court

determines “whether, based on the entire record, a fact finder could

reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the allegations in the petition

were proven.” Id. (citations omitted).

Even if the trial court had the power to enter the temporary order, it

abused its discretion by doing so in the absence of any supporting evidence.

The provision relied upon by the trial court, Section 157.374, requires a

finding of “a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the

child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §157.374 (West 2014). The Supreme Court of

Texas has held that application of this provision contemplates a situation

“where the child was in imminent danger of physical or emotional harm and

immediate action was necessary to protect the child.” McElreath v. Stewart,

545 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. 1977) (citations omitted).

The trial court simply heard no evidence raising any immediate

question concerning the child’s welfare. Indeed, very little was said about the

child during the hearing. At best, the trial court heard a visitation supervisor

say the child was torn between his parents. No evidence suggested that this

resulted in “a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the

12
child.” This evidence “falls far short of the necessary statutory requisites of

immediacy and seriousness.” Id. at 958.

Independently, the trial court also lacked any evidence by which it

could have concluded that Mother’s possession rights were in Step 4 under

the Judgment. The evidence conclusively established that Mother was not in

Step 4. Mother admitted to using drugs until June 2014. Her lawyer also

admitted, on the record, that Mother did not take her first drug test until

June 2014 (and, even then, it was not the required random test). By the

terms of the Judgment, even if Mother’s non-compliant June test started the

provisions of Step 1, she could not possibly enter Step 4 until at least March

2015.32

Of course, the trial court’s order also lacked sufficient supporting

evidence because there is no evidence—literally none—that Mother ever

exited Step 1. The order establishes SurScan as the exclusive testing

provider. Mother admitted under cross-examination that she has not

undergone the required random drug testing at SurScan. This testimony

conclusively establishes Mother’s failure to comply with the Judgment in a

matter sufficient to permit her to exit Step 1. The trial court abused its
32
The Judgment requires Mother to remain in Step 1 for ten weeks, in Step 2 for three
months, and in Step 3 for three months. Assuming a start date of July 1, 2014, this would
mean Mother could not enter Step 4 until March 2015 at the earliest.

13
discretion by declaring Mother to be in Step 4 when the evidence established

that she is not.

4. The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the Judgment.

The real truth, as the record makes fairly clear, is that the trial court

just changed its mind about the MSA and Judgment, concluding they were

not in the best interest of the child. The trial court stated on the record its

belief that the Judgment’s requirements were too difficult and Mother never

would be able to comply with them.33 Casting aside the parties’ mediated

settlement agreement and the Judgment, the trial court simply “declared”

Mother’s way to full standard visitation.

Once the Judgment became final, the trial court lost plenary power to

modify it by any means. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). The Judgment became final

well in advance of the enforcement hearing. For better or worse, the

Judgment required Mother to fulfill certain conditions to obtain standard

visitation with the child. As the evidence at the hearing established, Mother

failed to comply with those conditions. By simply “declaring” Mother to be

in step four, the trial court impermissibly modified the Judgment.

33
R.273.

14
 Even had the Judgment not been final the trial court could not have

modified the provision concerning the various steps. The Judgment was

based on an MSA. Even before the Judgment became final, the trial court

would have lacked the authority to reject the MSA based on a best interest

analysis. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 470-71, 477-78.

Prayer

The trial court abused its discretion in entering the Order. As a result,

Relators ask that this Court grant a writ of mandamus and direct the trial

court to dissolve the Order.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Charles “Chad” Baruch
Texas Bar Number 01864300
THE LAW OFFICE OF CHAD BARUCH
3201 Main Street
Rowlett, Texas 75088
Telephone: (972) 412-7192
Facsimile: (972) 412-4028
Email: baruchesq@aol.com

Counsel for Relator

15
 Certificate of Compliance

This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word for Mac. Relying on the
word count function in that software, I certify that this brief contains 2,822
words (exclusive of the caption, identify of parties and counsel, table of
contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues,
signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance, and certificate of
service).

/s/Charles “Chad” Baruch
Attorney for Relators

Certificate of Service

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that a true copy of this
instrument was served in accordance with Rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure on each party or that party’s lead counsel on January
22, 2015, as follows:

Charles C. Phillips
Philips & Epperson, LP
2301 Virginia Parkway
McKinney, Texas 75071
By email to:
rcollins@philipsandepperson.com

The Honorable Raymond Wheless
Judge, 366th Judicial District Court
2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 30146
McKinney, Texas 75071
By regular mail

/s/Charles “Chad” Baruch
Attorney for Relator

16
 Rule 52.3(j) Certification

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that he has reviewed this
petition, as well as the record, and concluded that every factual statement in
this petition is true, correct, and based on competent evidence included in
the appendix or record. The undersigned counsel of record further certifies
that the pleadings, orders, and judgment contained in the appendix are true
and correct copies of the originals.

/s/Charles “Chad” Baruch
Attorney for Relator

17

1
 Filed: 12/19/2014 2:44:40 PM
Andrea S. Thompson
District Clerk
Collin county, Texas
By Tina Chandler Deputy
Envelope 10: 3551192
CAUSE NO. 366-55837-2009

IN THE INTEREST OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
H.W.G. §. 366TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
A CHILD § COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER CONCERNING VISITATION

On December 19, 2014, the Court heard this case·. After hearing evidence

and argument of counsel, the Court find~ that EMILY C. STEPHENS has satisfied

all prerequisites to advance to Step 4 visitation as outlined in the parties' prior

order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that effective December 19, 2014, the

visitation of EMILY C. STEPHENS with the child the subject of this suit shall be

in accordance with Step 4 visitation as outlined in the Order in Suit to Modify

Parent-Child Relationship entered on or about October 28, 2014.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all terms of the prior order not modified

herein shall remain in full force and effect.
12/19/2014
SIGNED on _ _ _ _ ___;~ 2014.

~· ~
ruDGEP:JI-D_rn_G_____________

ORDER CONCERNING VISITATION SOLO PAGE
2
 NO. 366-55837-2009

IN THE INTEREST OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT .
§
§ 366TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
A CHILD § COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP

On this day the Court heard this case.

Appearances

:i ,J ' ' Petitioner, MICHAEL GIBB, did not appear in person but has agreed to the

terms of this order as evidenced by Petitioner's signature and that of his attorney,

Howard Shapiro, below.

Respondent, EMILY STEPHENS, has made a general appearance and has

agreed to the terms of this order, to the extent permitted by law, as evidenced by

Respondent's signature, and that of her attorney of record, Kristy Blanchard, below.

Also appearing was Charity Borserine, appointed by the Court as amicus

attorney to assist the Court in protecting the best interests of the child the subject of

this suit. The amicus attorney has agreed to the terms of this order, as evidenced by

the signature of the amicus attorney below.

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
!?¥\RENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 1
~bn~ent by Person with Right to. Designate Primary Residence
1'·1

'
EMILY STEPHENS, who has the exclusive right to designate the residence

of the child under the most recent final order, has consented to the terms of this order

as evidenced by EMILY STEPHENS's signature below.

Jurisdiction

·1'i' : The Court, after examining the record and the evidence and argument of

counsel, finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties and that no

other court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this case. All persons entitled

to citation were properly cited.

Jury

.A jury was waived, and all questions of fact and of law were submitted to .') f

the Court.

Record

The making of a record of testimony was made by Nicki Garcia, the Court

Reporter for the 366th Judicial District Court.

Child

The Court finds that the following child is the subject of this suit:

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 2
)_;'<'
 . ~ ..
Name:
I ,,..
Sex: Male
Birth date:
Home state: Texas
Social Security number:

Findings

The Court finds that the material allegations in the petition to modify are true

and that the requested modification is in the best interest of the child. IT IS

6RDERED that the requested modification is GRANTED.

Parenting Plan

The Court finds that the provisions in these orders relating to the rights and

duties of the parties with relation to the child, possession of and access to the child,

child support, and optimizing the development of a close and continuing relationship
·'
l5:etween each party and the child constitute the parties' agreed parenting plan.

Conservatorship

The Court finds that the following orders are in the best interest of the child.

,, IT IS ORDERED that MICHAEL GIBB and EMILY STEPHENS are

appointed Joint Managing Conservators of the following child:

IT IS ORDERED that, at all times, MICHAEL GIBB, as a parent joint

managing conservator, shall have the following rights:

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 3
,· '
) ·..
 1. the right to receive information from any other conservator of the child

concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

2. the right to confer with the other parent to the extent possible before

making a decision concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

3. the right of access to medical, dental, psychological, and educational

records of the child;

,,; 4 the right to consult with a physician, dentist, or psychologist of the

child;

5. the right to consult with school officials concerning the child's welfare

and educational status, including school activities;

6. the right to attend school activities;

7. the right to be designated on the child's records as a person to be notified

in case of an emergency;

8. the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment during an

emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of the child; and

9. the right to manage the estate of the child to the extent the estate has

been created by the parent or the parent's family.

IT IS ORDERED that, at all times, EMILY STEPHENS, as a parent joint

managing conservator, shall have the following rights:

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 4
 1. the right to receive information from any other conservator of the child

concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child

2. the right to confer with the other parent to the extent possible before

making a decision concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

3. the right of access to medical, dental, psychological, and educational

records of the child;

~~(''i·l·l·
~
.. ,I , 1... · I
4 e the right to consult with a physician, dentist, or psychologist of the

child;

5. the right to consult with school officials concerning the child's welfare

and educational status, including school activities;

6. the right to attend school activities;

i.''.·'....
. ',. ~ 7. the right to be designated on the child's records as a person to be

nbtified in case of an emergency, except during periods of supervised possession

under Step 1 ofthis Order.

8. the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment during an

emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of the child; and

9. the right to manage the estate of the child to the extent the estate has

been created by the parent or the parent's family.

IT IS ORDERED that, at all times, MICHAEL GIBB and EMILY

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 5
 \

STEPHENS, as parent joint managing conservators, shall each have the following

duties:

1. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child in a timely manner

of significant information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

and

2. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child if the conservator

resides with for at least thirty days, marries, or intends to marry a person who the

conservator knows is registered as a sex offender under chapter 62 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure or is currently charged with an offense for which on conviction

the person would be required to register under that chapter. IT IS ORDERED that

this information shall be tendered in the form of a notice made as soon as practicable,

but not later than the fortieth day after the date the conservator of the child begins to

r€side with the person or on the tenth day after the date the marriage occurs, as'

appropriate. IT IS ORDERED that the notice must include a description of the

offense that is the basis of the person's requirement to register as a sex offender or

of the offense with which the person is charged. WARNING: A

CONSERVATOR COMMITS AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS C

MISDEMEANOR IF THE CONSERVATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE THIS

NOTICE.

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PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 6
 IT IS ORDERED that, during his periods of possession, MICHAEL GIBB, as

parent joint managing conservator, shall have the following rights and duties:

1. the duty of care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline of the
.. :i,.

child;

2. the duty to support the child, including providing the child with

clothing, food, shelter, and medical and dental care not involving an invasive

procedure;

3. the right to consent for the child to medical and dental care not
: );1

involving an invasive procedure; and

4. the right to direct the moral and religious training of the child.

IT IS ORDERED that, during her periods of possession, EMILY STEPHENS,

ftS parent joint managing conservator, shall have the following rights and duties:

1. the duty of care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline of the

child;

2. the duty to support the child, including providing the child with

clothing, food, shelter, and medical and dental care not involving an invasive

procedure;

3. the right to consent for the child to medical and dental care not

involving an invasive procedure; and

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 7

j···
'
 4. the right to direct the moral and religious training of the child.

IT IS ORDERED that MICHAEL GIBB, as a parent joint managing

conservator, shall have the following rights and duty:

1. the exclusive right to designate the primary residence ofthe child within

Collin County, Texas, or a county contiguous to Collin County, Texas;

2. the exclusive right, after conferring with the other conservator, to

consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment involving invasive procedures;

3. the exclusive right, after conferring with the other conservator, to

consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child;

4. the exclusive right to receive and give receipt for periodic payments for

the support of the child and to hold or disburse these funds for the benefit of the

child;

5. the independent right, after conferring in advance with the other

conservator, to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions of
>'

substantial legal significance concerning the child;

6. the independent right, after conferring m advance with the other

conservator, to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the armed forces of the

United States;

.:•\.

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 8
 7. the exclusive right, after conferring with the other conservator, to

make decisions concerning the child's education;

8. except as provided by section 264.0111 of the Texas Family Code, the

independent right, after conferring in advance with the other conservator, to the
'·
services and earnings of the child;

9. except when a guardian of the child's estate or a guardian or attorney ad

litem has been appointed for the child, the independent right, after conferring in

advance with the other conservator, to act as an agent of the child in relation to the

child's estate if the child's action is required by a state, the United States, or a foreign

g~.:Jvermnent; and

10. the independent duty to manage the estate of the child to the extent the

estate has been created Michael Gibb or his family.

IT IS ORDERED that EMILY STEPHENS, as a parent joint managing

conservator, shall have the following rights and duty:

the independent right, after conferring m advance with the other

conservator, to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions of

substantial legal significance concerning the child;

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 9
 2. the independent right, after conferring in advance with the other

conservator, to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the armed forces of the

United States;

3. except as provided by section 264.0111 of the Texas Family Code, the

independent right, after conferring in advance with the other conservator, to the
; i'.
s~rvices and earnings of the child;

4. except when a guardian of the child's estate or a guardian or attorney ad

litem has been appointed for the child, the independent right, after conferring in

advance with the other conservator, to act as an agent of the child in relation to the

alnilq's estate if the child's action is required by a state, the United States, or a foreign

g0vemment; and

5. the independent duty to manage the estate of the child to the extent the

estate has been created by Emily Stephens or her family.

;;c.· ! The Court finds that, in accordance with section 153.001 of the Texas Family

Clode, it is the public policy of Texas to assure that children will have frequent and

continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest

of the child, to provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child, and

to encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after the

parents have separated or dissolved their marriage. IT IS ORDERED that the

bRbER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 10
~fin{ary residence of the child shall be Collin County, Texas, or a county contiguous
;':''

to Collin County, Texas, and the parties shall not remove the child from Collin

County, Texas, or a county contiguous to Collin County, Texas for the purpose of

changing the primary residence of the child until modified by further order of the

court of continuing jurisdiction or by written agreement signed by the parties and

p.aed ·with the court.
·.,) / .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MICHAEL GIBB shall have the exclusive

right to designate the child's primary residence within Collin County, Texas, or a

county contiguous to Collin County, Texas.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this geographic restriction on the residence

pfthe child shall be lifted if, at the time MICHAEL GIBB wishes to remove the

child from Collin County, Texas, or a county contiguous to Collin County, Texas

for the purpose of changing the primary residence of the child, EMILY STEPHENS

does not reside in Collin County, Texas, or a county contiguous to Collin County,

Texas.

'llbssession and Access

1. Modified Standard Possession Order

IT IS ORDERED that each conservator shall comply with all terms and

conditions of this Modified Standard Possession Order. IT IS ORDERED that this

'
ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 11
Modified Standard Possession Order is effective immediately and applies to all

periods of possession occurring on and after the date of the Mediated Settlement

filed I this cause. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

(a) Definitions

1. In this Modified Standard Possession Order "school" means the

primary or secondary school in which the child is enrolled or, if the child is not

j3nrolled in a primary or secondary school, the public school district in which the

child primarily resides.

2. In this Modified Standard Possession Order "child" includes each

child, whether one or more, who is a subject of this suit while that child is under the

~ge of eighteen years and not otherwise emancipated.
:.·'

r~c (b) Mutual Agreement or Specified Terms for Possession

IT IS ORDERED that the conservators shall have possession of the child at

times mutually agreed to in advance by the parties, and, in the absence of mutual

agreement, it is ORDERED that the conservators shall have possession of the child

under the specified terms set out in this Modified Standard Possession Order.

:: (c) Approved Supervisors for Supervised Possession and Access

IT IS ORDERED that any of the following may be used as supervisors during

the supervised possession and access that EMILY STEPHENS

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 12
shall be solely responsible for the cost of said supervisor:

a. Hannah's House, on-site or at an off-site location with an

employee ofHannah's House

b. Misty Lewis

c. Meghan 0' Shea

:31 d. Rebecca Martin

e. Randy Nabors (Sierra Investigations)

f. A Family Affair on-site, or at an off-site location with an

employee of A Family Affair

Supervised periods of possession will be supervised by the supervisors

designated in this Order. . Supervised visitations may take place at an offsite

location selected by EMILY STEPHENS and the supervisor. The supervisor will

supervise throughout the entire period of possession of by

EMILY STEPHENS in accordance with the provisions ofthis Order.

(d) Drug Testing

IT IS ORDERED that EMILY STEPHENS shall submit to the

following drug testing requirements:

';
1. Testing facility will be Surscan.

2. SurScan rules will determine what is a "no show."

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PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 13
 3. A "no show" or diluted sample will be deemed a positive test

result.

4. EMILY STEPHENS will submit to random standard 10 panel

monthly drug tests at the requests of SurScan.

5. EMILY STEPHENS will submit to quarterly standard 10 panel

hair testing, with the initial test to take place no later than

February 5, 2014.

6. EMILY STEPHENS will be subject to the SurScan Randoni

Drug Testing policies.

7. EMILY STEPHENS will be responsible for the cost of drug

testing billed by SurScan.

8. The attorneys for MICHAEL GIBB and EMILY STEPHENS

will be authorized to receive the results of each drug test;· and

EMILY STEPHENS shall execute such documents and sign any

releases necessary to provide the test results to MICHAEL GIBB

and/or counsel for MICHAEL GIBB and EMILY STEPHENS at

the time of each test.

9. The obligation to submit to drug testing will end after two (2}

consecutive years of testing without a positive finding, which
1\

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
~4v~ ~(A~ ?.q,-zott
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 14
 two year period will begin on the date of entry of this Order, and

10. A positive finding on a drug test will return EMILY STEPHENS

to the beginning of Step 1 possession rights until she advances

out of Step 1 as set forth in this Order.

(e) Supervised Possession and Access for Emily Stephens Step 1

IT IS ORDERED that Emily Stephens shall have supervised possession and

access to the child as follows:

Step 1 will continue for ten (10) consecutive weeks beginning January 29,

2014 and will require EMILY STEPHENS to exercise every period of possession

during that ten (10) week period. EMILY STEPHENS may consent to the maternal

grandparents being present with EMILY STEPHENS during no more than three (3)

;visits during a consecutive ten (1 0) week period. These possession rights are subject

to the drug testing requirements described herein. Neither EMILY STEPHENS not

her parents may be denied any possession with the child due to any of the drug

testing requirements. However, a positive test result, pursuant to Surscan rules and

this Order:
., 1. During Step 1 will return EMILY STEPHENS to the beginning of a ten

(1 0) consecutive week period of possession under the Step 1 possession

schedule, upon completion of the on-going ten (10) consecutive week

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 15
 period of possession currently being exercised by EMILY STEPHENS,

and

2. During Steps 2 through 4 will immediately return EMILY STEPHENS to

the beginning of a ten (1 0) consecutive week period of possession under

Step 1.

The maternal grandparents may not participate in more than three (3) visits

during any of the ten ( 10) consecutive week periods of possession, even if EMILY

STEPHENS is required to re-start Step 1. Each ten (1 0) consecutive week period

of possession will be completed prior to beginning another ten (1 0) consecutive

week period of possession.

1. Weekend Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS will have the right to

supervised possession of the child on Saturdays following the first,

third, and fifth Friday of each month, beginning at 2:00p.m. and ending

cl 1· that day at 5:00p.m. Said visit will be supervised at all times. EMILY

STEPHENS must be present with the child during the entire visit during

this Step 1. The conservator can agreeto change the time if the period

of possession is in conflict with the child's regular extracurricular

activity. These periods of possession shall not interfere with

l ~ .' MICHAEL GIBBS~ or summer possession. Any period of

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 16
 possession for EMILY STEPHENS under Step ·1, which is missed due

to MICHAEL GIBB's ~summer possession will be made-up
"11'\~~ Q~d tLpCJl!\
on another date.

2. Thursday Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS will have supervised
.,

possession of the child on Thursdays preceding the second and fourth

Friday of each month, beginning at 2:30 p.m. and ending that day at

5:30p.m. Said visit will be supervised at all times by employees of

Hannah's House or A Family Affair or one of the supervisors

designated in this Order. These periods of visitation will not interfere

with MICHAEL GIBBS periods of extended summer possession. Any

period of possession for EMILY STEPHENS under Step 1, which is

missed due to MICHAEL GIBB' S extended summer possession will be
l'uud-u_~~J~~
made-up orl'a'uotfier date.

3. Telephone Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

telephone visitation with the child on Wednesday of each week from

7:00p.m. to 7:30pm. EMILY STEPHENS shall leave a message on

MICHAEL GIBB's personal cellular telephone setting forth the

number that she is calling from and MICHAEL GIBB shall return the

call within 15 minutes. If EMILY STEPHENS is in a facility and has

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 17
 provided MICHAEL GIBB notification that she is in such facility,

MICHAEL GIBB shall answer all calls between 7:00 and 7:30p.m. on

Wednesdays during such time period.

4. Lunch at Child's School- Following a hair test result with a negative

finding, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to have lunch with the

child one time per month, with appropriate notice/contact with the

school/daycare in accordance with school policy for parents, and may

bring the grandparents with her to have lunch with the child in

accordance with school policy.

5. Attendance at Activities- Following a hair test result with a negative

finding, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to attend the child's

school functions and extracurricular activities, and may bring anyone

with her that EMILY STEPHENS wishes to attend said events.

In the event EMILY STEPHENS has a conflict on any period of possession

for work, or the child's activities conflict with any period of possession, or

MICHAEL GIBB's summer possession conflicts with a period of possession, the

parties will re-schedule EMILY STEPHENS visitation, to a mutually agreed upon

day and time. EMILY STEPHENS shall give MICHAEL GIBB 24 hours advance

notice of any work conflict which will necessitate changing a period of possession,

ORnER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 18
b'r of her intent not to exercise a period of possession. Notice shall be provided

through Our Family Wizard.

(f) Possession and Access for Emily Stephens Step 2

After completion of Step 1, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the following

periods of possession of the child for Step 2 during the subsequent three (3) month

period as stated below. These possession rights are subject to the drug testing

requirements described herein.

1. Weekend Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

possession of the child on Saturdays following the first, third and fifth

Friday of each month, beginning at 10:00 a.m. and ending that day at

pt· · 4:00p.m. EMILY STEPHENS must be present with the child during

the entire visit during this Step 2. These periods of possession shall

not interfere with MICHAEL GIBB's periods of extended summer

possession. Any period of possession for EMILY STEPHENS under

Step 2, which is missed due to MICHAEL GIBB's extended summer

possession will be made-up on another mutually agreed upon date. ,'

2. Telephone Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

telephone visitation with the child on Wednesday of each week from

7:00p.m. to 7:30pm. EMILY STEPHENS shall leave a message on

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 19
 MICHAEL GIBB 's cellular telephone setting forth the number that she

is calling from and MICHAEL GIBB shall return the call within 15

minutes. If EMILY STEPHENS is in a facility and has provided

MICHAEL GIBB notification that she is in such facility, MICHAEL

GIBB shall answer all calls between 7:00 and 7:30p.m. on Wednesdays

during such time period.

3. Lunch at Child's School- Under Step 2, EMILY STEPHENS shall

have the right to have lunch with the child at any time, with appropriate

notice/contact with the school/daycare in accordance with school policy

for parents, and may bring the grandparents with her to have lunch with

the child in accordance with school policy.

4. Attendance at Activities - Under Step 2, EMILY STEPHENS shall

have the right to attend the child's school functions and extracurricular

activities, and may bring anyone with her that EMILY STEPHENS

wishes to attend said events.

In the event EMILY STEPHENS has a conflict on any period of possession

for work, or the child's activities conflict with any period of possession, or

MICHAEL GIBB 's extended summer possession conflicts with a period of

possession, the parties will re-schedule EMILY STEPHENS visitation, to a mutually

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 20
agreed upon day and time. EMILY STEPHENS shall give MICHAEL GIBB 24

hours advance notice of any work conflict which will necessitate changing a period

of possession.

(g) Possession and Access for Emily Stephens Step 3

After completion of Step 2, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

possession of the child under Step 3 during the subsequent three (3) month period as

stated below. The possession rights are subject to the drug testing requirements

described herein.

1. Weekend Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

possession of the child on each Saturday and Sunday following the first,

third, and fifth Friday of each month, beginning at 9:00 a.m. on

ht · Saturday and ending at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, and beginning at 9:00

a.m. on Sunday and ending at 6:00p.m. on Sunday. These periods of

possession shall not interfere with MICHAEL GIBBS periods of

extended summer possession. Any period of possession for EMILY

STEPHENS under Step 3, which is missed due to MICHAEL GIBB's

:,:( extended summer possession will be made-up on another mutually

agreed upon date.

2. Telephone Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

ORDER IN SUIT TO MOD1FY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 21
 telephone visitation with the child on Wednesday of each week from

7:00p.m. to 7:30pm. EMILY STEPHENS shall leave a message on
,•:..
MICHAEL GIBB 's personal cellular telephone setting forth the

number that she is calling from and MICHAEL GIBB shall return the

call within 15 minutes. If EMILY STEPHENS is in a facility and has

provided MICHAEL GIBB notification that she is in such facility,

MICHAEL GIBB shall answer all calls between 7:00 and 7:30p.m. on

Wednesdays during such time period.

3. Lunch at Child's School - Under Step 3, EMILY STEPHENS shall

have the right to have lunch with the child at any time, with appropriate

notice/contact with the school/daycare in accordance with school policy

for parents, and may bring the grandparents with her to have lunch with

the child in accordance with school policy.

4. Attendance at Activities - Under Step 3, EMILY STEPHENS shall

have the right to attend the child's school functions and extracurricular

activities, and may bring anyone with her that EMILY STEPHENS

wishes to attend said events.

In the event EMILY STEPHENS has a conflict on any period of possession

for work, of the child's activities conflict with any period of possession, or

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 22
MICHAEL GIBB's extended summer possessiOn conflicts with a period of

possession, the parties will re-schedule EMILY STEPHENS visitation, to a mutually

agreed upon day and time. EMILY STEPHENS shall give MICHAEL GIBB 24

hours advance notice of any work conflict which will necessitate changing a period

of possession.

(h) Possession and Access for Emily Stephens Step 4

After completion of Step 3, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

possession of the child under Step 4 as follows. These possession rights are subject

to the drug testing requirements described herein.

1. Weekend Visitation - EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to

possession of the child beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the first, third and

fifth Friday of each month and ending on the immediately following

Sunday at 6:00 p.m. These periods of possession shall not interfere

J 11 • with MICHAEL GIBBS periods of holiday or extended summer

possessiOn.

2. Weekends Extended by Holiday - Except as otherwise explicitly

provided in this Modified Standard Possession Order, if a weekend

period of possession by EMILY STEPHENS begins on a Friday that

,•, is a student holiday or teacher in-service day during the regular school

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 23
 term, as determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a

federal, state, or local holiday during the summer months when school

is not in session, or if the period ends on or is immediately followed by

a Monday that is such a holiday, that weekend period of possession

shall begin at the time the child's school is regularly dismissed on the

Thursday immediately preceding the Friday holiday, student holiday or

teacher in-service day or end at 6:00 p.m. on that Monday holiday,

student holiday or teacher in-service day, as applicable. These periods

of possession shall not interfere with MICHAEL GIBBS periods of

holiday or summer possession.

3. Mid-Week/Thursday possession- EMILY STEPHENS shall have

the right to possession of the child beginning at 6:00p.m. on Thursday

of each week during the regular school term and ending at 8:00p.m. on

that day.

4. Lunch at Child's School- Under Step 4, EMILY STEPHENS shall

have the right to have lunch with the child at any time, with appropriate

notice/contact with the school/daycare in accordance with school policy

for parents and may bring the grandparents with her to have lunch with

the child in accordance with school policy.

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 24
 5. Extended Summer possession by EMILY STEPHENS for Summer

of 2015- In addition to regular weekend periods of possession set forth

above, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to designate one seven

(7) day period of exclusive possession by EMILY STEPHENS,

beginning no earlier the day after the child's school is dismissed for the

summer vacation and ending no later than seven days before school

resumes at the end of the summer vacation in that year, provided that

EMILY STEPHENS shall provide MICHAEL GIBB with twenty one

(21) days advance written notice of her intention to exercise this period

of possession and the dates of such period of possession. Said period

of possession shall begin and end at 6:00p.m. and shall not interfere

with Father's Day.

6. Extended Summer possession by EMILY STEPHENS for 2016 and

Future Years - With Written Notice by April 1 - If EMILY

STEPHENS gives MICHAEL GIBB written notice by April 1i

specifying an extended period of periods of summer possession of that

year, EMILY STEPHENS shall have possession of the child for thirty

(30) days beginning no earlier than the day after the child's school is

dismissed for the summer vacation and ending no later than seven days

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 25
 before school resumes at the end of the summer vacation in that year,

to be exercised in no more than two separate periods of at least seven

(7) consecutive days each, as specified in the written notice. These

periods of possession shall begin and end at 6:00 p.m. and shall not

interfere with Father's Day Weekend.

- Without Written Notice by April l, 2016 or Future Years - If

EMILY STEPHENS does not give MICHAEL GIBB written notice by

April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer

possession for that year, EMILY STEPHENS shall have possession of

the child for thirty (30) consecutive days in that year beginning at 6:00
''
p.m. on July 1 and ending at 6:00p.m. on July 31.

7. Spring Break in Even-Numbered Years- In even-numbered years,

beginning at the time the child's school is regularly dismissed on the

day the child is dismissed from school for the school's spring vacation

and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the day before school resumes after that

vacation.

8. Thanksgiving in Odd-Numbered Years - In odd-numbered years,

EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to possession of the child

beginning at 6:00p.m. on the day the child is dismissed from school for

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 26
 the Thanksgiving holiday and ending at 6:00 p.m. on the Sunday
}'

following Thanksgiving.

9. Mother's Day- EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to possession

of the child each year, beginning at 6:00p.m. on the Friday preceding

-Mother's Day and ending at 6:00p.m. on Mother's Day, provided that

if EMILY STEPHENS is not otherwise entitled under this Modified

Possession Order to present possession of the child, she shall pick up

the child from MICHAEL GIBB's residence and return the child to that

same place.

10. Child's Birthday - If a parent is not otherwise entitled under this

Modified Possession Order to present possession of the child on the

child's birthday, that parent shall have possession of the child beginning

at 6:00p.m. and ending at 8:00p.m. on that day, provided that that

parent picks up the child from the other parent's residence and returns

the child to that same place.

11. Christmas Holidays in Even-Numbered Years- In even-numbered

years, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to possession of the

child beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day the child is dismissed from

school for the Christmas school vacation and ending at noon on

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 27
 December 28.

Christmas Holidays in Odd-Numbered Years - In odd- numbered

years, EMILY STEPHENS shall have the right to possession of the

child beginning at noon on December 28 and ending at 6:00p.m. on the

day before school resumes after that Christmas school vacation.

Notwithstanding the periods of possession ORDERED for EMILY

STEPHENS under Step 1 through Step 4, it is explicitly ORDERED that MICHAEL

GIBB shall have a superior right of possession of the child as follows:

1. Spring Break in All Odd-Numbered Years- In odd-numbered years,

beginning at 6:00p.m. on the day the child is dismissed from school for

the school's spring vacation and ending at 6:00p.m. on the day before

school resumes after that vacation.

2. Summer Weekend Possession by MICHAEL GIBB in All Years

while EMILY STEPHENS is Under Step 1 - 3 Visitation - If

MICHAEL GIBB gives EMILY STEPHENS written notice 30 days in

advance of his elected one-week period of summer possession,

MICHAEL GIBB may elect one seven (7) day period of extended

summer possession during the summer school vacation. Any period

of possession for EMILY STEPHENS which is missed due to

ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-Page 28
 MICHAEL GIBB' s period of extended summer possession, will be

made up on another mutually agreed upon date.

2. Summer Weekend Possession by MICHAEL GIBB in All Years

while EMILY STEPHENS is Under Step 4 Visitation- IfMICHAEL

GIBB gives EMILY STEPHENS written notice by April 15 of a year,

MICHAEL GIBB shall have possession of the child on any one

weekend beginning at 6:00p.m. on Friday and ending at 6:00p.m. on

the following Sunday, during any one period of the extended summer

possession by EMILY STEPHENS in that year, provided that

MICHAEL GIBB picks up the child from EMILY STEPHENS and

returns the child to that same place.

3. Extended Summer Possession by MICHAEL GIBB in All Years

while EMILY STEPHENS is Under Step 4 Visitation- IfMICHAEL

GIBB gives EMILY STEPHENS written notice by April 15 of a year

or gives EMILY STEPHENS fourteen days' written notice on or after

April 16 of a year, MICHAEL GIBB may designate one weekend,

beginning no earlier than the day after the child's school is dismisse