Bob Deuell v. Texas Right to Life Committee, Inc.

ACCEPTED 01-15-00011-CV 1/7/2015 FIRST COURT3:32:32 PM OF APPEALS Chris Daniel - District ClerkHOUSTON, Harris County TEXAS Envelope No. 3685657 1/14/2015 11:22:17 AM By: Phyllis WashingtonPRINE CHRISTOPHER Filed: 1/7/2015 3:32:32 PM CLERK NO. 2014-32179 TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTEE, INC. § FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS § HOUSTON, TEXAS v. § 152N° JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1/14/2015 11:22:17 AM § CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE BOBDEUELL § HARRIS COUNTY, ClerkTEXAS DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: NOW COMES Defendant, BOB DEUELL, and files this Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, pursuant to Texas Rules ofAppellate Procedure Sections 26.1 (b) and 28.1, from the federal court's Order remanding this matter back to State court issued on December 23, 2014. Defendant would respectfully show the Comi the following: This case was removed to Federal Court on September 25, 2014 by the Defendant on the basis of federal question was raised by the Plaintiff in its amended original petition in which it assetied a cause of action under42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed its second amended petition dropping its claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its' Motion to Remand arguing that the Federal comi no longer had jurisdiction. On December 23, 2014, Judge Miller granted Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, (attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of Judge Miller's Order) Defendant hereby appeals this Court's jurisdiction as the issues are oven11led as a matter of law. Defendant asserts that tllis case should have been dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizen Participation Act codified at Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. The Court did not mle on the motion to dismiss within the time petiod prescribed Defs Notice of Appeal Page I by Section 27.005 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Therefore, the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law, and the moving party m ay appeal. See § 27.008(a) Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Defendant intends this Interlocutory Appeal to be accelerated in accordance with Rule 28.1 of the Texas Rules ofAppellate Procedure. Defendant would further show the Court that this appeal stays commencement of a trial and all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal in the First Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas pursuant to Section 51.014(b), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. SIGNED this 7th day of January, 2015. Respectfully submitted, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal Hyde & Zech, P.C. attorneys & counse l ors at l aw • ra mpagel aw . com A Professional Corporation 2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609 Austin, Texas 78745 512/279-6431 512/279-6438 (Facsimile) george.hyde@rampage-aus.com scott.tschirhart@rampage-aus.com By: GEORGE E. HYDE State Bar No. 45006157 SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART State Bar No. 24013655 Counsel for Defendant Bob Deuel! Defs Notice of Appeal Page2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon the below named individual(s) as indicated, and according to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the 7th day of January, 2015. James E. "Trey'' Trainor, III Electronic Notification BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSON, L.L.P. 401 W. 15th Street, Suite 845 Austin, TX 78701 Joseph M. Nixon Electronic Notification BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSON, L.L.P. 1300 Post Oak Blvd., 25th Floor Houston, TX 77056-3000 GEORGE E. HYDE SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART Defs Notice of Appeal Page3 Case 4:14-cv-02754 Document 17 Filed in TXSD on 12/23/14 Page 1 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE , INC., § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL ACTION H-14-02754 § BOB DEUELL, § § Defendant. § O RDER This case was removed to federal court on September 25, 2014, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction after plaintiff amended its original petition asserting a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1, p. 84. Since removal, plaintiff has filed its second amended petition, dropping its claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 11. Plaintiff now seeks remand, arguing that this court no longer has jurisdiction because it abandoned the only federal claim asserted in the case. Dkt. 12. Defendant opposes remand on the bases that plaintiff’s motion to remand was untimely and its second amended complaint should not be considered by the court because it was not filed with consent of the defendant or with leave from the court. Dkt. 13. After considering the motion, response, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion to remand should be GRANTED. The threshold issue is whether plaintiff properly filed its second amended complaint. Plaintiff correctly argues that it was permitted to file its second amended complaint as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Specifically, a party is permitted to amend its pleading “once as a matter of course . . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” FED . R. CIV . P. 15(a)(1)(B). Defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on October 15, 2014, and plaintiff A Case 4:14-cv-02754 Document 17 Filed in TXSD on 12/23/14 Page 2 of 3 filed its second amended complaint on November 5, 2014. Plaintiff’s amendment, therefore, was timely and permitted as a matter of course without consent from defendant or leave from the court. Since the only federal claim was eliminated from the suit, no federal question remains before the court. However, the dismissal of the federal claim does not necessarily divest the court of supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Knatt v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of E. Baton Rouge Parish, 373 F. App’x 438, 441 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The subsequent dismissal of all federal claims from [plantiff’s] suit did not divest the district court of supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state- law claims.”). But under § 1367(c)(3), the general rule in this circuit is to dismiss or remand state- law claims following dismissal of the federal claims they supplement. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992). The court’s application of this rule is guided by four factors identified by the Supreme Court, namely judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988). Here, all four factors weigh heavily in favor of remand. First, this case is in its infancy, discovery has not begun, and this court has made no rulings on defendant’s motions to dismiss under Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 350 (“[W]hen the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”). Second, the convenience factor weighs in favor of remand, as there is no geographic hardship that would be imposed on the parties upon remand to the Harris County district court from which the case originated. Brim v. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 213 F. App’x 303, 306 (5th Cir. 2007). Third, the fairness factor weighs in favor of remand. Remanding the case will not present a danger of conflicting rulings or reopening matters litigated before this court because there have been no substantive rulings made by this court. And lastly, as to the comity factor, while the court is competent to interpret Texas law, the court also 2 Case 4:14-cv-02754 Document 17 Filed in TXSD on 12/23/14 Page 3 of 3 recognizes that principles of federalism require deference to Texas state courts to determine quintessential matters of Texas law. Accordingly, because the Carnegie-Mellon factors weigh strongly in favor of remand, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state-law claim. This action is REMANDED to the 152nd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. Defendant’s pending motions to dismiss (Dkts. 6, 16) are DENIED AS MOOT. It is so ORDERED. Signed at Houston, Texas on December 23, 2014. ___________________________________ Gray H. Miller United States District Judge 3