Laura Leticia Zepeda Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez,Jr. v. Legend Natural Gas III, LP Legend Natural Gas, LLC Lewis Energy Group, LP And Lewis Petro Properties, Inc

ACCEPTED
04-14-00899-cv
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
4/30/2015 4:51:46 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK

NO. 04-14-00899-CV
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
04/30/2015 4:51:46 PM
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk

LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of
Jose Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
Appellant,

v.

LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC;
LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP, LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.,
ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING, LP, VIRTEX HOLDINGS, LLP,
VIRATEX OPERATING CO., INC., ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS, LLC;
ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and XTO ENERGY, INC.,
Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEES LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP
AND LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC

Appealed from the 81st District Court of La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 14-07-009-CVL

Isaac J. Huron, State Bar No. 24032447
Ramon R. Rodriguez, State Bar No. 24088319

McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Tel: (210) 822-6666
Fax: (210) 822-1151
e-mail: ihuron@lawdcm.com
rrodriguez@lawdcm.com
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellants: Leticia Zepeda Vasquez

Appellant’s Counsel: Jeffrey L. Dorrell
H. Mark Burck
Daniel Dutko
HANZEN LAPORTE, LLP
11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
Houston, Texas 77079
Tel: (713) 522-9444
Fax: (713) 524-2580
jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
mburck@hanszenlaporte.com
ddutko@hanszenlaporte.com

Appellees and Counsel: Legend Natural Gas III, LP and
Legend Natural Gas, LLC

Isaac J. Huron
Ramon Rodriguez
DAVIS, CEDILLO & MENDOZA, INC.
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Tel: (210) 822-6666
Fax: (210) 822-1151
ihuron@lawdcm.com
rrodriguez@lawdcm.com

ii
Virtex Holdings, LP and
Virtex Operating Co., Inc.

Christopher Lowrance
Brian C. Miller
Karol S. Furmaga
ROYSTON RAYZOR VICKERY & WILLIAMS
802 N. Carancahua, Suite 1300
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Tel: (361) 884-8808
Fax: (361) 884-7261
chris.lowrance@roystonlaw.com
brian.miller@roystonlaw.com
karol.furmaga@roystonlaw.com

XTO Energy, Inc.

Jose E. Garcia
Francisco R. Villarreal
GARCIA & VILLARREAL PLLC
4311 N. McColl Road
McAllen, Texas 78504
Tel: (956) 630-0081
Fax: (956) 630-3631
jeg@gvlaw.net
panchov@gvlaw.com

Rosetta Resources Operating, LP

William A. Abernethy
DONNELL ABERNETHY & KIESCHNICK
555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Tel: (361) 888-5551
Fax: (361) 880-5618
babernethy@dakpc.com

iii
Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC and
Enterprise Products Company

J. Joseph Vale
E. Michael Rodriguez
Erin A. Hudson
ATLAS HALL & RODRIGUEZ
818 Pecan (P.O. Box 3725)
McAllen, Texas 78501
Tel: (956) 682-5501
Fax: (956) 686-6109
jvale@atlashall.com
mrodiguez@atlashall.com
ehudson@atlashall.com

Lewis Energy Group, LP and
Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.

David L. Ortega
James M. “Jamie” Parker, Jr.
NAMAN HOWELL SMITH & LEE, PLLC
Union Square II
10001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
Tel: (210) 731-6300
Fax: (210) 785-2953
dortega@namanhowell.com
jparker@namanhowell.com

iv
 RECORD REFERENCES

Appellees, Legend Natural Gas III, LP and Legend Natural Gas, LLC, will

refer to the Clerk’s Record as “(CR ___)” and the Clerk’s Supplemental Record as

“(CSR ___)”.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .......................................................... ii

RECORD REFERENCES .........................................................................................v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... vi

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. vii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................3

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................4

1. The Duty to Maintain the Public Roadways Rests with State and Local
Government. ....................................................................................................4

2. Appellant’s Factual Allegations are Legally Insufficient................................7

3. Appellant Is Not Entitled to Another Opportunity to Amnend Her Pleadings
.......................................................................................................................11

CONCLUSION & PRAYER ...................................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................................14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................15

vi
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Adams v. Grapotte,
69 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) aff'd, 130 Tex. 587,
111 S.W.2d 690 (1938) ................................................................................. 4, 5, 6, 7

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) .................................................................................... 8, 10

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) .................................................................................... 8, 10

Buchanan v. Rose,
159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1942) ....................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 10

Cassidy v. TeamHealth Inc.,
No. 01-08-324-CV, 2009 WL 2231217, *7 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]
July 23, 2009, pet. den.) ...........................................................................................11

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears,
911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995) ............................................................................11

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
429 S.W.3d 752, 754..................................................................................................8

Grapotte v. Adams,
130 Tex. 587 (1938) .................................................................................................10

Haddix v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co.,
253 S.W.3d 339, 347 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008, no pet.) ............................. 11, 12

Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., INC. v. Escoto,
288 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................................11

Tara Partners, Ltd. v. City of South Houston,
282 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex.App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2009, pet. denied) ..... 11, 12

Wooly v. Schaffer,
447 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], no pet. 2014)........................8

vii
 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellees, Legend Natural Gas III, LP and Legend Natural Gas, LLC,

believe that the issues in this case can be decided without oral argument, but would

request argument time if oral argument is granted to Appellant.

viii
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant, Leticia Zepeda Vasquez (“Appellant”), filed suit against

Appellees Legend Natural Gas III, LP; Legend Natural Gas, LLC; Lewis Energy

Group, LP; Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.; Rosetta Resources Operating, LP; Virtex

Holdings, LLP; Virtex Operating Company, Inc.; Enterprise Products Holdings,

LLC; Enterprise Products Company; and XTO Energy, Inc. (collectively

“defendants”) for the negligence and gross negligence, which, allegedly, caused

the death of her late husband, Jose Vasquez. (CR 079). Mr. Vasquez died in a

vehicular accident that took place on Krueger Road in La Salle County, Texas on

August 4, 2012. (CR 082). Appellant claims that the defendants’ negligence caused

Mr. Vasquez’s death by operating their trucks on Krueger Road at high rates of

speed and possibly overweight, thereby damaging the public roadway. (CR 082-

084). More specifically, Appellant maintains Mr. Vasquez confronted a dust cloud

as he drove on Krueger Road which proximately caused him to drive off the road

and be killed. (CR 084).

Legend Natural Gas III, LP and Legend Natural Gas, LLC (“Appellee”

herein) filed a Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s causes of action as

baseless. (CR 062-068). On September 18, 2014, the Honorable Judge Stella

Saxton granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss. (CR 074). Subsequently, on

November 20, 2014, Judge Saxton granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss

1
under Rule 91a. (CR 147). Appellant filed her notice appeal shortly thereafter. (CR

159). Appellant never requested leave to amend her pleadings after defendant’s

motions to dismiss were granted.

2
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The issue presented in this case has been addressed on two occasions by the

Texas Supreme Court. In each instance, the Court found that a defendant who

lawfully operates his vehicle on a public roadway cannot be held liable for the

damages that result from the deterioration of the roadway. Appellant’s pleadings

fail to state a claim that is supported in law or fact, because Appellee owed no duty

to Appellant to maintain the public roadway. Moreover, Appellant’s factual

allegations are legally insufficient to support an inference that Appellee operated

its vehicles on the road unlawfully, and conclusory statements of law do not satisfy

the Appellant’s burden of stating a cause of action for which relief can be granted.

Finally, Appellant waived her opportunity to amend her pleadings by failing to

request such relief from the trial court.

3
 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Perhaps most telling is the fact that Appellant wholly fails to identify a

single case that stands for the proposition that she advances. Imposing a duty upon

Defendants in this case runs afoul of well-established Texas jurisprudence, and

would impose a duty where none exists. The duty of maintaining public roads rests

with the state and local government.

The issue raised by Appellant has been addressed by the highest court of this

state in two analogous cases, one which is thoroughly cited by Appellant. In each

instance, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a duty upon a defendant

who lawfully operates a vehicle on a public roadway—such as Appellee herein—

would render “the use of the highways too hazardous from the standpoint of public

liability.” Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1942). Because Appellant’s

pleadings do not set forth legally sufficient facts to establish that Appellee’s

operated their vehicles along the roadway in question in an unlawful manner, there

is no basis to depart from well-settled Texas jurisprudence.

1. The Duty to Maintain the Public Roadways Rests With State and Local

Government.

The Buchanan and Adams v. Grapotte, 69 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.

1934) aff'd, 130 Tex. 587, 111 S.W.2d 690 (1938) courts addressed the issue raised

by Appellant, and in each case the court found that the lawful user of the road

4
owed no duty to maintain or repair road. In fact, the Adams court went one step

further, and acknowledged that the duty to repair the public roadways rests

exclusively with the government. Adams, 69 S.W.2d at 432 (“In its last analysis,

the judgment in the instant case can be upheld alone upon the ground that it is the

duty of abutting owners, and likewise of their lessees, to repair the public

thoroughfares adjoining their premises. That duty does not exist, but rests

exclusively on the municipality, and where there is no duty there can be no

negligence.”). To impose such a duty upon private individuals to maintain public

roadways would disserve the constituents and the jurisprudence of the state.

Buchanan, 159 S.W.2d at 110 (“It would be carrying the matter too far to say that

one must give notice of every known defect in a road naturally resulting from his

normal and legitimate use thereof. ”).

In Buchanan, the court was tasked with determining whether a driver “who

drives over a bridge on a public road and thereafter discovers that such bridge,

because of its defective condition, has broken down under the weight of his

vehicle, without negligence on his part, is under any duty to give warning so as to

prevent other travelers from being injured as a result of the broken bridge.” Id. at

109. The defendant in Buchanan was driving his truck down a public roadway,

and, as he crossed over a bridge, the bridge gave way and pressed down at one end

below the embankment creating a dangerous condition. Id. The defendant refused

5
to do anything about it when he was confronted by another driver about the

condition of the bridge. Id. Thereafter, Mrs. Buchanan was injured when her and

her husband drove onto the bridge. Id. The court ultimately held that a non-

negligent user of the roadway is under no duty to warn others of the dangerous

conditions created by his lawful use of the roadway. Id. To hold otherwise “would

make the use of the highways too hazardous from the standpoint of public

liability.” Id. at 110. Buchanan address the issue of whether Appellee was under a

duty to warn Appellant of the alleged dangerous condition created by their lawful

use. The next critical question is, did Appellee owe Appellant a duty to repair the

road?

This issue was decided by this state’s highest court in 1938. Adams sought

recovery from Grapotte for injuries sustained as the result of her stepping into a

hole or depression in the sidewalk in front of Grapotte’s garage business. Adams,

69 S.W.2d at 461. Her theory against Grapotte was that his invitation to his

customers to drive over the sidewalk to enter his garage had caused the depression,

and ultimately her injuries. Id. The theory seemed “to be that appellant was

enjoying some kind of special privilege in the sidewalk by using same as an

integral part of his business, for which reason the duty devolved upon him, as the

proprietor of the business, to keep the sidewalk in repair.” Id. Recognizing that the

duty to maintain the sidewalk, much like the public roadways, rests with the

6
government, the court found that there could be no negligence where no duty

existed. Id. at 462 (“She seeks to hold the tenant liable on the ground that he

contributed to this condition by inviting his customers to use the drive-in-way over

the sidewalk. Her theory is based essentially upon the assumption that appellant

was making a wrongful use of a portion of the public thoroughfare. Is the

assumption correct? We think not.”). Unless there are facts that warrant a departure

from this general rule—that the duty to repair rests with the county—there is no

basis for holding a defendant liable for his use of a public roadway.

The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from this well-settled law,

and the Appellant’s conclusory statements of law and scant factual allegations

cannot support a finding that the Appellee was negligent in this instance.

2. Appellant’s Factual Allegations are Legally Insufficient.

A dismissal under Rule 91a is a question of law, which this Court reviews de

novo. The few Texas appellate courts that have reviewed decisions under new Rule

91a have all held that the factual allegations contained in the pleadings must be

reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. In other words, the

allegations, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, must be

taken as true. “In that context, [courts] construe the pleadings liberally in favor of

the plaintiff, look to the pleader's intent, and accept as true the factual allegations

in the pleadings to determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively

7
demonstrate” that plaintiff has stated a cause of action for which relief can be

granted. Wooly v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.],

no pet. 2014). This analysis is similar to that of an analysis for legally sufficiency.

Id.

And while factual allegations must be taken as true, the factual allegations,

much like a federal court’s analysis under Rule 12 (b)(6), must contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 76 (quoting

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In essence, the plaintiff’s complaint is

liberally construed in her favor, and her well-pleaded facts are taken as true.

GoDaddy, 429 S.W.3d at 754 (emphasis added). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In addition,

courts “may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative

explanations,’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the

plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 567).

Appellant suggests in her brief that she pleaded, inter alia, the following

facts: (1) some of defendants’ trucks traveled at unsafe speed; (2) some of

defendants’ trucks travelled recklessly, and; (3) some of defendants’ trucks were

8
overweight. Appellant’s Brief at Pg. 8. However, a more careful review of the

Appellant’s pleadings suggests otherwise. Factual allegations, other than

conclusory statements that defendants were negligent or reckless, regarding the

Appellee’s use of the road do not appear in Appellant’s live petition until page 5,

wherein she states that “[d]efendant’s drivers continually drive down Krueger

Road at a high rate of speed, operate heavy and maybe overweight vehicles on

Krueger Road, and operate vehicles that Defendants knew Krueger Road could not

handle.” (CR 083). She states the same factual allegations once more with a slight

variation, stating later that the defendant’s vehicles were “possibly overweight,”

instead of maybe overweight. (CR 085). She further alleges that the Lewis Energy

truck that was travelling in front of the deceased was doing so at a high rate of

speed and was driven recklessly, according to an eye witness. (CR 084).

Appellant’s conclusory statements regarding Appellee’s negligence or

recklessness should not be considered in this Court’s analysis. Such statements are

conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts pleaded by Appellant. The

only factual allegations made by Appellant are that the Appellee’s trucks were

driven at a high rate of speed and were possibly overweight. She does not state the

trucks were driven at an unlawful rate speed, nor does she identify any correlation

or causal connection between the rate of speed at which a truck is driven and road

deterioration. Her claim that the trucks were, “might” have or “possibly” could

9
have been overweight, even if accepted as true, does not support an inference that

the Appellee, or any of the other defendants, operated their vehicles in a negligent

manner. As previously stated, this Court “may infer from the factual allegations in

the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanations,’ which suggest lawful conduct

rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). Therefore, this Court can infer

from Appellant’s suggestions that the trucks were not overweight and were

operated in a lawful manner. When a defendant does no more than use the public

roadways lawfully, liability cannot attach for injuries that result from the

deterioration of the same. See Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1942); see

also Grapotte v. Adams, 130 Tex. 587 (1938).

Moreover, Appellant has not plead facts demonstrating that the alleged

overuse of the road created a dangerous condition beyond what users of any

unmaintained road might anticipate. In this instance, Appellant maintains that Mr.

Vasquez was confronted with a dust cloud while driving down Krueger Road,

which proximately caused his accident. (CR 082 and 084). A dust cloud on any

unmaintained road is not a dangerous condition that one would not anticipate and

is rather a condition that any driver might expect to encounter when traveling upon

an unmaintained road. Being such an obvious condition, there is no duty to warn

on the part of defendants, or any other driver travelling down Krueger Road.

10
Cf., Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., INC. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex. 2009)

(holding that “because the risk associated with driving while fatigued is common

knowledge . . . no duty to train employees about those risks”); Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995) (holding that there is no duty to warn of

“obvious risks” that are common knowledge).

3. Appellant Is Not Entitled to Another Opportunity to Amend Her

Pleadings.

Even where the pleadings are insufficient, a plaintiff is not necessarily

entitled to an opportunity to amend. Tara Partners, Ltd. v. City of South Houston,

282 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex.App.—Houston (14th Dist.) 2009, pet. denied); see also

id. at 578. “Although the general rule reflects a preference for allowing

amendment, a plaintiff may forfeit this opportunity through inaction.” Id. at 578.

“By failing to seek permission to amend after the trial court found the

[defendants’] plea[s] meritorious, [Appellant] forfeited the opportunity to amend

while this case was pending in the trial court.” Tara, at 578 (emph. added). Once

the trial court ordered dismissal, Appellant had an obligation to “seek or request an

opportunity for another amendment to their petition.” Id.; see also Haddix v. Am.

Zurich Ins. Co., 253 S.W.3d 339, 347 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008, no pet.) (similar

statement). Appellant also had an obligation to “present the trial court with any

proposed amendments.” Cassidy v. TeamHealth Inc., No. 01-08-324-CV, 2009

11
WL 2231217, *7 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2009, pet. den.); see

also Haddix, at 347. Even if Appellant had objected to the dismissal orders or

made a motion for new trial (neither of which she did), she still had to

affirmatively seek leave to amend and tender a proposed amendment to preserve

any right to complain that an opportunity to amend was erroneously denied.

Haddix, at 347 (objection and motion for new trial insufficient to preserve alleged

error).

Appellant made no such argument after dismissal in the trial court and

thereby forfeited the opportunity to make any such argument on appeal. See, e.g.,

Tara, at 578; Haddix, at 347. Even if Appellant had preserved the argument, an

appellate court may not remand a case to the trial court merely on speculation that

an amendment may cure a defect. Haddix, at 347.

In this instance, given Appellant’s failure to seek relief in the trial court, she

has waived any opportunity to now seek such relief.

12
 CONCLUSION & PRAYER

Accordingly, Appellees, Legend Natural Gas III, LP and Legend Natural

Gas, LLC, pray that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Respectfully submitted,

McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Tel: (210) 822-6666
Fax: (210) 822-1151

By: /s/ Isaac J. Huron
Isaac J. Huron
State Bar No. 24032447
Ramon Rodriguez
State Bar No. 24088319
ihuron@lawdcm.com
rrodriguez@lawdcm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP AND
LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC

13
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief is in compliance with the rules governing the
length and font requirements for briefs prepared by electronic means. The brief was
prepared using Microsoft Word 2010. According to the software used to prepare this
brief, the total word count, including footnotes, but not including those sections
excluded by rule, is 2,307. The “Times New Roman” font is used in this brief, with
14 pt. font for the body of the brief, and 12 pt. font for footnotes.

/s/ Isaac J. Huron
Isaac J. Huron

14
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has
been forwarded on this 30th day of April, 2015, via the electronic service system
provided through Texas.gov and via e-mail to Appellant’s counsel and all other
Appellees’ counsel in this matter:

Jeffrey L. Dorrell
H. Mark Burck
Daniel Dutko
HANZEN LAPORTE, LLP
11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
Houston, Texas 77079
Tel: (713) 522-9444
Fax: (713) 524-2580
jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
mburck@hanszenlaporte.com
ddutko@hanszenlaporte.com
Counsel for Appellant

Christopher Lowrance
Brian C. Miller
Karol S. Furmaga
ROYSTON RAYZOR VICKERY & WILLIAMS
802 N. Carancahua, Suite 1300
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Tel: (361) 884-8808
Fax: (361) 884-7261
chris.lowrance@roystonlaw.com
brian.miller@roystonlaw.com
karol.furmaga@roystonlaw.com
Counsel for Virtex Holdings, LP and
Virtex Operating Co., Inc.

15
Jose E. Garcia
Francisco R. Villarreal
GARCIA & VILLARREAL PLLC
4311 N. McColl Road
McAllen, Texas 78504
Tel: (956) 630-0081
Fax: (956) 630-3631
jeg@gvlaw.net
panchov@gvlaw.com
Counsel for XTO Energy, Inc.

William A. Abernethy
DONNELL ABERNETHY & KIESCHNICK
555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Tel: (361) 888-5551
Fax: (361) 880-5618
babernethy@dakpc.com
Counsel for Rosetta Resources Operating, LP

J. Joseph Vale
E. Michael Rodriguez
Erin A. Hudson
ATLAS HALL & RODRIGUEZ
818 Pecan (P.O. Box 3725)
McAllen, Texas 78501
Tel: (956) 682-5501
Fax: (956) 686-6109
jvale@atlashall.com
mrodiguez@atlashall.com
ehudson@atlashall.com
Counsel for Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC,
and Enterprise Products Company

16
David L. Ortega
James M. “Jamie” Parker, Jr.
NAMAN HOWELL SMITH & LEE, PLLC
Union Square II
10001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
Tel: (210) 731-6300
Fax: (210) 785-2953
dortega@namanhowell.com
jparker@namanhowell.com
Counsel for Lewis Energy Group, LP and
Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.

/s/ Isaac J. Huron
Isaac J. Huron

17