Graciela Casas Arjona v. State

ACCEPTED
13-13-00541-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
1/28/2015 11:05:23 AM
DORIAN RAMIREZ
CLERK

Cause No. 13-13-00541-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
AT CORPUS CHRISTI-EDINBURG,1/28/2015
TEXAS11:05:23 AM
DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
Clerk
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRACIELA CASAS ARJONA, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPEAL OF JUDGMENT IN CAUSE NO. CR-2968-11-B
FROM THE 93RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
THE HONORABLE JUDGE RUDY DELGADO, PRESIDING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF TEXAS/APPELLEE

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, JR.
Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas

LUIS A. GONZALEZ, ASSISTANT
Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas

HIDALGO COUNTY COURTHOUSE
Edinburg, TX 78539
Telephone #: (956) 318-2300, ext. 750
Facsimile #: (956) 380-0407
luis.gonzalez@da.co.hidalgo.tx.us
State Bar No. 24083088

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED

1
 IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLEE certifies that the following is a complete list of the parties,

attorneys, and all other interested persons regarding this matter:

APPELLANT in this case is GRACIELA CASAS ARJONA.

APPELLANT was represented in the trial court by ROBERT CAPELLO,

101 N. 10th Ave., Edinburg, TX 78541; and ROEL ESQUIVEL, 114 S. 12th Ave.,

Edinburg, TX 78539.

APPELLANT is represented on appeal by Victoria Guerra, 320 W. Pecan

Blvd., McAllen, TX 78504.

APPELLEE is the State of Texas, by and through RICARDO RODRIGUEZ

JR., Criminal District Attorney, Hidalgo County, TX.

APPELLEE was represented in the trial court by RENE GUERRA, Criminal

District Attorney in and for Hidalgo County, Texas, 100 N. Closner, 3rd floor,

Edinburg TX 78539, by his Assistant Criminal District Attorneys CREGG

THOMPSON and ROXANNE SALINAS.

APPELLEE is represented on appeal by RICARDO RODRIGUEZ JR.1,

Criminal District Attorney in and for Hidalgo County, Texas, 100 N. Closner, 3 rd

floor, Edinburg TX 78539, by his Assistant Criminal District Attorney, LUIS A.

GONZALEZ.

1
This appeal arose when former District Attorney Rene Guerra held office. As of January 1st,
2015, Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. is now the active district attorney for Hidalgo County.
ii
 NOTES AS TO THE FORM OF CITATION

A.) Citation to the Clerk’s Record will be to page number, e.g. CR 47 refers to
Page 47 of the Clerk’s Record.

B.) Citation to testimony in the Reporter’s Record will be to volume and page
numbers, e.g. ‘3 RR 56’ refers to page 56 of volume 3 of the Reporter’s Record.

C.) Citation to the State’s Exhibits will be to exhibit number, e.g. SX 39 refers to
State’s Exhibit number 39, found in the‘exhibits’ volume within the Reporter’s
Record.

D.) Reference to the Brief of Appellant will be to page number, e.g. Brief of
Appellant, p. 9.

iii
 NOTE AS TO ORAL ARGUMENT

The State of Texas respectfully submits that oral argument in the instant case

would not serve to enlighten the Court further or illuminate the issues in that,

because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and

record, the decisional process of the Court would not be significantly aided by oral

argument. The State of Texas, therefore, respectfully submits that oral argument in

this case is not necessary, and therefore waives oral argument.

Nonetheless, the State of Texas reserves the right to present oral argument

should the Court grant oral argument.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page ....................................................................................................................i

Identification of Parties and Counsel ........................................................................ ii

Note as to the Form of Citation................................................................................ iii

Note as to Oral Argument .........................................................................................iv

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... v

Index of Authorities ................................................................................................ vii

Statement of the Case................................................................................................. x

Issues Presented ........................................................................................................xi

Statement of Facts ................................................................................................... xii

Summary of Argument ........................................................................................ xviii

Argument and Authorities.......................................................................................... 1

Counterpoint One (In Response to Issue No. One):

The evidence produced at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to
support the jury’s guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt for the
offense of Capital Murder of Reyes Garcia ..................................................... 1

Counterpoint Two (In Response to Issue No. Two):

The trial court did not err when an unanimity instruction was not
included in the jury charge .............................................................................. 8

Counterpoint Three (In Response to Issue No. Three):

Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a
unanimity instruction in the jury charge ....................................................... 15

v
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 24

Prayer ....................................................................................................................... 25

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 26

Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 26

vi
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ......................................................................... 11

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .................................................................. 1

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) ...................................................... 15

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..........................................13, 14, 16

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cases

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)....................................10

Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)...................................... 15

Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).................................... 5

Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........................................... 15

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ....................................... 3

Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ..................................13, 14

Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)........................................ 3

Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ..............................13, 14

Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ........................................ 2

Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)........................................ 15

Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ................................................ 6

Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ...................................... 2

Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .......................................... 3
vii
Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........................................... 6

Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ................................. 10

Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ............................................. 15

Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........................................ 5, 6

Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)....................................... 5

Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .............................................. 6

State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ....................................14

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ...............................14, 15

Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...............................1, 8, 9

Texas Courts of Appeals Cases

Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d) ....................................................................... 5

Gardner v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7326 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2008)(not designated for publication) .............................11, 12

Hanson v. State, 55 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, pet. ref'd) .......................................................... 11, 12 (n. 18), 13

Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.)...................................................................14, 15

Ozuna v. State, 199 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.)........................................................................... 3

Wheaton v. State, 129 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.)........................................................................... 2

viii
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.29(a) .................................................................... 11

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. V, § 13........................................................................ 11

TEX. PENAL CODE § 2.01 .......................................................................................... 11

TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a) ....................................................................................... 4

TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b) ....................................................................................... 4

TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(a) ....................................................................................... 5

TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(b) ....................................................................................... 5

TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2)................................................................................... 5

TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b) ....................................................................................... 5

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03 .......................................................................................... 4

TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a) ..................................................................................... 4

TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(3) ................................................................................ 4

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV ................................................................................. 11

ix
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by indictment in cause number CR-2968-11-B for

two counts of Capital Murder. (CR 2-3).

On June 6, 2013, the jury found the Appellant guilty of Count One and

Count Two. (28 RR 69).

On June 10, 2013, the State abandoned Count Two and the trial court

imposed upon the Appellant a sentence of confinement in the Institutional Division

of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of life without parole.

(29 RR 4-6, CR 127-29).

On June 20, 2013, the Appellant filed a motion for new trial. (CR 139-43).

On the same day, the Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. (CR 131).

On June 28, 2013, the trial court denied the Appellant’s motion for new trial.

(CR 146).

The Appellant is now before this Court by way of three points of error.

x
 ISSUES PRESENTED

Counterpoint One (In Response to Issue No. One):

The evidence produced at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense of Capital Murder
of Reyes Garcia.

Counterpoint Two (In Response to Issue No. Two):

The trial court did not err when an unanimity instruction was not included in the
jury charge.

Counterpoint Three (In Response to Issue No. Three):

Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a
unanimity instruction in the jury charge.

xi
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Facts Pertinent to Counterpoint One (In Response to Issue No. One) 2

On the evening of June 23, 2010, Graciela Casas Arjona (‘Appellant’) and

her sister, Vanessa Garcia (‘Vanessa’), were cooking dinner at Vanessa’s home.

23 RR 80-81. Vanessa resided at 2416 Kirk Ave., Mission, TX along with her

husband Reyes Garcia Jr. (‘Victim’), their son, Reyes Garcia III (‘Garcia III’), and

their daughters. While the two sisters were cooking, the victim and Appellant’s

boyfriend, Roel Cantu, were outside in the back patio drinking beer. 23 RR 83.

Later in the evening, Garcia III, the victim’s son, was in his room when he

saw men dressed in black walking through the hallway. 23 RR 64. Garcia III

followed them. 23 RR 66. While following, Garcia III noticed that one of them

was taking the guns the victim had displayed on the wall of the living room. 23

RR 71. A person behind Garcia III told him to follow and Garcia III did so. 23

RR 66. Garcia III walked into the master bedroom and saw his sisters, Appellant,

and his mother Vanessa on top of the bed. 23 RR 66-67. The men in black had

large machine-gun type weapons. 23 RR 67. Garcia III was told to go to the bed

and put his head down; Garcia III stood against the bed and looked down. 23 RR

2
Because Appellant was convicted solely on Count One of the indictment and challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence thereof, the State has provided only those facts as it deems
pertinent to this issue.

xii
67. The men in black searched through the room and dumped the contents out of

some drawers. 23 RR 68.

The victim was brought into the room and the men in black asked the victim

for money. Id. The victim told him he had already gave them everything he had.

Id. One of the men in black kicked the victim. 23 RR 69. Garcia III could feel the

kicks as the victim had been on the floor, next to his feet and against his legs. Id.

The victim was taken out of the room. Id. Shortly after, Garcia III hears the sound

of gun fire, followed by the sound of the men in black running out of the house.

Id. Garcia III heard a vehicle burning rubber. Id. Garcia III ran out the room and

saw his father, the victim, on the floor full of blood. 23 RR 70. After some

difficulty with the phone, the survivors called police. 23 RR 71.

Officer Eduardo Hernandez of the Mission Police Department (‘MPD’) was

the first to arrive at 2416 Kirk Ave., Mission, TX after dispatch radioed that a male

subject had been shot at the address. 24 RR 67-68. Officer Hernandez walked

inside the home after Vanessa told him that her husband was shot. 24 RR 69.

Officer Hernandez saw the victim’s bloody and gun-shot ridden body on the floor.

24 RR 70. Officer Hernandez immediately called the ambulance after he

determined that the victim was not moving and did not appear to be alive. 24 RR

70. Forensic pathologist Dr. Norma Jean Farley performed the autopsy on the

victim and discovered 8 gun-shot wounds on his body. 25 RR 43. Dr. Farley

xiii
opined that the victim’s cause of death was gun-shot wounds to the torso. 25 RR

69.3

Shortly after the murder, Officer Rosember Ramirez arrived at the crime

scene. 23 RR 23. Roel Cantu, Appellant’s boyfriend, was outside, laying on the

tailgate of a black truck, complaining of chest and stomach pain. 23 RR 24-25.

Once inside the home, Officer Ramirez noticed bullet casings on the floor of the

living room area. 23 RR 28. Officer Ramirez talked to Vanessa, who told him

about a security camera video receiver in one of the bedrooms. 23 RR 29. In this

particular room, Officer Ramirez finds the video receiver unplugged, as well as

clothing on the floor and the bed. Id. A drawer from the furniture was also on top

of the bed. Id. Officer Ramirez talked to next-door neighbor Arnulfo Salinas, who

lived in 2418 Kirk Ave., who stated he heard 6 shots and saw a black Ford

Expedition leaving westbound with no headlights at a high rate of speed. 23 RR

30-31.

The video surveillance given to MPD showed a black Ford Expedition

parked in the driveway of the victim’s home shortly before the murder. 23 RR

104; SX 22-23. The video surveillance also showed four men exiting the vehicle.

23 RR 104-105; SX 22-23. MPD Investigators noticed that in the video, the back

passengers had both exited the vehicle from the back driver-side door, indicating

3
Dr. Farley’s autopsy report is memorialized in SX 73 of the record.
xiv
that there was a problem with the back passenger-side door. Id. Upon close

inspection of the video, it appeared to MPD investigators that the black Ford

Expedition had an indention on the passenger-side step rail. Id.

After viewing the home surveillance video, MPD investigators visited Roel

Cantu at the hospital emergency room. 23 RR 115. Cantu stated that a person he

referred to as ‘El Sapo’ was involved in the murder. 23 RR 117. When MPD

investigators could not find ‘El Sapo’, MPD Investigator Catarino Sanchez talked

to Cantu again at the police department to try to get more information. 23 RR 119.

Investigator Sanchez noted that Cantu’s second statement had been different from

the first one he made at the hospital, so Cantu was detained for investigative

purposes.4 23 RR 119-122. Investigator Sanchez next talked to the Appellant. 23

RR 123. Appellant provided a written statement in which she directly contested

Cantu’s account of the murder. 23 RR 126-27.5 Next, ‘El Sapo’ and his wife came

to the police station and provided written statements which casted doubt on

Cantu’s allegation of his involvement in the victim’s murder.6 23 RR 127-28.

4
During trial, Investigator Sanchez described Cantu as being deceptive during this encounter as
Cantu was continuously rubbing his hands on his thighs as he was talking. 23 RR 119-20.
Sanchez also described the differences between Cantu’s first and second statements,
memorialized in 23 RR 120-22.
5
Appellant’s first statement is memorialized in SX 40 of the record.
6
‘El Sapo’ was identified as Jesus Diaz Garcia; ‘El Sapo’s’ wife was identified as Flor Giselle
Flores Ramirez. 23 RR 127.

xv
Shortly after, Cantu made a third statement confessing his involvement in the

murder of the victim. 23 RR 129-30. Cantu’s third statement cleared ‘El Sapo’

and directed MPD investigators to Tony Mendez and Mendez’s cousin Jeffery

Juarez, also known as ‘El Dragon.’7 Id. Juarez was a known member of the Tri-

City Bombers, a criminal street gang out of the Pharr-San Juan-Alamo, Texas area.

23 RR 130.

Surveillance was setup at Tony Mendez’s home address, 411 Nicholson,

Pharr, Texas.8 23 RR 131. When no one showed up at the property, a search

warrant was executed the following day; ammunition was found in the attic, but

not much else. Id. To date, Tony Mendez has not been found.9 23 RR 220. Later,

an individual talked to Donna police department, identifying Ezequiel Angel

Falcon as one of the persons in the home surveillance video of the black Ford

Expedition the night of the murder.10 26 RR 49. Cantu indentified Falcon, via

7
Phone records revealed that Cantu had made a phone call to Tony Mendez just minutes prior
to the masked men making entry to the back yard of the home. 23 RR 211-12. In addition, in
his third statement, Cantu stated that Juarez was one of the masked men. 23 RR 212.
8
In his statement, Cantu admitted to meeting with Mendez at this home. 23 RR 134.
9
Mendez’s cellphone was ‘pinged’ at Devon Drive, Mission, Texas, before execution of the
search warrant on 411 Nicholson. 23 RR 218. This address is where Mendez’s parents and
brother resided. Id.
10
The surveillance video was given to the local media by MPD investigators for public
assistance in indentifying the four individuals who exited the black Ford Expedition. 26 RR
49.

xvi
photo lineup, as the man who kicked the victim prior to the murder.11 Id.; 23 RR

135. A search warrant was executed at Falcon’s home address, 6316 Whitetail,

Donna, Texas. 23 RR 135-39. Cocaine, marihuana, and ammunition was found on

the property. 23 RR 137. The homeowners were arrested, but Falcon was not

found. 23 RR 137-38. The following day, Falcon turned himself in.12 23 RR 138-

39.

On July 8th, 2010, MPD investigators received a surveillance video from the

Falfurrias checkpoint. 23 RR 141. The video showed Jeffery Juarez as the front

passenger in a vehicle, heading northbound, about an hour after the murder of the

victim.13 23 RR 141-42. Juarez’s sister, Roxanne Hernandez, was identified as the

rear passenger. The male driver remained unidentified, but Pharr PD investigator

J.J. Mendoza thought that the driver looked like a man that worked at a bakery in

their city. 23 RR 149-50. About the same time, MPD investigators received

information that Roxanne Hernandez had been arrested in Pharr, TX, along with

two other men who had not been identified as any of the men in the home

11
Cantu also stated that the man who kicked the victim wore red tennis shoes. 23 RR 139.
12
One of the individuals arrested at 6316 Whitetail was Falcon’s mother. Falcon agreed to turn
himself in if his mother was released. MPD investigators arranged for this exchange to take
place. 23 RR 139-40.
13
Cellphone location data records revealed that Juarez had been traveling from the Mission-
Palmview area to McAllen-Pharr area, then to Falfurrias, all the way to Katy, Texas before,
during, and after the murder. These records correspond with the sighting of Juarez via video
surveillance at the Falfurias checkpoint.
xvii
surveillance video. 23 RR 149. Surveillance was setup at the location of La

Reynera bakery, and the same black Ford Expedition from the victim’s home

surveillance video was found parked on the side of the building. 23 RR 150-51.

Using the Expedition’s license plate, investigators were able to track down the

registered owner. 23 RR 155.

MPD investigators visited the registered owner, Diana Duran, who stated

she had sold the Expedition to her daughter Jessica, but that a guy named ‘Ricky’

usually drove it. 23 RR 156. Duran contacted her granddaughter Jasmine,

daughter of Jessica, who came to Duran’s house to speak with MPD investigators.

23 RR 157. Jasmine confirmed that ‘Ricky’ was actually Ricardo Sanchez, her ex-

boyfriend. Id. Sanchez had been one of the men arrested with Roxanne

Hernandez. Id. On July 10th, 2010, a search warrant was executed on Sanchez’s

home address, 228 West Clark, Pharr, Texas.14 23 RR 158.

While in county jail, an investigator from the Hidalgo County Sherriff’s

Office overheard Sanchez speaking about getting rid of weapons during a three-

way phone call. 25 RR 13. Sanchez also stated that his blood would be found

inside the vehicle he was driving.15 Id. Investigators were able to find out the

14
Sanchez lived about a block away from La Reynera bakery, located on 132 West Clark, Pharr,
Texas. 23 RR 158.
15
Sanchez’s DNA matched the blood that was later found inside the black Ford Expedition’s
driver side door handle and steering wheel after the execution of a search warrant on the
vehicle.. 25 RR 20-21; 26 RR 53.
xviii
phone number of the unknown persons Sanchez was talking to, and ‘pinged’ its

location at 207 Camino Real, Apartment no. 6 in San Juan, Texas. 25 RR 12-14.

A search warrant was executed at 207 Camino Real, resulting in investigators

finding three weapons, cocaine, and marihuana. 25 RR 17. One of the weapons

found at the apartment was a shotgun that belonged to the victim. 25 RR 26.

On July 21st, 2010, MPD investigator Dina Valdez met up with Appellant at

a doctor’s office. 26 RR 55. Investigator Valdez had been trying to locate Tony

Mendez as Appellant had previously stated that she and Roel Cantu had spent

some time living with him. 26 RR 54. Appellant, pregnant at the time, identified

Tony Mendez via photo lineup. 25 RR 21-23, 26 RR 55. About 10 months after

the victim’s murder, in April 2011, Roel Cantu incriminated Appellant in the

crime. 26 RR 96. Cantu stated he had not previously incriminated her because of

her pregnancy. 26 RR 97. Investigators Valdez, Perez, and Olvera visited

Appellant on April 4, 2011, at a trailer park near 107 and Ware Road in Edinburg.

26 RR 57. Appellant voluntarily drove to the police department to talk to

Investigator Valdez and provided a second statement. 26 RR 63, 67.

In her second statement, Appellant recanted the contents of her first

statement. 26 RR 68.16 She stated that her sister Vanessa Garcia, the victim’s

wife, wanted the victim dead, and individually offered Cantu and her brother

16
Appellant’s second statement is memorialized in SX 86 of the record.
xix
Alejandro Arjona ten thousand dollars to kill him. 26 RR 69. Appellant stated she

received money for providing information to law enforcement which led to the

victim being busted for drug possession. 26 RR 70. Appellant also admitted that

she and Cantu had been staying with Tony Mendez at his apartment prior to the

murder. Id. After providing the statement, Investigator Valdez drove Appellant to

her home. 26 RR 77. Later that day, an arrest warrant was issued on Vanessa,

who showed up at the police department in the afternoon and was subsequently

incarcerated. 26 RR 78-79.

On April 6, 2011, Appellant voluntarily returned to the police department as

requested by MPD investigators. 26 RR 80. When she arrived that evening,

Appellant was arrested based on a warrant. Id. Shortly after, Appellant provided

her third and final statement. 26 RR 87.17 In her third statement, Appellant

revealed that Vanessa had wanted the victim gone, whether dead, in jail, or beat

up. 26 RR 89. Vanessa sought Appellant’s help in finding someone to kill the

victim. Id. Vanessa had offered her and Roel Cantu ten thousand dollars to find

someone to kill the victim. 26 RR 90. While living with Tony Mendez, Appellant

and Cantu had told Mendez about Vanessa’s offer as well as guns and money

available for the taking. Id. Specifically, Appellant stated “I told Tony that

Vanessa was looking for someone to kill her husband and that she was willing to

17
Appellant’s third and final statement is memorialized in SX 94 of the record.
xx
pay for it.” Id. Mendez told Appellant and Cantu that he would make contact with

his cousin ‘El Dragon,’ a.k.a. Jeffery Juarez, and tell him about robbing the victim.

26 RR 91. Juarez later showed up at Mendez’s apartment. Id. Mendez told

Juarez that there was lots of money and guns at the victim’s house. Id. Juarez

agreed to arrange the robbery. Id.

Continuing her third statement, Appellant stated that on the night of the

murder, Vanessa had invited Appellant over to her home to eat caldo. 26 RR 92.

Appellant, Cantu, and Vanessa knew that the robbery was going to take place but

not the exact time, and that the hired guys that Juarez gathered together would not

hurt Appellant, the kids, or Vanessa. Id. Appellant next described what happened

when the masked men shot and killed the victim. 26 RR 93. Appellant then stated

that neither she nor Cantu received anything for robbing the victim’s house. 26 RR

94.

xxi
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant’s legal insufficiency claim is without merit because the evidence,

properly viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was legally sufficient for

a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s jury charge error claim is without merit because the legal

authorities hold that a unanimity instruction is unnecessary when party liability and

co-conspirator liability theories of Capital Murder are alleged as alternates in the

jury charge.

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit because

Appellant fails to prove that trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury charge

under unanimity grounds amounted to ineffective assistance under Strickland.

xxii
 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Counterpoint One (In Response to Issue No. One)

The evidence produced at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to support

the jury’s guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense of Capital

Murder of Reyes Garcia, and, as such, it is unnecessary for this Court to reverse

the judgment.

Argument:

In Issue No. One, Appellant argues that the evidence produced at trial was

legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. See Brief of Appellant, pp.

11-31. Appellant’s claim is without merit.

A. Rules and Principles

A review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence does not involve any

weighing of favorable and non-favorable evidence. Instead, when reviewing a case

for legal sufficiency, the reviewing court views all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and determines whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875, 878-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly, appellate courts must

“determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the

combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most

1
favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 879. “It has been said quite appropriately, that

‘[t]he appellate scales are supposed to be weighted in favor of upholding a trial

court's judgment of conviction, and this weighing includes, for example, the highly

deferential standard of review for legal-sufficiency claims.’” Id.

The Court must therefore determine whether the evidence presented to the

jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, proves beyond a reasonable

doubt that appellant committed the crime for which the jury found him guilty. See

Id. It is the obligation and responsibility of appellate courts “to ensure that the

evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the

crime that was charged." See Id. at 882. In determining the legal sufficiency of the

evidence, appellate courts will properly consider all of the evidence, admissible

and inadmissible. See Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998). That is, even evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in a

legal sufficiency review. See Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 378 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1994).

Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of the offense

as defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Wheaton v. State, 129

S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.). "Such a charge

would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does

not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the

2
State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for

which the defendant was tried." Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997).

In analyzing the verdict, appellate courts recognize that the jury is the

exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their

testimony. See Ozuna v. State, 199 S.W.3d 601, 610 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

2006, no pet.). The jury may accept or reject all or part of the evidence. See Id.

The jury may also draw reasonable inferences and make reasonable deductions

from the evidence. See Id.; see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (jurors are permitted to make reasonable inferences from the

evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and circumstantial evidence alone can

be sufficient to establish guilt). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review,

appellate courts may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and

substitute their judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d

735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000).

B. Applicable Law

Appellant was found guilty by jury for Capital Murder. A conviction for

Capital Murder, as charged in the indictment in the instant case, requires the State

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person intentionally commits murder in

the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of Robbery or

3
Burglary. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03. A person commits the offense of

robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain property, he

intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 29.02(a). A person commits the offense of burglary of a building if, without the

effective consent of the owner, the person enters a habitation, or a building (or any

portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony,

theft, or an assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(3).

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his

conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or

cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly, or with

knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances

surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the

circumstances exist; A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a

result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to

cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b).

The jury charge allowed the jury to convict Appellant as either a principal or

as party for Capital Murder. See CR 109-118. To prove that Appellant was guilty

of Capital Murder, under a party theory, the State was required to show that he was

criminally responsible for the actions of another under TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02.

The jury charge in the instant case provided an instruction on the law of parties

4
under TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(a) and § 7.02(b). A person is criminally

responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct,

by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible or both. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 7.01(a). Each party to an offense may be charged with commission

of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(b). Circumstantial evidence alone

may also be used to prove that a person is a party to an offense. See, e.g., Powell v.

State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d

288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1987); Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App. – Corpus

Christi 2000, pet. ref’d).

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if

acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he or she

solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2). A person is criminally responsible for

an offense committed by the conduct of another if, in the attempt to carry out a

conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the

conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though

having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the

unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the

carrying of the conspiracy. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02 (b). It is proper to submit

5
a jury charge on either Section 7.02 (a)(2) or Section 7.02 (b), although those

concepts are not alleged in the indictment. See, e.g., Powell, 194 S.W.3d at 506;

Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Marable v. State, 85

S.W.3d 287, 287-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 n. 5

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

C. Analysis

Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was not legally

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense

of Capital Murder. Brief of Appellant, p. 11. Contrary to this argument, the

evidence presented to the jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,

proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed Capital Murder under

both the law of parties and co-conspirator liability.

Appellant cannot seriously contend that the State failed to prove that a

Capital Murder, specifically one committed in the course of a Robbery or

Burglary, had occurred. During trial, there was overwhelming evidence that four

masked men riding in a black Ford Expedition parked on the driveway of the

victim’s residence, 2416 Kirk Street, Mission, TX (23 RR 22-23, 64-70, 104-105;

SX 22-23). These masked men entered the home and demanded money (23 RR

64, 68); kicked, shot, and killed the victim (23 RR 69; 24 RR 67-69; 25 RR 43, 69;

SX 73); stole the victim’s gun collection (23 RR 71); and left the crime scene in

6
the black Ford Expedition, westbound, at a high rate of speed with no headlights

on (23 RR 30-31).

Rather, the thrust of Appellant’s argument is that the evidence was

insufficient for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was

guilty as a party or co-conspirator for the death of the victim. To prove that

Appellant was guilty of Capital Murder, under a party theory, the State was

required to show that she was criminally responsible for the actions of another

under TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02, beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the application

of the guidelines above, provided in this brief under subsection “A. Rules and

Principles,” the Court with find that the evidence in this case was sufficient to

support Appellant’s conviction.

Based on the evidence presented during trial, the jury in the instant case

could have easily inferred that Appellant was involved in the murder of the victim.

Appellant’s own statements, specifically her third statement, revealed that her

sister Vanessa had offered Appellant and Roel Cantu ten thousand dollars to hire

someone to kill the victim. 26 RR 90. Appellant and Cantu shared this

information with the man they were living with at the time, Tony Mendez. Id.

Specifically, Appellant stated “I told Tony that Vanessa was looking for someone

to kill her husband and that she was willing to pay for it.” Id. Appellant also told

7
Mendez that there was lots of money and guns available for the taking at the

victim’s home. Id.

In her brief, Appellant argues that the murder of the victim was the

independent actions of another and that she did not know the murder was going to

take place despite knowing the time and place of the robbery. See Brief of

Appellant, pp. 22-23. Appellant totally ignores that by informing Mendez of

Vanessa’s offer of ten thousand dollars for the murder of the victim, Appellant had

set in motion the events to come, as thereafter Mendez contacted his cousin Jeffery

Juarez, and planned and executed the armed robbery-homicide. 26 RR 91. Based

on Appellant’s statement, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Appellant

encouraged and solicited the masked men to kill the Appellant. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was legally sufficient

evidence to find Appellant guilty as a party under TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02 (a)(2).

See Winfrey, 323 S.W.3d at 878-79.

Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her

conviction under co-conspirator liability because she could not have anticipated the

murder of the victim. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-30. Appellant emphasizes her

statement that she did not know whether the victim was going to be killed the night

of the murder. See Brief of Appellant, pg. 28. Even if this contention were true,

Appellant cannot escape the fact that the victim’s murder should have been

8
anticipated. Again, Appellant totally ignores that by informing Mendez of

Vanessa’s offer of ten thousand dollars for the murder of the victim, Appellant had

set in motion the armed robbery-homicide of the victim. 26 RR 91. Appellant

admitted that she knew the robbery was going to take place that day, but not the

exact time. Id. Appellant also admitted that she knew that she, her sister Vanessa,

nor the children would be hurt during commission of the robbery. Id. Based on

entirety of the evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the murder

of the victim was committed in furtherance of the planned robbery and that

Appellant should have anticipated the murder of the victim as a foreseeable

consequence of the conspiracy to commit robbery. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, there was legally sufficient evidence to find

Appellant guilty as a co-conspirator under TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02 (b). See

Winfrey, 323 S.W.3d at 878-79.

9
Counterpoint Two (In Response to Issue No. Two)
The trial court did not err when an unanimity instruction was not included

in the jury charge.

Argument:

In Issue No. Two, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to

include a unanimity instruction in the jury charge as to the alternative paragraphs

alleged in Count One of the indictment. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 32-39.

Appellant’s claim is without merit.

A. Rules and Principles

As discussed above in the State’s response to Appellant’s Issue No. One, the

jury charge authorized the jury to convict Appellant of Capital Murder if the jury

found she either assisted others in the offense of Capital Murder, under TEX.

PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2), or conspired with others, who committed Capital

Murder in furtherance of the conspiracy, under § 7.02 (b). See CR 109-118. In

reviewing the charge, this Court must first decide whether error exists. See

Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Because

Appellant did not properly object to the alleged jury charge error at trial, Appellant

will only obtain reversal if the alleged error, assuming without conceding it exists,

was egregious. See Brief of Appellant, p. 32 (conceding defense counsel did not

object to the jury charge); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985) (describing “egregious harm”).
10
 The Texas Constitution includes a due course of law protection along with

the requirement that only a unanimous jury may convict a defendant charged with

a felony. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. V, § 13; see also TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 36.29(a). The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury while

the Fourteenth Amendment contains due process protections, which the Supreme

Court has determined require juries to find every element of a charged offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The penal code also requires that “no person may be

convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 2.01.

Therefore, if a person is charged with two different offenses, a jury may only

convict the person of both offenses if the jury unanimously agrees the State has

proven every element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gardner v.

State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7326, *20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008)(not

designated for publication)(citing Hanson v. State, 55 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.-

Austin 2001, pet. ref'd)). When a defendant is tried for two different and separate

offenses, a general jury charge including both offenses submitted in the disjunctive

would be inappropriate. Id. This rule, however, does not apply to alternate

11
methods, manner, or means by which an accused is charged with committing the

one-charged offense.18 See Id.

B. Analysis

As previously mentioned above, Appellant was charged with the offense of

Capital Murder, and the charge authorized conviction on a finding that she either

assisted others in the offense of Capital Murder, under TEX. PENAL CODE §

7.02(a)(2), or conspired with others, who committed Capital Murder in furtherance

of the conspiracy, under § 7.02 (b). See CR 109-118. The State has previously

established above in this brief that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish

guilt under either theory. In addition, liability under either section was simply

alternate manner and means to which the unanimity rule does not apply. See

Gardner, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7326, at *20. Therefore, jury unanimity with

18
In Hanson v. State, Hanson was charged with the single offense of capital murder, and the
charge authorized conviction on a finding that he either assisted another to commit the offense
(under § 7.02(a)(2)) or conspired with another who committed the offense in furtherance of
the conspiracy (under § 7.02(b)). Hanson, 55 S.W.3d at 694. Like the charge in the case
before this Court, the charge in Hanson was submitted in two separate application paragraphs
joined by "or." See Id. at 693; CR 112. The Hanson court stated, “The two alternate theories
of party liability were merely alternate methods or means by which [Hanson] committed the
one charged offense. Jury unanimity as to which theory of party liability applied was not
necessary, and the general verdict of guilt was proper so long as either theory was proved.”
Id. at 694. Hanson further argued that because subsections (a)(2) and (b) of penal code
section 7.02 assign criminal liability, they are offenses. And, because they do not contain the
same elements, they are different offenses. Id. The Hanson court disagreed, stating, “Section
7.02 does not independently define criminal conduct or prescribe punishment therefor.
Instead, section 7.02 enumerates the various ways in which a person can be held criminally
responsible for another's criminal conduct, as that conduct is defined elsewhere in the code.”
Id. at 694-95.

12
respect to which theory of party liability applied was not necessary, and the general

verdict of guilty was proper. See Id. at *22 (citing Hanson, 55 S.W.3d at 694-95).

Counterpoint Three (In Response to Issue No. Three)

Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a

unanimity instruction in the jury charge.

Argument:

In Issue No. Three, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective when

it failed to request a unanimity instruction in the jury charge. See Brief of

Appellant, p. 39. Appellant’s claim is without merit.

A. Rules and Principles

“To obtain a reversal of a conviction under the Strickland test, a defendant

must show that: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense,

resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.”

Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Deficient performance means that

‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Ex parte Napper, 322

S.W.3d 202, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

13
“To establish deficient performance, ‘the defendant must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “The prejudice prong of Strickland requires showing

‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 248 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “[E]ach

case must be judged on its own unique facts.” Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 353.

The burden is on appellant to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999). Appellant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's

conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that

his actions could be considered sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689; see also Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

2006, no pet.). A reviewing court will not second-guess legitimate tactical

decisions made by trial counsel. See State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 696 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (“[U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that

counsel’s conduct was not the product of a strategic or tactical decision, a

reviewing court should presume that trial counsel’s performance was

constitutionally adequate...”).

14
 Counsel’s effectiveness is judged by the totality of the representation, not by

isolated acts or omissions. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at

851. An allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the

record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Bone v. State,

77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 n.6. In

almost all cases, direct appeal is an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective

assistance claim because the record is generally underdeveloped. See Andrews v.

State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003). If counsel's reasons for his conduct do not

appear in the record and there is at least the possibility that the conduct could

have been grounded in legitimate trial strategy, appellate courts will defer to

counsel's decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct

appeal. See Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)(citing

Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

B. Analysis

Appellant argues that her trial attorneys were ineffective when they

committed egregious harm by not objecting to the jury charge and requesting a

unanimity instruction as to the alternative paragraphs alleged in Count One of the

indictment. See Brief of Appellant, p. 40. However, as discussed above in the

State’s response to Appellant’s Issue No. Two, the trial court did not commit

15
egregious error by failing to place a unanimity instruction in the jury charge

because none was required. Thus, trial counsel did not render ineffective

assistance in failing to object to the jury charge on unanimity grounds. As such,

Appellant fails to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding

would have been different had trial counsel made proper objections. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

16
 CONCLUSION

The State of Texas, Appellee, respectfully submits, that, for the reasons set

forth herein, the evidence presented in the instant case was legally sufficient to

support the jury’s guilty verdict; the trial court did not err by failing to submit a

unanimity instruction in the jury charge; and Appellant’s trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to object to the absence of a unanimity instruction in the jury

charge. Appellee respectfully submits that the Judgment of the trial court should in

all respects be affirmed.

17
 PRAYER

Wherefore, premises considered, the State of Texas prays the Court affirm

the Judgment of the trial court.

Respectfully submitted,

RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, JR.
Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas

/s/ Luis A. Gonzalez

LUIS A. GONZALEZ, ASSISTANT
Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas

HIDALGO COUNTY COURTHOUSE
Edinburg TX 78539
Telephone #: (956) 318-2300 ext. 750
Facsimile #: (956) 380-0407
luis.gonzalez@da.co.hidalgo.tx.us
State Bar No. 24083088

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

18
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this document has 7937 words.

/s/ Luis A. Gonzalez
Luis A. Gonzalez

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Brief of Appellee to counsel for Appellant, Victoria Guerra, via electronic service,

on this the 28th day of January, 2015.

/s/ Luis A. Gonzalez
Luis A. Gonzalez

19