Tibbs, James Ishmael

Summarize Case

Related Cases

IN THE 252nd,CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON R.ECEIVIED IN sTATE oF TExAs eou~r oF cRJWIINALAPPEALs JAMES ISHMAEL TIBBS MAY 13 2015 -Vs.- Cause No. 21560 THE STATE OF TEXAS Abel Acosta, Clerk APPLICATION FOR WRIT To: THE HONORABLE JUDGE WEST OF THE ABOVE SAID COURT. Comes now,JAMES ISHMAEL TIBBS, •• pursuant to Artical I,Sec. 10,Clause 1,of the u.s.C.A. -(no state •.. shall p~ss any bill of attainder,ex post facto law,or law impairing the Obligation Of ~o Contracts; .. .. Derek J. T. Adler, .. explaning that "the term' ex post facto law wo~ld lit~rally refer to any law ... which gives legal consequences to actions or events that took place before the date of its ... passage" .. Ogden,25 U.S. at 266, •. explaining that'the states are forbidd en to pass any •. ex post facto law,by which a man shall be punishe criminally or penally,by loss of life,of his liberty,property,for an act,which,at the time of its commission,violated no existing 1 law of the land" •• ••• Specifically ••• A persons trial ends June 3rd,1994, •• under the laws that were in effect the Judgment,Conviction,Sentance and Punishment was ove Complete,.SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION C.C.P. art.62.102, .. was not i in effect untill Sept.1st, 1997,.it only applied to a person who was eligable under applicable state law, •• Therefore Applicant is not eligable,because this law was not in effect,it violates the u.s.c.A. ex post facto and bill of attander Clause, •• sawyer V. Whitly,112 Sct.2514, ••• Double Jeopardy Attaches,.because Multiple Prosecutions for the same offence, .• a person who was tried convic ted,sentanced and punished the Judgment held the new laws provisi ons that were Adjudicated,.because of that; .. the Judge Orde~ed a person to comply with .Sex Offinder Registration,C.C.P. Artical 62.102,Provisions, •. Failure to Comply where that law is applicabl did not Require Indictment,.because the court Orders Failure to Comply was CUREABLE and they were only arrested for a Capious Profine or Contempt of Court Order, .• NOT A 25 to LIFE SENTANCE TO PRISON_FOR THREE STRIKES FELONY CONVICTION •• which is a GLOSED DOOR to the only Defence Avaliable A FIRST FEDERAL CLAIM OF ACTUA INNOCENCE, see cf Lonkar V Thomas, 116 Set. 1293, •• First Federal Claim Of Actual Innocence,.GATE-WAY-EXCEPTION,.where Schulp V. Delo,115 Sct.851, •• no single juror acting rationally would lack a reasonable doubt, .•• or vote to convict ,.is an AQUITTAL the end RESULT 1• It is outside an assment as to whether no single juror laked a reasonable doubt, •. because an Aquittal is cl~arly de~ined in the GATE-WAY-EXCEPTION,Actual Innocence Acception For Procedural Bar On A First Federal Claim, ..• Exhibit (A) •• a Subpoina was sereved on Buellas Tibbs Grisham,.However; she was not Present for Trial,and her testimony was reguirea ~sa Matter of l~w, •.• because it was favorable to Defence,Because; •• the D.A. KNEW that the .• SY~OPSIS OF OFFENSE~.is false and that both of her children had motives,and she was interviewed by (CPS)-Agents,NOVEM~ER 30th 1989, .. Applicant was interviewed, .. Bonnie,and Damiens punititave confession to (CPS) was the reason she lied about being sexually assaulted was because Applicant slapped JACK, •• I,admitted to the accusation of slapping JACK the younges boy~ •• Applicant has been denied Brady material that had the jury heared, •• it is more likle than not no single juror would lack reasonable doubt,or voted to convict, ••. ,, Applicant,JAMES ISHMAEL TIBBS, swears under penalty of perjury in compliance wi~h 28 U.S.C.A. 1746 that the £oregoing clai~s are true and correct. state Of texas County of Jefferson Swornto and subscribed on this,Jltb__,day of frfay 2ojS ()_~~'7Jk ~ A fiant James Ishmael Tibbs 3955 Rothwell Str, Beaumont,Texas 77705 •.. Relief ••• The trial Court to SUBPOENA Buellas Tibbs Grisham for a jury trial,or a hearing to resolve the issue of whether a reasonable J doubt exzisted,under the Actual Innocence Acception, or the Brady V. Maryland,suppression of favorable evidence to Applicant, •••• Also whether the ex post facto law is offended •••• and as to whether in this particular case double jeopardy Attaches? ~~TFULLY SUBMITTED ~~/~-ih James Ishmael Tibbs 2. EXHIBIT (A) ,;_ ... • 'I1IB. ~~is O,'DIXAS ¥1. JAMPs TIBBS APPl.J~: W'.· SUBPOJWA COMBS NOW CJ die~. ()the,.,_,'!'!' lllil -~ ~Yt.~ IIPP'"'riaa for lbe luuaDi:e of a ·ror acti or the foUowiDI wt~ WboiD T~y ••. ~· lllllpoeaa WrU N~ ~-­ 1• ~S GR~SHAM P.;O. BOX 783 SOUR!..u:E TEIAS .· .. I .. ··. :t ·. . L. :: ·3 . ':··;:~·-y'~ ... ."·.. ,7· a ··.4..__ _,;....._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-:---.,..---. ?i 5 '·.,.i'i~J •• :·... ~I ,,l ·.:i.. ·::.-....~;,:=~ ' ,· 516194 ·.' ;; . DATI! . ·t ,,.:.Y.;t:·-~J·...,":''''fi/!r:: ., ~·;·,-: ... :.·:\:·'·.~ .•• . ~oiH aa dllllbe · ·6th da)' or :" r ~~. .• ' mri'H-'W&v·~!TH· . . -. . . ,., ... ~ ·~ . ~ "Mi!c •: · . . ARY PUBLIC iii ...........W\ • • • - •••••••••••••••••••• * ••••••••••• ·=· •'i • rar· 1~: . _ .~· -~~~~~~. _. · · )CXIUIIIY,~.>=~.-.- ,:/~. : . ·:· . . . !Ou.;.~-.,·-~-it ........... ...:....C.O.-.~·~w.. ... c:.._.~._ .., •'!'1'1111111 ~tr• .. ; ·. .... · ~ ~ ll!illoloi .ll!ill!"''b ~/!!r!'qff r- ..... !Iii....._ ·A ........._. rl ........... II ...................... . ·:_~:~--~· ·. ",; :· ..... , . ·.. ·. ·. ·.· . .__ ;: .- ..·_:· ~---· -~~ L·;.£···.·.· ·... .·. · :.'_(·; _.-· . ·.. '. . . . -~7 Z4 ---I 0: : ·.-I·~·;.:; ·..........:.................:.. .~.~-- .....................---............-.. . _._ . . ---..~-- . . ·-.·--.. . . -.- . --.. . ------. ______a _____;·______ -.. . . --~--~: . . .. . .. · :THB~OF .. ......-..~SJ:R~~~ ·&he if!t·3I"t1~'? .. _.· ._.,._:.-:;..._.... Trial Doc:Jun. ·"'·"-.·;·, -~·:.:::~· "!· I. JJa liij.WDJAmjt:ntirAct "ilJB AttoytJNJ.MBn ATI'OJlNBY. · . 2.WliQI..aDmiO COUrt allyl~ io.da lif.IIJ.Ibl A~. · · . · · If JQi1 'iDOYC ar ~ ·iirl)' ~ can ihi~Yfialeu ~iliatar .l.ofCJI!IIay-Frkla)'. · , ... I:QIJ L111. • 5:00 pm., Telepbaliil C~-8614 or (G)n7-2191, SaL 1614_. 3. PAJI.JJBB mAPPBAB .wbm ~ WiJJ.reluJt iDa~~ luued for ,aur·anat. ::. ~"'-~-~- ••••••~••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••~•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . and Carmell); seea/sosupraSection liB (discussion ofthe factsofFenwick's C41Se). 464 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 91 38.07 fell under the fourth Caltkr category of ex post facto laws because the facts in Carmel! paralleled those in Fenwick's case. 29' Although Justice Chase did cite to Fenwick's case as an ex- ample of the fourth category, Fenwick's case was never discussed again by the Supreme Court, not even in those cases that in- volved a procedural rule that would come under the fourth 294 category of Calder. If Fenwick's case were considered an im- portant guiding principle in a determination of ex post facto laws under the fourth Calder category, the Court would have used it as such in the precedent cases addressing procedural statutes. 295 Additionally, Fenwick's case is mentioned only briefly in Calder296 and is cited as an example of more than one category of ex post facto laws. 297 As the dissent noted, the four-category formulation in Calder is itself only dictum. 298 The majority made no attempt to explain why Fenwick's case should be resurrected as a '~ide" for determining if procedural laws were ex post facto. In short, the majority diverged from the reasoning of well-establish precedent in using Fenwick's case, a case men- tioned only briefly in Calder and never again, as a mcyor deter- minant that Texas Article 38.07 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.300 293 See Cannell, 120 S. Ct. at 1632; see also supra Section 'N.A. (discussion of major- ity's reliance on Fenwick). m See Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883); Hopt, 110 U.S. 574; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). 295 See Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; Kring, 107 U.S. 221; Hopt, 110 U.S. 574; Thompson, 171 U.S. 380; Beazell, 269 U.S. 167; Collins, 497 U.S. 37. None of these cases make any reference to Fenwick sexample. 296 See Calder, 3 U.S. at 389 (Fenwick's case is mentioned in a footnote. The entire text of the footnote reads: "The case of Sir John Fenwick, in 1696"). 297 See id. (citing Fenwick's case for two propositions, "declaring acts to be treason, which were not treason, when committed," and violating "the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the exiting Jaw re- quired two"). 298 See Cannell. 120 S. Ct at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Chase's formulation was dictum, because Calder involved a civil statute). 299 See id. at 1629. 500 See id. at 1629-1632 (whereas Calder mentioned Fenwick's case in passing, the majority in CarmeU makes it a central focus of inquiry; the majority fully discusses the facts of the case, analogizes them to Carmell's case, and determines that the two fact patterns are so similar, that Texas Article 38.07 must fall under the fourth category of Calder); /d. at 1641 (in responding to the dissenting opinion, as well, the majority re- lies on Fenwick's case as "the guide"). 2001] CARMEU V. TEXAS 465 Furthermore, even if the majority were correct in relying on Fenwick's case to invalidate Texas Article 38.07, Justice Stevens overstated the analogy between the facts of Fenwick's case and 301 the facts of Carmell's. Most, importantly, Fenwick's case in- volved a Bill of Attainder; the Parliament passed a special piece of legislation tarpeted at one individual and one individual alone: Fenwick. 30 No such situation existed in Cannell's case. In Carmell, the legislature passed a general piece of legislation targeting criminal procedure in all sex offense cases. 31J3 The dis- tinction betvveen these two types of legislative actions is para- mount;304 the Framers regarded Bills of Attainder as especially egregious to a fundamental notion of justice, and as such, im- plicates all of the reasons the framers promulgated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 305 A Bill of Attainder, the Court argued in Cum- mings~ usurps the judicial function and removes all of the pro- tections of trial from the criminal defendant. 506 In contrast, Texas Article 38.07 does not implicate the con- cerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause.so7 Texas Article 38.07 was not s~t See id. at 1631-32 (the majority noted that "Indeed, the circumstances of peti- tioner's case parallel those ofFenwick's case 300 years earlier"). ~ Id. at 1630; See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (noting that bills of attainder "are gen- erally directed against individuals by name," and that "[b] ills of this sort. .. have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion, or gross subservency to the crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others"). S!l3 See TEx. CODE CRn.t. P. ANN. an. 38.07 (West 2000); sc.e also Carmel/, 120 S. CL at 1624. sot See Calder, 3 U.S at 390. Ifjustice Chase cited Fenwick's case because of the par- ticularly egregious act of Parliament in altering the rules of evidence to ltugel one mdz- vidual, than the Cannell Coun's analogy fails. Texas Article 38.07, unlike the law in Fenwick's case, was not amended in order to target an individual. !!lS See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (explaining the special nature of Bills of Attainder: "In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises . the powers and office ofjudge; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicia) magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the fonns or safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether con- formable to the rules of evidence or othenvise; and it fixes the degree or punishmem in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offensen); sa al.ro ~1ark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills ofAttainder, and the Definilwn of Punuhment: on Dama, the Hawaii Amendment. and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 S\'RACUSE L RE.V. 227, 238-39 (1998). s!:'6 See id. 'Y7 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Texas 3 Article 38.07 does not implicate either of two important purposes for which the E.x 466 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 91 passed with Scott Leslie Cannell in mind but as a general meas- ure, affecting all citizens. As the dissent argued, "the amend- ment of Texas 38.07 simply brought the rules governing certain victim testimony in sexual offense prosecutions into conformi:;ra with Texas law governing witness testimony generally." 3 8 Moreover, Texas Article 38.07 removed none of the protections of a criminal trial; Cannell received a full trial, with benefit of counsel, before a jury, and he was presumed innocent until the prosecution could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had committed the offenses for which he was charged. Because Fenwick's case involved a Bill of Attainder, it is inherently dif- ferent from Cannell's case; whereas Fenwick was the target of "vindictive" legislation, aimed specifically at him, Carmell was simply subjected to a general procedural rule applied to all criminal defendants in sex offense cases. C. THE Mi\)'ORI1YS TREATMENT OF BEAZELLAND COLLINS Third, the majority's decision was incorrect because even if Justice Stevens was correct in his assertion that Article 38.07 meets the definition set forth in the fourth Calder category, the majority ignored precedent that effectively nullified that cate- gory.309 The maJority argued that Collins was at best "cryptic" on the issue of whether the fourth Calder category was still good Iaw. 31 ° Further, the majority argued that if Collins intended to nullify the fourth category of Calder, "we think it strange that it 511 would have done so in a footnote.'' These arguments avoid the ultimate conclusion reached by Collins.m First, Collins paid deference to the four categories of Calder, but only as a general principle, and the Court further explained that the Beazell defini- tion was the one best suited to the original understanding of the Post Facto clause was promulgated: "to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed," and to "[restrict] governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindic- tive legislation"). 308 Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) . .!.09 See CoUins, 497 U.S. at 37. 510 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1635 (noting that "it seems most accurate to say that CoUins is rather cryptic"). m Id. at 1636. 512 It is interesting to note that CoUinswas authored by Chief justice Rehnquist, who dissented in CarmeU. Wouldn't Chiefjustice Rehnquist, the author of CollinsJ be in the best position to determine if the Court meant to nullify the fourth principle of Caldm Of course. 2001] CARMEIL V. TEXAS 467 313 framers. The majority is correct that the Collins Court men- tioned Beazell's omission of the fourth Calder category in a foot- note, but tlle fact that the Court did so does not necessarily mean that it was any less serious about adopting the Beazell defi- nition. It is important to note tllat directly after tlle Collins Court explained tlle omission, it adopted the Beazell definition as "faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause." 314 Most importantly, in analyzing the facts involved in Collins, the Court did not apply the four categories of Calder, the Court ultimately applied the Beazell formulation in determining that the Texas statute did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the statute was a rule of procedure.:us The majority in Carmell ignored tlle fact that the Collins Court ultimately applied the Beazell formulation, and ignored the fact that the Collins Court did so with a rule of procedure, one which typically should have been subjected to analysis under the fourth cate- 316 gory of Calder. The Collins Court"s ultimate application of the Beazell formulation as a pragmatic matter, along with its ringing endorsement of the Beazell formulation in direct comparison with the four Calder categories (and the explicit recognition that Beazell omitted the fourth category) lead to one inescapable conclusion: the Collins court effectively nullified the fourth category of Calder, and replaced the four-category Calder formu- lation with the more general formulation provided in BeazelL 117 313 See CoUins, 497 U.S. at 42-43. Sl4 Id. 315 See id. at 51. The Court applied the Beazell test in reaching its holdin~ "The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more bur- densome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause." 516 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1635-36. 517 See Neil Colman McCabe and Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto Pruvzswns of Stale Constitutions, 4 EMERGING IssuEs ST. CONST. L. 133, 134-35 (1991) (explaining that the "four categories ... have not stood the test of time," and that Collms Court narrowed the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and curtailed the fourth cntegory); Victoria L Miller, VII. Criminal Prow:lure: Trial and Post-tritzllssues, 29 RUTCERS LJ. 1257, 1288 (1998) (acknowledging that the CoUins Court adopted the BeDUll formulation for the definition of ex post facto laws, and acknowledging that the Bcaull formulation omit- ted the fourth category of Calde1); Matteo, supra, note 25, at 595. i-.-1 468 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 91 Thus, Carmell majority's response that Collins is "cryptic" is un- persuasive. VI. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court's decision in Carmell was incorrect for three reasons. First, the majority erroneously concluded that Article 38.07 was a rule affecting the sufficiency of the evidence needed to convict.m In reality, 38.07 does not affect the ulti- mate sufficiency of the evidence standard: the prosecution's burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. s19 Addi- tionally, 38.07 functions exactly like a rule of witness compe- tency, the alterations of which were upheld in Hopt. 320 Second, the majority in Carmell relied too heavily on a three-hundred- year-old case that was mentioned only briefly in Calder v. Bull, and never again, even in cases that implicated Calder's fourth principle. 521 In addition, the mcyority's reliance on that case was misplaced; the facts surrounding Fenwick's execution are in- herently different from the facts in Carmell.m Third, even if the mcyority were correct in its assertion that 38.07 fell under the fourth category of Calder, the mcyority ignored important precedent that effectively nullified that category. 323 As a result, the majority frustrated what the Collins Court sought to achieve: eradication of the confusion surrounding whether procedural rules violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 324 Thanks to the Carmell Court, the situation is now more confused than ever. Danielle Kitson sJs See supra notes 254-55; see also supra Section VB (discussion of Article 38.07 as a law of witness competency). m See id. 20 s See supra note 94. s See supra Section VA (discussion ofthe m~ority's reliance on Fenwick's case). 21 sn See id. su See supra note 310; see also supra Section VC (discussion of the abandonment of Calder's fourth category. 4 " See supra note 260. l) I t ., 416/2015 Legal Definition of'Ex Post Facto' Not every change in a convicted person's situation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. A law implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause only if it criminalizes conduct that was not a crime when it was committed, increases the punishment for a crime beyond what it was at the time the act was committed, or deprives a person of a defense available at the time the act was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42- 43 (1990). Courts have held that legislation may lawfully impose new requirements on convicted persons if the statute's 'overall design and effect' indicates a 'non-punitive intent.' United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.'93). data:texllhtml:charset=utf-R%3Csoan%20stvle%3D%22cnlor%~%?0rnhiO%?r.%?00%?r.%?00\%~%?11fnnl-f::amilv•t.~•t.?n'Tim,..,ot.?nN.,..,ot,?nRnrn,n'•t. 111 E ~J ':"' 41612015 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) Search Cornell Legal Information Institute QP't\11 ACCESS TO t.AW ~INC£ HI~:! (L·II·] ' SUPPORTUI GIVE NOW iSearch all of Lll... ] l;:§qjJ ABOUT Lll I GET THE LAW I FIND A LAWYER I LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA I HELP OUT Supreme Court ABOUT SEARCH SUBSCRIBE LIIBULLETIN PREVIEWS ~ SU~~MECOURTTOOLB_O_X----~ ,__.,.,_,..,,._ ·- .v....... ~an Lll sponsor Collins v. Youngblood (89-742), 497 U.S. 37 (1990) Concurrence Syllabus Opinion ~INVOLVED """'"'""' HTML version WordPerfect version HTML version WordPerfect version HTML version WordPerfect version I ~ Lll Announce Blog l1l'! Lll Supreme Court Bulletin Syllabus @ MAKE A DONATION @ CONTRIBUTE CONTft:H NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus @ BECOME A SPONSOR (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus _____________ @) .....__ GIVE FEEDBACK constitutes no part of the opinion of the All lawyers Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience an Lll sponsor of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., ZOO U.S. 321, 337. Syllabus COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OFCRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONALDIVISION v. YOUNGBLOOD CEirriORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 89-742. Argued March 19, 1990- Decided June 21, 1990 Respondent was convicted in a Texas state court of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, arguing that Texas law did not authorize both a fine and prison term for his offense, and thus that his judgment and sentence were void and he was entitled to a new trial. The court, bound by a State Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, recommended that the writ be granted. Before the writ was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals however, a new statute was passed allowing an appellate court to reform an improper verdict assessing a punishment not authorized by law. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals reformed the verdict by ordering that the fine be deleted and denied the request for a new trial. Arguing that the new Texas law's retroactive application violated the Ex Post-Facto Clause of Art. 1, 10, respondent filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal https:/twww.law.cornell .edu/supctlhtmii89-742.ZS.html 1/::1 ~ .j ~· 41612015 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) District Court, which was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the statement in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, that retroactive procedural statutes violate the Ex Post-Facto Clause unless they "leave untouched all the substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the ... accused," the court held that respondent's right to a new trial under former Texas law was a "substantial protection." Held: 1. Although the rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288- which prohibits the retroactive application of new rules to cases on collateral review - is grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations, it is not jurisdictional in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide r: the issue sua sponte. Since Texas has chosen not to rely on Teague, the merits of respondent's claim will be considered. P. 3. ,·. ;7->. ·.·• .... -- _··: / -.,. . .·:_;. . _;'~~ 2. The application of the Texas statute to respondent is not ~. . -~- .· : prohibited by the Ex Post-Facto Clause. Pp. 3-14. (a) The definition of an ex post-facto law as one that (1) punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, (2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or (3) deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, is faithful to this Court's best knowledge.of the original underst~rding of the Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively ~lter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Respondent concedes that Texas' statute does not fall within the Beazell categories, since it is a procedural change in the law. However, h·e errs in arguing that this Court's decisions have not limite.d the Clause's scope to those categories, but have stated more broadly that retroactive legislation contravenes the Clause if it deprives an accused of a "substantial protection" under law existing at the time of the crime, and that the new_ trial guaranteed by Texas law is such a protection. When cases have described as "procedural" those changes that do not violate.the Clause even though they work to the accused's disadvantage, see, e.g., . . Beazell, ·. . supra, at 171, it is logical to presume that '"procedurar' refers to changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicat~d as opposed to substantive changes in the law; .the ·:substantial protection" discussion in Beazell, Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-383, and Malloyv. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180·, 183, has imported confusion into the Clause's interpretation and should be read to mean that a legislature does not immunize a law from scrutiny under the Clause simply by labeling the law "procedural." It should not be read to adopt without explanation an undefined enlargement of the Clause. Pp. 3-9. (b) Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, and Thompson v. Utah, supra, htlps:/lwww .I em .cornell.edu/supctlhtmi/89-742.ZS.html ?J?. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) are inconsistent with the understanding of the term "ex post-facto law" at the time the Constitution was adopted, rely on reasoning that this Court has not followed since Thompson was decided, and have caused confusion in state and lower federal courts about the Clause's scope. Kring and Thompson are therefore overruled. Pp. 9- 14. 882 F. 2d 956, reversed. Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined. ABOUT Lll CONTACT US ADVERTISE HERE HELP TERMS OF USE MORE (LII] https:/lwww.law.cornell.edu/supctlhtmii89-742.ZS.html . 313 .