PD-1341-14
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
July 6, 2015 Transmitted 7/6/2015 3:28:21 PM
Accepted 7/6/2015 4:04:17 PM
No. PD-1341-14
ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
______________________________
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
______________________________
STACY STINE CARY,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
______________________________
On Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Court of Appeals No. 05-12-01421-CR
______________________________
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
______________________________
KEN PAXTON *JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General
Supervising Attorney
CHARLES E. ROY for Non-Capital Appeals
First Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appeals Division
State Bar No. 00793549
ADRIENNE McFARLAND Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov
Deputy Attorney General
for Criminal Justice *Lead Appellate Counsel
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
EDWARD L. MARSHALL Austin, Texas 78711
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division Telephone: (512) 936-1400
Facsimile: (512) 936-1280
_____________________________
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................. 1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................ 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ..................................................... 12
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 14
I. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE ONE: The Court Should Affirm
the Lower Court Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have
Found—As This Jury Actually Found—That Appellant Did
Not Intend Her Payments to Spencer to Constitute “Political
Contributions,” Irrespective of How the Money was
Ultimately Spent ............................................................................ 14
A. Appellant should be estopped from complaining
that the jury was not instructed about, or required
to return a verdict on, the stricter statutory proof
standard for bribery .............................................................. 15
B. Standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence
challenges. ............................................................................. 19
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
C. Applicable law to establish bribery ...................................... 21
1. As charged here, bribery is an inchoate
offense........................................................................... 21
2. The law of parties......................................................... 26
D. A rational juror could have concluded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Appellant did not intend
the illicit payments to constitute “political
contributions,” irrespective of how those payments
were actually used................................................................. 28
1. Appellant misconstrues the statute ............................ 28
2. Appellant misapplies Jackson ..................................... 33
II. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE TWO: The Court Should Affirm
the Court of Appeals Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have
Found Sufficient Evidence of Bribery —As This Jury Actually
Found—Because Proof of a Bilateral Agreement Is Not a Pre-
Condition Under All Parts of the Bribery Statute ....................... 48
A. Appellant again misconstrues both the statute and
the test for legal sufficiency .................................................. 38
B. When reviewing all evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom, in favor of the jury’s verdict,
Appellant’s argument fails.................................................... 40
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
III. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE THREE: The Court Should
Affirm the Lower Court Because a Reasonable Juror Could
Have Found—As This Jury Actually Found—the Evidence
was Sufficient to Show that Appellant Had the Requisite
Intent to Commit Bribery .............................................................. 48
IV. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE FOUR: The Court Should Affirm
the Court of Appeals Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have
Found—As This Jury Actually Found—Sufficient Evidence to
Support Appellant’s Conviction for Engaging in Organized
Criminal Activity and Money Laundering .................................... 51
PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................... 52
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................ 53
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4 ............................................................ 54
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ..................... 27
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................. 19, 34
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ..................... 20
Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) .... 20
Garza v. State, 841 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992)....................... 20
Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .................... 19, 20
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ........................ 35
Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ................ 21, 49
Hayes v. State, 265 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) . 26
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .......................... 20
Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984) ................ 24
Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ......................... 20
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .................................... 12, 20, 33
Levine v. Steve Scharn Custom Homes, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) ..................................................................... 35
Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)....................... 27
v
Martinez v. State, 696 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985)22, 24, 25,
39
McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ........... 12, 22
Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) .................... 27
Mustard v. State, 711 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986) .................. 24
Patterson v. State, 950 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997)............... 27
Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ....................... 35
Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).................. 16, 32
Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ..................... 28
Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ............. 16, 19
Sowells v. State, 270 S.W. 558 (1925) ..................................................... 38
Trenor v. State, 333 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) 27
Statutes
Tex. Election Code § 251.001 .................................................................. 29
Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2) ........................................ 26, 47
Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(a) ........................................................................ 16
Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(a)(2) .................................................................. 21
Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(a)(4) .................................................................. 15
vi
Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(d) ...................................................................... 16
Other Authorities
Model Penal Code § 240.1 ....................................................................... 24
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction from the 366th Judicial
District Court of Collin County, Texas. Following a jury trial, Stacy Stine
Cary (Appellant), was convicted of all eight counts alleged in her
superceding indictment as follows: one count of engaging in organized
criminal activity (EOCA), six counts of bribery, and one count of money
laundering. CR 314–24, 1119–58; 9 RR 57–60.1 Appellant was sentenced
in each count to ten years’ incarceration, probated over ten years, with
the condition that she serve 30 days in jail, and assessed a $10,000 fine.
CR 1119–58. Appellant appealed. CR 1114–15.
A divided panel of the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed all
convictions. Two justices voted to affirm. Cary v. State, No. 05-12-01421-
CR, 2014 WL 4261233, at *37 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2014). The
dissenting justice would have reversed all convictions. Id. at *49.
1 “CR” refers to the Clerk’s Record—the transcript of pleadings and documents
filed with the clerk during trial and is followed by page number. “RR” refers to the
Reporter’s Record of the transcribed trial proceedings which occurred June 18, 2012
through June 27, 2012, and on October 11, 2012, and is preceded by volume number
and followed by page number.
1
This Court granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review
(PDR) on the four issues identified below. Order, Stacy v. State, PD-1341-
14 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2015).
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court has already indicated that it would permit oral
argument. Id. The State joins Appellant’s request for oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Court granted PDR on the first four grounds raised by
Appellant, as follows:
1. Whether the State affirmatively proved Appellant’s innocence by
proving that the alleged bribes were “Political Contributions?”
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to show the requisite
consideration intended to support the bribery convictions?
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant had
the requisite intent to commit bribery?
4. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s
conviction for EOCA and money laundering?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal ultimately turns on the meaning and weight of
circumstantial evidence, which, by its very nature, is grounded in
2
plausible inference and argument. Because Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38.1(g) does not permit a party to advance “argument” in the
Statement of Facts, however, the State will use this section to provide a
brief overview of the relevant facts—reserving its inferential analysis to
its argument section below. So, too, and in the interests of brevity, the
State respectfully directs the Court to the majority’s thorough and
lengthy description of proceedings at trial, below.
Count One alleged that Appellant worked in combination with her
husband David Cary; judicial candidate and ultimately judge-elect
Suzanne Wooten; and Wooten’s campaign manager James Stephen-
Spencer, in committing bribery, money laundering, or tampering with a
government record. CR 315–17. Counts Two through Seven alleged that
Appellant bribed Wooten in exchange for Wooten entering the judicial
race, continuing her campaign for judge, and presiding over and issuing
favorable rulings in cases to which Appellant and her husband were a
party. CR 317–22. Count Eight alleged Appellant was funding the
criminal activity of bribery. CR 322.
3
Appellant was a joint owner in several petroleum-related business
ventures with her siblings, working mostly on the business side rather
than directly in the oil fields; she also owned her own business. 4 RR 59,
6 RR 118, 8 RR 215–16, 225. She married David Cary, a father of twin
daughters with special needs, from a previous marriage. 3 RR 54, 61.
David was embroiled in a heated custody battle with his ex-wife Jennifer
Cary, which began six months after their divorce proceedings were
finalized in late 2004. 3 RR 51–62, 81–85, 107–11, 175. Ultimately, the
judge presiding over the custody proceedings, Judge Sandoval, ruled in
favor of the ex-wife, and Appellant’s husband was removed as joint
managing conservator and ordered to pay $30,000 into an education fund
for his daughters, approximately $416,000 for his ex-wife’s legal fees, and
$50,000 in sanctions. 3 RR 75, 78–79, 82–85. After Appellant’s husband
failed to timely pay these fees, his ex-wife filed a collections suit with the
assistance of attorney Israel Suster. 3 RR 96–97. While the suit was
pending, Appellant paid $30,000 towards the twins’ education fund on
behalf of her husband. 3 RR 84. Under the assumption that Appellant’s
husband had access to the account from which Appellant withdrew the
4
$30,000, Mr. Suster reported Appellant’s account for “turnover,” which
was an investigation process into whether that asset could be used
towards the collection of the $416,000 in legal fees. 3 RR 167, 169–73,
188–92. But Appellant contested this turnover action, including filing a
countersuit in another court; ultimately though, citing a need to keep all
related litigation together, Appellant’s countersuit against Mr. Suster for
fraud was transferred to the 380th District Court, over which Judge
Sandoval presided. 3 RR 183–88, 157, 196–203; 11 RR 2479–84 (State’s
Exhibit (SX) 67), 8112–13 (SX 173).
After Appellant’s husband became frustrated with his losses in the
custody proceedings—including (1) his inability to transfer the case to
another court, (2) the denial of his motion to recuse Judge Sandoval, and
(3) the appointment of his ex-wife as sole managing conservator of their
twins—he and Appellant began searching for a broader solution to their
problems. 3 RR 66–68, 75, 93–95; 4 RR 14. After seeking assistance at
the Capitol in the fall of 2007, they were introduced to Spencer. 4 RR 12–
14, 17–18; 11 RR 1737–41 (SX 8A).
5
The three met in October of 2007 at the Carys’ home, during which
time they discussed a broad range of topics, including Appellant’s
business interests. 4 RR 56–60, 63–64. At Appellant’s trial, Spencer
testified that no concrete plans were made between the couple and
Spencer regarding legislative action or Appellant’s businesses at the end
of their October 2007, two-hour meeting. Id. In grand jury proceedings
which occurred more than 4 years after that meeting, a contract dated
October 9, 2007, was produced that allegedly set out an agreement for
Appellant to pay Spencer $250,000 in exchange for his consulting services
in four areas unrelated to Wooten or Judge Sandoval. 4 RR 64–65; 2 11
RR 7763–65, 7894–96 (SX 130, 150, respectively). At Appellant’s trial,
the State pointed out discrepancies between the contract and Spencer’s
testimony—such as its suspicious near-identicality to a contract drawn
up in October 2009, executed between Spencer and another company for
2 Those tasks were purportedly: “(1) Assessment of a new pumping technology
for possible use and deployment in your field operations; and for possible investment
by you, personally; (2) Analysis of the U.S. electric marketplace, and potential
investment in SmartGrid-related ventures; (3) Assistance in assessing and securing
counsel in anticipation of and for contemplated litigation; and (4) Assessment and
proposal for family-centered advocacy, with an emphasis on parental rights.” SX 130,
150 at 1.
6
his consulting services—as well as discrepancies between the money
Spencer received and the invoices he had produced pursuant to the
contracted work. 5 RR 27–40, 214–22, 238–44; 6 RR 81–86; 11 RR 8236–
41 (SX 176), 7942–46 (SX 156).
Appellant made six payments to Spencer between January 4, 2008
and March 12, 2008, totaling $150,000. 5 RR 45. Spencer provided no
work product to Appellant during this period. 5 RR 31–37. Rather, he
testified that he began drafting a letter with an accompanying “investor
appeal” for Appellant in April 2008, identifying one business venture for
her pursuit, but which he provided sometime before August 1, 2008. 5 RR
128–30, 134–35; 11 RR 7776–97, 7898–7917 (SX 135, 151, respectively),
7810 (SX 137). In July 2008, he began working on a “summary analysis
of the U.S. Electric Grid Marketplace.” 5 RR 183–89, 11 RR 7799–7808,
7919–28 (SX 136, 152, respectively). Spencer also shared a slideshow
presentation with Appellant, detailing an approach to support their
interests in parental rights. 5 RR 190–206; 11 RR 7831–92 (SX 139). This
represented the bulk of the work Spencer purportedly did in exchange for
$150,000—a draft letter, a summary analysis, and a slideshow.
7
Appellant’s brother testified on her behalf at trial, indicating that
working in the oil business necessitated reliance on consultants, but
admitted that Appellant never shared with him the work performed by
Spencer, despite Appellant’s brother’s experience in the fields. 8 RR 212,
216, 235–36. Rather, he affirmed that he only knew about the two
companies briefed by Spencer because Appellant’s trial counsel shared
Spencer’s memoranda with him the week before trial. 8 RR 235–36.
Spencer testified 3 that one interest area he shared with the
coalition was unseating judges who did not appear to properly adhere to
the family code. 4 RR 52–53. After meeting with the Carys, Spencer
looked into the Cary family law proceedings and—based on that single
file—identified Judge Sandoval as one such judge who should be
3 Spencer was compelled to testify under Penal Code §71.04. 4 RR 30-34
(hearing granting Spencer testimonial immunity under Texas Penal Code Sec. 71.04);
4 RR 35 ([Spencer’s counsel] “[I]f you weren’t being compelled to testify under 71.04
at this point in time, would you invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination?” [Spencer]: “I would, sir.”). Spencer was still under indictment and
that there was no plea agreement in place between the State and Spencer. 4 RR 39-
40 (in which Spencer testifies before jury in direct examination that he is being
compelled to testify under a grant of testimonial immunity under the Texas Penal
Code; was charged with engaging in criminal activity, with bribery, and with money
laundering; and there was no “agreement between the State and [Spencer] or
[Spencer’s] attorney;” Spencer affirmed he understood that “nothing [he] can do here
today testifying is going to help [him] in whether or not the State prosecutes [him].”)
8
unseated. 4 RR 79–82, 88–93. However, Spencer testified he did not
discuss “the campaign with [the Carys]. [He] did not discuss [his]
business with the Carys with Suzanne.” 6 RR 42.
Spencer contacted Wooten in December 2007 to gauge her interest
in running against Judge Sandoval in the March 2008 election. 4 RR 136,
141–42, 147. Wooten was the third potential candidate whom Spencer
approached; the other two had declined. 4 RR 119–26, 131–33. Spencer
offered to act as her campaign manager, though he had never managed a
campaign before; however, he had spoken with experienced campaign
manager and campaign consultant Hank Clements, who agreed to work
as a subcontractor for Spencer. 4 RR 149–53, 183–84; 5 RR 43–44, 183–
84. After Wooten met with Clements, she conveyed her agreement to run
against Judge Sandoval to Spencer. 4 RR 155, 180–82. Spencer admitted
it would take a lot of resources to run a successful campaign against an
incumbent judge, and presented Wooten with a “beer” budget, consisting
of $60-70,000, and a “champagne” budget in the amount of $100-150,000.
4 RR 149–53; 5 RR 45, 47–48; 11 RR 1956 (SX 39), 1938 (SX 37).
9
During the same period that Appellant paid Spencer $150,000.00,
ostensibly for Spencer’s unrelated consulting services, between January
4, 2008 and March 12, 2008, Wooten filed paperwork to run against
Judge Sandoval for the 380th Judicial District Court seat in Collin
County, and ultimately won the race. 5 RR 45, 76. Spencer denied that
Wooten knew anything about the Carys, denied that he was putting
Wooten in a difficult position and, instead, was “protecting her” by
“partitioning off the two,” since he “wasn’t going to shut down [his]
business to run a judicial campaign.” 6 RR 43.
An attorney with the Texas Ethics Committee, a state agency
responsible for overseeing financial reporting for lobbyists and
campaigns, among other duties, testified that judicial candidates have
statutory obligations to file certain financial reports. 6 RR 148–49, 151–
57. These reports must include the candidate’s personal resources, funds
raised from donors, and loans taken or given during the campaign, in
addition to campaign expenses and expenditures. 6 RR 151–53, 155, 157,
160, 162–68. Both Spencer’s bank accounts and Wooten’s campaign
account show that the campaign expenses they incurred, e.g. 6 RR 54–
10
60, 71, could not have been paid without the money provided by
Appellant. 7 RR 19, 26–33, 40. None of Wooten’s financial statements
listed the Carys or Spencer as donors or loan sources. 11 RR 2026–33
(SX 52), 2154–2432 (SX 62), 2434–59 (SX 63), 7730–40 (SX 97); 5 RR 176-
79; 7 RR 19, 56.
Jay Valentine, a former consultant for David Cary’s business,
testified that, “during the course of trying to hire [Spencer], [Appellant’s
husband, David Cary,] had said several times that the reason we were
going to hire Spencer was that he was the person who was able to fix
problems. And he said that Spencer was the person who had fixed his
situation with the judge, and was going to get his situation reversed.” 8
RR 74. Valentine also testified that when Spencer talked about his role
in the Wooten campaign, “Spencer’s comments were more braggadocios
than Cary’s were. Spencer’s comments were that he was able to get
Wooten elected and that he owned her. He used that word two or three
times. And that he – he used that as a reason for why he was able to get
things done as an example of, Look, this is the kind of stuff I can do.” 8
RR 76–77.
11
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant’s arguments suffer from three fundamental defects.
First, Appellant misconstrues the measure for legal sufficiency under the
familiar test in Jackson v. Virginia. 4 Specifically, Appellant asks the
Court to re-weigh the evidence presented at trial in an effort to animate
a determination rejected by a properly-instructed jury, by resolving all
credibility choices and inferential conflicts against those explicit and
implicit determinations. This she cannot do. When the jury’s verdict is
analyzed pursuant to the correct legal measure, as the majority did
below, Appellant’s arguments fail.
Second, Appellant misconstrues both the bribery statute and this
Court’s decision in McCallum v. State.5 As charged here, bribery is an
inchoate offense criminalizing the simple transfer of money with corrupt
intent. It matters not whether there was a “meeting-of-the-minds”
between Appellant and Wooten; or even whether Appellant’s
expectations regarding Wooten’s behavior after the transfer of money
4 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
5 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
12
were rational, or likely. Hence, Appellant’s effort to shift legal focus away
from her own acts and intentions, to examine whether Wooten acted in
conformity with Appellant’s hopes and expectations, is irrelevant.
Finally, much of Appellant’s argument is directed to establishing
legal insufficiency with respect to only some of the alternative theories in
the charge. To this end, she often narrows her focus to only those theories
that are, generally speaking, more difficult for the State to prove on this
record. But by selectively attacking only a subset of available theories
upon which the jury could convict, Appellant misses the mark. Here, the
simplest and most salient measure for legal sufficiency is whether a
rational juror could have believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that when
Appellant made each of the six payments to Spencer, she hoped to obtain
favorable rulings from Wooten in pending cases in which Appellant or
her husband were parties. This is the simplest restatement of the
relevant question, at least on this record.6 When Appellant’s arguments
6 The State does not waive, and explicitly reserves, consideration of the
alternative theories of criminal liability for purposes of Jackson review. The State
focuses on this particular theory both because it exposes the weakness of Appellant’s
arguments, and because it is arguably the “easiest” measure of Jackson sufficiency.
13
are analyzed with reference to this simple question—as the majority did
below—legal sufficiency becomes apparent.
ARGUMENT
I. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE ONE: The Court Should Affirm the
Lower Court Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have Found—As
This Jury Actually Found—That Appellant Did Not Intend Her
Payments to Spencer to Constitute “Political Contributions,”
Irrespective of How the Money was Ultimately Spent.
With respect to the first issue, Appellant alleges that the evidence
adduced at trial is insufficient to sustain her six convictions for bribery.
See Appellant’s Br. at 18–27. Specifically, Appellant contends—in
contradiction to her position at trial—that the State’s evidence
established the payments made from her to Spencer were used to fund
Wooten’s campaign, and were, therefore, “political contributions.” See id.
at 20. Appellant also complains that “the jury was not instructed on, and
did not return a verdict on, bribery under the much stricter standard
required for political contributions, and the evidence would have been
insufficient had they been so charged.” Id. The State will address these
arguments in turn.
14
A. Appellant should be estopped from complaining that the jury
was not instructed about, or required to return a verdict on,
the stricter statutory proof standard for bribery.
Appellant should be estopped from assigning error to the jury
charge. There are four basic alternatives to proving bribery under the
relevant statute, contained in four separate subsections of the Penal
Code: Section 36.02(a)(1) through (4). When prosecuting bribery under
the fourth subsection, the State has a significantly higher burden of
proof. See Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(a)(4). 7 And as relevant here, the State
is required to proceed under the fourth subsection in some circumstances.
Specifically, Section 36.02(d) reads:
It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1),
(2), and (3) of Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political
contribution as defined by Title 15, Election Code, or an
expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter
305, Government Code.
7 “[A]ny benefit that is a political contribution as defined by Title 15, Election
Code,1 or that is an expenditure made and reported in accordance with Chapter 305,
Government Code, if the benefit was offered, conferred, solicited, accepted, or agreed
to pursuant to an express agreement to take or withhold a specific exercise of official
discretion if such exercise of official discretion would not have been taken or withheld
but for the benefit; notwithstanding any rule of evidence or jury instruction allowing
factual inferences in the absence of certain evidence, direct evidence of the express
agreement shall be required in any prosecution under this subdivision.” Tex. Penal
Code § 36.02(a)(4).
15
Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(d). Where a criminal statute expressly includes
a provision beginning with, “It is an exception to the application of,” the
State “must negate the existence of [that] exception in the accusation
charging commission of the offense and prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant or defendant’s conduct does not fall within the
exception.” Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(a), (b) (West 2013). For purposes of
this appeal the question then becomes whether a reasonable juror could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the payments made by
Appellant were not “political contributions.”
But whether or not the jury was reasonable when it actually
determined that the State proved this element beyond a reasonable
doubt, Appellant should not here be permitted to complain about the lack
of the related instruction pursuant to the heightened standard of proof in
Penal Code § 36.02(d). “[T]he law of invited error estops a party from
making an appellate error of an action it induced.” Prystash v. State, 3
S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Ripkowski v. State, 61
S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“Prystash subsequently
overruled Powell by holding that a party could estop himself from
16
complaining about the failure to submit any issue, regardless of the
nature of the issue involved.”).
Here, the defense theory at trial was that Appellant transferred the
relevant funds to Spencer to compensate him for his work under the
alleged consulting agreement; and that Appellant had no knowledge that
Spencer used that money in relation to Wooten’s decision to run for office,
whatsoever. This point bears repeating: Appellant’s position at trial was
necessarily that the payments were not intended as political
contributions because she paid Spencer for unrelated consulting services
and had no knowledge of Spencer’s activities in support of Wooten’s
campaign. See, e.g., 1 RR “Motion for Directed Verdict” 4–6. But she now
argues on appeal, that they were political contributions.
But if Appellant wanted the benefit of an instruction regarding the
heightened proof requirements in Penal Code § 36.02(d), she would have
had to concede to the jury—as she appears to concede on appeal—that
her payments pursuant to the consulting agreement were subterfuge,
fabricated several years after its purported effective date to provide a
false explanation for the transfers of money from Stacy to Spencer. But
17
such an approach would fundamentally contradict her theory of the
defense, and may well have been disastrous if pursued at trial. See, e.g.,
8 RR 212–13 (eliciting testimony from Appellant’s brother that he paid
one consultant “a lot of money” —$60,000 in the 1980’s—“[u]p front”),
219–24 (Appellant’s brother describing long-held practice of hiring
consultants in the oil and real estate businesses); 1 RR “Motion for
Directed Verdict” 6 (Appellant’s counsel arguing, “There’s just not an
issue of fact for the Court to send to a jury,” where Spencer testified, “‘I
screened them. They didn’t – Suzanne Wooten didn’t know about this
money or where it came from, or that it came from the Carys, or it came
from Stacy Cary.’”).
Moreover, Appellant’s defensive theory (i.e., that the payments to
Spencer were compensation for unrelated consulting services)
necessarily required the State to prove that the payments were made for
the benefit of Wooten, pursuant to Appellant’s corrupt intentions under
the bribery statute. In reliance on this theory of the defense, the
prosecutor attempted to disprove it by tracing those payments through
Spencer to Wooten, including Appellant’s knowledge thereto. Now—on
18
appeal—Appellant essentially advances a new jury-argument, one that
she affirmatively declined to pursue in the trial court. Appellant now
contends that a hypothetical, reasonable juror would be required to
conclude that the payments were political contributions, despite the fact
that she told the actual jury they were not.
Appellant should not be permitted to have it both ways. For this
reason Appellant should be estopped from complaining about the failure
of the jury charge to include the heightened proof requirements
attendant in Penal Code § 36.02(d). See Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d at
389.
B. Standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges.
This Court has mandated that the sufficiency of evidence standard
established in Jackson v. Virginia, is the only standard to be used in a
criminal case. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (plurality op.); see Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). On review, all evidence, and any reasonable inferences from
that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
19
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319; Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746.
The jury is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and the weight
of the evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). The reviewing court must resolve or reconcile conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the verdict. Id.; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. “An
appellate court determines whether the necessary inferences are
reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Ervin
v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)
(citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The
appellate court must view both direct and circumstantial evidence
equally when reviewing the record based on a sufficiency of the evidence
claim. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The reviewing court does not resolve any conflict
of fact, reweigh the evidence, or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
Garza v. State, 841 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.).
20
Important, too, is when a court’s charge authorizes the jury to
convict on more than one theory—as the charge did here—the verdict of
guilty will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the charged
theories. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). As
the State will establish below, application of the rule in Guevara is
especially important to understand the weakness in Appellant’s
approach.
C. Applicable law to establish bribery
1. As charged here, bribery is an inchoate offense.
As relevant to this case, a person commits bribery if she
intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another,
any benefit as consideration for (1) the recipient’s decision, vote,
recommendation, or other exercise of official discretion in a judicial
proceeding, or (2) the recipient’s decision, opinion, recommendation, vote,
or other exercise of discretion as a public servant. Tex. Penal Code §
36.02(a)(2), (1) (West 2008)8 (respectively); see 2 CR 643–48. Also, as
8 Given that the law in effect at the time an offense is committed is controlling,
the State cites the relevant criminal statutes from 2008.
21
previously established, it is an exception to the application of either of
those provisions that the benefit is a “political contribution” as defined
by the Election Code. Id. at § 36.02(d).
When it is alleged under the bribery statute that an individual
offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another, and the jury is properly
instructed that proof of any one of the three alleged acts would warrant
conviction, no proof of a bilateral agreement is needed. Martinez v. State,
696 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, pet. ref’d) (distinguishing
McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).9 Appellant,
however, reads McCallum to stand for the proposition that the “as
consideration” language in the bribery statute means the State must
always prove “a bilateral agreement—in effect an illegal contract to
exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official
9 “After careful consideration, we find that McCallum is factually and legally
distinguishable from the instant cause. In McCallum, the indictment alleged only
that the defendant conferred the benefit on the recipient. Under that indictment,
proof that the defendant offered the alleged benefit was not sufficient to convict. The
instant indictment, on the other hand, alleges that appellant solicited, agreed to
accept, and accepted the benefit from Zepeda, and the jury was properly instructed
that proof of any one of the three alleged acts would warrant conviction. Thus, it was
not necessary for the State to prove that appellant agreed to accept or accepted the
alleged benefit, and evidence that appellant merely solicited the benefit will support
the conviction.” Martinez, 696 S.W.2d at 932.
22
function.” See Appellant’s Br. at 16. Appellant seems to argue that, while
the public official need not actually “accept” that consideration, there
must be proof that a benefit was actually communicated to the official,
with a mutual understanding about what official performance the
defendant wanted “in exchange” for the consideration. See id. Hence,
Appellant focuses the majority of her brief on her contention that the
State failed to prove Wooten had a mutual understanding regarding
Appellant’s expectations, as purportedly evidenced by Wooten’s actions
after receiving Appellant’s consideration.
A careful analysis of the Court’s McCallum opinion, however,
establishes that Appellant is incorrect. See supra, note 9. And given this
confusion with the McCallum holding, this appeal is an opportunity for
the Court to clarify it in line with both Martinez, and the majority opinion
below. As the Third Court persuasively reasoned in this regard:
Under § 36.02, a person commits the offense of bribery
if he intentionally or knowingly offers or solicits a benefit as
consideration for a variety of official acts or omissions.
Common sense dictates that when it is alleged and proved
that the defendant offered or solicited a proscribed benefit, it
is not necessary to further prove that the offer or solicitation
resulted in a bilateral arrangement or unlawful contract with
23
the other party. The offense of bribery is complete when the
offer or solicitation is made.
The relevant language of § 36.02 was taken verbatim
from § 240.1 of the Model Penal Code. In Model Penal Code §
240.1, Comment 4(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments,
1980), it is stated:
The offense of bribery is defined in a manner
that includes a completed agreement between the
person who offers the bribe and the person who
receives it. It also permits prosecution of inchoate
conduct intended to achieve that objective. The
terms “offers” and “solicits” clearly refer to such
inchoate behavior and are designed to include
what might be regarded as an attempt to give or to
receive a bribe.
Martinez, 696 S.W.2d at 932–33 (emphasis added) (quoting Model Penal
Code § 240.1, Comment 4(b), (c)); accord Mustard v. State, 711 S.W.2d
71, 75 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no pet.) (“The offense of bribery focuses
on the mental state of the actor, and is complete if a private citizen, by
offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer intends an agreement.”) (citing
Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, pet.
granted)).
This approach makes particular sense given the manner in which
law enforcement entities often detect and prosecute bribery. Take, for
24
example, a hypothetical defendant who decides to bribe a judge to
influence the outcome of his own criminal prosecution. Assume that in
order to execute his scheme, the defendant unwittingly contacts and then
utilizes intermediaries, who are actually undercover police officers.
Indeed, assume the ultimate target of the bribe (i.e., the judge), was not
even aware of the undercover sting operation conducted by police to
document the crime.10 Because bribery is an inchoate offense—at least as
charged here—it matters not whether there was a “meeting-of-the-
minds,” or even whether the defendant’s expectations regarding the
judge’s favorable rulings, were rational or even likely. See Martinez, 696
S.W.2d at 932–33. Rather, as in both the hypothetical defendant’s case
and as charged here, so long as a rational juror could conclude that
Appellant took an affirmative act in furtherance of her corrupt-intent-
10 Indeed, this hypothetical is premised on an actual bribery prosecution that
occurred in Austin, Texas, which was heavily reported in the media. Members of the
Los Zetas crime syndicate attempted to bribe the Honorable Judge Sam Sparks, a
federal district judge in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. See e.g.,
Criminal Compl., United States. v. Francisco Agustin Colorado Cebado, also known
as Francisco Colorado, Jr., No. 1:13-cr-00458-DEW-2 (formerly No. 1:13-mj-00471-
AWA) (W.D. Tex. Sep. 5, 2013), ECF No. 1; see also Colorado-Cebado (2), No. A–13–
CR–458 DEW, 2013 WL 5852621 at *1 (considering United States’ Motion for
Detention).
25
scheme, as defined in the bribery statute, she is guilty of bribery. 11 See
id.
2. The law of parties
The jury charge instructed that Appellant may be found criminally
responsible for bribery, either as a primary actor or under the law of
parties. 2 CR 643–48. A party may be criminally responsible under the
law of parties in several ways. Hayes v. State, 265 S.W.3d 673, 678 n.4
(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). “An individual is
criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed
by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally
responsible, or both.” Tex. Penal Code § 7.01(a). A person is also
criminally liable for an offense committed by the conduct of another if
“acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he
solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to
commit the offense.” Id. at § 7.02(a)(2). And as established below, a
reasonable jury could have concluded as much here.
11 This also assumes that the State has proven that the relevant payments
were not political contributions, beyond a reasonable doubt. The State will analyze
this issue below.
26
It is well-settled that a jury may be charged on the law of parties
even though no such allegation is contained in the indictment. Marable
v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287, 287 & n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (collecting
cases); see Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(reaffirming that state and federal law both specify that due process does
not require defendant’s culpability as a party to be pled in charging
instrument), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1763 (2012). “This rule applies not
only to the law of parties found in [s]ection 7.02(a)(2) [of the Penal Code]
but also the law of parties found in [s]ection 7.02(b).” Montoya v. State,
810 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
With respect to sections 7.01 and 7.02(a)(2), a conviction under the
law of parties requires a showing that, at the time of the offense, the
parties acted together and contributed to a common purpose. Patterson
v. State, 950 S.W.2d 196, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d). In
other words, the State must show conduct constituting an offense, plus
an act by the defendant “done with the intent to promote or assist such
conduct.” Trenor v. State, 333 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, no pet.). To determine whether a defendant participated as a
27
party, the Court may examine events occurring before, during, and after
the commission of the offense and may rely on actions demonstrating an
understanding to commit the offense. See Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d
288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
D. A rational juror could have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant did not intend the illicit payments to
constitute “political contributions,” irrespective of how those
payments were actually used.
Appellant contends that “the State affirmatively negated an
essential element of the crime by proving that the alleged bribery could
only have been “political contributions.” Appellant’s Br. at 18–19.
Because Appellant misconstrues the relevant law, and because she
fundamentally alters the test for legal sufficiency, the Court should reject
this claim, and affirm the court below.
1. Appellant misconstrues the statute.
The question here is whether a reasonable juror could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the payments made by Appellant were
not “political contributions.” To start this analysis one must first define
“political contribution.” To this end, the jury was given the following
28
definitions, which track the relevant statutes (and which Appellant has
not complained of on appeal):
“Contribution” means a direct or indirect transfer of
money, goods, services, or any other thing of value and
includes an agreement made or other obligation incurred,
whether legally enforceable or not, to make a transfer. The
term includes a loan or extension of credit, other than those
expressly excluded by law, and a guarantee of a loan or
extension of credit, including a loan described by law. The
term does not include a loan made in the due course of
business by a corporation that is legally engaged in the
business of lending money and that has conducted the
business continuously for more than one year before the loan
is made or an expenditure required by law to be reported.
“Political contribution” means a campaign contribution
or an officeholder contribution.
“Campaign contribution” means a contribution to a
candidate or political committee that is offered or given with
the intent that it be used in connection with a campaign for
elective office or on a measure. Whether a contribution is
made before, during, or after an election does not affect its
status as a campaign contribution.
“Expenditure” means a payment, distribution, loan,
advance, reimbursement, deposit, or gift of money or any
thing of value and includes a contract, promise, or agreement,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make an expenditure.
2 CR 643–48 (emphasis added); see Tex. Election Code § 251.001(2), (5),
(3), (6) (West 2008). In this case then, a “political contribution” is defined
29
as a “campaign contribution.” Id. And, as relevant here, a campaign
contribution is the direct or indirect transfer of something of value to a
candidate (i.e., Wooten), “with the intent that it be used in connection
with a campaign for elective office. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
The question under the statute is not whether (or how) a given
payment was actually used in a campaign; rather, the question is
whether the person who made the payment—and who otherwise acted
with corrupt intent under the statute—subjectively intended that the
payment be used in a campaign. In other words, the target’s ultimate
disposition of the money is not outcome determinative to the question of
the briber’s intent. See id.
Moreover, application of this exception to the facts of this case
suggests an additional nuance. As established above, and assuming that
Appellant’s physical act of transferring each sum aligned with her
corrupt intent under the statue, each payment constituted an
independent, completed crime. In other words, the question of intent here
focusses on the instant Appellant took the volitional act of transferring
each sum of money. And like the question of corrupt intent, the question
30
of whether Appellant intended that each payment be used in connection
with a campaign for elective office, should necessarily be measured at the
same moment.
Although the undersigned has been unable to locate precedent on
this point, with all respect to the Court, no other interpretation makes
sense. 12 Here, a rational juror would not be required to conclude that
Appellant subjectively intended that each payment be used in Wooten’s
campaign simply because the money ended up there weeks or months
later. First, it is difficult to imagine how Appellant can complain that the
jury acted unreasonably in concluding that the payments were not
political contributions, given that her defense at trial was the same. See
12 Take, for instance, the following hypothetical. A defendant decides to bribe
a judge to influence the outcome in defendant’s criminal case. To this end, the
defendant purchases a penthouse condominium in downtown Austin, and transfers
title to the judge as part of his scheme to influence the outcome of his criminal trial.
Two weeks after obtaining title to the condominium, the judge sells it, and uses every
dollar of the proceeds to fund her re-election campaign. Assume that the prosecutor
proved corrupt intent. Under Appellant’s view, a rational juror would be required to
conclude the payment was a political contribution because the prosecutor would
necessarily have proven that it was used, dollar-for-dollar, to fund a campaign. The
better view is that the target’s ultimate use may be relevant to determine a
defendant’s subjective intent—or not—depending on the facts of the case. However,
the target’s ultimate use is not determinative under the text of the statute.
31
Prystash, 3 S.W.3d at 531 (“[T]he law of invited error estops a party from
making an appellate error of an action it induced.”).
Moreover, if the jury concluded that Appellant possessed a corrupt
intent when transferring the money to Spencer—not that she had a
specific expectation regarding Spencer or Wooten’s use of the money,
other than for Wooten to enter favorable decisions in Appellant and
Appellant’s husband’s pending cases—Appellant’s conviction must be
affirmed. And in her opening brief to this Court, Appellant seems to
acknowledge this line of reasoning. See Appellant’s Br. at 34–35 (“Even
in the light most favorable to the State, there was no evidence that Ms.
Cary knew what Mr. Spencer was doing with the money she transferred
beyond perhaps generally using it for the Wooten campaign.”). In other
words, Appellant continues to maintain that the evidence fails to
establish she had any expectations regarding the way Spencer and
Wooten used the money. Id. Taking Appellant’s characterization at face
value then, if the jury reasonably believed that the State established
corrupt intent, then the jury could also have concluded that Appellant
32
had no real understanding or expectation regarding how Spencer or
Wooten would use the money. See id.
Because the eventual disposition of Appellant’s surreptitious
payments to Spencer is not dispositive to Appellant’s subjective intent
regarding Wooten’s ultimate use of those payments, the jury could have
found that the six payments were not political contributions.
2. Appellant misapplies Jackson.
More troubling, Appellant misconstrues the test for legal
sufficiency review. The test under Jackson focuses exclusively upon
whether a decision the jury actually made was supported by the evidence
at trial, after resolving all credibility choices and inferential conflicts in
favor of the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Appellant is asking the
Court to re-weigh the evidence 13 presented at trial in an effort to animate
a determination rejected by a properly-instructed jury, by resolving all
credibility choices and inferential conflicts against those explicit and
13 Most of Appellant’s “evidentiary” support for this sufficiency claim is, in
reality, premised on the prosecutor’s argument, which is not evidence. See Appellant’s
Br. at 19–27.
33
implicit determinations. See Appellant’s Br. at 19–27. 14 Indeed, the
dissent takes the same approach below.15
Appellant’s focus on evidence tending to contradict the jury’s
verdict is fundamentally at odds with the standard described in Jackson.
Indeed, her approach (and the approach used by the dissent) may be
likened to the standard for factual sufficiency rejected by this Court in
Brooks. Under that now-discarded standard, the reviewing court was not
required to defer to either the jury’s credibility or weight determinations,
and the reviewing court could sit as a thirteenth juror and “disagree with
a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and with a jury’s weighing of
the evidence.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (internal quotations omitted).
Alternatively, Appellant’s approach finds similarities with the factual
sufficiency standard used in civil cases. E.g., Levine v. Steve Scharn
Custom Homes, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 637, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
14For example, Appellant focuses almost the entirety on the prosecutor’s
argument at trial, tending to establish that the payments ended up being used in the
campaign. See Appellant’s Br. at 19–27.
15 E.g., Cary, 2014 WL 4261233, at *42 (“The State contended and the State’s
evidence showed that the monies transferred in this case were political
contributions—monies used to defray political expenditures incurred by Wooten
during her election campaign.”).
34
2014, pet. denied) (“When the appellants attack the factual sufficiency of
an adverse finding on an issue on which they did not have the burden of
proof, the appellants must demonstrate the finding is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust.”). Finally, to the extent that Appellant suggests that
the State was required to disprove other reasonable hypotheses, she may
be attempting to reanimate the long discarded Geesa standard. See
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled
by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (rejecting the
“any reasonable hypothesis” analytical construct in circumstantial
evidence cases to review evidentiary sufficiency). None of these
approaches is available here.
And to the extent that Appellant means to argue that her payments
were political contributions as a matter of law, she cites no authority for
this proposition. Given that the relevant factual inquiry is necessarily
limited to the jury’s determination regarding her subjective intent,
Appellant fails to explain how a court could take such a question out of
the jury’s hands.
35
When the evidence is properly analyzed under the Jackson
standard, and direct and inferential evidence against the jury’s verdict is
ignored, a rational juror could have reasonably found that Appellant’s
payments were not political contributions. As the lower court held:
The evidence showed Stacy did not transfer funds
directly to Wooten’s campaign; Stacy’s contention was that
she transferred funds to Spencer to compensate him for his
work under the purported consulting agreement. [An
Assistant General Counsel for the Texas Ethics Committee]
testified as to what constitutes a lawful political contribution
under the election code in a race for a Collin County district
court bench in 2008. According to [him], a political
contribution to a candidate for a Collin County bench could
not exceed $2,500 for the election cycle. Each of the six
transfers of funds from Stacy to Spencer that were funneled
to the Wooten campaign vastly exceeded the amount of an
allowable political contribution to a judicial candidate, and
the transfers of funds were not reported by Wooten as political
contributions under the election code on any campaign
finance report or amended campaign finance report filed with
the Ethics Commission or as loans under the election code on
any personal financial statement filed with the Ethics
Commission. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 253.155(b) (West
2010).
Based on the applicable standard of review, a rational
jury could have reasonably found that Stacy’s payments were
not political contributions as defined by the statute. Stacy
does not argue otherwise on appeal.
36
Cary, 2014 WL 4261233, at *34 (emphasis added). It bears repeating:
when Jackson sufficiency is properly measured with reference to only the
evidence supporting the jury’s historic determination, legal sufficiency
becomes apparent here. And important, too, as correctly noted by the
majority in the lower court, Appellant did not challenge the jury’s
determination by reference to the evidence supporting its determination.
Id. In other words, Appellant only argued that the jury was required to
make an inference that it did not make; she has never contended that the
inference made by the jury was not rationally grounded in the evidence
supporting that historic decision, as Jackson requires. And consistent
with her position in the lower court, Appellant does not here argue that
the evidence supporting the jury’s historic determination was insufficient
to justify its conclusion. Hence, application of the proper Jackson
measure should ineluctably lead to Appellant’s convictions being
affirmed, and the State asks the Court to do so here.
37
II. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE TWO: The Court Should Affirm the
Court of Appeals Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have Found
Sufficient Evidence of Bribery —As This Jury Actually Found—
Because Proof of a Bilateral Agreement Is Not a Pre-Condition
Under All Parts of the Bribery Statute.
A. Appellant again misconstrues both the statute and the test
for legal sufficiency.
In issue two, Appellant shifts her legal-sufficiency focus to the proof
of a bilateral agreement between her and Wooten, and then complains
about the lack of evidence establishing both that Wooten acted in
conformity with a bribe, and that Appellant received quid-pro-quo
consideration in return for Appellant’s payments. See Appellant’s Br. 27–
33. Because Appellant’s contentions are founded on a misunderstanding
of the bribery statute, the Court should reject this claim. See supra,
Section I(D)(1).
When rejecting a similar argument, this Court once observed:
It was not essential to the appellant’s conviction that in
receiving the money Patton [the target] acted with a criminal
intent. In delivering the money to Patton with the intent to
bribe him, the appellant committed the offense without
regard to the motive of Patton in receiving the money.
Sowells v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 465, 468, 270 S.W. 558, 559 (1925)
(internal citations omitted). In Sowells, this Court advanced the bedrock
38
principle recognized by the Third Court in Martinez, 696 S.W.2d at 932–
33. As established in Section I(C)(1), supra, given the way Appellant was
charged, proof of bilateral agreement (or counter-consideration) is wholly
unnecessary to affirm Appellant’s convictions. And because Appellant
improperly shifts the legal focus away from her own acts and intentions,
to the supposed lack of evidence regarding whether Wooten acted in
conformity with Appellant’s hopes and desires, her argument fails.
For example, Appellant argues, “there was no evidence that Ms.
Wooten considered dropping out of the race or that anyone thought she
needed inducement to stay in once she became a candidate.” Appellant’s
Br. at 29. Since the crime for which Appellant was charged would have
been complete as of the moment she transferred money to Spencer,
Wooten’s thoughts or actions are irrelevant. Appellant continues: “There
was not . . . evidence that Ms. Wooten had any idea that the Carys were
involved with Spencer or were transferring money to him. Thus, she
would not have known for whom to rule favorably.” Id. at 30. But it
matters not that a defendant’s bribery scheme is well thought-out, or
even likely to succeed. As charged here, bribery is an inchoate offense
39
criminalizing the transfer of money with corrupt intent. The State was
required to prove nothing more. All of Appellant’s remaining arguments
on this point fail for the same reasons. See id. at 31–32.
Finally, attention should be paid to the dissent because Appellant
here relies on it. See Appellant’s Br. at 32 (quoting Cary, 2014 WL
4261233, at *46 (“The evidence is equally consistent with the proposition
that appellant merely hoped or believed that Wooten would make better
rulings than Judge Sandoval had. Under McCallum, such evidence is not
sufficient to prove bribery.”)). The dissent’s analysis again turns Jackson
on its head. In other words, the dissent acknowledges that the relevant
evidence rationally supported what the jury did, but then supplants that
historic determination with an “equally consistent” inference, against the
jury’s verdict. See id. Because the dissent misconstrues Jackson, it fails
to support Appellant’s present argument, and should be rejected.
B. When reviewing all evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, in favor of the jury’s verdict, Appellant’s argument
fails.
The jury in Appellant’s case reviewed the following evidence: Just
three months prior to the beginning of the Wooten’s campaign for judicial
40
office, Appellant and her husband were introduced to Spencer. 4 RR 56–
57. Within one or two weeks of that meeting, Appellant supposedly
entered into a $250,000 contract with Spencer for his services on four
consulting deliverables, having nothing to do with Wooten’s campaign.
SX 150; 6 RR 6–50, 86–98 (demonstrating that defense counsel proffered
the terms of the consulting agreement to explain that Appellant’s
payments to Spencer had nothing to do with Wooten). The contract looked
suspiciously similar to a contract drafted and signed more than two years
later, with a company for whom Appellant’s husband worked; the
contract with Appellant included a typographical error of “TDI,” the
name of the above-mentioned company, which Spencer had initially
testified he had no idea existed at the time he entered the contract with
Appellant. 5 RR 238–44; 6 RR 76–77, 81–86; SX 156, 130. Allegedly
pursuant to this contract, Appellant provided wire transfers and checks
to Spencer for the amounts of $50,000.00 on January 4, 2008; $25,000.00
on January 30, 2008; $25,000 on February 14, 2008; $25,000.00 on
February 26, 2008; $10,000.00 on March 7, 2008; and $15,000.00 on
March 14, 2008. 6 RR 40, 51–54, 96–97, 101–06; 5 RR 36; 6 RR 96–97; 7
41
RR 103–09; Defense Exhibits (“DX”) 6, 5, 4. Remarkably, Appellant made
these payments to Spencer despite the fact that he had produced no
contract deliverables until after April 2008 and prior to August 1, 2008.
5 RR 128–30, 134–35, 183–88, 190–206.
It bears repeating that, according to Appellant at trial, all of these
transferred payments to Spencer were made for wholly unrelated
consulting services, and Appellant attempted to convince the jury that
she had no knowledge Spencer was utilizing these payments in an effort
to get Wooten elected.16 5 RR 27, 29, 36; 6 RR 6–50, 86–98. Under
Appellant’s theory at trial, Spencer’s efforts to get Judge Sandoval
unseated—the judge who had caused Appellant and her husband so
many problems—was a coincidence.
The defense further attempted to demonstrate in her case-in-chief
that Appellant hired Spencer, not to funnel money to Wooten’s campaign,
but in the official capacity as a consultant. Mr. Stine, Appellant’s brother,
16 Additionally, these six payments were made between the date Wooten filed
for judicial candidacy and shortly after the end of the election. 6 RR 40, 58. Looking
to the timing of the contract, the payments began some three months after the
contract’s start date (October 2007) and continued at a 2-week interval, after the first
one-month break. 6 RR 40, 51-54, 96-97, 101-06.
42
testified that hiring consultants was a necessity in the oil business, and
often yielded varied results. 8 RR 212–13, 219–20. But he also testified
that he “vetted” the consultants he used, such as through asking sources
familiar with the new areas he would venture into. 8 RR 220, 238–39.
Here, Appellant relied only on the introduction to Spencer from Royce
Poinsett, the highly credentialed legislative general counsel to then-
Speaker of the House Tom Craddick, but not someone with extensive
experience in the areas Appellant supposedly contracted with Spencer for
his services. 4 RR 5–6, 13–19. Additionally, Mr. Stine testified that, in
one instance in which he felt he had been swindled by a particular
venture partner, he had not only not paid all the money up front, but he
had also attempted to get his money back. 8 RR 213. Yet Appellant took
no such precautions, having paid Spencer $150,000.00 in the span of 1.5
months, and only attempted to collect on a loan to Spencer of $15,000,
made the next year. 6 RR 40, 51-54, 60-61.
The State also produced evidence through the testimony of
Appellant’s CPA that Appellant was diligent and attentive to the
management of her money, namely in reporting and claiming business
43
and legal expenses in her tax returns. 6 RR 119–26. For example, despite
Ms. Kedzie having informed Appellant that the expenses for Appellant’s
husband’s divorce and custody proceedings were not deductible,
Appellant again pressed Ms. Kedzie for their deduction, exchanging a
note that said, “Thanks to my stepchildren litigious abusive narcissistic
gold-digging mother, does personal legal stuff not get deducted? Why
shouldn’t defending my home and family be deductible?” 6 RR 120–22,
127–28; SX 172 (emphasis removed). Remarkably, however, Appellant
did not list or report to her CPA that Spencer was a consultant for any of
her businesses for the tax year of 2008—effectually neither claiming nor
deducting as contractor wages any of the $150,000 paid to Spencer. 6 RR
127–30.
The State produced evidence that Appellant not only knew about
the difficult civil litigation between her husband and his ex-wife, but took
an active role: paying for his legal fees, filing as an intervenor in her
husband and his ex-wife’s lawsuit, and filing suit against the collections
attorney for her husband’s ex-wife. 3 RR 183, 186–90. And the State also
produced evidence that, despite Appellant’s attempt to file a lawsuit
44
affecting her husband’s ex-wife outside of the 380th Judicial District
Court, Appellant’s case was ultimately transferred back to that court—
and Appellant did nothing with that case to move it along until Wooten
took the bench. 3 RR 218–20. Additionally, Appellant’s husband also filed
a second Motion to Modify in his custody proceedings in that court, only
after Wooten took the bench. 3 RR 219.
Finally, a comparison of the chain of communications and bank
records provides the strongest evidence that Appellant’s characterization
of her $150,000 payments to Spencer was a complete fabrication, and also
provided a key link in supporting the jury’s finding of guilt. 7 RR 96–119;
SX 98A. For example, looking to the date of the transfer of monies on
March 7, 2008, after Wooten won the election, evidence shows campaign
consultant Clements called and texted Spencer. 6 RR 66–67; 7 RR 107–
08; 11 RR 6217, 6237 (SX 81A) . Spencer later issued a cashier’s check to
Clements for $10,000.00, presumably as the “win” bonus as promised
prior to Clements’s hiring. 5 RR 48–50. But between 7:00 a.m. and 11:00
a.m. on the day of that issuance, the phone records of Spencer and the
Carys show that Spencer and Appellant’s husband exchanged a total of
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17 text messages, and Appellant and her husband exchanged four phone
calls or messages,; Appellant then arranged for $10,000.00 to be wired to
Spencer, and—nearly one hour later—that same amount was issued to
Clements. 7 RR 107–08; 6 RR 53–59; 11 RR 38, 43, 45–46 (SX 98A), 2939–
41 (SX 77), 5517 (SX 79C), 5783 (SX 80).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing the guilt of an actor, and alone is sufficient to establish guilt.
Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. The cumulative effects of these facts are
sufficient to support the conviction under the law of parties. See id.
Namely, that Appellant’s entire defense at trial was a fabrication. That
the consulting agreement was a subterfuge, fabricated several years after
its purported effective date to provide a false explanation for the
transfers of money from Stacy to Spencer. In other words, that Appellant
knowingly made each of the six payments to Spencer, hoping to obtain
favorable rulings from Wooten, in cases in which Appellant or her
husband were parties—and then lied about it. See, e.g., 3 RR 66–68, 75,
93–95; 4 RR 14, 79–82, 88–93, 136, 141–42, 147; 5 RR 31–37, 40–41; 6
RR 54–60, 71; 7 RR 19, 26–33, 40. The cumulative effect of these facts
46
indicate that Appellant aided or attempted to aid her husband, who
worked with Wooten and/or Spencer to unseat Judge Sandoval with an
understanding that Wooten would issue favorable rulings to Appellant
and her husband in cases already pending in front of her. See Tex. Pen.
Code Ann. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2) (law of parties); see also Hayes, 265
S.W.3d at 678, n.4 (a party may be criminally responsible under law of
the parties in several ways); Patterson, 950 S.W.2d at 202 (at the time of
the offense, the parties acted together and contributed to a common
purpose); see also Trenor, 333 S.W.3d at 806 (State must show conduct
constituting an offense, plus an act by the defendant “done with the
intent to promote or assist such conduct”).
Finally, Appellant’s apparent concession to this Court—that her
subterfuge could just as easily have been interpreted by a rational juror
as an effort to avoid the contribution limits under the Election Code—
fails under its own weight. First, Appellant should be required to
explicitly concede her own subterfuge before urging this Court to impute
its inference to the jury. Second, this contention again smacks of Geesa
—ultimately, Appellant asserts that the State should disprove a
47
competing rational inference. But lastly, Appellant ignores the inverse of
her argument: if the jury could infer from Appellant’s deception that she
was attempting to avoid the minor criminal sanction associated with
contribution reporting or limits, then the jury could also rationally infer
that Appellant used subterfuge to avoid public exposure of her corrupt
intentions under the bribery statute.
III. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE THREE: The Court Should Affirm the
Lower Court Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have Found—As
This Jury Actually Found—the Evidence was Sufficient to Show
that Appellant Had the Requisite Intent to Commit Bribery.
In issue three, Appellant appears to shift her legal-sufficiency focus
to proof of bribery more generally. See Appellant’s Br. 33–35. But because
Appellant’s contentions are again founded on a misunderstanding of the
bribery statute, the Court should reject this claim, too. Appellant’s
principal argument on this question seems to be encapsulated by the
following:
In this case, it requires speculation to conclude that any
bribery occurred at all. The State’s theory is that Mr. Spencer
delayed sending bills until the campaign’s fundraising could
catch up, so that the “benefit” was being able to spend money
earlier than the campaign otherwise should have. There was
no evidence, however, that Ms. Wooten knew anything about
this alleged benefit because there was no evidence that she
48
understood that expenses allegedly should have been
recognized earlier.
Appellant’s Br. at 34. But by again focusing on the particular arguments
made by the prosecutor in a vacuum, and by stating the measure for legal
sufficiency in terms of only the most demanding alternative theories in
the charge, Appellant misapplies Jackson and attempts to resurrect
Geesa. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49 (when a court’s charge authorizes
the jury to convict on more than one theory, the verdict of guilty will be
upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the charged theories).
Here, the most salient measure for legal sufficiency is whether a
rational juror could have believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that when
Appellant knowingly made each of the six payments to Spencer, she
hoped to obtain favorable rulings from Wooten, in cases in which
Appellant or her husband were parties. 17 This is the simplest
restatement of the relevant question, at least on this record. 18 Appellant’s
efforts to establish legal insufficiency with evidentiary arguments and
17Obviously, this measure for sufficiency assumes the State proved the
payments were not intended to be political contributions.
18 Again, the State does not waive, and explicitly reserves, consideration of the
alternative theories of criminal liability for purposes of Jackson review.
49
observations beyond the scope of this simple, narrow question, should be
rejected outright.
And it matters not that, as of the time Appellant made the
payments to Spencer, Wooten could not yet provide Appellant the benefit
Appellant hoped to receive. See Tex. Penal Code § 36.02(b) (“It is no
defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor
sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether
because he had not yet assumed office or he lacked jurisdiction or for any
other reason.”). Rather, Appellant need only have hoped that Wooten
would use her “official discretion” as a judge, at some time in the future,
to change the outcome in litigation in which her or her husband were
parties. Id.
And as established in Section II, supra, review of the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict, plainly establishes legal sufficiency on this
point.
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IV. STATE’S REPLY TO ISSUE FOUR: The Court Should Affirm the
Court of Appeals Because a Reasonable Juror Could Have Found—
As This Jury Actually Found—Sufficient Evidence to Support
Appellant’s Conviction for Engaging in Organized Criminal
Activity and Money Laundering.
In issue four, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support Appellant’s convictions for both money laundering and EOCA.
See Appellant’s Br. 35–41. Appellant’s contentions are necessarily
premised on her argument that there was insufficient evidence for the
jury to convict her of bribery—a predicate offense for both EOCA and
money laundering. See id. Hence, if this Court affirms the lower court’s
determination that the evidence was legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction for bribery, then Appellant’s contention on this
issue must be rejected too.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
FOR ALL THESE REASONS, the State respectfully requests that
this Honorable Court to affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General
ADRIENNE McFARLAND
Deputy Attorney General
for Criminal Justice
EDWARD L. MARSHALL
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN*
*Lead Counsel Assistant Attorney General
Supervising Attorney
for Non-Capital Appeals
Criminal Appeals Division
State Bar No. 00793549
Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF
TEXAS
52
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Rule 9.5(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I do hereby certify that if the email address of attorneys
designated below is on file with the electronic filing manager, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing notice was served electronically by that
electronic filing manager, on the following attorneys via electronic mail:
John Michael Helms Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
Moreover, I do hereby certify that if the email addresses for the
designated attorneys are not on file with the electronic filing manager, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was served by email,
addressed to:
John Michael Helms Jr.
john@johnhelmslaw.com
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Assistant Attorney General
53
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 73.1(f)
This brief complies with Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(i)(3) in that it
contains 10,550 words, as calculated pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc.
9.4(i)(1), in Microsoft Word 2013, Century, 14 points.
/s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
Assistant Attorney General
54