AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed March 12, 2015.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00126-CV
Sheik Tehuti, Appellant
V.
Trans-Atlas Financial, Inc., Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-13-06496-C
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Myers, and Justice Evans
Opinion by Justice Myers
Sheik Tehuti appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding possession of certain property to
Trans-Atlas Financial, Inc. Tehuti brings eleven issues contending the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment for Trans-Atlas on its claim and Tehuti’s counterclaims. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2003, Tehuti signed a deed of trust on a tract of land as security for a
note for $49,500 payable to Trans-Atlas. The deed of trust stated that if the property was sold
under the deed of trust, “Grantor [Tehuti] shall immediately surrender possession to the
purchaser. If Grantor fails to do so, Grantor shall become a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser,
subject to an action for forcible detainer.” According to the substitute trustee’s deed, Tehuti
defaulted on the note, and the property was posted for foreclosure. Trans-Atlas purchased the
property at the substitute trustee’s sale and received the substitute trustee’s deed. Trans-Atlas
delivered a letter to Tehuti and all other occupants of the property demanding they immediately
vacate the property and turn over possession of the property to Trans-Atlas. The letter stated that
if Tehuti and all other occupants did not vacate the property within three days, then a forcible
detainer suit would be filed.
Trans-Atlas filed its suit for forcible detainer in the justice court on October 22, 2013.
On November 15, 2013, the justice court rendered judgment for Trans-Atlas and awarded
possession of the property to Trans-Atlas. Tehuti appealed the justice court’s judgment to the
county court at law. During the trial before the court, the trial court admitted into evidence the
deed of trust, the substitute trustee’s deed, and the notice to vacate. A witness for Trans-Atlas
testified that Tehuti still occupied the premises. The county court at law rendered judgment of
possession of the property to Trans-Atlas. Tehuti now appeals the judgment of the county court
at law.
PRO SE PARTIES
Tehuti is pro se before this Court. We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs.
Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). However,
we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply
with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,
184–85 (Tex. 1978); Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854. To do otherwise would give a pro se
litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Shull v. United Parcel
Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
FORCIBLE DETAINER
A forcible detainer action is a procedure to determine the right to immediate possession
of real property where there was no unlawful entry. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(2) (West
–2–
2014); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.1; 1 Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no
pet.). It is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain possession without
resort to an action on the title. Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818–19 (1936); Rice, 51 S.W.3d
at 709. The trial court must adjudicate the right to actual possession of the property. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 510.3(e). All other claims, including questions of title, validity of a foreclosure,
counterclaims, and suits against third parties are not permitted. Id. Those claims must be
brought in separate suits. Id. Accordingly, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is which
party has the right to immediate possession of the property. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Whether a
sale of property under a deed of trust is invalid may not be determined in a forcible detainer
action but must be brought in a separate suit. Scott, 90 S.W.2d at 818; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710
(quoting Scott).
To prevail on its forcible detainer action, Trans-Atlas had to prove (1) it owned the
property by virtue of a foreclosure sale deed, (2) Tehuti became a tenant at sufferance when the
property was sold under the deed of trust, (3) Trans-Atlas gave Tehuti notice to vacate the
premises, and (4) Tehuti refused to vacate the premises. See Elwell v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 267 S.W.3d 566, 568–69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see also PROP. §
24.002 (West 2014).
A forcible detainer suit is brought in justice court. PROP. § 24.004(a) (West 2014). The
decision of the justice court may be appealed to the county court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(a). The
appeal is by trial de novo, which is “a new trial in which the entire case is presented as if there
had been no previous trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). In the county court, a party may “plead,
1
Although rule of civil procedure 510 is titled “Eviction Cases,” it states that it applies to suits “to recover possession of real property under
Chapter 24, of the Texas Property Code,” that is, forcible detainer and forcible entry and detainer lawsuits. Also, the property code states,
“Eviction suits include forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer suits.” See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (West 2014).
–3–
prove and recover his damages, if any, suffered for withholding or defending possession of the
premises during the pendency of the appeal.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.11.
Standard of Review
Each of Tehuti’s eleven issues contends the trial court “erred in granting summary
judgment.” Tehuti states in his “Annexed Appellant’s Brief” that Trans-Atlas filed a motion for
summary judgment. However, the record does not show that Trans-Atlas moved for summary
judgment. Instead, the record shows the case was tried on the merits in a trial before the court.
It was not resolved by summary judgment. Tehuti did not attend the trial; a person identifying
herself as “the notary for Mr. Tehuti” told the trial court that Tehuti was sick.
The parties did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court did
not make findings of fact and conclusions of law. When no findings of fact and conclusions of
law were requested or filed, it is implied that the trial court made all findings necessary to
support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam);
Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). The judgment will be
upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d at 754.
We review the implied findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency, and we review
the trial court’s implied legal conclusions de novo. In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). When addressing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a
reasonable fact-finder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder
could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Anything more than a
scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v.
Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In a factual sufficiency
review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the finding only if the finding is
–4–
so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that the finding is clearly wrong
and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Morris v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 334 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Tehuti’s Issues
In his first 2 and second issues, Tehuti contends the underlying foreclosure was unlawful
because Trans-Atlas failed to establish a valid chain of title, failed to establish that Tehuti was in
default, and failed to establish it was the valid holder of the note. The validity of a foreclosure
sale may not be determined in a suit for forcible detainer but must be brought in a separate suit.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Scott, 90 S.W.2d at 818–19; Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315
S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Defects in the foreclosure process or with
Trans-Atlas’s title are not relevant in the suit before us. See Williams, 315 S.W.3d at 927.
At the trial, Trans-Atlas presented evidence (1) it owned the property by virtue of a
foreclosure sale deed, that is, the substitute trustee’s deed; (2) Tehuti became a tenant at
sufferance when the property was sold under the deed of trust; (3) Trans-Atlas gave Tehuti
notice to vacate the premises; and (4) Tehuti refused to vacate the premises. This evidence,
uncontroverted by any evidence from Tehuti, entitled Trans-Atlas to judgment for possession of
the property. See Elwell, 267 S.W.3d at 568–69. It was not necessary for the trial court to
determine whether the foreclosure was valid before awarding possession to Trans-Atlas. Id. at
569.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment awarding
possession of the property to Trans-Atlas. Any defects in the foreclosure of the property or in
2
Tehuti’s first issue states, “The trial court erred in granting Trans-Atlas Financial’s motion for summary judgment on its foreclosure
action.” However, Trans-Atlas did not bring a “foreclosure action” in this lawsuit.
–5–
Trans-Atlas’s title to the property do not affect the validity of the trial court’s judgment in this
case. We overrule Tehuti’s first two issues.
Tehuti’s third through eleventh issues contend the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment on Tehuti’s counterclaims for common-law and statutory fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, exemplary damages,
declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Tehuti does not cite to any pleading in the record
alleging these claims, and it does not appear from the record that he brought them in this case.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (argument in appellant’s brief must contain appropriate citations to
the record). However, even if he did attempt to bring them in this case, except for claims for
damages incurred during the pendency of the appeal in county court, counterclaims are not
permitted in suits for forcible detainer but must be brought in separate suits. TEX. R. CIV. P.
510.3(e), 510.11. The claims Tehuti asserts in his brief were not for damages incurred during the
pendency of the appeal in county court. Therefore, to the extent Tehuti actually brought any
counterclaims in this case and that the trial court denied them, we conclude the court did not err
by denying those claims. We overrule Tehuti’s third through eleventh issues.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
140126F.P05 JUSTICE
–6–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
Sheik Tehuti, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-00126-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-13-06496-C.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. Chief
Trans-Atlas Financial, Inc., Appellee Justice Wright and Justice Evans
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Trans-Atlas Financial, Inc. recover its costs of this appeal
from appellant Sheik Tehuti.
Judgment entered this 12th day of March, 2015.
–7–