United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 21, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60239
Summary Calendar
Fredericka Cain Todd
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Natchez-Adams School District
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(03-CV-170)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Frederick Cain Todd appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgement to Defendant-Appellee Natchez-
Adams School District dismissing with prejudice Todd’s claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Finding no error, we
affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I
In July 2001, the Natchez-Adams School District (“NASD”)
posted notice of a job opportunity for the position of elementary
school principal at McLaurin Elementary School. Eleven persons,
including Todd, applied for the job. Each applicant met certain
threshold qualifications, and each was interviewed by an eight-
person hiring committee. The committee members asked each
applicant the same questions and ranked their responses on
standardized forms. The committee members were instructed not to
ask questions based on impermissible factors, including race,
gender, or age. NASD Superintendent Dr. Carl Davis, in accordance
with past practice, accepted the committee’s recommendation and
hired the person with the highest score following the interview
process, Allison Lack.
After filing a claim with the EEOC, Todd initiated the present
lawsuit, contending that NASD failed to hire her for the position
of McLaurin Elementary Principal on the basis of her race, age, and
gender.1 Todd, a 57-year old African American female, claimed that
the hiring of Lack, a young white female, evidences that NASD
impermissibly discriminated against her on account of her race and
age. NASD responds that Todd was not hired because she did not
perform well in front of the interview committee and was not the
best candidate for the position. The district court granted
1
Todd’s gender claim was dismissed with prejudice by the district court and
is not at issue in this appeal.
2
summary judgment to NASD, finding that Todd failed to present any
evidence of intentional discrimination. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court.2 We apply
the burden-shifting framework provided by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green3 to Todd’s claims of racial
discrimination and age discrimination.4 Under McDonnell-Douglas,
after the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination,5
the employer must identify a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its action that supports a finding that unlawful discrimination
did not cause the employment action.6 The district court found
that NASD provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not
hiring Todd––specifically, that she did not perform well in her
interview. Todd contends that the reason must be stated with
2
Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir.
2003).
3
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
4
See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2001); Bauer v.
Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999).
5
Here, it is undisputed that Todd has made out a prima facie case of
discrimination.
6
Bauer, 169 F.3d at 967.
3
“sufficient clarity” to afford the employee a realistic opportunity
to show that the reason is pretextual.7
We agree with the district court that NASD’s proffered reason
for not hiring Todd was sufficiently clear. NASD asserted that
Todd was not hired because she did not perform well in her
interview, and the evidence submitted in connection with NASD’s
motion for summary judgment supports that finding. As the district
court found, “Many of the interviewers stated that they felt Todd
did not address questions precisely and did not provide much detail
regarding the plans she would implement if she were selected for
the position.” Moreover, the evaluation sheets submitted by the
interviewers indicated that Todd’s responses were “too lengthy” and
that she “seem[ed] to ramble a bit.” We find no error in the
district court’s analysis.
Next, Todd argues that NASD ignored all objective
qualifications and relied, instead, on a subjective interview
process to fill the Principal position at McLaurin Elementary. We
disagree. We have held that “[t]he mere fact that an employer uses
subjective criteria is not . . . sufficient evidence of pretext.”8
Here, there is no evidence that the interview process was used as
7
See Patrick v. Ridge, 384 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2004).
8
Manning v. Chevron Chemical Co., LLC, 322 F.3d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 2003).
4
a mask for discrimination.9 As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “An
interview is frequently necessary to assess qualities that are
particular important in supervisory or professional positions . . .
because traits such as common sense, good judgment, originality,
ambition, loyalty and tact often must be assessed primarily in
subjective fashion.”10 We think this principal is especially
appropriate when a school district is hiring the Principal of an
elementary school. We find no error in the district court’s
analysis.
III
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
9
Without evidence of discrimination by the interviewers, and we find none,
we will not second guess NASD’s decisions regarding the interview process. See
EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1448 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The ADEA
was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment
decisions nor was it intended to transform the courts into personnel
manageers.”).
10
Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 2001).
5