Paul Edward Hudson v. Dallas County

ACCEPTED
07-14-00444-CV
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
8/3/2015 3:21:54 PM
Vivian Long, Clerk

No. 07-14-00444-CV

IN THE
FILED IN
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 7th COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS
AMARILLO, TEXAS 8/3/2015 3:21:54 PM
VIVIAN LONG
CLERK
________________________________________________________________________

PAUL EDWARD HUDSON
Appellant

VS.

DALLAS COUNTY, CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, PARKLAND
HOSPITAL DISTRICT, AND DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND
Appellees

________________________________________________________________________

Appealed from the
rd
193 District Court of Dallas County, Texas

DALLAS COUNTY, CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, PARKLAND
HOSPITAL DISTRICT, AND DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND’S
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Edward Lopez, Jr.
Bar No. 12563520
LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP
2777 N. Stemmons Freeway
Suite 1000
Dallas, Texas 75207
(214) 880-0089 telephone
(214) 754-7167 fax
edwardl@lgbs.com
dallas.litigation@lgbs.com
Attorneys for Appellees
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. i
LIST OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................ ii - iii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES................................................................................................ ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................ 1
ISSUES PRESENTED..................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. 2

ISSUE NO. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants
must follow, whether any of Appellant’s “issues” represent a
sustainable basis for appeal? ..................................................................................... 2

ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units
was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s rulings and entry of
judgment? .................................................................................................................. 4

ISSUE NO. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered
by the trial court based upon arguments which were not affirmatively
pled and raised for the first time on appeal? .............................................................. 6

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 6
PRAYER .......................................................................................................................... 7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................... 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 8

-i-
 LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law:

Adams v. First National Bank, 154 S.W.3d 859, 871 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2005, no pet.) ... 6
Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1970)........................... 5

Anheuser Busch v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 942 (Tex. App.–Dallas
1993, pet. denied) ................................................................................................................... 3
Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d 162, 163 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.) ..................... 4
In Re Becerra, 100 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no writ) ........................ 5
Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).................................................................... 4
Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982).................................................... 5
Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. 1988) .......................................... 4
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 34 (Tex. 1987) .................................... 6
Escamilla v. City of Laredo, 9 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
pet. denied) ............................................................................................................................. 6
Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Company, 881 S.W.2d 279,
284, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 843 (Tex. 1994) ............................................................................... 4
Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1997, no writ) .......... 2
Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1999, no pet.) ..................... 3
Hays Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero Transmission Company,
645 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. App. –Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ......................................... 5
Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. 1982) ........................................... 5
Labrador Oil Co. V. Norton Drilling Co., 1 S.W.3d 795
(Tex. App.–Amarillo 1999, no pet.) ...................................................................................... 3
Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835 S.W.2d 66, 75 (Tex. 1992) ......................................... 6
Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. App. –El Paso 1997, no writ) .......................... 3
Most Worshipful Prince Hall v. Jackson, 732 S.W.2d 407, 412
(Tex. App.–Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............................................................................. 3
Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) ................................................................................................ 5
Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).................................................. 4

- ii -
Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2004,
pet denied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076, 125 S. Ct. 928, 160 L.Ed 2d 816 (2005) .............. 2, 4
Webb v. Johns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1972) ................................................................ 5

Rules of Procedure/Statutes:

Tex. R. App. P.1.1.................................................................................................................. 2
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) .......................................................................................................... 6
Tex. R. App. P. 38, 38.1(e) .................................................................................................... 3
Tex. R. App. P 38.1(g) and (h) .............................................................................................. 3
Tex. Prop. Tax Code § 33.47(a) ............................................................................................ 2, 5

- iii -
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal of an action filed by Dallas County, City of Dallas, Dallas Independent

School District, Dallas County School Equalization Fund, Parkland Hospital District and Dallas

County Community College District in their capacity as taxing units situated in Dallas County,

Texas (the “Taxing Units”) seeking to recover unpaid and delinquent ad valorem business personal

property taxes on property within their jurisdictional boundaries.

The defendants in the underlying trial case were Gloria J. Roque, a/k/a Gloria J. Lee, d/b/a

Old School Night Club, a/k/a Old School Club and Paul Edward Hudson d/b/a Old School Night

Club a/k/a Old School Club. Both parties appeared in court on the trial date of November 10, 2014

ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue No. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants must follow, whether any of

Appellants “issues” represent a sustainable basis for appeal?

Issue No. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units was legally sufficient to

support the trial court’s rulings and entry of judgment?

Issue No. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered by the trial court based

upon arguments which were not affirmatively pled and raised for the first time on appeal?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is an action filed by Dallas County, City of Dallas, Dallas Independent School

District, Dallas County School Equalization Fund, Parkland Hospital District and Dallas County

Community College District in their capacity as taxing units situated in Dallas County, Texas (the

“Taxing Units”) seeking to recover unpaid and delinquent ad valorem business personal property

Appellees’ Brief Page 1
07-14-00444-CV
taxes on property located at 2910 S. Lamar Street, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Following a bench trial at which both defendants appeared, the trial court considered the

evidence, records and testimony presented by the parties and entered judgment in favor of the

Taxing Units. On November 10, 2014, the Honorable Judge M. Kent Sims signed a judgment

awarding the liquidated claims for delinquent ad valorem business personal property taxes.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The procedures in a suit to collect delinquent ad valorem business personal property taxes

are fairly simple and straight-forward. The taxing units are permitted to establish their prima facie

case by introducing portions of the tax roll by certified record. Once introduced, the records

establish each and every element necessary for the trial court to grant judgment in favor of the

Taxing Units. Tex. Prop. Tax Code § 33.47. That process was followed by the Taxing Units in

this case. There was no error by the court and the judgment was supported by the evidence. In

the absence of fundamental error, an appellate court has no discretion to reverse an otherwise

error-free judgment. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Issue No. 1: Based upon the briefing standards which all litigants must follow, whether any

of Appellants “issues” represent a sustainable basis for appeal?

All parties appearing in the appellate courts of Texas must conform to the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure. Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.–Dallas

2004, pet denied), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076, 125 S.Ct. 928, 160 L.Ed 2d 816 (2005). Tex. R.

App. Pro. 1.1. A pro se litigant is required to properly present his case on appeal, just as he is

required to do at the trial court. Strange, 126 S.W.2d at 678. If this were not the rule, pro se

Appellees’ Brief Page 2
07-14-00444-CV
litigants would be given an unfair advantage over those parties represented by counsel.

Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1997, no writ).

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth the required contents and organization

for an appellant’s brief. See, Tex. R. App. P. 38. One such requirement is that appellant’s brief

must concisely state all issues or points presented for review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e). An issue

presented in an appellants brief is considered sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate

court to the particular error from which the complaint is made. Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d

162, 163 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2004, no pet.). This guideline is not met when an appellant merely

utters brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations. Moreover, the complete

absence of legal authority or the complete failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue

waives the complaint on appeal. See, Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. App. –El Paso

1997, no writ).

To avoid the possibility of waiver due to inadequate or deficient briefing, a party must

ensure that arguments raised in support of a position are adequately supported by authority and any

necessary record references. Labrador Oil Co. V. Norton Drilling Co., 1 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.–

Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1999, no

pet.). Moreover, if the brief fails to refer to pertinent portions of the record, the court may decline

to make an independent search of the record. Anheuser Busch v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d

928, 942 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1993, pet. denied); Most Worshipful Prince Hall v. Jackson, 732

S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). If the factual recitation lacks the

necessary references to the record that are required by Appellate Rule 38.1(g) and (h), it cannot

provide a basis for the reversal of the trial court’s judgment.

Appellees’ Brief Page 3
07-14-00444-CV
 On appeal, an appellant bears the burden of discussing his assertions of error. An appellate

court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine

whether there was error. Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678. When reviewing a civil matter, an appeals

court cannot consider an issue not raised in appellant’s brief, even if the ends of justice would so

require. Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d at 163-64. Nor can an appeals court speculate as to

the substance of the specific issues an appellant urges the court to consider. Strange, 126 S.W.3d

at 678.

Appellant’s Brief is wholly deficient and inadequate to preserve any error on appeal. The

Brief is a disjointed, incoherent and random collection of arguments without any reference to the

record or authority to support the position taken. Because the Brief is wholly inadequate, and

unsupported by the evidence and record, Appellant has waived all prospective issues on appeal.

See, Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Company, 881 S.W.2d 279, 284, 37

Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 843 (Tex. 1994). Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Issue No. 2: Whether the evidence presented by the Taxing Units was legally sufficient to

support the trial court’s rulings and entry of judgment?

When considering a “no evidence” or “legal sufficiency” point on appeal, the courts of

appeal can consider only the evidence favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and must

disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d

518, 522 (Tex. 1988). In considering a factual sufficiency point, the appellate court should assess

all the evidence and reverse for a new trial only if the challenged finding is so against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715

S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). In a bench trial,

the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses/evidence and the weight to be

Appellees’ Brief Page 4
07-14-00444-CV
given to their testimony. Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. 1982). It may

resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness as well as in the

testimony of different witnesses. Webb v. Johns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1972). The trial

judge can reject or accept any witnesses’ testimony/evidence, in whole or in part. In Re Becerra,

100 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2003, no writ).

In this case, the evidence was presented by way of certified governmental records (with

accompanying affidavits) and no live witnesses were called. As such, the court weighed the only

admissible and uncontroverted evidence which was presented. The evidence presented by the

Taxing Units relative to their taxes was consistent with state law. Section 33.47(a) of the Texas

Property Tax Code provides in relevant part:

(a) In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit’s current tax roll and
delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the property and the
amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued constitute prima
facie evidence that each person charged with a duty relating to the imposition of
the tax has complied with all requirements of law and that the amount of tax
alleged to be delinquent against the property and the amount of penalties and
interest due on that tax as listed are the correct amount. (emphasis added)

The Texas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted and applied this section of the Tax Code.

See Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982). Once introduced, certified tax

records create a prima facie case "as to every material fact necessary to establish [their] cause of

action, including that defendants owned the subject property and owed the amounts claimed.

Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000,

pet. denied); see also Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982); Hays

Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero Transmission Company, 645 S.W.2d 542, 545

(Tex. App. –Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston, 453

Appellees’ Brief Page 5
07-14-00444-CV
S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1970). Once the presumption is created, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to

introduce evidence in support of its claim that it did not own the subject property or owe the

amounts alleged. Escamilla v. City of Laredo, 9 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,

pet. denied). For this reason, the evidence supported the entry of the court’s judgment and

should not be disturbed.

Issue No. 3: Whether this court should disturb the judgment entered by the trial court based

upon arguments which were not affirmatively pled and raised for the first time on appeal?

It is an established rule of Texas procedure, that absent fundamental error, an appellate

court has no discretion to reverse an otherwise error-free judgment based upon a new argument

raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835

S.W.2d 66, 75 (Tex. 1992); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 34 (Tex.

1987)(per curiam). A party cannot complain on appeal about a trial court’s failure to award relief

when the party never pled for the relief in the trial court. Adams v. First National Bank, 154

S.W.3d 859, 871 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2005, no pet.)

Additionally, Appellant’s Brief raises issues which were not perfected at trial or in any post

judgment pleading. For this reason, this court should affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CONCLUSION

Appellant’s appeal should be denied and the judgment of the trial court affirmed for the

reason that Appellant has failed to provide this Court with any basis for reversal. His brief fails to

meet the requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and it is devoid of any cohesive,

coherent and reasoned analysis. For these reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

Appellees’ Brief Page 6
07-14-00444-CV
 PRAYER

Appellees, the Taxing Units, pray that the Court affirm the Judgment of the trial court,

deny all relief requested by Appellant and award the Taxing Units their respective costs on appeal.

Respectfully Submitted,

LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP

Edward Lopez, Jr.
State Bar No. 12563520
2777 N. Stemmons Freeway, Suite 1000
Dallas, Texas 75207
Tel. (214) 880-0089
Fax (214) 754-7167
Dallas.litigation@lgbs.com

Attorney for Appellees
Dallas County, et al

Appellees’ Brief Page 7
07-14-00444-CV
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word and

contains 2,666 words, as determined by the computer software’s word-count function, excluding

the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

Edward Lopez, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that on this the 3rd day of August, 2015 the undersigned attorney served a

copy of Appellees’ Brief upon the following parties:

Paul Edward Hudson Via CM/RRR #7014 1820 0000 2078 8389
2935 Sundial Dr.
Dallas, TX 75229

Edward Lopez, Jr.

Appellees’ Brief Page 8
07-14-00444-CV