in the Matter of T. L. G., a Juvenile

ACCEPTED
12-15-00185-CV
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
10/9/2015 9:57:54 AM
Pam Estes
CLERK

No. 12-15-00185-CV

_____________________________________________________________
FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE TYLER, TEXAS
10/9/2015 9:57:54 AM
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE PAM ESTES
Clerk

TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TYLER
_____________________________________________________________

In the Matter of
T.L.G.,
a juvenile

_____________________________________________________________
On Appeal from Juvenile Cause No. J-15-00007
In the 2nd Judicial District Court of Cherokee County, Texas

Sitting as a Juvenile Court
_____________________________________________________________
Brief for Appellee

_____________________________________________________________
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

ALLEN W. ROSS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 528
JACKSONVILLE, TX 75766
903.683.2454 (VOICE)
903.683.2472 (TELE-FAX)
ATTORNEY FOR THE JUVENILE
(COURT-APPOINTED)
SBN: 00788324
 INTERESTED PARTIES

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made
in order that the Justices of this Honorable Court may evaluate possible
disqualification or recusal.

DANA NORRIS YOUNG
County Attorney, Cherokee County, Texas
Trial Counsel / State of Texas

TREVOR M. ROSE
Asst. County Attorney, Cherokee County, Texas
Appellate Counsel / State of Texas

T.L.G.
Appellee/Juvenile

ALLEN W. ROSS
Trial and Appellate Counsel for the Juvenile

Hon. Dwight L. Phifer
Presiding Judge, 2nd District Court

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENTS ......................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ..............................................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................5
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................... 18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TRAP 9.4(i) ........................................... 19
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................1
Order of the Trial Court ................................................................................................. 1
Texas Family Code §51.095 .......................................................................................... 2
Texas Family Code §52.025 .......................................................................................... 7
Texas Code Criminal Procedure Art. 38.22 .......................................................... 8

ii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ...................................... 5, 6
Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) ............................................ 11
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)................................. 10, 11
Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 526 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)....................................... 5, 6
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.)............................. 10
In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d 704 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2009, no pet.) . 8, 9,
10, 11
Jeffley v. State, 38 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2001) ............... 9
Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 408 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009), aff'd on
other grounds ........................................................................................................................8
Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) .............................................. 10
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, (1980) ..................................... 9
Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) ........................................... 5
Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) .......................... 9
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, (1994) ............................ 8, 9
State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ............................................ 6
Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ............................................ 5, 6
Statutes
Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 ............................................................................ 8
Texas Family Code § 51.095 ..........................................................................................7, 16
Texas Family Code § 52.025 .............................................................................................. 13
Other Authorities
Appellant’s Brief .................................................................................................................... 16

iii
 No. 12-15-00185-CV

_____________________________________________________________
IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TYLER

_____________________________________________________________
In the Matter of
T.L.G.,

a juvenile
_____________________________________________________________
On Appeal from Juvenile Cause No. J-15-00007

In the 2nd Judicial District Court of Cherokee County, Texas
Sitting as a Juvenile Court
_____________________________________________________________

Brief for Appellee
_____________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

Comes now Appellee, TLG, by and through his attorney of record,

ALLEN W. ROSS, and presents for receipt his Appellee Brief in the above

styled and numbered cause of action.

1
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee adopts by reference the Statement of the Case as contained

within Appellant’s Brief as being factually correct concerning the nature and

procedural history of this case.

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENTS

Appellee is of the opinion that oral argument would assist the appellate

court in further understanding the nuances, issues, facts and legal arguments

that are involved in this case. Therefore, Appellee requests such an

opportunity.

Appellee, however, respects the court’s determination in this matter,

and in the event the court decides that such argument would not be

resourceful, Appellee will defer to the court’s decision.

2
 ISSUES PRESENTED

1. THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS SOUND DISCRETION, WEIGHED THE
FACTS, JUDGED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES AND
DETERMINED THAT THE STATE’S WITNESS WAS BEING
UNTRUTHFUL WHEN TESTIFYING THAT THE JUVENILE WAS
“FREE TO LEAVE”. THEREFORE, THE COURT APPROPRIATELY
SUPPRESSED THE STATEMENT OF THE JUVENILE MADE TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT.

3
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellee adopts by reference the Statement of the Facts as contained

within Appellant’s Brief as being factually correct concerning the nature and

procedural history of this case and the interrogation of the juvenile with the

following exception:

Towards the end of the interview, the child never admitted to engaging

in a sexual assault, but rather that he was the victim of a sexual assault. (RR.

Vol 2, pg 11).

4
 ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under a

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673

(Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Appellate courts do not engage in their own factual

review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The trial

court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and

the weight to be given their testimony. Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25

(Tex.Crim.App. 2007).

A trial court’s determination of whether the defendant was in custody

presents a mixed question of law and fact. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520,

526 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Therefore, the trial court is given almost total

deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even

if the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an

evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application of law to fact

questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id. at

526-27; Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. But when application of law to fact

5
questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the

trial court’s rulings are reviewed de novo. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 527;

Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673.

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate

courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

Weide, 214 11 S.W.3d at 24. When a trial court rules on a motion to suppress

without entering findings of fact or conclusions of law, appellate courts

assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its

ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. Herrera, 241

S.W.3d at 527. The trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is supported by the

record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v.

Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).

6
 II. THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS SOUND DISCRETION, WEIGHED THE
FACTS, JUDGED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES AND
DETERMINED THAT THE STATE’S WITNESS WAS BEING
UNTRUTHFUL WHEN TESTIFYING THAT THE JUVENILE WAS
“FREE TO LEAVE”. THEREFORE, THE COURT APPROPRIATELY
SUPPRESSED THE STATEMENT OF THE JUVENILE MADE TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT.

The admissibility of custodial statements made by a juvenile is governed

by section 51.095 of the Family Code. See Texas Family Code. § 51.095.

Subsection 51.095(a)(5) provides that a juvenile's oral statement is admissible

if these conditions are satisfied: (1) the statement is made while the child is

in the custody of an officer, in a detention facility or other place of

confinement, or in possession of the Department of Family and Protective

Services; (2) the statement is recorded by an electronic recording device; and

(3) at some time before making the statement, “the child is given the warning

described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the warning is part of the

recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives each

right stated in the warning.”Id. § 51.095(a)(5). A juvenile's oral statement

made as a result of custodial interrogation without the benefit of a

7
magistrate warning is inadmissible at trial. See id. § 51.095(a)(5), (b)(1); see

also Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 §§ 2, 3.

But “[a] statement of a juvenile that is not the product of custodial

interrogation is not required to be suppressed by section 51.095 [.]” In re

D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d 704, 712 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2009, no pet.) at

712; see Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009),

aff'd on other grounds, 325 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (“A voluntary

oral statement by a juvenile that does not stem from custodial interrogation

is admissible, even if the juvenile did not receive the statutory

admonishments.”).

Custodial interrogation is questioning that is initiated by law enforcement

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

freedom in any significant way. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322,

114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528 (1994); In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712 (addressing

whether juvenile was in custody for purpose of determining admissibility of

confession in juvenile delinquency proceeding). “A custodial interrogation

occurs when a defendant is in custody and is exposed ‘to any words or

8
actions on the part of the police ... that [the police] should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’ “Roquemore v. State, 60

S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689–90 (1980)). A juvenile is in custody if,

under the objective circumstances, a reasonable child of the same age would

believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted. Jeffley v. State,

38 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2001).

The analysis involves two steps. In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712. First, we

determine whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of movement to the

degree associated with an arrest by examining all of the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 114 S.Ct. at 1528–

29;, In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712. This determination focuses on the

objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views of

either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury,

511 U.S. at 322, 114 S.Ct. at 1528–29; In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712. “[T]he

restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the degree

9
associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention.” Dowthitt

v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

Second, we consider whether, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable

person would have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation

and leave. In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 712. Courts have traditionally considered

four factors in making this determination: (1) whether probable cause to

arrest existed at the time of questioning; (2) the subjective intent of the

police; (3) the focus of the investigation; and (4) the subjective belief of the

defendant. Id. Because the custody determination must be based upon the

objective circumstances, however, the subjective intent of both the

interrogating officers and the person being questioned is irrelevant except

to the extent that intent is manifested in words or actions. Id.

A juvenile may be in custody when he is interrogated alone by an armed

police officer in an enclosed space. See In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 713; see

also In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, 511–12 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).

Being the focus of an investigation alone does not amount to being in

custody. Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Neither

10
does stationhouse questioning, in and of itself, constitute custody. Dowthitt,

931 S.W.2d at 255. When the circumstances show that an individual acts upon

the invitation or request of the police and there are no express or implied

threats that he will be forcibly taken, that person is not in custody. Dancy v.

State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 778–79 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d

at 713. “The mere fact that an interrogation begins as non-custodial,

however, does not prevent it from later becoming custodial; police conduct

during the encounter may cause a consensual inquiry to escalate into

custodial interrogation.” Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255.

Four general situations may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is

physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when

a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law

enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person

to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, or

(4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do

not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. See id; In re D.J.C., 312S.W.3d at

713.

11
1. Was there a formal arrest or restraint of movement of the juvenile
to the degree associated with an arrest.

It is undisputed that at the time of the interrogation, the juvenile: (1)

came to the Jacksonville Police Station at the request of law enforcement;

(2) that he did so by his own method of transportation and was not

brought to the police station by law enforcement; (3) that he was not in

handcuffs, shackles, leg-irons or other formal means of restraint during

the interview and (4) that he was told he was not under arrest.

2. In light of the circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt
that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.

(a) Did probable cause to arrest exist at the time of questioning?

Yes. During direct question by defense counsel, the interviewing officer

(hereinafter referred to as “Compton”, established that probable cause

was developed prior to the interview with the juvenile “after looking at the

interviews from the Conroe Police Department, the report that they

submitted, and when I talked to Ty.” (RR. Vol. 2, pg 12, Ln 7-15).

If the State proffers that probable cause somehow was not developed

until the conclusion of the interview, we would further point out that

12
under questioning by defense counsel it was revealed that the officer

somehow took the Appellee’s outcry to being the victim of a sexual assault

as an admission of committing a sexual assault. (RR. Vol. 2, pg 11, Ln 4-

17).

(b) What was the subjective intent of the police?

It is clear from the testimony of Compton that the subjective intent of

law enforcement was to arrest the Appellee with our without a statement.

Regardless of the fact that Compton testified on numerous occasions that

the Appellee “was free to leave”, it is clear that this was not the case.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that under examination from the state’s

attorney, Compton testified that the juvenile was taken to a “designated

juvenile processing office” (RR. Vol. 2, pg 18, Ln. 25 – pg. 19, Ln. 1-3).

Texas Family Code § 52.025. - DESIGNATION OF JUVENILE
PROCESSING OFFICE.

(a) The juvenile board may designate an office or a room, which may be
located in a police facility or sheriff's offices, as the juvenile processing
office for the temporary detention of a child taken into custody under
Section 52.01. The office may not be a cell or holding facility used for
detentions other than detentions under this section. The juvenile board
by written order may prescribe the conditions of the designation and limit
the activities that may occur in the office during the temporary detention.

13
(b) A child may be detained in a juvenile processing office only for:
(1) the return of the child to the custody of a person under
Section 52.02(a)(1);
(2) the completion of essential forms and records required by
the juvenile court or this title;
(3) the photographing and fingerprinting of the child if otherwise
authorized at the time of temporary detention by this title;
(4) the issuance of warnings to the child as required or permitted
by this title; or
(5) the receipt of a statement by the child under Section
51.095(a)(1), (2), (3), or (5).
(c) A child may not be left unattended in a juvenile processing office and
is entitled to be accompanied by the child's parent, guardian, or other
custodian or by the child's attorney.
(d) A child may not be detained in a juvenile processing office for longer
than six hours.

Without doubt the state wants the trial court to understand that the

rules were followed. However, taking any juvenile to a “designated

processing room” only becomes relevant per the language of the statute,

for the “temporary detention of a child taken into custody. This revelation

that Compton was attempting to comply with §52.025, further reveals his

subjective intent which was to ultimately, and prior to the interview, arrest

the Appellee.

14
 Compton seems to take great pride in the fact that he allowed the

juvenile to leave the interrogation room prior to arrest (RR. Vol. 2 pg, 24,

Ln. 4-9; pg. 25, Ln 2-6; pg. Ln. 17-24). However, the Appellee was arrested

less than one minute after the conclusion of the interview (RR. Vol. 2 pg, 25,

Ln. 2-6). Although Compton told the Appellee he was free to leave and

terminated the interrogation, he immediately arrested the Appellee as

soon as he crossed the threshold of the interrogation room (RR. Vol. 2 pg,

26, Ln. 17-24). Further, in that time period, he had learned nothing new

about the case except that Compton formed a mistaken belief that the

Appellee had confessed (RR. Vol. 2 pg, 12, Ln. 16-18). This action further

demonstrates Compton’s subjective intent and that he intended to arrest

the juvenile long before the interview began.

Further, under examination, Compton testified to on multiple

occasions – as result of questioning from the state’s attorney, Appellee’s

attorney and the trial judge, that had the Appellee refused to talk to him,

he would have gotten a magistrate to warn the Appellee (RR. Vol. 2 pg,

25, Ln. 13-17; pg. 27, Ln. 1-10; pg. 28; Ln 2-6; pg. 28-29). It was not until

15
 further examination by the trial court, did he finally attempt to “correct”

his testimony. (RR. Vol. 2 pg, 28-29. However, it does not appear that the

trial court was completely satisfied with Compton’s responses (RR. Vol. 2

pg, 28-32).

(c) Who was the sole subject of the investigation?

The testimony clear establishes that the Appellee was the sole focus of

the investigation. (RR. Vol. 2 pg, 14, Ln. 14-16). Such is further conceded

in Appellant’s Brief. (Appellant’s Brief, pg. 5).

(d) What was the subjective belief of the defendant/Appellee?

There was no testimony as to the subjective belief of the Appellee

because he did not testify.

SUMMARY / CONCLUSION

In Texas Family Code §51.095, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute

designed (among other things) to (1) protect the liberty interests of juveniles

accused of criminal offenses and (2) to protect the integrity of confessions

given by those juveniles accused (and presumably guilty of) criminal offenses.

16
It is a statute that employs a check upon law enforcement by the utilization

of a neutral magistrate.

The Jacksonville Police Department has developed a unique strategy

which can only be interpreted as an effort to circumvent the intent of the

Texas Legislature. Arguably, the Jacksonville Police Department is under

belief that as long as they simply tell a juvenile he/she is “free to leave”

regardless of their true intent, they never have to comply with §52.095. In

that this reaches an absurd result, this could never have been the intent of

the Legislature. Clearly, the Jacksonville Police Department is not acting in

good-faith and within the bounds of established law. Law enforcement is

mandated to uphold our laws, not seek creative ways to circumvent them.

The trial court’s analysis of this matter focused on the credibility of

Compton. The trial court did not believe Compton, and this fact should be

accepted by the Appellate Court. The Trial Court’s ruling is supported by the

record and the law was correctly applied. Therefore, the ruling must be

upheld.

17
 PRAYER

Wherefore, Appellee prays that this Honorable Court affirm the Trial

Court’s decision suppressing the statement of the Appellee.

_____________________________________
ALLEN W. ROSS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 528
JACKSONVILLE, TX 75766
903.683.2454 (VOICE)
903.683.2472 (TELE-FAX)
SBN: 00788324

18
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this brief is being served

on the parties or their counsel listed below by Electronic Mail, on October 9,

2015 in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5, to-wit:

trevor@cocherokee.org.

_____________________________________
ALLEN W. ROSS
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TRAP 9.4(i)

I, ALLEN W ROSS, state that I have complied with Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i), to-wit:
FONT: Segoe UI
SIZE: 14pt
WORD COUNT: 3245

_____________________________________
ALLEN W. ROSS
Attorney for Appellee

19
 APPENDIX

Order of the Trial Court

Appendix 1
Texas Family Code §51.095

Sec. 51.095. ADMISSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT OF A CHILD. (a)
Notwithstanding Section 51.09, the statement of a child is admissible in
evidence in any future proceeding concerning the matter about which the
statement was given if:
(1) the statement is made in writing under a circumstance
described by Subsection (d) and:
(A) the statement shows that the child has at some time
before the making of the statement received from a magistrate a warning
that:
(i) the child may remain silent and not make any
statement at all and that any statement that the child makes may be used
in evidence against the child;
(ii) the child has the right to have an attorney
present to advise the child either prior to any questioning or during the
questioning;
(iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorney, the
child has the right to have an attorney appointed to counsel with the child
before or during any interviews with peace officers or attorneys
representing the state; and
(iv) the child has the right to terminate the
interview at any time;
(B) and:
(i) the statement must be signed in the presence
of a magistrate by the child with no law enforcement officer or prosecuting
attorney present, except that a magistrate may require a bailiff or a law
enforcement officer if a bailiff is not available to be present if the
magistrate determines that the presence of the bailiff or law enforcement
officer is necessary for the personal safety of the magistrate or other court
personnel, provided that the bailiff or law enforcement officer may not
carry a weapon in the presence of the child; and

Appendix 2
 (ii) the magistrate must be fully convinced that the
child understands the nature and contents of the statement and that the
child is signing the same voluntarily, and if a statement is taken, the
magistrate must sign a written statement verifying the foregoing requisites
have been met;
(C) the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives these rights before and during the making of the statement and
signs the statement in the presence of a magistrate; and
(D) the magistrate certifies that the magistrate has
examined the child independent of any law enforcement officer or
prosecuting attorney, except as required to ensure the personal safety of
the magistrate or other court personnel, and has determined that the child
understands the nature and contents of the statement and has knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived these rights;
(2) the statement is made orally and the child makes a
statement of facts or circumstances that are found to be true and tend to
establish the child's guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property,
or the instrument with which the child states the offense was committed;
(3) the statement was res gestae of the delinquent conduct or
the conduct indicating a need for supervision or of the arrest;
(4) the statement is made:
(A) in open court at the child's adjudication hearing;
(B) before a grand jury considering a petition, under
Section 53.045, that the child engaged in delinquent conduct; or
(C) at a preliminary hearing concerning the child held in
compliance with this code, other than at a detention hearing under
Section 54.01; or
(5) subject to Subsection (f), the statement is made orally
under a circumstance described by Subsection (d) and the statement is
recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device that records
images, and:

Appendix 3
 (A) before making the statement, the child is given the
warning described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the warning is a
part of the recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives each right stated in the warning;
(B) the recording device is capable of making an
accurate recording, the operator of the device is competent to use the
device, the recording is accurate, and the recording has not been altered;
(C) each voice on the recording is identified; and
(D) not later than the 20th day before the date of the
proceeding, the attorney representing the child is given a complete and
accurate copy of each recording of the child made under this subdivision.
(b) This section and Section 51.09 do not preclude the admission of
a statement made by the child if:
(1) the statement does not stem from interrogation of the
child under a circumstance described by Subsection (d); or
(2) without regard to whether the statement stems from
interrogation of the child under a circumstance described by Subsection (d),
the statement is:
(A) voluntary and has a bearing on the credibility of the
child as a witness; or
(B) recorded by an electronic recording device, including
a device that records images, and is obtained:
(i) in another state in compliance with the laws of
that state or this state; or
(ii) by a federal law enforcement officer in this
state or another state in compliance with the laws of the United States.
(c) An electronic recording of a child's statement made under
Subsection (a)(5) or (b)(2)(B) shall be preserved until all juvenile or criminal
matters relating to any conduct referred to in the statement are final,
including the exhaustion of all appeals, or barred from prosecution.
(d) Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5) apply to the statement of a child
made:
(1) while the child is in a detention facility or other place of
confinement;

Appendix 4
 (2) while the child is in the custody of an officer; or
(3) during or after the interrogation of the child by an officer if
the child is in the possession of the Department of Family and Protective
Services and is suspected to have engaged in conduct that violates a penal
law of this state.
(e) A juvenile law referee or master may perform the duties imposed
on a magistrate under this section without the approval of the juvenile
court if the juvenile board of the county in which the statement of the child
is made has authorized a referee or master to perform the duties of a
magistrate under this section.
(f) A magistrate who provides the warnings required by Subsection
(a)(5) for a recorded statement may at the time the warnings are provided
request by speaking on the recording that the officer return the child and
the recording to the magistrate at the conclusion of the process of
questioning. The magistrate may then view the recording with the child or
have the child view the recording to enable the magistrate to determine
whether the child's statements were given voluntarily. The magistrate's
determination of voluntariness shall be reduced to writing and signed and
dated by the magistrate. If a magistrate uses the procedure described by
this subsection, a child's statement is not admissible unless the magistrate
determines that the statement was given voluntarily.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1086, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 982, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts
1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1477, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.
1297, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1420, Sec.
21.001(29), eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 949 (H.B. 1575), Sec. 5, eff. September 1,
2005.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 908 (H.B. 2884), Sec. 8, eff. September
1, 2007.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 110 (H.B. 841), Sec. 3, eff. May 21,
2011.

Appendix 5
 Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1158 (H.B. 2337), Sec. 1, eff.
September 1, 2011.

Appendix 6
Texas Family Code §52.025

Sec. 52.025. DESIGNATION OF JUVENILE PROCESSING OFFICE. (a)
The juvenile board may designate an office or a room, which may be
located in a police facility or sheriff's offices, as the juvenile processing
office for the temporary detention of a child taken into custody under
Section 52.01. The office may not be a cell or holding facility used for
detentions other than detentions under this section. The juvenile board by
written order may prescribe the conditions of the designation and limit the
activities that may occur in the office during the temporary detention.
(b) A child may be detained in a juvenile processing office only for:
(1) the return of the child to the custody of a person under
Section 52.02(a)(1);
(2) the completion of essential forms and records required by
the juvenile court or this title;
(3) the photographing and fingerprinting of the child if
otherwise authorized at the time of temporary detention by this title;
(4) the issuance of warnings to the child as required or
permitted by this title; or
(5) the receipt of a statement by the child under
Section 51.095(a)(1), (2), (3), or (5).
(c) A child may not be left unattended in a juvenile processing office
and is entitled to be accompanied by the child's parent, guardian, or other
custodian or by the child's attorney.
(d) A child may not be detained in a juvenile processing office for
longer than six hours.

Added by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 495, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1991. Amended
by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1086, Sec. 48, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 2001, 77th
Leg., ch. 1297, Sec. 13, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.

Appendix 7
Texas Code Criminal Procedure Art. 38.22

Art. 38.22. WHEN STATEMENTS MAY BE USED.
Sec. 1. In this article, a written statement of an accused means:
(1) a statement made by the accused in his own handwriting;
or
(2) a statement made in a language the accused can read or
understand that:
(A) is signed by the accused; or
(B) bears the mark of the accused, if the accused is
unable to write and the mark is witnessed by a person other than a peace
officer.
Sec. 2. No written statement made by an accused as a result of
custodial interrogation is admissible as evidence against him in any criminal
proceeding unless it is shown on the face of the statement that:
(a) the accused, prior to making the statement, either received from
a magistrate the warning provided in Article 15.17 of this code or received
from the person to whom the statement is made a warning that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at
all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in
court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to
and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a
lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time; and
(b) the accused, prior to and during the making of the statement,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights set out in the
warning prescribed by Subsection (a) of this section.
Sec. 3. (a) No oral or sign language statement of an accused made
as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused
in a criminal proceeding unless:

Appendix 8
 (1) an electronic recording, which may include motion picture, video
tape, or other visual recording, is made of the statement;
(2) prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is
given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the
warning;
(3) the recording device was capable of making an accurate
recording, the operator was competent, and the recording is accurate and
has not been altered;
(4) all voices on the recording are identified; and
(5) not later than the 20th day before the date of the proceeding, the
attorney representing the defendant is provided with a true, complete, and
accurate copy of all recordings of the defendant made under this article.
(b) Every electronic recording of any statement made by an accused
during a custodial interrogation must be preserved until such time as the
defendant's conviction for any offense relating thereto is final, all direct
appeals therefrom are exhausted, or the prosecution of such offenses is
barred by law.
(c) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any statement
which contains assertions of facts or circumstances that are found to be
true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the accused, such as the
finding of secreted or stolen property or the instrument with which he
states the offense was committed.
(d) If the accused is a deaf person, the accused's statement under
Section 2 or Section 3(a) of this article is not admissible against the accused
unless the warning in Section 2 of this article is interpreted to the deaf
person by an interpreter who is qualified and sworn as provided in Article
38.31 of this code.
(e) The courts of this state shall strictly construe Subsection (a) of
this section and may not interpret Subsection (a) as making admissible a
statement unless all requirements of the subsection have been satisfied by
the state, except that:
(1) only voices that are material are identified; and

Appendix 9
 (2) the accused was given the warning in Subsection (a) of Section 2
above or its fully effective equivalent.
Sec. 4. When any statement, the admissibility of which is covered by
this article, is sought to be used in connection with an official proceeding,
any person who swears falsely to facts and circumstances which, if true,
would render the statement admissible under this article is presumed to
have acted with intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's
meaning for the purpose of prosecution for aggravated perjury under
Section 37.03 of the Penal Code. No person prosecuted under this
subsection shall be eligible for probation.
Sec. 5. Nothing in this article precludes the admission of a statement
made by the accused in open court at his trial, before a grand jury, or at an
examining trial in compliance with Articles 16.03 and 16.04 of this code, or
of a statement that is the res gestae of the arrest or of the offense, or of a
statement that does not stem from custodial interrogation, or of a
voluntary statement, whether or not the result of custodial interrogation,
that has a bearing upon the credibility of the accused as a witness, or of any
other statement that may be admissible under law.
Sec. 6. In all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness
of a statement of an accused, the court must make an independent finding
in the absence of the jury as to whether the statement was made under
voluntary conditions. If the statement has been found to have been
voluntarily made and held admissible as a matter of law and fact by the
court in a hearing in the absence of the jury, the court must enter an order
stating its conclusion as to whether or not the statement was voluntarily
made, along with the specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion
was based, which order shall be filed among the papers of the cause. Such
order shall not be exhibited to the jury nor the finding thereof made known
to the jury in any manner. Upon the finding by the judge as a matter of law
and fact that the statement was voluntarily made, evidence pertaining to
such matter may be submitted to the jury and it shall be instructed that
unless the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was
voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such statement for any
purpose nor any evidence obtained as a result thereof. In any case where a

Appendix 10
motion to suppress the statement has been filed and evidence has been
submitted to the court on this issue, the court within its discretion may
reconsider such evidence in his finding that the statement was voluntarily
made and the same evidence submitted to the court at the hearing on the
motion to suppress shall be made a part of the record the same as if it were
being presented at the time of trial. However, the state or the defendant
shall be entitled to present any new evidence on the issue of the
voluntariness of the statement prior to the court's final ruling and order
stating its findings.
Sec. 7. When the issue is raised by the evidence, the trial judge shall
appropriately instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such
statement.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a written,
oral, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a
custodial interrogation is admissible against the accused in a criminal
proceeding in this state if:
(1) the statement was obtained in another state and was obtained in
compliance with the laws of that state or this state; or
(2) the statement was obtained by a federal law enforcement officer
in this state or another state and was obtained in compliance with the laws
of the United States.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1967, 60th
Leg., p. 1740, ch. 659, Sec. 23, eff. Aug. 28, 1967; Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p.
935, ch. 348, Sec. 2, eff. Aug. 29, 1977.

Sec. 3(a) amended by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 398, ch. 186, Sec. 4, eff. May
15, 1979; Sec. 3(d) added by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 398, ch. 186, Sec. 5,
eff. May 15, 1979; Sec. 3 amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 711, ch. 271,
Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1981; Sec. 3(a) amended by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 777,
Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Sec. 3(e) added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 777,
Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Sec. 8 added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 990, Sec.
1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.

Appendix 11
Amended by:
Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 679 (H.B. 2090), Sec. 1, eff. September
1, 2013.

Appendix 12