in Re State Farm Lloyds

ACCEPTED 04-15-00474-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 7/28/2015 4:51:49 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK 04-15-00474-CV No. ____________ Court of Appeals, Fourth District FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS San Antonio, Texas SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 07/28/2015 4:51:49 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk In re State Farm Lloyds Relating to Cause Nos. 2014-CVF-001162-D1, 2014-CVF-001048-D1 in the 49th Judicial District Court Webb County, Texas RECORD ON MANDAMUS, VOLUME 1 J. Joseph Vale jvale@atlashall.com State Bar No. 24084003 Sofia A. Ramon sramon@atlashall.com State Bar No. 00784811 Dan K. Worthington dkw@atlashall.com State Bar No. 00785282 ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP 818 Pecan/P.O. Box 3725 McAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 (phone) (956) 686-6109 (facsimile) Attorneys for Relator State Farm Lloyds July 28, 2015 Oral Argument Requested Record on Mandamus Relator State Farm Lloyds files this Record along with its Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed on this same date, relating to Cause Nos. 2014-CVF-001162- D1 and 2014-CVF-001048-D1 in the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas. State Farm Lloyds is e-filing the Record in two separate volumes, including a volume for authenticated transcripts. The index for the entire Record is attached as an exhibit, followed by Record Volume 1. Respectfully submitted, /s/ J. Joseph Vale J. Joseph Vale jvale@atlashall.com State Bar No. 24084003 Sofia A. Ramon sramon@atlashall.com State Bar No. 00784811 Dan K. Worthington dkw@atlashall.com State Bar No. 00785282 ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP 818 Pecan/P.O. Box 3725 McAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 (phone) (956) 686-6109 (facsimile) Attorneys for State Farm Lloyds 2 Verification Before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared J. Joseph Vale, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and said: 1. My name is J. Joseph Vale. I am one of the attorneys for the relator in the referenced cause. I am above the age of eighteen, have never been convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, and am competent to make this affidavit. The facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct. 2. The documents contained in Tabs 1 through 11 of the Record on Mandamus are true and correct copies of certified copies obtained from the Webb County District Clerk. 3. The documents contained in Tabs 12 through 19 are true and correct copies, as per file-stamps or e-file confirmations on same or as reflected by certificates of service by counsel herein or as reflected by the trial judge's or clerk's signature or as received from the trial court or clerk and/or as sent by my office to the court, of the same documents filed and/or maintained by the court in connection with the trial court proceedings referenced above. Further, the Dockets contained in the record are true and correct copies of the dockets in this matter as printed from the I-Docket website. ~ MARIANELA TREVINO Notary Public, State of Texas l1~r~ Notary Public My commission expires: .. \~.~ ~J STATE OF TEXAS ~ My Comm. Exp. 03-27·2019 3 Certificate of Service I certify that the foregoing document (and any attachments) was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I also certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record on July 28, 2015, as follows: Recipient: Attorney for: Served by: J. Steve Mostyn Plaintiffs/real parties Electronically (jsmdocketefile@mostynlaw.com) in interest if available, or THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM by facsimile 3810 West Alabama Street Raul Rodriguez, Houston, Texas 77027 Noemi Rodriguez, Fax: 713-714-1111 and Alma Pena and Gilberto Hinojosa (ghinojosa@ghinojosalaw.net) LAW OFFICE OF GILBERTO HINOJOSA, P.C. 622 E. Saint Charles St. Brownsville, Texas 78520 Fax: 956-544-1335 Hon. Jose A. Lopez Trial Certified mail, Webb County Courthouse judge/respondent return receipt 1110 Victoria St. Suite 304 requested Laredo, Texas 78040 /s/ J. Joseph Vale J. Joseph Vale 4 Record Index Volume 1 Date Tab Trial Cause1 Document Pena Docket [printed from I-Docket] Rodriguez Docket [printed from I-Docket] 06/03/14 1 Pena Plaintiff’s Original Petition 06/13/14 2 Rodriguez Plaintiffs’ Original Petition 07/14/14 3 Pena State Farm Lloyds’ Special Exceptions and Original Answer 07/14/14 4 Rodriguez State Farm Lloyds’ Special Exceptions and Original Answer 01/22/15 5 Pena Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order 01/22/15 6 Rodriguez Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Protective Order 02/10/15 7 Pena Defendants’ Response and Objections to Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Entry of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order 02/23/15 8 Rodriguez Defendants’ Response and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Entry of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order 1 As explained in the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, this original action relates to two separate trial cause numbers, which the trial judge considered jointly for purposes of the order and motion at issue. In this Index, “Pena” will be used for documents filed only in Cause No. 2014-CVF- 001048-D1, “Rodriguez” will be used for documents filed only in Cause No. 2014-CVF-001162- D1, and “Both” will be used for documents filed in both cause numbers. 5 03/03/15 9 Pena Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response and Objections to Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Entry of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order 03/23/15 10 Pena Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Protective Order 03/25/15 11 Pena Defendant State Farm’s Motion to Strike or Reconsider Plaintiff’s Amended Protective Order Regarding Confidential Information and Motion for Entry of Protective Order 05/22/15 12 Pena Signed Unopposed Order Granting Motion of Attorneys Huseman & Stewart P.L.L.C. to Withdraw and for Substitution of Counsel for Defendants 05/22/15 13 Rodriguez Signed Unopposed Order Granting Motion of Attorneys Huseman & Stewart P.L.L.C. to Withdraw and for Substitution of Counsel for Defendants 06/16/15 14 Pena Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition 06/16/15 15 Rodriguez Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition 07/02/15 16 Pena Proposed Protective Order 07/02/15 17 Rodriguez Proposed Protective Order 07/13/15 18 Pena Signed Protective Order 07/13/15 19 Rodriguez Signed Protective Order 6 Authenticated Transcripts Volume 03/05/15 Both Hearing on Motion to Strike, Motion to Compel, and Plea in Abatement 04/09/15 Both Hearing on Motion to Enforce, Motion to Quash, and other Motions 7 Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... All | Motions | Orders | Answers / Citations | Other Documents / Actions | Costs | Payments | Ledger Civil Docket; Case 2014CVF001048 D1; Accounts, Contracts, Notes PENA, ALMA vs LANIER, BECKY et al Filed 06/03/2014 - Disposition: 49th District Court, District Clerk, Webb County, Texas Court Settings: 12/01/2015 13:30 PM 12/14/2015 8:00 AM Date Description/Comments Reference Typ Amount 06/03/2014 Case Status entered as ACTV. TXT 06/03/2014 Case Status ACTV: Active " 06/03/2014 For STATE FARM LLOYDS " 06/03/2014 *IMG*CONTRACT " 06/09/2014 Court date/time: 9/04/2014 13:30 H earing Type: 17 Clndr Call " 06/09/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 06/09/2014 Status entered as Open " CALENDAR CALL FAXED TO ATTORNEY J. STE VE MOSTYN 06/09/2014 " AND ATTACHED 06/09/2014 COPY TO CITATIONS. (LT) " *IMG*(4) CITATIONS ISSUED TO STATE FAR M LLOYDS AND 06/09/2014 " BECKY LANIER 06/09/2014 AND PLACED IN PRIVATE SERVER BOX. (LT) " 06/09/2014 " 06/09/2014 **** " CIATIONS RELEASED AND RETURNED TO ATTO RNEY IN 06/09/2014 " FED EX ENVELOPE 06/09/2014 PROVIDED BY ATTORNEY. 06/19/2014 (LT) " 06/09/2014 JURY DEMAND PAID BY ATTORNEY J. STEVE MOSTYN. (LT) " *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO STATE 07/07/2014 " FARM LLOYDS BY 1 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... SERVING ITS ATTORNEY FOR SERVICE RENDI BLACK. DOS 07/07/2014 " 6/30/14. MG *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYD'S SPE CIAL 07/14/2014 " EXCEPTIONS AND ORIGINAL 07/14/2014 ANSWER. (ATTY. VAN HUSEMAN) MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT, BECKY LANIER'S, ORIGI NAL ANSWER. 07/14/2014 " (ATTY. VAN 07/14/2014 HUSEMAN). MG " *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO BECKY 07/17/2014 " LANIER. DOS 7/9/14. 07/17/2014 MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS', STATE FARM LLOYDS A ND BECKY 08/07/2014 " LANIER, PLEA IN 08/07/2014 ABATEMENT. MG " JURY PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER (RECEIV ED) SENT TO 08/20/2014 " COURT 08/20/2014 COORDINATOR (PF) " *IMG* DEFENDANT'S DECLARATION INVOKING RULE 167 08/25/2014 " OF THE TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CHAPTER 42 OF THE CIVIL 08/25/2014 " PRACTICE AND REMEDIES 08/25/2014 CODE (PF) " 08/26/2014 Court date/time: 9/04/2014 13:30 H earing Type: 17 Clndr Call " 08/26/2014 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 08/26/2014 GUIDELINE ORDER RECEIVED " 09/08/2014 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 09/08/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 09/08/2014 Status entered as Open " 09/08/2014 Court date/time: 5/18/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 09/08/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 09/08/2014 Status entered as Open " PTGO SIGNED BY JUDGE JOE LOPEZ AND COP IES SENT TO 09/09/2014 " COUNSEL VIA FAX 09/09/2014 FSR " *IMG* PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. PRE-T RIAL SET FOR 09/09/2014 " 4/28/15 AT 1:30PM AND TRIAL SET FOR 5/18/14 AT 8AM. SIGN ED 8/28/14 BY 09/09/2014 " JUDGE LOPEZ. 09/09/2014 FAXED TO TIFFANY DE BOTT AND J. STEVE MESTYN. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND /OR 01/22/2015 " OVERRULE DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND MO TION TO 01/22/2015 " COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL 2 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 01/22/2015 DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS (PF) " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE 01/22/2015 " ORDER (PF) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 01/22/2015 " PROTECTIVE 01/22/2015 ORDER (RECEIVED) (PF) " ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR 01/22/2015 " OVERRULE DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND MO TION TO 01/22/2015 " COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS (REC EIVED) 01/22/2015 " (PF) ORDER SETTING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S M OTIONS SENT 01/23/2015 " TO COUNSEL VIA 01/23/2015 FAX FSR " 01/23/2015 Court date/time: 2/17/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 01/23/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 01/23/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING ON PLAINTI FF'S MOTION 01/26/2015 " FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIO N TO STRIKE 01/26/2015 " AND/OR OVERRULE DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN DISC OVERY AND 01/26/2015 " MOTION TO COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSES SET F OR FEB. 17, 01/26/2015 " 2015 AT 9:00 A.M. FAXED TO J. STEVEN MOSTYN AND VAN HUSE MAN BY 01/26/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR (PF) *IMG* DEFENDANTS', STATE FARM LLOYDS A ND BECKY 01/27/2015 " LANIER, PLEA IN 01/27/2015 ABATEMENT. MG " ORDER SETTING HEARING. RECEIVED/SENT T O COURT 02/02/2015 " COORDINATOR. MG 02/02/2015 *IMG* DEFENDANTS' DESIGNATION OF EXPER TS. MG " 02/05/2015 *IMG* MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE (PF) " 02/05/2015 ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE (RECEIVED) (PF) " ORDER SETTING HEARING (RECEIVED) SENT TO COURT 02/05/2015 " COORDINATOR (PF) 02/06/2015 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' PLEA IN ABAT EMENT. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN TS' PLEA IN 02/06/2015 " ABATEMENT. MG 02/09/2015 Court date/time: 2/12/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 67 Mnt/Contin " 02/09/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 3 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 02/09/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* FIAT. MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE SET FOR2/12/15 02/09/2015 " AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, AND BRUC E J. 02/09/2015 " WERSTAK III. MG ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR C 02/10/2015 " ONTINUANCE. RECEIVED. MG *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN TS' MOTION 02/10/2015 " FOR CONTINUANCE. MG *IMG* DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE AND OBJECTI ONS TO 02/10/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF STATE 02/10/2015 " FARM'S PROPOSED 02/10/2015 PROTECTIVE ORDER. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIF F, ALMA 02/10/2015 " PENA'S, MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR OVERRULE DEFENDANTS' OBJ ECTIONS 02/10/2015 " TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL DISC OVERY 02/10/2015 " RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS. 02/10/2015 MG " *IMG* VERIFIED MOTION TO ADMIT COUNSEL PRO HAC 02/11/2015 " VICE 02/11/2015 (NO ORDER/FIAT ATTACHED) (PF) " CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 02/12/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION FOR CONTINU ANCE. 02/12/2015 " ATTY. ANDREW TAYLOR WAS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF. ATTY. BRUCE WER STAK WAS 02/12/2015 " PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT. CONTINUANCE GRANTED. CASE WAS RESET TO 3/5/15 AT 02/12/2015 " 9AM FOR MOTION TO 02/12/2015 STRIKE. MG " *IMG* ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE. SIGN ED 2/12/14 02/12/2015 " BY JUDGE LOPEZ. COPIES MAILED OUT TO VAN HUSEMAN AND J . STEVE 02/12/2015 " MOSTYN. MG 02/13/2015 Court date/time: 2/12/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 67 Mnt/Contin " 02/13/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 02/13/2015 Court date/time: 2/17/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 02/13/2015 Status changed from Open to Post / " 02/13/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 02/13/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 4 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 02/13/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO ENTER PROPERTY 02/13/2015 " AND TO INSPECT, 02/13/2015 MEASURE, AND PHOTOGRAPH. MG " 02/16/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS', STATE FARM LLOYDS A ND BECKY 02/16/2015 " LANIER, FIRST 02/16/2015 SUPPLEMENTAL PLEA IN ABATEMENT. MG " FIAT. DEFENDANTS'S MOTION TO COMPEL PL AINTIFF'S 02/18/2015 " DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS FIRST OF INTERROG ATORIES 02/18/2015 " AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION FILED BY DEFENDANT, STATE F ARM 02/18/2015 " LLOYDS. RECEIVED/SENT TO 02/18/2015 COURT COORDINATOR. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL PLA INTIFF'S 02/18/2015 " DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS FIRST SET OF INTERRO GATORIES 02/18/2015 " AND REQUESTS FOR 02/18/2015 PRODUCTION. MG " 02/18/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 02/18/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/18/2015 Status entered as Open " ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE SIGNED BY J UDGE JOE 02/18/2015 " LOPEZ AND COPIES SENT TO COUNSEL VIA FAX TOGETHER WITH ORDE R SETTING 02/18/2015 " HEARING FSR *IMG* ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE. SIGN ED 2/17/15 02/23/2015 " BY JUDGE LOPEZ. 02/23/2015 FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY D EBOLT. MG " *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING. MOTION SE T FOR 3/5/15 02/23/2015 " AT 9AM. FAXED TO 02/23/2015 J. STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY DEBOLT. MG " ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSI ON OF 02/24/2015 " COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE 02/24/2015 (RECEIVED) SENT TO COURT COORDINATOR ( PF) " ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTION TO COM PEL SENT 02/25/2015 " TO COUNSEL 02/25/2015 VIA FAX FSR " FIAT SETTING PLEA IN ABATEMENT HEARING SENT TO 02/25/2015 " COUNSEL VIA FAX 02/25/2015 FSR " 5 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... AGREED ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION 02/25/2015 " OF COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE (RECEIVED) SENT TO COURT COORDINATOR 02/25/2015 " (PF) 02/26/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 66 Mtn/Compel " 02/26/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/26/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* FIAT. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMP EL 02/26/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS OF INTE 02/26/2015 " RROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SET FOR 3/5/15 AT 9AM. FAXE D TO J. STEVE 02/26/2015 " MOSTYN, TIFFANY 02/26/2015 DEBOLT, AND BRUCE J. WERSTAK III. MG " *IMG* FIAT. FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PLEA IN ABATEMENT 02/26/2015 " SET FOR 3/5/15 AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, AND 02/26/2015 " BRUCE J. WERSTAK 02/26/2015 III. MG " ORDER ON ADMISSION OF COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE 02/26/2015 " SIGNED *IMG* AGREED ORDER GRANTING APPLICATIO N FOR 02/27/2015 " ADMISSION OF COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE SIGNED, FAXED TO J. STEVE N MOSTYN, 02/27/2015 " TIFFANY DEBOLT, BRUCE J. WERSTAK, III AND JONATHAN M. REDGRAVE BY 02/27/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR 02/27/2015 (PF) " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPO RT OF THEIR 02/27/2015 " VERIFIED PLEA IN 02/27/2015 ABATEMENT. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 03/03/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE SUPPLE MENTAL 03/03/2015 " DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS AND MOTION TO STRIKE/OVERRUL E 03/03/2015 " OBJECTIONS. MG *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 03/03/2015 " AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTEC TIVE ORDER 03/03/2015 " AND PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENT RY OF 03/03/2015 " STATE FARM'S 03/03/2015 PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER. (SL) " 6 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... ORDER DENYING...REC'D AND SENT TO COUR T 03/03/2015 " COORDINATOR. (SL) *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN T'S MOTION 03/03/2015 " TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STA TE FARM 03/03/2015 " LLOYDS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODU CTION. 03/03/2015 " (SL) ORDER DENYING....REC'D AND SENT TO COURT COO 03/03/2015 " RDINATOR.(SL) CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 03/05/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO STRIKE/M OTION TO 03/05/2015 " COMPEL/PLEA IN ABATEMENT. ATTYS. ANDREW TAYLOR AND GI LBERTO 03/05/2015 " HINOJOSA WERE PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. ATTYS. BRUCE WERSTAK, VAN 03/05/2015 " HUSEMAN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, JONATHAN REDGRANE, AND FELIX ARAMBULA WERE 03/05/2015 " PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL, REQUEST FOR 03/05/2015 " PRODUCTION 5:OBJECTIONS OVERRULED. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO D ESTROY ALL 03/05/2015 " DISCOVERY EXCHANGED AFTER ONE YEAR THE CASE IS RESOLVED OR RETURN IT 03/05/2015 " TO DEFENDANTS 03/05/2015 COUNSEL. ORDER TO BE SUBMITTED. MG " 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 66 Mtn/Compel " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL/VIDEO 03/13/2015 " DEPOSITION OF ALMA 03/13/2015 PENA. ATTACHED WITH ORDER. MG " 03/16/2015 Court date/time: 3/26/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 118 MTN/QUASH " 03/16/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/16/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* FIAT PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO QUASH THE 03/16/2015 " ORAL/VIDEO DEPOSITION OF ALMA PENA SET FOR MARCH 26, 2015 AT 9: 00 A.M. FAXED 03/16/2015 " TO J. STEVEN 7 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT AND BRUCE WERST AK, III BY 03/16/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR 03/16/2015 (PF) " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE PL AINTIFF'S 03/19/2015 " EXPERTS' OPINIONS. ATTACHED WITH FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO C OURT 03/19/2015 " COORDINATOR. MG *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL /VIDEO 03/23/2015 " DEPOSITION OF GENE RILEY 03/23/2015 OF VALLEY WIDE RESTORATION SERVICES, I NC. MG " *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL /VIDEO 03/23/2015 " DEPOSITION OF PHILIP N. 03/23/2015 SPOTTS OF THE MISSION GROUP. MG " *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL /VIDEO 03/23/2015 " DEPOSITION OF RANDAL G. 03/23/2015 CASHIOLA OF THE CASHIOLA LAW FIRM. MG " *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL /VIDEO 03/23/2015 " DEPOSITION OF GILBERTO 03/23/2015 HINOJOSA. MG " 03/23/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT. MG " *IMG* MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS OF S TATE FARM 03/24/2015 " LLOYDS CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE AND OBJECTIONS TO DEPOS ITION 03/24/2015 " TOPICS, NO ORDER ATTACHED 03/24/2015 (PF) " AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER (RECEIVED) SE NT TO 03/24/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR (PF) 03/25/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 157 MotExclu " 03/25/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/25/2015 Status entered as Open " 03/25/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 03/25/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/25/2015 Status entered as Open " 03/25/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 03/25/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " FIAT SETTING MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTI FF'S 03/25/2015 " EXPERTS' OPINION SENT TO 03/25/2015 COUNSEL VIA FAX FSR " PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE NOTICE OF COURT S ETTING 03/25/2015 " RESET SENT TO COUNSEL 03/25/2015 VIA FAX FSR " FIAT-MOTION TO STRIKE OR RECONSIDER PL AINTIFFS 03/25/2015 " AMENDED 8 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING CONFIDENTIA L 03/25/2015 " INFORMATION AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER (RECEIVED) S ENT TO 03/25/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR (PF) *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM'S MOTION TO STRIKE OR 03/25/2015 " RECONSIDER PLAINTIFFS AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER RE GARDING 03/25/2015 " CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PR OTECTIVE 03/25/2015 " ORDER (NO ORDER) (PF) 03/26/2015 " 03/26/2015 " 03/26/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 03/26/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/26/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* NOTICE OF COURT SETTING-RE-SET T O APRIL 28, 03/26/2015 " 2015 AT 9:00 A.M. FOR PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE FAXED TO J. S TEVEN 03/26/2015 " MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT 03/26/2015 AND BRUCE J. WERSTAK, III BY COURT COO RDINATOR (PF) " *IMG* FIAT MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF 'S EXPERTS 03/26/2015 " OPINIONS FILED BY DEFENDANTS STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY LANIER 03/26/2015 " SET FOR APRIL 28, 2015 AT 9:00 A.M. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY 03/26/2015 " DEBOLT AND BRUCE 03/26/2015 WERSTAK, III BY COURT COORDINATOR (PF) " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL/VIDEO 03/26/2015 " DEPOSITIONS OF GENE RILEY, PHILIP SPOTTS, RANDY CASHIOLA, AND GILBERTO 03/26/2015 " HINJOSOSA 03/26/2015 (PF) " ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO Q UASH 03/26/2015 " DEFENDANT'S NOTICES OF INTENTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS OF GE NE RILEY, 03/26/2015 " PHILIP SPOTTS, RANDY 03/26/2015 CASHIOLA, AND GILBERTO HINOJOSA (RECEI VED) (PF) " FIAT SETTING HEARING ON MOTION TO STRI KE OR 03/27/2015 " RECONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER SENT TO COUNS EL VIA 03/27/2015 " FAX FSR *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE CO URT ORDER 03/27/2015 " REGARDING PLAINTIFFS 03/27/2015 MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (PF) " 9 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO E NFORCE 03/27/2015 " COURT ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 03/27/2015 " (RECEIVED) (PF) FIAT-MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL/VIDEO DE POSITION 03/27/2015 " OF GENE RILEY PHILIP SPOTTS, RANDY CASHIOLA AND GILB ERTO 03/27/2015 " HINOJOSA (RECEIVED) SENT 03/27/2015 TO COURT COORDINATOR (PF) " FIAT-PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE COU RT ORDER 03/27/2015 " REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND 03/27/2015 " DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS OF STATE FARM LLOYDS 03/27/2015 " CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE AND OBJECTIONS TO DEPOSITION TOPIC (RECEIV ED) SENT TO 03/27/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR 03/27/2015 (PF) " *IMG* FIAT. MOTION TO STRIKE OR RECONS IDER 03/27/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING CONFIDENTIA L 03/27/2015 " INFORMATION AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER FILED BY DEF ENDANT, 03/27/2015 " STATE FARM LLOYDS SET FOR 4/28/15 AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY 03/27/2015 " DEBOLT, AND 03/27/2015 BRUCE J. WERSTAK III. MG " 03/27/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " 03/27/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " 03/27/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS' OPP OSITION TO 03/27/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND MOTION FOR 03/27/2015 " CLARIFICATION AND RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL 03/27/2015 " AND STRIKE. MG 03/30/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 03/30/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/30/2015 Status entered as Open " 03/30/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 118 MTN/QUASH " 03/30/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/30/2015 Status entered as Open " 03/31/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 10 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 03/31/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 03/31/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* FIAT. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFO RCE COURT 03/31/2015 " ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND 03/31/2015 " DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS OF STATE FARM LLOYDS 03/31/2015 " CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE AND OBJECTIONS TO DEPOSITION TOPICS SET FO R 4/9/15 AT 03/31/2015 " 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, VAN HUSEMAN AND BRUCE J. WERSTAK 03/31/2015 " III. MG *IMG* FIAT. OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 03/31/2015 " ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND RECON 03/31/2015 " SIDERATION OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND STRIKE FILED BY D EFENDANT 03/31/2015 " STATE FARM LLOYDS SET FOR 4/9/15 AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE M OSTYN, TIFFANY 03/31/2015 " DEBOLT, AND 03/31/2015 BRUCE J. WERSTAK III. MG " *IMG* FIAT. MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL/V IDEO 03/31/2015 " DEPOSITIONS OF GENE RILEY, PHILIP SPOTTS, RANDY CASHIOLA AND GILB ERTO 03/31/2015 " HINOJOSA FILED BY PLAINTIFF, ALMA PENA SET FOR 4/28/15 A T 9AM. FAXED 03/31/2015 " TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, AND BRUCE J. W ERSTAK III. 03/31/2015 " MG *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEO 04/02/2015 " DEPOSITION OF MR. 04/02/2015 PENA. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL AND 04/06/2015 " VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION 04/06/2015 OF MR. PENA. ATTACHED WITH ORDER. MG " ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO Q UASH 04/06/2015 " DEFENDANT'S NOTICES OF INTENTION TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF MR PENA 04/06/2015 " (RECEIVED) (PF) *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL AND 04/06/2015 " VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION 04/06/2015 OF MR. PENA (PF) " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT S TATE FARM 04/07/2015 " LLOYD'S OPPOSITION TO 11 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE COURT OR DER AND 04/07/2015 " RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYD'S MOTION FOR CLARIFIC ATION AND 04/07/2015 " RECONSIDERATION OF 04/07/2015 PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL AND STRI KE. MG " FIAT-MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL AND VIDE OTAPED 04/07/2015 " DEPOSITION OF MR 04/07/2015 PENA (RECEIVED) (PF) " *IMG* NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEO 04/08/2015 " DEPOSITION OF ALMA 04/08/2015 TORRES (PF) " CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 04/09/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO ENFORCE/ MOTION TO 04/09/2015 " QUASH/MOTIONS. ATTYS. ANDREW TAYLOR AND GILBERTO HINOJOSA WE RE 04/09/2015 " PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. ATTYS. FELIX ARAMBULA, TIFFANY DEBOLT, AND BRIAN 04/09/2015 " CHANDLER WERE PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS. DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE 04/09/2015 " TRAINING MATERIALS FOR 100 ADJUSTERS FOR AMARILLO AND DALLAS COUNTY 04/09/2015 " AND ALL FOR WEBB COUNTY. 04/09/2015 *IMG* MOTION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE (PF ) " ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL (RECEIV ED) SENT 04/09/2015 " TO COURT COORDINATOR 04/09/2015 (PF) " *IMG* SUBPOENA RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO 04/10/2015 " ALMA TORRES. DOS 4/10/15. 04/10/2015 MG " 04/10/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 118 MTN/QUASH " 04/10/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 04/10/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 04/10/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 04/10/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 04/10/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL AND 04/10/2015 " VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION 04/10/2015 OF MR. PENA. ATTACHED WITH ORDER. MG " *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT (RESCHEDULE HE ARING 04/13/2015 " FROM APRIL 28, 2015) 04/13/2015 (PF) " 12 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL AND 04/13/2015 " VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ALMA TORRES AND MOTION FOR PROTECTI VE ORDER 04/13/2015 " (PF) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH THE ORA L AND 04/13/2015 " VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ALMA TORRES AND MTOION F OR 04/13/2015 " PROTECTIVE ORDER (RECEIVED) 04/13/2015 (PF) " 04/15/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 04/15/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 04/15/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 157 MotExclu " 04/15/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. RECEIVED/SE NT TO COURT 04/16/2015 " COORDINATOR. MG 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 4/28/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 04/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 5/18/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 04/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 12/01/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 04/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 04/24/2015 Status entered as Open " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 12/14/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 04/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 04/24/2015 Status entered as Open " PTGO SIGNED BYJUDGE JOE LOPEZ AND COPI ES SENT TO 04/24/2015 " COUNSEL VIA FAX 04/24/2015 FSR " *IMG* PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. PRE-T RIAL SET FOR 04/27/2015 " 12/1/15 AT 1:30PM. AND TRIAL SET FOR 12/14/15 AT 8AM. SIG NED 4/23/15 BY 04/27/2015 " JUDGE LOPEZ. 04/27/2015 FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY D EBOLT. MG " 05/06/2015 *IMG* NOTICE OF APPEARANCE " AGREED ORDER. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT C 05/14/2015 " OORDINATOR. MG *IMG* LETTER DATED MAY 15, 2015 FROM T IFFANY 05/15/2015 " DEBOLT IN RE TO ORDERS. 05/15/2015 MG " *IMG* REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION OF ORAL DEPOSITION 05/18/2015 " OF ALMA JUVENTINA 05/18/2015 ON APRIL 7, 2015. " 13 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... *IMG* UNOPPOSED MOTION OF ATTORNEYS HU SEMAN & 05/18/2015 " STEWART P.L.L.C. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNS EL FOR 05/18/2015 " DEFENDANTS (W/ ORDER 05/18/2015 ATTACHED) SENT TO COURT COORDINATOR. < CMG> " ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 05/27/2015 " COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS SIGNED BY JUDGE JOE LOPEZ AND COPIES S ENT TO 05/27/2015 " COUNSEL VIA FAX FSR *IMG* UNOPPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF 05/29/2015 " ATTORNEYS HUSEMAN & STEWART P.L.L.C. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUT ION OF 05/29/2015 " COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS. SIGNED 5/22/15 BY JUDGE LOPEZ. FAXED T O J. STEVE 05/29/2015 " MOSTYN, VAN HUSEMAN, 05/29/2015 AND SOFIA A. RAMON. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE CO URT ORDER 06/11/2015 " REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION COMPEL DISOVERY (WITH ORDER ATT ACHED) 06/11/2015 " SENT TO COURT 06/11/2015 COORDINATOR. " 06/15/2015 Court date/time: 7/02/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 06/15/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 06/15/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* NOTICE OF COURT SETTING (PLAINTI FFS' MOTION 06/16/2015 " TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 06/16/2015 " DISCOVERY- SET FOR JULY 06/16/2015 2, 2015 AT 9:00 A.M. " 06/16/2015 " COPY OF NOTICE EMAILED TO ATTORNEYS J. STEVE 06/16/2015 " MOSTYN/ANDREW TAYLOR AND VAN HUSEMAN/TIFFANY L. DEBOLT BY COURT 06/16/2015 " COORDINATOR. 06/16/2015 *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITI ON. CMG " 06/17/2015 *IMG* (2) CITATIONS ISSUED AS TO RAY P ADILLA. CMG " 06/17/2015 " **WAITING ON COPIES AND SELF ADDRESSED STAMPED 06/17/2015 " ENVELOPE.** 06/17/2015 " 06/17/2015 CITATIONS RELEASE IN FED EX ENVELOPE 6 /19/15 " *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS' OPP OSITION TO 06/19/2015 " MOTION TO ENFORCE, 14 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... MOTION FOR ENTRY, AND MOTION TO STAY P ENDING 06/19/2015 " MANDAMUS 06/19/2015 Court date/time: 7/02/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 164 MotStayPro " 06/19/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 06/19/2015 Status entered as Open " 06/19/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 06/19/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 06/19/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING ON DEFENDA NT'S STATE 06/22/2015 " FARM LLOYD'S MOTION FOR ENTRY AND MOTION TO STAY PENDING M ANDAMUS 06/22/2015 " SIGNED. HEARING SET FOR 7/2/15 AT 9:00 A.M. COPY FAXED TO ATTO RNEY OF RECORD 06/22/2015 " BY COURT 06/22/2015 COORDINATOR. JER " *IMG* FIAT (MOTIONS SET FOR 7/16/15 AT 9:00 A.M.) COPY 06/22/2015 " FAXED TO 06/22/2015 ATTORNEY OF RECORD BY COURT COORDINATO R. JER " 07/01/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT " 07/01/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT " 07/02/2015 Court date/time: 7/02/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 07/02/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 07/02/2015 Court date/time: 7/02/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 164 MotStayPro " 07/02/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 07/02/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO ENFORCE. NO 07/02/2015 " ATTORNEYS PRESENT. CASE 07/02/2015 RESET TO 7/16/15 AT 9AM FOR MOTION TO ENFORCE. MG " *IMG* LETTER FROM ATLAS, HALL & RODRIG UEZ LLP 07/02/2015 " DATED 7/2/15 07/02/2015 IN RE: HEARING FOR JULY 16, 2015 " *IMG* PROTECTIVE ORDER RCVD & SENT TO COURT 07/02/2015 " COORDINATOR JLA *IMG* REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION OF ORAL DEPOSITION 07/02/2015 " OF MARIA DEL CARMEN 07/02/2015 VIERA-PENA MAY 12, 2015 J LA " 07/06/2015 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER RECEIVED " 07/07/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 164 MotStayPro " 07/07/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 07/07/2015 Status entered as Open " 07/07/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 15 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 07/07/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 07/07/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO RAY 07/08/2015 " PADILLA. DOS 6/26/15. 07/08/2015 MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT RAY PADILLA'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO 07/10/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 07/10/2015 AMENDED PETITION. MG " 07/13/2015 PROTECTIVE ORDER SIGNED " 07/14/2015 *IMG* PROTECTIVE ORDER- SIGNED ON 7/13 /15 " 07/14/2015 " COPY FAXED TO ATTORNEYS J. STEVE MOSTY N AND 07/14/2015 " SOFIA RAMON BY COURT 07/14/2015 COORDINATOR. " 07/15/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 07/15/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO 07/15/2015 " ENFORCE COURT ORDER REGARDING HER MOTION TO COMPEL D 07/15/2015 " ISCOVERY AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS' MOTION FO R ENTRY 07/15/2015 " AND MOTION TO STAY. 07/15/2015 ATTACHED WITH ORDER. MG " CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 07/16/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO ENFORCE/ MOTION TO 07/16/2015 " STAY. ATTY. ANDREW TAYLOR WAS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF. ATTY S. SOFIA 07/16/2015 " RAMON AND ELIZABETH CANTU WERE PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS. DEF ENDANTS 07/16/2015 " STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR 07/16/2015 ENTRY & MOTION TO STAY 30 DAYS GRANTED . MG " 07/16/2015 agreed order signed " 07/17/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 07/17/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 07/17/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 164 MotStayPro " 07/17/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " *IMG* AGREED ORDER. SIGNED 7/16/15 BY JUDGE LOPEZ. 07/17/2015 " EMAILED TO J. 07/17/2015 STEVE MOSTYN AND VAN HUSEMAN. MG " *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE 16 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... TO RELATOR'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MAND AMUS HAS 07/21/2015 " BEEN FILED. MG *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE 07/21/2015 TO RELATOR'S MANDAMUS RECORD HAS BEEN FILED. MG " *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE TO RELATOR'S OPPOSED MOTION FOR TEMPOR ARY 07/21/2015 " RELIEF STAYING ORDER 07/21/2015 COMPELLING DISCOVERY HAS BEEN FILED. M G " Search | Case History | Parties | Attorneys | Links | Services [ Site Map ] [ Return to Top ] All | Motions | Orders | Answers / Citations | Other Documents / Actions | Costs | Payments | Ledger © 1999 Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved. User ID: atlas&hall Unauthorized access is prohibited. Usage will be monitored. Viewed as of: July 24, 2015, time : 11:39:54 Agreements 17 of 17 7/24/2015 11:40 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... All | Motions | Orders | Answers / Citations | Other Documents / Actions | Costs | Payments | Ledger Civil Docket; Case 2014CVF001162 D1; Accounts, Contracts, Notes RODRIGUEZ, RAUL vs FARIAS, FELIPE et al Filed 06/13/2014 - Disposition: 49th District Court, District Clerk, Webb County, Texas Court Settings: 12/01/2015 13:30 PM 12/14/2015 8:00 AM Date Description/Comments Reference Typ Amount ORDER FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE (RECEIVED) SENT TO 04/09/2014 TXT COURT COORDINATOR 04/09/2014 (PF) " 06/13/2014 Case Status entered as ACTV. " 06/13/2014 Case Status ACTV: Active " 06/13/2014 For STATE FARM LLOYDS " 06/13/2014 *IMG* CONTRACT " 06/19/2014 Court date/time: 9/04/2014 13:30 H earing Type: 17 Clndr Call " 06/19/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 06/19/2014 Status entered as Open " CALENDAR CALL FAXED TO ATTORNEY AND AT TACHED 06/19/2014 " TO CITATION. MR *IMG* (2) CITATIONS ISSUED TO STATE FA RM LLOYDS BY 06/20/2014 " SERVING ATTORNEY FOR SERVICE RENDI BLACK, (2) CITATIONS ISSUED TO 06/20/2014 " FELIPE FARIAS. PLACED IN FILE, PENDING COPIES OF PETI TION AND FED 06/20/2014 " EX ENVELOPE TO 06/20/2014 MAIL BACK TO ATTORNEY. MR " *IMG* LETTER FROM ATTY. MOSTYN LAW FIR M 06/23/2014 " ATTACHED COPIES OF PETITION 06/23/2014 AND FED EX ENVELOPE " 1 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 06/23/2014 CITATION MAILED TO ATTY. J. STEVE MOST YN (PF) " *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO STATE 07/07/2014 " FARM LLOYDS BY SERVING ITS ATTORNEY FOR SERVICE RENDI BLACK. DOS 07/07/2014 " 6/30/14. MG *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO FELIPE 07/07/2014 " FARIAS. DOS 07/07/2014 6/30/14. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYD'S SPE CIAL 07/14/2014 " EXCEPTIONS AND ORIGINAL 07/14/2014 ANSWER. (ATTY. VAN HUSEMAN). MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT, FELIPE FARIAS', ORIGI NAL ANSWER. 07/29/2014 " (ATTY. VAN 07/29/2014 HUSEMAN). MG " *IMG* LETTER DATED AUGUST 1, 2014 IN R E TO COPIES. 08/01/2014 " MG *IMG* DEFENDANTS, STATE FARM LLOYDS AN D FELIPE 08/07/2014 " FARIAS', PLEA IN 08/07/2014 ABATEMENT. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT'S DECLARATION INVOKING RULE 167 08/25/2014 " OF THE TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CHAPTER 42 OF THE CIVIL 08/25/2014 " PRACTICE AND REMEDIES 08/25/2014 CODE (PF) " JURY PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER (RECEIV ED) SENT TO 08/26/2014 " COURT 08/26/2014 COORDINATOR (PF) " 08/26/2014 Court date/time: 9/04/2014 13:30 H earing Type: 17 Clndr Call " 08/26/2014 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 08/26/2014 GUIDELINE ORDER RECEIVED " 09/08/2014 Court date/time: 6/02/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 09/08/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 09/08/2014 Status entered as Open " 09/08/2014 Court date/time: 6/22/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 09/08/2014 Assignment of court date/time. " 09/08/2014 Status entered as Open " PTGO SIGNED BY JUDGE JOE LOPEZ AND COP IES SENT TO 09/09/2014 " COUNSEL VIA FAX 09/09/2014 FSR " *IMG* PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. PRE-T RIAL SET FOR 09/09/2014 " 6/2/15 AT 1:30PM AND TRIAL SET FOR 6/22/15 AT 8AM. SIGN ED 8/28/15 BY 09/09/2014 " JUDGE LOPEZ. 2 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 09/09/2014 FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY D E BOIT. MG " 10/08/2014 ORDER. RECEIVED. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS, STATE FARM LLOYDS AN D FELIPE 10/08/2014 " FARIAS', MOTION TO 10/08/2014 CONFIRM ABATEMENT. MG " ORDER SETTING HEARING. RECEIVED/SENT T O COURT 10/08/2014 " COORDINATOR. MG ORDER SETTING HEARING. RECEIVED/SENT T O COURT 10/28/2014 " COORDINATOR. MG *IMG* STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE 10/28/2014 " ORDER. MG ORDER SETTING HEARING ON STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR 10/29/2014 " PROTECTIVE ORDER SENT BACK TO DISTRICT CLERK'S OFFICE - A CERTIFICATE 10/29/2014 " OF CONFERENCE NEEDS TO BE SUBMITTED IN ORDER TO SET THE MOTION 10/29/2014 " FOR HEARING *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL DEF ENDANTS TO 01/22/2015 " PRODUCE SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE AND DOCUMENTS AND M OTION 01/22/2015 " TO STRIKE/OVERRULE 01/22/2015 OBJECTIONS (NO FIAT ATTACHED) (PF) " *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE 01/22/2015 " ORDER (PF) 01/22/2015 (NO FIAT ATTACHED) " ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO C OMPEL 01/22/2015 " DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONS E AND 01/22/2015 " DOCUMENTS AND MOTION 01/22/2015 TO STRIKE/OVERRULE OBJECTIONS (RECEIVE D) (PF) " ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 01/22/2015 " PROTECTIVE 01/22/2015 (RECEIVED) (PF) " *IMG* DEFENDANTS, STATE FARM LLOYDS AN D FELIPE 01/27/2015 " FARIAS', PLEA IN 01/27/2015 ABATEMENT. MG " ORDER SETTING HEARING. RECEIVED/SENT T O COURT 02/02/2015 " COORDINATOR. MG *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN TS' PLEA IN 02/06/2015 " ABATEMENT. MG ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' PLEA IN ABAT EMENT. 02/06/2015 " RECEIVED. MG 02/10/2015 Court date/time: 3/03/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 02/10/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 3 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 02/10/2015 Status entered as Open " 02/10/2015 Court date/time: 3/03/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 02/10/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/10/2015 Status entered as Open " ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTION TO COM PEL AND 02/11/2015 " ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE 02/11/2015 ORDER SENT TO COUNSEL VIA FAX FSR " ORDER SETTING HEARING ON PLEA IN ABATE MENT SENT 02/11/2015 " TO COUNSEL VIA FAX 02/11/2015 FSR " *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING PLAINTIFFS ' MOTION 02/12/2015 " FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTIO N TO 02/12/2015 " COMPEL DEFENDANTS' TO PRODUCE SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONS ES AND 02/12/2015 " DOCUMENTS AND MOTION TO STRIKE/OVERRULE OBJECTIONS SET FOR MAR CH 3, 2015 02/12/2015 " AT 9:00 A.M. FAXED TO VAN HUSEMAN AND J STEVE MOSTYN BY C OURT 02/12/2015 " COORDINATOR (PF) *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING DEFTS. STA TE FARM 02/12/2015 " LLOYDS AND FELIPE ARIAS PLEA IN ABATEMENT SET FOR MARCH 3, 2015 AT 02/12/2015 " 9:00 A.M. FAXED TO STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY DEBOLT BY COU RT 02/12/2015 " COORDINATOR (PF) 02/19/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT (PF) " *IMG* DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL PLA INTIFFS' 02/20/2015 " DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS FIRST SET OF INTERRO GATORIES 02/20/2015 " AND REQUESTS FOR 02/20/2015 PRODUCTION. MG " 02/20/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE AND OBJECTI ONS TO 02/23/2015 " PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF STATE 02/23/2015 " FARM'S PROPOSED 02/23/2015 PROTECTIVE ORDER. MG " 02/24/2015 Court date/time: 3/03/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 02/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 02/24/2015 Court date/time: 3/03/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 02/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 02/24/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 4 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 02/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/24/2015 Status entered as Open " 02/24/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 66 Mtn/Compel " 02/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/24/2015 Status entered as Open " 02/24/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 02/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 02/24/2015 Status entered as Open " FIAT SETTING MOTION TO COMPEL HEARING SENT TO 02/25/2015 " COUNSEL VIA FAX 02/25/2015 FSR " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIF FS' MOTION 02/26/2015 " TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESP ONSE AND 02/26/2015 " DOCUMENTS AND MOTION 02/26/2015 TO STRIKE/OVERRULE OBJECTIONS (PF) " *IMG* FIAT. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMP EL 02/26/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS FIRST O F 02/26/2015 " INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION FILED BY DEFENDANT, STA TE FARM 02/26/2015 " LLOYDS SET FOR 3/5/15 AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFF ANY DEBOLT, 02/26/2015 " AND BRUCE J. 02/26/2015 WERSTAK III. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPO RT OF THEIR 02/27/2015 " PLEA IN ABATEMENT. 02/27/2015 MG " ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CO MPEL 03/04/2015 " PLAINTIFFS' DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STATE FARM LLOYDS' FIRST SET OF 03/04/2015 " INTERROGATORIES AND 03/04/2015 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION. RECEIVED. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN T'S MOTION 03/04/2015 " TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS' DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO STA TE FARM 03/04/2015 " LLOYDS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODU CTION. 03/04/2015 " MG *IMG* VERIFIED MOTION TO ADMIT COUNSEL PRO HAC 03/04/2015 " VICE. MG ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSI ON OF 03/04/2015 " COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE. MG 5 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 03/05/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO STRIKE/M OTION TO 03/05/2015 " COMPEL/PLEA IN ABATEMENT. ATTYS. ANDREW TAYLOR AND GI LBERTO 03/05/2015 " HINOJOSA WERE PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. ATTYS. BRUCE WERSTAK, VAN 03/05/2015 " HUSEMAN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, JONATHAN REDGRANE, AND FELIX ARAMBULA WERE 03/05/2015 " PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL, REQUESTS FOR 03/05/2015 " PRODUCTION 2 AND 6:OBJECTIONS OVERRULED. COUNSEL FOR PL AINTIFFS TO 03/05/2015 " DESTROY ALL DISCOVERY EXCHANGED AFTER ONE YEAR TH E CASE IS 03/05/2015 " RESOLVED OR RETURN IT TO DEFENDANTS COUNSEL. ORDER TO BE SUB MITTED. 03/05/2015 " MG 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 91 PLE/ABATE " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 66 Mtn/Compel " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 03/06/2015 Court date/time: 3/05/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 37 Motions " 03/06/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " 03/09/2015 *IMG* DEFENDANTS' DESIGNATION OF EXPER TS. MG " *IMG* ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR A DMISSION 03/18/2015 " OF COUNSEL PRO HAC 03/18/2015 VICE, SIGNED " COPY OF ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION 03/18/2015 " OF COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN, TIFFANY DEBOLT, 03/18/2015 " BRUCE J. WERSTAK, III AND EMAILED TO JONATHAN M. REDGRAVE BY COURT 03/18/2015 " COORDINATOR (PF) *IMG* MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS OF S TATE FARM 03/24/2015 " LLOYDS CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE AND OBJECTIONS TO DEPOS ITION 03/24/2015 " TOPIC, NO ORDER ATTACHED 03/24/2015 (PF) " 03/27/2015 FIAT. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT COORDINAT OR. MG " *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS' OPP OSITION TO 03/27/2015 " PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND MOTION FOR 03/27/2015 " CLARIFICATION AND 6 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL 03/27/2015 " AND STRIKE. MG 04/02/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 04/02/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 04/02/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* FIAT. OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 04/02/2015 " ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND RECON 04/02/2015 " SIDERATION OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND STRIKE FILED BY D EFENDANT 04/02/2015 " STATE FARM LLOYDS SET FOR 4/9/15 AT 9AM. FAXED TO J. STEVE M OSTYN, TIFFANY 04/02/2015 " DEBOLT, AND 04/02/2015 BRUCE J. WERSTAK III. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANT S TATE FARM 04/07/2015 " LLOYDS'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE COURT ORDER AND 04/07/2015 " RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS'S MOTION F OR 04/07/2015 " CLARIFICATION AND RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL 04/07/2015 " AND STRIKE. MG CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 04/09/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO ENFORCE. ATTYS. 04/09/2015 " ANDREW TAYLOR AND GILBERTO HINOJOSA WERE PRESENT FOR PLA INTIFFS. 04/09/2015 " ATTYS. FELIX ARAMBULA, TIFFANY DEBOLT, AND BRIAN CHANDLER WER E PRESENT 04/09/2015 " FOR DEFENDANTS. DEFENDANTS TO PRODUCE TRAINING MATERIA LS FOR 04/09/2015 " 100 ADJUSTERS FOR AMARILLO AND DALLAS COUNTY AND ALL FOR WEBB 04/09/2015 " COUNTY. ORDER FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE (RECEIVED) SENT TO 04/09/2015 " COURT COORDINATOR 04/09/2015 (PF) " 04/09/2015 *IMG* MOTION FOR TRIAL CONTINUANCE (PF ) " 04/10/2015 Court date/time: 4/09/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 20 Mtn Enforc " 04/10/2015 Status changed from Open to Held " *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT (CONTINUANCE O F TRIAL) 04/13/2015 " (PF) PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. RECEIVED/SE NT TO COURT 04/16/2015 " COORDINATOR. MG 7 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 6/22/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 04/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 6/02/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 04/24/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 12/01/2015 13:30 H earing Type: 2 Pre-Trial " 04/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 04/24/2015 Status entered as Open " 04/24/2015 Court date/time: 12/14/2015 8:00 H earing Type: 4 Jury Trial " 04/24/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 04/24/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* PRE-TRIAL GUIDELINE ORDER. PRE-T RIAL SET FOR 04/27/2015 " 12/1/15 AT 1:30PM AND TRIAL SET FOR 12/14/15 AT 8AM. SIG NED 4/23/15 BY 04/27/2015 " JUDGE LOPEZ. 04/27/2015 FAXED TO J. STEVE MOSTYN AND TIFFANY D EBOLT. MG " 05/06/2015 *IMG* NOTICE OF APPEARANCE " AGREED ORDER. RECEIVED/SENT TO COURT C 05/14/2015 " OORDINATOR. MG *IMG* LETTER DATED MAY 15, 2015 FROM T IFFANY 05/15/2015 " DEBOLT IN RE TO ORDERS. 05/15/2015 MG " *IMG* UNOPPOSED MOTION OF ATTORNEYS HU SEMAN & 05/18/2015 " STEWART P.L.L.C. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNS EL FOR 05/18/2015 " DEFENDANTS (W/ ORDER 05/18/2015 ATTACHED) SENT TO COURT COORDINATOR. < CMG> " ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 05/27/2015 " COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS SIGNED BY JUDGE JOE LOPEZ AND COPIES S ENT TO 05/27/2015 " COUNSEL VIA FAX FSR *IMG* ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION OF 05/29/2015 " ATTORNEYS HUSEMAN & STEWART P.L.L.C. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUT ION OF 05/29/2015 " COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS. SIGNED 5/22/15 BY JUDGE LOPEZ. FAXED T O J. STEVE 05/29/2015 " MOSTYN, VAN HUSEMAN, 05/29/2015 AND SOFIA A. RAMON. MG " *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE CO URT ORDER 06/11/2015 " REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (WITH ORDER 06/11/2015 " ATTACHED) SENT TO COURT 06/11/2015 COORDINATOR. " 8 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO STRIKE 06/11/2015 " AND/OR OVERRULE DEFENDANT STATE FARM'S OBJECTIONS TO W RITTEN 06/11/2015 " DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO 06/11/2015 COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY RESPONSE S " 06/16/2015 *IMG* PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITI ON. CMG " 06/17/2015 *IMG* (2) CITATIONS ISSUED AS TO RAY P ADILLA. CMG " 06/17/2015 " **WAITING ON COPIES FOR CITATIONS AND SELF 06/17/2015 " ADDRESSED STAMPED 06/17/2015 ENVELOPE.** " 06/17/2015 " 06/17/2015 CITATIONS RELEASE IN FED EX ENVELOPE 6 /19/15 " *IMG* DEFENDANT STATE FARM LLOYDS' OPP OSITION TO 06/19/2015 " MOTION TO ENFORCE, MOTION FOR ENTRY, AND MOTION TO STAY P ENDING 06/19/2015 " MANDAMUS *IMG* FIAT (MOTIONS SET FOR 7/16/15 AT 9:00 A.M.) COPY 06/22/2015 " FAXED TO 06/22/2015 ATTORNEY OF RECORD BY COURT COORDINATO R. JER " *IMG* ORDER SETTING HEARING ON DEFENDA NT STATE 06/22/2015 " FARM LLOYD'S MOTION FOR ENTRY AND MOTION TO STAY PENDING M ANDAMUS 06/22/2015 " SET FOR 7/2/15 AT 9:00 A.M. COPY FAXED TO ATTORNEY OF RECORD BY COURT 06/22/2015 " COORDINATOR. JER 07/01/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT " 07/01/2015 *IMG* RULE 11 AGREEMENT " *IMG* LETTER FROM ATLAS, HALL & RODRIG UEZ DATED 07/02/2015 " 7/2/15 07/02/2015 IN RE: HEARING FOR JULY 16, 2015 " *IMG* PROTECTIVE ORDER RCVD & SENT TO COURT 07/02/2015 " COORDINATOR JLA 07/06/2015 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER RECEIVED " *IMG* CITATION RETURN SHOWING SERVICE AS TO RAY 07/08/2015 " PADILLA. DOS 6/29/15. 07/08/2015 MG " *IMG* STATE FARM'S OPPOSITION TO PLAIN TIFFS' 07/08/2015 " SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR OVERRULE DEFENDANT STATE FARMS' 07/08/2015 " OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL SUPPLEM ENTAL 07/08/2015 " DISCOVERY RESPONSES. MG 9 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... *IMG* DEFENDANT RAY PADILLA'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO 07/10/2015 " PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 07/10/2015 AMENDED PETITION. ATTY. CHARLES W. DOW NING. MG " 07/13/2015 PROTECTIVE ORDER SIGNED " 07/14/2015 *IMG* PROTECTIVE ORDER- SIGNED ON 7/13 /15 " 07/14/2015 " COPY FAXED TO ATTORNEYS J. STEVE MOSTY N AND 07/14/2015 " SOFIA RAMON BY COURT 07/14/2015 COORDINATOR. " 07/15/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 07/15/2015 Assignment of court date/time. " 07/15/2015 Status entered as Open " *IMG* PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 07/15/2015 " SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR OVERRULE DEFENDANT ST ATE 07/15/2015 " FARM'S OBJECTIONS TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL 07/15/2015 " SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY 07/15/2015 RESPONSES. MG " CASE CALLED. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE LOPE Z 07/16/2015 " PRESIDING. COURT REPORTER CINDY LENZ. HEARING:MOTION TO STRIKE. ATTY. 07/16/2015 " ANDREW TAYLOR WAS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF. ATTYS. SOFIA RAMON AND ELIZABETH 07/16/2015 " CANTU WERE PRESENT 07/16/2015 FOR DEFENDANTS. PARTIES PASSING HEARIN G. MG " 07/17/2015 Court date/time: 7/16/2015 9:00 H earing Type: 111 Mot/Strike " 07/17/2015 Status changed from Open to Canc e " *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE TO RELATOR'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MAND AMUS HAS 07/21/2015 " BEEN FILED. MG *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE 07/21/2015 TO RELATOR'S MANDAMUS RECORD HAS BEEN FILED. MG " *IMG* LETTER DATED JULY 20, 2015 FROM FOURTH COURT 07/21/2015 " OF APPEALS IN RE TO RELATOR'S OPPOSED MOTION FOR TEMPOR ARY 07/21/2015 " RELIEF STAYING ORDER 07/21/2015 COMPELLING DISCOVERY HAS BEEN FILED. M G " Search | Case History | Parties | Attorneys | Links | Services [ Site Map ] [ Return to Top ] All | Motions | Orders | Answers / Citations | Other Documents / Actions | Costs | Payments | Ledger 10 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM Court Center Docket Review. Case History Header. http://idocket.com/cgi-bin/db2www/c_h_all.mbr/run?st=028&cnty=JF... © 1999 Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved. User ID: atlas&hall Unauthorized access is prohibited. Usage will be monitored. Viewed as of: July 24, 2015, time : 11:38:36 Agreements 11 of 11 7/24/2015 11:38 AM TAB 1 OF THE RECORD Filed 6/312014 4:02:29 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001048D1 CAUSE NO.4Ok21JF?YDIO4Rt)1 ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Alma Pena (“Plaintiff’), and files this Pkiint(fJ’s Original Petition, complaining of State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”) and Becky Lanier (“Lanier”) (to whom will be collectively referred as “Defendants”), and for cause of action, Plaintiff would respectfully show this Honorable Court the following: DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN I. Plaintiff intends for discovery to be conducted under Level 3 of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This case involves complex issues and will require extensive discovery. Therefore, Plaintiff will ask the Court to order that discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery control plan tailored to the particular circumstances of this suit. PARTIES 2. Plaintiff Alma Pena is an individual residing in Webb County, Texas. 3. Defendant State Farm is an insurance company engaging in the business of insurance in the State of Texas. This defendant may be served with personal process, by a process server, by serving its Attorney for Service: Rendi Black, 17301 Preston Road, Dallas, Texas 75252. 4. Defendant Becky Lanier is an individual residing in and domiciled in the State of Texas. This defendant may be served with personal process by a process server at her place of residence at 11755 Sunset Woods, Helotes, Texas 78023. JURISDICTION 5. The Court has jurisdiction over this cause of action because the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court. Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief over $200,000 but not more than $1,000,000. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her petition during and/or after the discovery process. 6. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant State Farm because this defendant is a domestic insurance company that engages in the business of insurance in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. 7. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Lanier because this defendant engages in the business of adjusting insurance claims in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise Out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. VENUE 8. Venue is proper in Webb County, Texas, because the insured property is situated in Webb County, Texas. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §15.032. Page 2 FACTS 9. Plaintiff is the owner of a Texas Homeowners’ Insurance Policy (hereinafter referred to as “the Policy”), which was issued by State Farm. 10. Plaintiff owns the insured property, which is specifically located at 1014 Reagan Dr., Laredo, Texas 78046, in Webb County (hereinafter referred to as “the Property”). II. State Farm sold the Policy insuring the Property to Plaintiff 12. On or about June 7, 2013, a hail storm and/or windstorm struck Webb County, Texas, causing severe damage to homes and businesses throughout the area, including Plaintiff’s residence (“the Storm”). Specifically, Plaintiff’s roof sustained extensive damage during the Storm. Water intrusion through the roof caused significant damage throughout the entire home including, but not limited to, the home’s ceilings, walls, insulation, and flooring. Plaintiff’s home also sustained substantial structural and exterior damage during the Storm, as well as damage to the play set. After the Storm, Plaintiff filed a claim with her insurance company, State Farm, for the damages to her home caused by the Storm. 13. Plaintiff submitted a claim to State Farm against the Policy for Other Structure Damage, Roof Damage, Structural Damage, Water Damage, and Wind Damage the Property sustained as a result of the Storm. 14. Plaintiff asked that State Farm cover the cost of repairs to the Property pursuant to the Policy, including but not limited to, repair and/or replacement oIthe roof and play set and repair of the and interior water damages, pursuant to the Pol icy. 15. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendant Lanier as the individual adjuster on the claim. The adjuster assigned to Plaintiff’s claim was improperly trained and failed to perform a Page 3 thorough investigation of Plaintiff’s claim. On or about December 3, 2013, Lanier conducted a substandard inspection of Plaintiff’s Property. For example, Lanier spent a mere fifteen (15) minutes inspecting Plaintiff’s entire Property for Storm damages. Furthermore, Lanier was uncooperative and quick to discount any damages that Plaintiff pointed out. The inadequacy of Lanier’s inspection is further evidenced by her report, which failed to include all of Plaintiff’s Storm damages noted upon inspection. For example, Lanier failed to include many of the damages to the home’s roof and interior, as well as the damages to Plaintiff’s play set. Moreover, the damages thai Lariier actually included in her report were grossly undervalued, in part because she both underestimated and undervalued the cost of materials required for necessary repairs, incorrectly applied material sales tax, and failed to include contractor’s overhead and profit. Ultimately, Lanier’s estimate did not allow adequate funds to cover the cost of repairs to all the damages sustained. Lanier’s inadequate investigation was relied upon by State Farm in this action and resulted in Plaintiff’s claim being undervalued and underpaid. 16. Together, Defendants State Farm and Lanier set about to deny and/or underpay on properly covered damages. As a result of these Defendants’ unreasonable investigation of the claim, including not providing full coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiff as well as under-scoping the damages during their investigation and thus denying adequate and sufficient payment to Plaintiff to repair her home, Plaintiff’s claim was improperly adjusted. The mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim has also caused a delay in her ability to fully repair her home, which has resulted in additional damages. To this date, Plaintiff has yet to receive the full payment to which she is entitled under the Policy. Page 4 17. As detailed in the paragraphs below, State Farm wrongfully denied Plaintiff’s claim for repairs of the Property, even though the Policy provided coverage for losses such as those suffered by Plaintiff. Furthermore, State Farm underpaid some of Plaintiff’s claims by not providing ftill coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiff; as well as under scoping the damages during its investigation. 18. To date, State Farm continues to delay in the payment for the damages to the Property. As such, Plaintiff has not been paid in full for the damages to her home. 19. Defendant State Farm failed to perform its contractual duties to adequately compensate Plaintiff under the terms of the Policy. Specifically, it refused to pay the full proceeds of the Policy, although due demand was made for proceeds to be paid in an amount sufficient to cover the damaged property, and all conditions precedent to recovery upon the Policy had been carried out and accomplished by PlaintifE State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract between State Farm and Plaintiff. 20. Defendants State Farm and Lanier misrepresented to Plaintiff that the damage to the Property was not covered under the Policy, even though the damage was caused by a covered occurrence. Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEx. iNs. CODE §54 I .060(a)( 1). 21. Defendants State Farm and Lanier failed to make an attempt to settle Plaintiff’s claim in a fair manner, although they were aware of their liability to Plaintiff under the Policy. Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CoDE §541 .060(a)(2)(A). Page 5 22. Defendants State Farm and Lanier failed to explain to Plaintiff the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendants State Farm and Lan ier failed to offer PlaintifT adequate compensation, without any explanation why full payment was not being made. Furthermore, Defendants State Farm and Lanier did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiffs claim. Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s conduct is a violation of’ the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEx. INS. Coi:n §54 I .060(a)(3). 23. Defendants State Farm and Lanier failed to affirm or deny coverage of Plaintiffs claim within a reasonable time. Specifically, Plaintiff did not receive timely indication of acceptance or rejection, regarding the full and entire claim, in writing from Defendants State Farm and Lanier. Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEx. INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(4). 24. Defendants State Farm and Lanier refused to fully compensate Plaintiff, under the terms of the Policy, even though Defendants State Farm and Lanier failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Specifically, Defendants State Farm and Lanier performed an outcome-oriented investigation olPlaintiff’s claim, which resulted in a biased, unfair, and inequitable evaluation of Plaintiffs losses on the Property. Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s conduct constitutes a violation of’ the Texas insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEx. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). Page 6 25. Defndant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding timely acknowledging Plaintiff’s claim, beginning an investigation of PlaIntiff’s claim, and requesting all information reasonably necessary to investigate Plaintiff’s claim, within the statutorily mandated time of receiving notice of Plaintiff’s claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEx. INS. CODE §542.055. 26. Defendant State Farm failed to accept or deny Plaintiff’s full and entire claim within the statutorily mandated time of receiving all necessary information. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEx. INs. CODE §542.056. 27. Defendant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding payment of claim without delay. Specifically, it has delayed full payment of Plaintiff’s claim longer than allowed and, to date, Plaintiff has not received full payment for her claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. 28. From and after the time Plaintiff’s claim was presented to Defendant State Farm, the liability of State Farm to pay the full claim in accordance with the terms of the Policy was reasonably clear. However, State Far-rn has refused to pay Plaintiff in full, despite there being no basis whatsoever on which a reasonable insurance company would have relied to deny the full payment. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Page 7 29. Defendants State Farm and Lanier knowingly or recklessly made false representations, as described above, as to material facts and/or knowingly concealed all or part of material information from Plaintiff 30. As a result of Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s wrongful acts and omissions, Plaintiff was forced to retain the professional services of the attorney and law firm who are representing her with respect to these causes of action. 31. Plaintiff’s experience is not an isolated case. The acts and omissions State Farm committed in this case, or similar acts and omissions, occur with such frequency that they constitute a general business practice of State Farm with regard to handling these types of claims. State Farm’s entire process is unfairly designed to reach favorable outcomes for the company at the expense of the policyholders. CAUSES OF ACTION: CAusEs OF ACTION AGAINST LANIER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAIR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 32. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendant Lanier to adjust the claim. Defendant Lanier was improperly trained to handle claims of this nature and performed an unreasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s damages. During the investigation, the adjuster failed to properly assess Plaintiff’s Storm damages. The adjuster also omitted covered damages from her reports, including many of Plaintiff’s roof and interior damages, as well as the damage to Plaintiff’s play set. In addition, the damages that the adjuster did include in the estimate were severely underestimated. Page 8 33. Defendant Lanier’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Selement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEx. INS. CODE §541.151. 34. Defendant Lanier is individually liable for her unfair arid deceptive acts, irrespective of the fact she was acting on behalf of State Farm, because she is a “person” as defined by TEx, INS. CoDE §541.002(2). The term “person” is defined as “any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, Lloyds plan, fraternal benefit society, or other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including an agent, broker, adjuster or life and health insurance counselor.” TEX. INS. Coou §54 1 .002(2) (emphasis added); see also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S,W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998) (holding an insurance company employee to be a “person” for the purpose of bringing a cause of action against him or her under the T’exas Insurance Code and subjecting him or her to individual liability). 35. Falsehoods and misrepresentations may be communicated by actions as well as by the spoken word; therefore, deceptive conduct is equivalent to a verbal representation. Defendant’s misrepresentations by means of deceptive conduct include, but are not limited to: (I) failing to conduct a reasonable inspection and investigation of PlaintitT’s damages; (2) stating that Plaintiff’s damages were less severe than they in fact were; (3) using her own statements about the non-severity of the damage as a basis for denying properly covered damages and/or underpaying damages; and (4) failing to provide an adequate explanation for the inadequate compensation Plaintiff received. Defendant Lanier’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of misrepresenting to Plaintiff material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of Page 9 competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INs. CODE §541 .060(a)( 1). 36. Defendant Lanier’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, even though liability under the Policy is reasonably clear, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §54 I .O6O(a)(2)(A) 37. Defendant Lanier failed to explain to Plaintiff the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendant Lanier failed to offer Plaintiff adequate compensation without any explanation as to why full payment was not being made. Furthermore, Defendants did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiffs claim. The unfair settlement practice of Defendant Lanier as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiff with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the offer of a compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CoDE §541 .060(a)(3). 38. Defendant Lanier’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiff, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiff constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx. INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(4). Page 10 39. Defendant Lanier did not properly inspect the Properly and failed to account for and/or undervalued many of Plaintiff’s exterior and interior damages, although reported by Plaintiff to State Farm. Defendant Lanier’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiff’s claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx. INS. CODE §54l.060(a)(7). CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 40. Plaintiff is not making any claims for relief under federal law. F’RA U D 41. Defendants State Farm and Lanier are liable to Plaintiff for common law fraud. 42. Each and every one of the representations, as described above, concerned material facts for the reason that absent such representations, Plaintiff would not have acted as they did, and which Defendants State Farm and Lanier knew were false or made recklessly without any knowledge of their truth as a positive assertion. 43. The statements were made with the intention that they should be acted upon by Plaintif1 who in turn acted in reliance upon the statements, thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer injury and constituting common law fraud. CoNsPIItcY TO COMMIT FRAUD 44. Defendants State Farm and Lanier are liable to Plaintiff for conspiracy to commit fraud. Defendants State Farm and Lanier were members of a combination of two or more persons whose object was to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. In reaching a meeting of the minds regarding the course of action to be taken against Plaintiff, Defendants State Farm and Lanier committed an unlawful, overt Page II act to further the object or course of action, Plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result. CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST STATE FARM ONLY 45. Defendant State Farm is liable to Plaintiff for intentional breach of contract, as well as intentional violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and intentional breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. BREAcH OF CONTRACT 46. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract made between State Farm and Plaintiff. 47. Defendant State Farm’s failure and/or refusal, as described above, to pay the adequate compensation as it is obligated to do under the terms of the Policy in question, and under the laws of the State of Texas, constitutes a breach of’ State Farm’s insurance contract with Plaintiff. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAiR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 48. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEx. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEx. INS. CODE §541.151. 49. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of misrepresenting to Plaintiff material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INs. CoDE §541 ,060(a)( I). 50. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, Page 12 even though State Farm’s liability under the Policy was reasonably clear, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx. INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(2)(A). 51, Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiff with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for its offer of a compromise settlement of the claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx. INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(3). 52. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiff, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiff constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx, INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(4). 53. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiff’s claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEx. INS. CODE §541 .060(a)(7). NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TExAs INSURANCE CODE: THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS 54. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. All violations made under this article are made actionable by TEX. iNS. CODE §542.060. 55. Defendant State Farm’s failure to acknowledge receipt of Plaintiff’s claim, commence investigation of the claim, and request from Plaintiff all items, statements, and forms that Page 13 it reasonably believed would be required within the applicable time constraints, as described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of claims and a violation of TEX. INS. CODE §542.055. 56. Defendant State Farm’s failure to notify Plaintiff in writing of its acceptance or rejection of the claim within the applicable time constraints, constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.056. 57. Defendant State Farm’s delay of the payment of Plaintiff’s claim following its receipt of alt items, statements, and forms reasonably requested and required, longer than the amount of time provided for, as described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. ACTS CoNsTITuTING ACTING AS AGENT 58. As referenced and described above, and further conduct throughout this litigation and lawsuit, Lanier is an agent of State Farm based on her acts during the handling olthis claim, including inspections, adjustments, and aiding in adjusting a loss for or on behalf of the insurer. TEX. INS. CODE §4001.051. 59. Separately, and/or in the alternative, as referenced and described above, State Farm ratified the actions and conduct of Lanier including the completion of her duties under the common law and statutory law. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 60. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds in insurance contracts. 61, Defendant State Farm’s failure, as described above, to adequately and reasonably investigate and evaluate Plaintiff’s claim, although, at that time, State Farm knew or Page 14 should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that its liability was reasonably clear, constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. KNOWLEDGE 62. Each of’ the acts described above, together and singularly, was done “knowingly,” as that term is used in the Texas insurance Code, and was a producing cause of Plaintif}’s damages described herein. DAMAGES 63. Plaintiff would show that all of the aforementioned acts, taken together or singularly, constitute the producing causes of the damages sustained by Plaintiff. 64. As previously mentioned, the damages caused by the Storm have not been properly addressed or repaired in the months since the Storm, causing further damages to the Property, and causing undue hardship and burden to Plaintiff. These damages are a direct result of Defendants State Farm’s and Lanier’s mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim in violation of the laws set forth above. 65. For breach of contract, Plaintiff is entitled to regain the benefit of her bargain, which is the amount of her claim, together with attorney’s fees. 66. For noncompliance with the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices, Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, which include the loss of the benefits that should have been paid pursuant to the policy, mental anguish, court costs, and attorney’s fees. For knowing conduct of the acts described above, Plaintiff asks for three times her actual damages. TEx. lNs.C0DE §541.152. 67. For noncompliance with Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims, Plaintiff is entitled to the amount of her claim, as well as eighteen (18) percent interest per annum on Page 15 the amount of such claim as damages, together with attorney’s fees, TEx. INS. CODE §542.060. 68, For breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, including all forms of loss resulting from the insurer’s breach of duty, such as additional costs, economic hardship, losses due to nonpayment of the amount the insurer owed, exemplary damages, and damages for emotional distress. 69. For fraud, Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages and exemplary damages for knowingly fraudulent and malicious representations, along with attorney’s fees, interest, and court costs. 70. For the prosecution and collection of this ciaim, Plaintiff has been compelled to engage the services of the attorney whose name is subscribed to this pleading. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum for the reasonable and necessary services of Plaintiff’s attorney in the preparatiOn and trial of this action, including any appeals to the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court of Texas. JURY DEMAND 71. Plaintiff hereby requests that all causes of action alleged herein be tried before a jury consisting of citizens residing in Webb County, Texas. Plaintiff hereby tenders the appropriate jury fee. Page 16 WRITfEN DISCOVERY REQUEsTs FOR DISCLOSURE 72. Plaintiff’s Request for Disclosure to Defendant Stale Farm Lloyds is attached as “Exhibit A.” Plaintff’s Request for Disclosure to Defendant Becky Lanier is attached as “Exhibit A-I.” REquESTS FOR PRODUCTION 73. Plaintjff’s Request for Production to Defendant State Farm Lloyds is attached as “Exhibit B.” Plaint jff ‘.s Request for Production 10 Defendant Becky Lanier is attached as “Exhibit B-I.” INTERROGATORIES 74. Plainsff First Set of Inierrogatories to Defendant State Farm Lloyds is attached as “Exhibit C.” Plainiff First Set of lnrerrogawries to Defendant Becky Lanier is attached as “Exhibit C-I .“ PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that upon trial hereof said Plaintiff has and recovers such sums as would reasonably and justly compensate her in accordance with the rules of law and procedure, as to actual damages, treble damages under the Texas Insurance Code, and all punitive and exemplary damages as may be found. In addition, PlaintifY requests the award of attorney’s fees for the trial and any appeal of this case, for all costs of Court on her behalf expended, for prejudgment and postjudgment interest as allowed by law, and for any other and further re(ief either at law or in equity, to which she may show herself justly entitled. Page 17 Respectfully submitted, THE M0STYN LAW FIRM Is/i. Steve Mostyn 3. Steve Mostyn State Bar No. 00798389 jsrnefiledocketmostynlaw.com 3810 West Alabama Street Nouston, Texas 77027 (713) 861-6616 (Office) (713) 861-8084 (Facsimile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF th•__ EITHER DEGOLLAcj ler the tn C and a / , Page 18 State District Court Jose A. Lopez 49TH Judicial District of Texas State District Judge Counties of Webb and Zapata June 9, 2014 NOTICE OF CALENDAR CALL CAUSE NO. 2O14CVFOO 1048 DI ALMA PENA vs STATE FARM LLOYDS PIeas take notice that this case is set for Calendar Call on 09/04/2014 at 130 PM at the 4915 District Court, 3 Floor, Webb County Justice Center. All Calendar Call hearings will be in open Court and on the record before the Honorable Judge Jose A. Lopez. Your presence is MANDATORY unless Counsel for PlaintifT(s) and Defendant(s) have in place a pre-trial guideline order with both Counsel and Judges signatures prior to calendar call date. This guideline order should have all appropriate dates including prc-trial, jury selection and all deadlines. Counsel for Plaintiff(s) please note that ii’ you (10 not appear for calendar call your case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Counsel for Defendanttp1ease note that if you do not appear for calendar call, a pre-trial guideline order may he entered with or without your approval and/or signature. ucstions regarding this matter please Feel Free to call our office at any time. If there are any 9 ‘‘ / ,L_— Maria Rosario Ramirez Civil Court Coordinator th 49 District Court Webb County• P.O. Box 6655• Laredo, Fcxas 78042 • tel. 956.523.4237• fax 956.523.5051 Zapata County • P.O. Box 789 Zapata, lexas 78076 • tel. 956.765.9935 • fax 956.765.9789 49di_dist.rictcourt@wehbcountytx .gov DC: ** Transmit Confirmation Report ** P.1 Jun 92014 12:46pm WEBB Co DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 I Name/Fax No. Fine Mode Start 09,12:46pm 0’43 Time Page Result 1 0 K Note [917138618084 * State Distret Court Jose A. Lopez 9TH Judicial District of Texas 4 State District Judge Counties of Webb and Zapata June 9, 2014 NOTICE OF CALENDAR CALL CAUSE NO. 2014CVF00104$ Di ijs4ifENA VS STATE FARM LLOYDS Please take notice that this casc is set for Calendar Call on 09/()4/2014 — at 1:30 PM at the 49” District Court, 3” Floor, Webb County justice Center. All Calendar Call hearings will be in open Court and on the record before the Honorable judge Jose A. Lopez. Your presence is MANDATORY unless Counsel for Plaintiul(s) and Defendant(s) base in place a pre.b-ial guideline order with both Counsel and Judge’s signatures prior to calendar call datr. This guideline order should have all appropriate dates including pretrial, jury selection and all dcadlin. Counsel for Plaintifl?sI p csse note that 1LyQIJ do not appej_r calendar call your case may 1 be disojissed for lack of prosecution. unsel for T)efendant(a please ncste that if you do not appear for calendar call, a prc_trial guidelin_e_ojder may be entered with or without your approval and/or signature. If there arc any 9 oestions regarding this matter please feel tiee its call our oflice at any time. - , Maria Rosario Ram irez Civil Court Coordinator th 49 District Court Webb Cuniv . P.O. Boa 6615 Urdo, rcad, 7R042 916 1234237 fax 956 5231051 ?.apaia Cnuaiy P.O. Bo l’” I cxa 7076 id. 95.?61.9’)3S las 956.761.9799 49th_duictc’ow’i0wcbbcountyoc .eov IX’ L,” TAB 2 OF THE RECORD Filed 6/,13/201AA:09:20 PM. Esth~~ qeg?lla'ri.'1 . lState Farin :tO' p·a·¥ the fuif 'C:laim in accor~(lnce with 'th.e terms ohli.e Pqlic.y was reasonaoly clear. However;. State. Farin has· refused to pay Plaintiffs, in fu 11,. de.spite ·,;,, •· there being,, no basis whatsoever ·oii· which . a, reasonable insu.rance .c:ompany. w.ould have relied ·to d~11y t.ne f~!ll.-payment. :State Farm's conduct c'onstltutes afaeach oft_he 'cornmon law duty of good faith an_d fair dealing. '.:29 . Defendants· State Farm and Farias: knowingly or. recklessly,made 'false:represef!taticms, ~s described above, . as ·to \fnatef.iai' faets:·. and/or knowingly corn::ealed. all or. p_af!.of material information from PiaintiffS. 30. As a f'esult of Oefenda'n~s Stat~ · F.arm''s and Farias' w.rongful (lets ·and . omissions, Plaintiffs ..wefe forced ta retain the pro'fessional setvices oftne ario_mey ~nd law' firm , who are . r~presenting them': ;vith r'eSp.e d tb~ these causes of action, Page 7 Jh PlaintiffS' experience is' .f16t' a'ii ;is-olated case. ·the act$ and ornissions ~{tate Fa.n.n COmTlJ itJ:ed· in this case, or similar acts and om issiOri.s, occur With.' imch frequehc;ytha.rtheY, corysti!ute a gene~al;business practice·of State:Earm with,r~gard to har(dlliig these ty_pes of. c_laims. Sta~e Farm!s < ~n.t.ire process is unfairly designed to.reach ,favora~le . outcomes' for.~ the company at the e_xpense·of.the pol icyholders. CAU.S ES'OF.AC:flON: eAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENi>ANt'FARIAS NONCOMPLiANCE Wlill'TEXAS .INSURANCE'C:ODE.:: UNFAI~S~TTLE~_EN.T PRA~lJCE_~ 32. Defendant State Fann assigned . Defendant f:ar_ias _t9~~d,jL.1st"t~e Claim·.. Defendant Farias was i.mproper-ly trained to ,handle·.cl'aims <)'f tbis. n(liure ._aJJ_d. p_<;:rf9_r111~d <(ln l!nre~sonable .investigation of' PiafrttiffS' damages. Durin~ .bis: ihyest_ig_atiOJ!; ihe. adjl!ster failed ·to properly assess Rlaintiffs' St6rl'n damag_es. Thee adjus~er aiso -6i1)jtte<1 cov.er.e.d 4a.JT1ages from his report, including the :·da1iiages:to the home's ro·o(a'f1d 'siding: ih . laintiffs' ·d~mage~ \'{ere )essisev~re 1 than · they in fact were;_(3) using his ·ow1i. ·statements-about the norHev~r.it~ ,of"t.he c!i!-m.age gs Cl basis for denying propei-IY covered damages :and/or underpaying ;(f(l_mag~.~;\ ~nq_ ·(~) failing to proviOe an adequate explanation for .the inadequate c6f\lpe_nsatltjn· P.lj:ilntiffs received, 'r:~efendanJ Far.ias' 'unfair settlement practice, as· descrihe(f abbve; ani:l the exan1pie given herein, of misrepresenting to Plaintiffs h1ateriai facts tclatin·g·to:thc. coverageJ aUs~l!e; constitut~s an unfair method of competition and .ah unfaif and deceptiVe act or ·practice i.n the. b.usiness of i_nsur.ance. 'Ttx. JNs. Coot §54:1.060(a)(.l ). 36.. [)cfe.ndimt Fari_a_s' un'fa,ir settlement. practice, as describecfab6ve, ot'Yailihg.·to atteJ'rlpt i11 good faith to effectuate.a prompt,Jair, arid ec'jTiftai5"i~ ·settle.inerit i;>ftbe ch:ilm, e..ven though liability under the Policy IS reasonably clear, ·constitut~s1~n . urif?ir m(;:ihod of C_O!llpetition and ,an Lin fair and deceptive act or practice: i.n th.e ~.Lisine.ss1 Qfin?tira_nce. TEX'. INS. CODE §54 l .060(a)(2)(A). -3 7-. Defendant. Farias failed to ·explain toj>iaihtiffs tlie. re.~sQns (qr J:iis.· off~r ·q_f an inadequate· s~ttlem~nL Specifically,_ Defendant. Farias fa\fed to offer Plai'nt_iffa ll;qequate. Pagei9:. compensation without any expl'afiati.on . asr to w)1y "ful.I P.'!Yment was not .~eing ·111ade:. Fu.rthermoi'e;. Defendant did n·ot ·communicate that ant fi.j{ure · s~t_tlemen'ts or payf!leufs would be fofthcoining to pay fot"the eritfre iosses: co~ered .· under: th"e Policy; 'l).or diq, he provide any explanation foftiie. failure to :adequately settle P-lail:itiffs ' claim, ·111e unfair sefr!Cmcnt practice·of Defendant F.a:r.ias as desc~ibed a5ove·;..of failln·g to promptlyprovi&e Plaintiffs:with a reasonable explanation of tlie basis in the PolicY,_, ·ih~relation to the facts' or ·applic/ful pµrpose or· a lawful purpose by unlawful'. means. In reachihg a meetlng'ofthe;_mind5 .regatdihg'th_e1cc;n,1r5e 9f 1;1Ction !O be t?ken against-Plaintiffs, DefendafitS State:Fafin and Farias· comh]itte:cf an. unla~ft.iJ , oyert ;a_ct to further ·the, object or course of: actiOn .. 'Plaintiffs 'suffer~.9 inJL1r::y as: ~ proX:itn.~!e resu!'t.. 45. Defendant:State' Farm is Jiabie lo -Plaintiffs. for. iritentiohal . . .. -· breach . ... of-contract; . ... ....... ,. as· well as intentional ·violations ·of the Texas Insurance Coe;Je; an.d intentio.Da,r b.~eacli ·of the•common, law. dLitY'of good'' falth ahd .fafr dealing. Page rJ BREACH'o1?·CoNTRJ\CT 46. Detbdant- State Farm's conduct' constiftites 'a breach o(the: insurance· contract made; be!_ween State Farm and Plaintiffs. 4~ . Defendant State Fa.rm-' s failure and/or refusal~ as described ;abo\ie, to~ p~y the .ade_quat_e'. cq.mp_ensation as it'is obligated to do under the terms,ofthe Pol!Cy in ·~(uestion, a:11d under the laws of t he State of Texas, constitutes a .breacn of ·state Farm ;_3 lnsliYaiice. contnict with Plaintiff~ . NoNCOMPtlANCEWITH 'i:EX;\S J~~UllAN'cE Cob£.: UNFAiR SEHLEMEN;'r.PRACTICES 48, Defcryda,nt State .Farm's conduct constitutes inuitipJC' violations of'the Tex.as Jn~µrance Code, .l.Infair Settlement Practices: TEX. INS'. CobE §54f.66o'(a). A'il . Vioiations uh_der this article are .m<:J._de actionable.byTl~X. INS ~ . CODE §54'1.151 . 49. Defe.1dant Sta.te.Farm's unfairsettlcment,practice; as descr.ibed aboVe,,.oflnisrepresentl·ng to: Piai~tif(s material :facts rela.ting ·to the coverage at 'issue, coiist!tutes~an. unfair iileth_od of competition and an u[lfafr and, dec~ptive act. or. practice in the: business of'insufarice. TEX. INS. CODE §54 L060(a)( I): 50. Defendant State Fa-rrh's unfair settlemen'l; prac~ice;· ~.s de~cribed above, of failing to. attempt in go6'd faith to e(fectucite a prompt;. fair, a_nd ·e_quitable settlement oFthe ·claim, even .though State Farrp "s li~_bility u_nqcr the P.olicy ·was reasonably clear; cohstitl.ites•an, i.mfair methoc:J .of competition and an unfair and deceptive·. act..of, praetice'.i'ri the b!liiness o(ins.u.r.anc_e, TEX., I~s. Cooi::-§541 .060(a)(4)(A) .. '5:1. De.fen.cfant Stat~ farm's unfair .settlement practice,_ as~ aescribed: ab-ov·e,, of: fallii}g t9 promptly provide Plaintiffs v,ri_th :a· rea_s_onable explanation .of·the . basis in tffe'. Poi'icy, '. in relation to the facts or _appl_icable law; for its offer of ·a compromise' settlelii'ent; oftlte: Page 12: Claim, cohstjtute~ ;m un_f~ir m~thod.· of con::ip.etition and an unfair· and· deceptive act 'or practice, in th'e business,. of insurance: TE?( . INS: G':ooq§54 l.060(a)(3 ). 52. Defendant State Earm's' unfair settlemerit· practic~,·mpt paytne11t of:claims an¢ ;aryiplatfort·of TEX. l'Ns,. CODE §.5:42.055. '56~ DefendanLStatc·Fann ;sJailure to.n·otify Plainti.ffs'in·writing of its accep1ance or: rejection · ofahe .. claim ·within the applicabie time .constraints; ;constiNtes'ii)1ol'l~Pr.Qm.p_t; p(!y.r.nent of the ·claim: TEX, INS. CODE §542.056. P~.g~ '13: ·57. Defendanr'S.tate;Farrn. 's d<;l{!Y.9f the payrne11t_:.of Pl.
  • .mmonl'aw duty of good faith ,and1fair dealing, Plaintiffs"fore.'entitie·d. to com:pens.11iory ·damages, i_nclµding al Lforms· of'loss··resultiiig:Jro-in the ~ihsurer'5(brea:th . of duty, such, ci.s _additio_nal costs, economic: hardship,. losses due to· nonpaymeiit;·ofdle: afno1.:nt the_:i'nsurer .owed, exem8lary qarn?ges, _a_nd' aamages"for emotional .distress. Page 15 .69 .. Ear fraud.~ . Piaiiltiffs :are entitiec;t JO r~cqye_r:actl:la.1 dam_ages ·and . exemplary damag~s for: kno\.\'. ln&iy fra\idU!ent and malicious repr~sent1:1~ions; al.orig with a'ttomey"'s. fees, interest~ anci court costs. 70. Fi:fr tlie prosecution and collection of this cl~ii:n, .Plaintjff~ hav~ been. cqmpelled: to engage the services of the attorney Whose. narne is; stib~.cdpeq !o i_ht:? p]eading,, Therefore, Plaintiffs are enti&d to receiver, a sum for 'the , rea_s.~:mable a11d · n.e~~ssary s~syic~s of' Plaihti ffs' attoi'ney'ln the P,reparation and·' tfial ·of this;action; h1ciu~i!1g'any app_e!llyto tl}e Gourt ofAppeals and/oHhe,SLlpfcme Court of Texas. JURY DEMAND 7i . .Plaintiffs her~_by "requ~st that al I causes of actiori ·alleged' herein·\)~ tried before a.Jury co_nsisting of'cjtiz.ens :resi_ding in Webb Courit:x,, Texas. Piaintrffs hereby tender- the appropriat_e jury fee . "*·;· . ~ITTEN. DiSCO:VERY .REQUf:STS FOR DISCLOSURE 72. Pldiiitiffs' Requestfdr Disclos_ure to .D_efenil.wit'$(aie fiarlJ! LJoyd~·; is attachedms "Exhibir A." Plainriffi' ;·RecjuestfofDisdo§zire,19.fJ..efe.n{i.q}1t Fe'f.ipe Farias. is attached as '~Exhi bit Acl ." \i./i:.JEREFQRE, PREMISES CQNSIDEREB, -p1<1..intiffs .Pr'!y that upon triaLh.ereof?, s·aid Rfaintiffs nave ?nd recover such sums intereser;i,b,le Judge Jose A. l:ope_z, Yo~ pres_ence ~is MANDATORYunfess CounseLf6r,Plairitiff(s) and Defendant(s) have l'n plate;a,,pre-tf.i~\ guidelin~ order ~i.tJi·:boih_ G_ouns~I:anclJudge's .signatures prior to calendar call .date .. This1guideline order should hav:e aJl a,pproprtate ,dates in{:Illifrt a-nd·c.i.i1.th.e r:.e.::ord~licforc•the· Hori'otab.ie ]udgeJose A., Lopez. Yoill"prt;sence is-MANDATORY urilcs.s Gounsel f9d~l~in~iff(~) arid. Defendant(s)"have .in··pl'ace a pre -triaFgui'.c.all .appropriate«lates in~luding, prectri~I. jury sc:l ect'io11 an (J .a II deadliiies _. Counsel for PlaintilT(s)'·please note ,that if you do :not appear for·calcndar call your case mav be dismissed for fackofprosecut.ion. Cow1sei for Defondant(s):please r~c)~e that iLy ou do-mifappear fordlendar- call'.·a.pre-tiial guideli1ie order ma5' lK shall retain the original written for acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to counsel the party dcsiiating the infonnation as confidential within ten (10) business days. of 6. Infonitation shall he designated as Confidential Infonnation within the meaning tills produced: Protective Order hy following the protocol below that con’esponds to the formal the a. For hard—copy documents, hv marking (lie first Bates—stamped page of document and each subsequent Bales—stamped page thereof containing Confidential ProprielaryProdneed Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Pursuant to a Conf A’ee./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Prcpnetarv & Trade Secret. Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree.,Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure. the content of the document. the h. For static image productions by marking the lirst Bates—stamped page ol’ document and cach subsequent Bates-stamped page thereol containing Coatidcntial hrtbrniation with (he following legend: “Confidential .s Propr:ctar’v Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Propnctarv & Trade i’aec 3 868 CO DISTRICT CLERIC Fax:955-523-5121 S 28 2015 O2:1i P010/018 Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Cont Agree./Prot. Order.” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. media for ESI c. For native format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery Confidential Jnfomiation as follows: “Confidential & designated as “Confideiflüil Pmprietazy’roduced Anuant to a Coil. Agree./Prot. Order” or ” In Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Con!: Agree.: hot. Order. may have addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file identifier) the appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL J1?OOlO48DI: Alma SUBJ_TQPROTECTIVE9RDERJN Cause Na 2OJ4C Webb Pena v. State Farm Lloyds and Betty Limier: in the 49th District Cowl. copy or static County, Texas.” When any file so designated is converted to a hard each page a image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear cm file containing protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. Ii’ a native r, trial, or is Confidential Information is used during a deposition, mcci and conl relrendng, or otherwise disclosed post-production, the parry introducing, submitting the native file must append the the file’s name (immediately following FII)ENTIAL its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CON olO4WI: Alma SUBJ_TQPRC)TECTIVE_ORDERJN Cause Na 2OIWlF-O t Court, Webb Pena v. &ate Farm Lloyds and Becky Lanier; in the 49th Distric name. Any County, Texas,” if such legend does not already appear in the file deposition. party using a native tile containing Confidential Information in a so that ills reflected hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record Page 4 WEBB CD DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 Jan 262015 02:lOpm P011/018 in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may niace en any hard—copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order ‘ aternoirks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under tile specific cause number. 7. Airy’ party who inadvertently discloses Conlidential Information during the discovery process shall. iinniediateiv upon discovery of the inadvertent dsciosure, give notice in writing to the party or parties in possession of such intbmiation that the inforniation is designated as “Confidential” and shall request its immediate return. Alter reCeIpt of such notice, the parties shall treat the information so designated as ConficienIia int’omiation iindei’ the terms of this Order, unless released of this duty by ilirther order of this Court, Additionally, an party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Information during the discovery process shall, immediately upon discovery of the inacverlen’. dselositre give notice in writing to the lrty which produced and provided this information, the nanies and addresses of the persons to whom it was disclosed and the date of the disclosure together with a copy of the notice by which the inadvertently disclosing party rcquested the ininiedi ale return of the documents. 8. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Infhmiation shall be retroactively designated within thirty t3h,i days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Infonriation. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such oilier Lime as may be agreed upon by the parties. any parties recev ing such notice shall sciurn to the Pace S WEBB CO DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 Jan 262015 02:lOpm P012/018 designating party all undesiRnated copies of such inlonnaton in their custody and possession, in exchange tbr the pmduction of properly designated jnfhnnation. or alternatively (upon the a’eement of the palies) shall ti)atffix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession. custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order. and:or (ii) with respect to ESI. take such reasonabLe steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. h. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced \v:tnoUt being designated as Confidential Information may he retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph Ta. above, it’ a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with texas Rule of Civil Procedure 1933(d) the receiving party mnst (i) make 110 further disclosure ot’ such designated infhrmation except as allowed under this Order: ii; take reasonable steps to notify any persons sho were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of (his Order: and (ni) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person riot permtted access to such in,tbrmation under (lie terms of this Order. No party shall he deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent desinnation. 9. Any party may’ request the party designating intbrniaton as “Confidential’ to consent to re designate confidential information as not confidential, which request shall not he rejected absent a good—faith determination by the designating part that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. Page 6 WEBB CO DISTRICT CLERK Fax:856—523—5121 Jan 262015 02:llpni P013/018 this Order on! if 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential lnftjmiation under the terms of counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposng counse l of that desgnaton at r within thirtY the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporte (3O business da\s after receiving the deposition transcript II deposition Iranseripls shall the deposition be considered confidential until thirty (30) days following the receipt of aion of said information as transcript. The court reporter shall note on the record the design Confidential and shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimom and mark the may use Confidential fhce of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential.” Ilie patties d of the terms of’ this Information during any deposition, provided the witness is apprise “A.” i1ie parties may Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Ediihit the room rcared of all use Confidential Information during a depostlion only if is first persons except the court reporter, the witness being deposed, counsel for the parties and any expert entitled to attend, and only it’ said witnes s executes the acknowledgement attached as Exhibit ‘A.” ses to Ii. In the case of inleiTogatorv answers, responses to request for production. and respon In fonnation will he made by requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential :irig that the answers or responses means nt a statement in the answers or responses specitS ation A producing party or specific parts thereof’ are designated as Confidential Inform gatory answers or responses to shall place the thilowing legend on each page of the interro requests fhr admission: “Contains Confidential Infoniianon.” confer or otherwise exchanged in 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and counsel flr the disclosing informal discovery’, shall be protected pursuant to this Order ti’ ential inibimathm. II’ the party ad ises the receiving party the information is Confid Pace 7 WEBB CO DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 Jan 262015 02:11p P014/018 Confidential Information discloser! during a meet and confer or other\\ se excianged in informal discovery is in the form of hard-copy documents. static’ images. or native tiles. that information shall he designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., h., and; or c. depending on the format of Ih materials introduced. 13. Al any time afler the de1iver’ of Confldential Docuntents. and afler making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated mnatcriats constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or partles receiving the Conlidential Documents may challenge the Confidential designation of all or am portion thereof’ by proviclmg written notice of the challenge to counsel for the party disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents. The party or parties disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt ol a nttcn challenge to dispute. file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Coni-idential Documenis in If the party or parties producing the Confidential Documents does not timely iltC ii motion he for specific protection, then the Confidential Documents in dtspute shad no longer subtect to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 14. If a timely motion for specific protection is tiled. am disputed document will remain confidential until a contrary determination is made by the Court and all such documents, this inIbnmiation or testimony shall continue to be treated as Confidential Information uniil Court makes a contrary decision regarding the status of the documents, inf’onnation or testjmony. At any hearing to resolve a challenge of a Conlidential designation, the party designating the information as “Confidential’ shall have the burden to c’sahlish that prt\’s i’ight to protection as if this Order did not Cyisi A partvs fiulure to challenge the designation ot’ documents. information, or testimony as “Confidential” information does Pa 8 WEBB CO DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 Jan 26 2015 D2:l2pio P015/018 testimon’, fhct. not constitute an admission that the document, inlLimation or is. in d at trod or hearing sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to conten that such document. intrirmation or testimony is ttot sensitive, confid ential. ontiegcd or at least twenty (20) proprietary, provided the party provides noilce of intention to do so days he(bre such trial or hearing. that make reference toContidentiai 15. Any papers flied with the Court in this actton be considered Confidential Information, or contain information derived therefrom, shall These papers shall be tiled Intonriation and shall he governed by the terms of this Order, Office so long as the materials tinder seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s retain their stratus as Confidential Inibrmation. ure. production, or exchange of 16. Pursuant to the agreement of the pae1es. no disclos ble attoniev—cttcnt privilege infbnnation in this case shall constitute a waiver ofaity’ applica this oranv otler federal or slate or of any applicable work product protection in ed, exeliaaged. proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclos whether intentionally’ or inadvertently among the parties, their produced. or discussed — — ) in the course of th!s litigation. counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts product protected ritoi’niatiOn, tile Upon learning of a production of’ privileged or work counsel at record notice of the producnig party shall within ten (tO) days give all 193.3(d). ‘11w receiving party must production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure ation and all copies and destroy promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced inform the substance of the privileged or am notes that reproduce. copy, or otherwise disclose work product protected information. shall not he deemed a waIver of: 17. Further. production pursuant to this Protective Order Page 9 WEBB CD DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 Jan 26 2015 02:12pm P016/018 a. Any pony’s right to ohect to aviv discovery request on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respeci to any discovery request. c Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential hiforniation in its sole and eoup1ete discretion, ci. The status of any material as a trade secret. 18. Any Qualified Person who obtains inibnnation pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. ibis Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered. modified, or vacated h the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court. pursuant to Rule 11 of the Te’sas Rules of Civil Procedure. It [S SO ORDERED on this day of_______ . 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING Page 10 ________ ___________ _______ W88 Co DISTRICT CLERK Fax:956—523—5121 .ian 26 2015 02:12pm P017/018 EXHIBIT “A” CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF.-0011J48-l)1 ALMA PP NA. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plain ii if, § § V. § WEBB COUNTY. TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS ANI) § BECKY LANIER, § Dc fencE aids. § 49TH JUDICIAL i)ISTRICT R AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTflE ORDE of at order to ae orovtdcd access to 1. , - , entered in the 49th Judicial __ —__________________ information designated as “Confidentiaf’ under the Brat earl ye Order 2014-CVF-OOit)4X-D1 .Alma District Court of Webb County. Texas (the ‘Court”) iii Cause No. nt and agree as thilows: Bena v. State Farm Lloyds ant/Becky Lamer (the “La\ssuit”). represe entered Lw the Court in the 1 1 have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order Lawsuit, 1 have reviewed said copy and I ant familiar with its terms. which I am given access in 2. With regard to any and all ‘Confidenliar information to ions 0! nc Protective connection with the Lawsuit. I agree to be hound by the provis Order. Court with respect to the 3 1 consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Protect we Order. l of record for al i parties in 4. 1 agree that copies of this undertaking will he sent to counse the Lawsuit. S1GNVFt. ‘RE. DATED: By TAB 8 OF THE RECORD Filed 2/23/2015 11:18:35AM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001162 Dl NO. 2OI4CVFOOI 162-Di RAUL RODRIGUEZ §AND NOEMI IN THE DISTRICT COURT RODRIGUEZ, § Plaintiffs § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § FARIAS, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF STATE FARM’S PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: Defendants State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”), Felipe Farias (collectively, “Defendants”) file their Response and Objections to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Entry of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. In support thereof, and pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants show as follows: I. INTRODUCTION I. The case presently before the Court is a suit arising out of a wind/hail insurance claim Plaintiffs filed with State Farm. Defendants object to the entry of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order because it is inadequate. By insisting that State Farm produce or disclose Confidential Information without an appropriate and standard agreement that such information is confidential and should be handled accordingly, Plaintiffs have put State Farm in an impossible position: State Farm can either disclose its protected materials without the basic protections that they warrant, and risk losing the confidential or trade secret status of the materials, or State Farm must withhold relevant discovery and risk sanctions from the Court. 2. The three-part argument Plaintiffs offer in support of their proposed order is conclusory, and ultimately the Protective Order proposed by Plaintiffs does not meet the criterions Plaintiffs proffered. 3. First, Plaintiffs argue that “Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order provides all parties, including State Farm Lloyds, adequate protection from disclosure of trade secret and proprietary information.” (See Plaintiffs’ Motion, at ¶ l.A.) However, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is deficient in its protections of Confidential Information, while State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order provides more complete protections, particularly with regard to electronically stored information (“ESI”), and better overall procedures. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order does not provide adequate procedures because: I. It does not contain terms related to the designation and handling of electronically stored information (“ES!”) that is confidential, proprietary, or trade secret. ii. It fails to recognize all persons whom will ordinarily handle Confidential Information during the course of this litigation. iii. It overlooks important procedures regarding the handling of Confidential Information and the duties of the parties that clearly should be preserved. 4. Second, Plaintiffs argue that “Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is consistent with protective orders previously entered and used for substantially similar litigation involving Plaintiffs’ counsel and State Farm.” (See Plaintiffs’ Motion, at ¶ LB.) However, Plaintiffs fail to advise the court that State Farm has consistently objected to the sharing provisions put forward by Plaintiffs, and the lack of safeguards for their Confidential Information following the resolution of each matter. 5. Third, Plaintiffs argue that “Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order contains a ‘Shared Discovery’ provision which will provide for more efficient discovery.” (See Plaintiffs’ Motion, at ¶ I .C.) However, the wide-spread sharing of Confidential information greatly 2 increases the risk that such information will be improperly disclosed, dilutes the Court’s ability to monitor and enforce the protections of a protective order, and poses an unreasonable risk to State Farm’s property rights. State Farm is entitled to a confidentiality order that will reasonably limit the dissemination of its confidential information. 6. With few exceptions, State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order (see Exhibit A) includes the terms proposed by Plaintiffs but also adds much needed procedures that will ensure all forms of State Farm’s Confidential Information are protected, regardless of the mode of production, without any adverse impact to the Plaintiffs.’ For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request this Court to deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of a Protective Order and move the Court to enter State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order in this case. II. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 7. Texas law encourages courts to grant protective orders to “protect [a] movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights.” Tex. R. Civ. P. § 192.6(b). Under the Texas discovery rules, privileged information is not discoverable. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a) (defining general scope of discovery as “any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action ....“) (emphasis added). Before a court can permit discovery of any confidential, trade secret, or proprietary information, a plaintiff must first establish the threshold requirements of relevance and a particularized need to discover the information and documents. In re C’ontinenlal Gen’l Tire, 979 S.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Tex. 1998); In re Union PacUic, 249 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. 2009) (a plaintiff must demonstrate the information sought is “material and See Exhibit B attached hereto for a paragraph-by-paragraph comparison of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order and State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 3 necessary” to presentation of the case in which it is sought). This is a case-specific inquiry. See In re Allstate County Mitt. Ins. Co. 227 S.W.3d 667, 668 (Tex. 2007) (granting mandamus in case involving overbroad requests for insurer personnel files and emphasizing that trial courts “must make an effort to impose reasonable discovery limits”); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (holding party requesting discovery has burden of demonstrating that the discovery is “tailored to include only matters relevant to the case”). Once the necessary thresholds are established, a trial court’s duty is to protect confidential and trade secret documents through an appropriate protective order. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987). 8. The Texas Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that confidential information can and should be the subject of an appropriately tailored protective order. See In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. 2000) (“We recognize that the possibility exists that the disqualified attorneys could conceivably have revealed confidential information in discovery, correspondence, or other documents. If this has happened, the former client can protect against tills disclosure ... by seeking a protective order under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.6.”) (emphasis added). Other courts from around the state and nation also routinely provide protection over the exchange of confidential materials during discovery. (See, e.g., Exhibit C, Southern District of Texas form Protective Order, at p. 1 (protecting confidential information); see also Exhibit D, Western District of Texas form Confidentiality and Protective Order, at pp. 2-3, protecting “information that the party in good faith believes in fact is confidential.”) As discussed below, the information Plaintiffs seek from State Farm is confidential, proprietary, and deserving of protection. 4 9. In addition, Texas law defines a trade secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” Hyde Corp. v. Hufjines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (1958); accord In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding); see also Tex. Civ. Rem. & Prac. Code § 134A.002(6) (the recently enacted Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as any “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers that (A) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and tiot being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (B) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”). As discussed below, the information Plaintiffs seek from State Farm is not only confidential and proprietary, but also contains trade secret information, deserving of protection. 10. The Texas Supreme Court described an “appropriate” protective order as one that “limits access to the information to the parties in [the instant] litigation, their lawyers, consultants, investigators, experts and other necessary persons employed by counsel to assist in the preparation of this case.” In re Continental Gen ‘1 Tire, 979 S.W.2d at 613, n. 3 (emphasis added); see also Zappe v. Medironic USA, Inc., No. C-08-369, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23727 (S.D. Tex. March 23, 2009) (noting the Texas Supreme Court’s move away from Garcia and entering a protective order that restricted the sharing of information). Moreover, an “appropriate” protective order requires return of the documents at the end of the case and requires that each person given access to the trade secret information agree in writing to maintain the information as confidential. In re Continental Gen ‘1 Tire, 979 S.W.2d at 613, n.3; see also In 5 re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 1991) (describing ‘appropriate” protective order for trade secrets as one that limits use to the case at hand, limits persons to whom trade secrets are disclosed and forbids reproduction of documents containing trade secret information). A. State Farm’s business information warrants confidential treatment. 11. State Farm has produced non-privileged claim-specific documents from its Enterprise Claim System and the relevant insurance policy. State Farm disagrees that the scope of all of Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are proper; however, State Farm is willing to produce additional responsive documents that are potentially relevant to the issues in this litigation, including policies, procedures, and training materials applicable to the adjustment of claims arising out of the weather event at issue a proper protective order is entered in this case. 12. State Farm’s Confidential Information warrants trade secret status because (1) the information is not known outside of State Farm or by others who compete with State Farm (i.e., other insurance carriers); (2) State Farm takes reasonable efforts to guard the secrecy of this information (such as not sharing it with others absent an appropriate confidentiality agreement or protective order, as is the case here); (3) this information is valuable to State Farm because it is vital to the efficient analysis and processing of claims; (4) State Farm has invested significant amounts of time, human resources, and money developing and implementing the systems described above; and (5) the information described above would not easily be acquired or duplicated by others. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 737. 13. Indeed, under Texas law, a trade secret is at risk of losing its trade secret status if its owners are not diligent in their efforts to protect its secrecy or otherwise treat it as confidential. Id. (factors relevant to determining whether a trade secret exists include, among 6 other things, the extent of the measures taken by the party to guard the secrecy of the information). In recognition of an owner’s responsibility to protect its trade secrets, and in addition to Tex. R. Civ. P. § 192.6(b) discussed above, the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically provide that a litigant may claim a privilege to refuse to disclose a trade secret so long as the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. See Tex. R. Evid. 507. “When disclosure is directed, the judge shall take such protective measure as the interests of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance ofjustice may require.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Tex. Civ. Rem. & Prac. Code § 134A.006 (the recently enacted Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act providing that “[tJhere is a presumption in favor of granting protective orders to preserve the secrecy of trade secrets. Protective orders may include provisions limiting access to confidential information to only the attorneys and their experts, holding in camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.”) (emphasis added). 14. To be clear, State Farm is not refusing to share its responsive confidential and proprietary information outright; it is merely requesting an appropriate confidentiality order that would allow it to do so without sacrificing the protections Texas law plainly affords. With few 2 State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order (see Exhibit A) includes the terms proposed exceptions, by Plaintiffs and simply adds much needed procedures that will ensure the protection of all forms of State Farm’s Confidential Information regardless of the mode of production, without any adverse impact to the plaintiffs. Thus, there is no principled basis for Plaintiffs’ opposition. 2 For the reasons stated in Section II. E. i,fta, State Farm does not agree to the broad sharing provisions included in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order. 7 B. State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order addresses the designation and handling of ESI that contains Confidential Information. 1 5. Plaintiffs have requested that State Farm produce ESI responsive to the discovery requests, but Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order does not fully protect the confidential ES! State Farm will produce. Critically, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is inadequate with respect to the handling of ESI for five reasons. 16. First, the general protections for Confidential Information should be met by limiting the unnecessary duplication of Confidential Information. ESI can be duplicated and circulated with ease, which increases the risk that confidential, propriety, or trade secret information will be disclosed in violation of the protective order. The last sentence of paragraph I of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order strengthens the general protections afforded by the order by expressly limiting unnecessary duplication and limiting the receiving party’s right to use other parties’ Confidential lnlbrmation to the current litigation. This is ever more important in light of the increased volumes of ES1 in litigation. As such, the provisions are in line with the protections contemplated by Rule 5O7 and should be adopted by the Court. 1 7. Second, Plaintiffs’ definition of Confidential Information does not specifically include ES!. ESI is distinct from hard copy documents or other information. For this reason, the Court should find that Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which fails to account for the need to protect ESI, is deficient, and instead adopt paragraph 2 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 1 8. Third, the protective legend that Plaintiffs propose the parties append to the file name (see Exhibit E, at ¶ 6) is so lengthy that it is unmanageable, and there is a risk the Windows operating system will cut it short. The Windows operating system has a 255 character limit for See paragraph 8 supra. 8 the combined file name and file path information. When Plaintiffs’ proposed legend in subparagraph 6.c is combined with standard path, file name, and Bates identifier information, it is very likely the combined information will exceed 255 characters. State Farm has proposed that the protective legend stop after the cause number. State Farm’s proposed protective legend will allow the parties to accurately identify electronic files and the matter in which the file was produced, and is not likely to exceed the Windows 255 character limit. Consequently, State Farm requests the Court reject Plaintiffs’ proposed paragraph 6 and accept the paragraph 6 proposed by State Farm. 19. Fourth, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order fails to require the destruction of confidential ESI if it is improperly disclosed to a non-Qua] ified Person. (See Exhibit E, at ¶ 7.) Since it would be impractical to return copies of confidential ESI once it is placed on new , it is essential that all non-authorized copies of confidential ESI be destroyed in order to 4 media ensure the confidentiality of the information contained on the unauthorized media. Paragraph 8 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order specifically requires a party that improperly discloses Confidential Information to a non-Qualified Person to request the destruction of any such ESI. This procedure enhances the safeguards for Confidential Information, without impacting the rights of the parties to use such information during the course of this litigation. This type of language is typical and non-controversial in other cases. For that reason, the Court should adopt the tenhis of paragraph 8 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order that provide for the destruction of ESI that contains Confidential Information. 20. Fifth, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is impractical because it omits clear procedures for the destruction or return of State Farm’s Confidential Information after the in order to return confidential ESI, the receiving party would have to turn over the actual media, such as the computer hard drive, that contains the copy of the confidential ESI. 9 resolution of the matter. Plaintiffs’ proposal effectively grants an unlimited use license to each plaintiff or their counsel to retain and use all State Farm Confidential Information received for an unlimited period of time. Such unlimited use is clearly beyond the scope of use necessary for the fair adjudication of this matter and should not be allowed. See generally In re BrIdgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003, orig. proceeding). The causes of action asserted in this litigation require proof of State Farm’s alleged misconduct with regard to these particular plaintiffs only and return of confidential materials at the end of this litigation will not hamper Plaintiffs’ ability to examine witnesses or prove the elements of their case. Paragraph 20 in State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order reasonably provides that within forty-five days of the iinai adjudication of the matter, all the confidentia], proprietary and trade secret material produced or disclosed by State Farm in the course of this litigation must be returned or destroyed. Because Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is not reasonably tailored to protect State Farm’s Confidential Information after this litigation concludes, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request for entry of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order and adopt paragraph 20 from State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. C. The confidentiality order should address all persons to whom it will be provided. 21. A protective order is easily vitiated without specific procedures to enforce the handling of protected information. The protective order entered by this Court should recognize all persons who reasonably will be required to handle Confidential Information in this matter, and designate only those persons as “Qualified Persons.” Plaintiffs’ definition of “Qualified Person” is both unreasonably under-inclusive and improperly over-inclusive in light of the facts of this case. 22. Plaintiffs’ definition of Qualified Persons is under-inclusive because it omits counsel’s staff; outside service-providers and consultants providing services related to document 10 and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); and the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order. Persons in all of these categories naturally will receive Confidential Information during the course of this litigation. Thus, it is unreasonably under-inclusive to omit them from the protective order from the outset. For these reasons, the Court should accept paragraph 3 in State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 23. For the reasons stated in section E. below, Plaintiffs’ inclusion of parties to other litigation (including State Farm’s competitors) within the definition of Qualified Persons is improperly over-inclusive and should be rejected by the Court. B. The Protective Order should clearly preserve the general rights and duties of the parties. 24. State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order includes additional terms that provide clear and consistent procedures regarding the handling of Confidential Information throughout the litigation. 25. First, State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order adds paragraph 9 which acknowledges that information in its possession, custody, or control may be the confidential information of non-parties. State Farm’s proposed paragraph 9 acknowledges the general duties that a party may owe to a non-party to protect the confidentiality of the non-party’s Confidential Information provided. Such practical duties do not impinge on the interest ofjustice in this case. Therefore, State Farm requests that the Court adopt paragraph 9 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 26. Second, State Farm modified paragraph 10 to ensure that all Qualified Persons may remain during testimony regarding Confidential Information provided they are otherwise entitled to attend the deposition. Plaintiffs’ proposed paragraph 10 impractically limits the 11 persons that can attend a deposition during testimony regarding Confidential Information. Under Plaintiffs’ proposal, all persons other than “the court reporter, the witness being deposed, counsel for the parties and any expert entitled to attend,” must leave the room, even if they are a Qualified Person who is otherwise entitled to attend the deposition. For example, it is common practice to have a party representative attend depositions and party representatives are Qualified Persons under the terms of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order. There is no reason to exclude Qualified Persons from a deposition if they are otherwise entitled to attend the deposition. The simplified procedure provided in State Farm’s proposal clarifies the standard procedures and rights related to depositions. For these reasons, the Court should adopt the terms of paragraph 10 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 27. Third, State Farm proposed paragraph 13 expands upon paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order and provides that a receiving party must have a good-faith basis to request that Confidential Information be re-designated. This requirement is clearly contemplated under the rules and therefore State Farm requests that the Court adopt its paragraph 13. 28. Fourth, State Farm amended paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order (c.f Exhibit A, at ¶ 15) regarding the procedure for the Court to hear objections to any designation. These amended provisions extend the deadline to thirty days so that it is consistent with other time requirements in the protective order. The paragraph otherwise parallels the Plaintiffs’ proposal, and State Farm requests that the Court adopt its paragraph 15 in order to simplif’ the administration of this case. 29. None of State Farm’s proposed additions and changes impinge upon the rights of Plaintiffs. Rather, they help protect the rights of all parties and streamline procedures in this 12 case. Because Plaintiffs have no practical or legal basis to object to these terms, Plaintiffs’ objections merely obstruct the unbiased adjudication of this matter. E. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order provides for improper sharing of confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information outside of this litigation. 30. State Farm will be prejudiced, and its property interests in its Confidential Information are likely to be compromised, if Plaintiffs’ counsel is allowed to share Slate Farm’s Confidential Information outside of this litigation. The wording in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order allows Plaintiffs’ counsel to share State Farm’s confidential and proprietary information directly with any party, attorney, or expert witness “arising out of hal/storms and/or windsiorms in Texas with a date of loss in 2012, andfor no other purpose.” The Protective Order specifically states: “Related Litigation” means a first-party lawsuit in Texas by an insured against State Farm Lloyds and its adjusters or adjusting companies that produced the Confidential Information for damages to insured property arising out of hailsiorms andJor windstorms in Texas with a date of loss in 2012. Confidential Information shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. (See Exhibit F, at ¶ 1.) The wide-spread sharing of Confidential Information greatly increases the risk that such information will be improperly disclosed, dilutes the Court’s ability to monitor and enforce the protections of a protective order, and poses an unreasonable risk to State Farm’s property rights. State Farm is entitled to a protective order that will reasonably limit the dissemination of its confidential information. 31. Plaintiffs cite In re Stale Farm Lloyds, No. 09-03-311 -CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8115 at *l..2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 18, 2003, orig. proceeding), to justify their proposed provisions for sharing discovery. I1owever, in that case the Court of Appeals merely made a conclusory holding, without providing any substantive analysis that shared discovery was 13 permissible in that case. That holding was never reviewed by Texas Supreme Court. When a similar issue was brought before the Texas Supreme Court in, In re Fire Insurance Exchange, No. 09-04-301-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8494 at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 23, 2004, orig. proceeding), the plaintiffs’ counsel — the same as Plaintiffs’ counsel as in this case — withdrew the protective order and made the issue moot. Consequently, there is no support in Texas law for the overbroad sharing provisions that Plaintiffs seek in this case. 32. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the shared discovery doctrine is also misplaced because the doctrine arose out of a products liability case, Garcia v. Peeples, and relates to the unique nature of such litigation, the nature of the discovery documents requested, and the public health and safety concerns implicated by the defendant’s discovery objections in that case. 734 S.W.2d 343; see also, Steenbergen v. Ford Motor Co., 814 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied) (automobile products liability case); American Honda Motor Co. v. Dibrell, 736 S,W.2d 257 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (all-terrain vehicle product liability case). The public health concerns at play in a product liability matter, where every potential consumer is equally impacted by the same design specification and manufacture process, are not present in the individual insurance claims that arose out of June 14, 2013, weather event. Moreover, each State Farm insurance policy at issue will be unique to the claimants and each insurance claim was independently adjusted. In fact, in most cases, the commonality between plaintiffs will not reach beyond the fact that they each purchased a policy from State Farm and allege they suffered property damage in the weather events. Plaintiffs cannot meet the burden to establish that a public benefit accrues from sharing discovery related to the specific insurance claims that have arisen regarding property damage from 2013. 14 33. Crucially, Garcia was decided nearly thirty years ago. Since that time, the ability to transmit vast quantities of information electronically has increased exponentially. Indeed, a single violation of the Protective Order could send State Farm’s trade secrets around the country in a matter of minutes. Once that happens, retrieval would be impossible. The ease with which information can now he spread substantially undermines any argument that trade secrets will be protected under a protective order that allows sharing. See, e.g., Gil v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. Action No. 1:06CV122, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65269 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (questioning plaintiff’s assertion that sharing provisions in a protective order would adequately protect trade secrets). 34. Garcia v. Peeples was also decided more than a decade before the Texas Supreme Court directly addressed the scope and application of the trade-secret privilege under Texas Rule of Evidence 507. See in re Continental Gen ‘1 Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998). Underlying the holding and reasoning of In re Continental is the Court’s recognition that “trade secrets are an important property interest, worthy of protection.” Id. at 612. It is axiomatic that “once a trade secret is made public all ownership is lost.” Computer Assocs., In! ‘1, Inc. v. A/tai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. 1996). This is true regardless of whether the production is requested in a case involving two business competitors or involving non-competitors. In re Continental Gen’l Tire, 979 S.W.2d at 613. 35. While extolling the general values of the civil litigation system, Plaintiffs fail to explain how a sharing provision in the protective order is necessary for discovery in their case. Nor can they explain it because giving State Farm’s trade secrets to other litigants has nothing to do with the prosecution of the case at hand. In contrast, the risk that State Farm’s trade secrets 15 will be improperly disclosed is drastically increased once sharing outside the confines of this litigation has occurred. 36. The language of Plaintiffs’ proposed order condones the widespread distribution of every confidential and proprietary document, confidential deposition transcript, or discovery response produced in this case to all lawyers who file a lawsuit against State Farm on a wind/hail claim in Texas with a date of loss of 2012 without regard to the causes of action and factual allegations contained therein, the relationship to the present litigation, and without any obligation to return or destroy the information afier a definite period of time. This allows Plaintiffs’ counsel to become a repository for such information for years to come, and will encourage associations and collusion with other counsel bringing claims against State Farm. Even under Garcia, the Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is deficient because it is not limited to similarly-situated litigants. 37. State Farm’s concerns about any protective order that allows a plaintiff’s counsel to become a repository are not unfounded. The litigation marketplace contains websites and exchanges devoted to dissemination of confidential and proprietary information, with few controls and no access to information about who has the trade secret information, or where it may be used. Allowing use of confidential documents without limitation is problematic not just because of the risk that Confidential Information will fall into the hands of State Farm’s competitors, but because the documents applying to or used in the handling of the claim at issue in this case may not be the same documents used or seen by adjusters in other cases; plaintiffs are thus allowed to falsely impeach parties and witnesses in other cases. 38. The protective order State Farm has proposed does not deny Plaintiffs any relevant Confidential Information that may be necessary for them to prove their case. But, 16 unlike Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, it also does not jeopardize the confidentiality of those materials by permitting an essentially ungoverned distribution to an overly broad class of persons into the indefinite future. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order is overly broad and Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient justification for allowing a sharing provision. 39. For these reasons, the expansive sharing language in paragraphs I and 3 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order should be rejected by the Court. III. CONCLUSION 40. in light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Protective Order should be denied and State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order, attached as Exhibit A, should be entered as a full confidentiality order in this case. Adoption of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order will allow State Farm to continue producing responsive material to Plaintiffs while mitigating any risk that State Farm’s Confidential Information will be disclosed without sufficient protection or otherwise lose its trade secret status. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants pray this Honorable Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order, enter State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order attached hereto, and for any other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they show themselves justly entitled. 17 ___ ______________________ __ Respectfully submitted, HUSEMAN & STEWART 615 N. Upper Broadway, Suite 2000 Corpus Christi, TX 78401-0781 (361) 883-3563; (361) 883-0210 (Fax) VAN HE!AN State Bar No. 1032350 TIFFANY DEBOLT State Bar No. 24074118 Attorneys for Defendants State Farm Lloyds And Felipe Farias CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true and correct copy of the foregoing was thisday of February 2015, served on the following via e-service: VIA E-SERVICE Mr. J. Steve Mostyn The Mostyn Law Firm 3810 West Alabama Street Houston, Texas 77027 TTWANY DEBOLT the___ By 18 Filed 2/2312015 11:18:35AM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001162 Dl NO. 2O14CVFOOI 162-DI RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI § IN THE DISTRICT COURT RODRIGUEZ, § Plaintiffs § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § FARIAS, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Felipe Farias (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim and for no other purpose. Confidential Information, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely in this litigation. 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as ‘Confidential” and/or “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored I EBIT information (“ES!”), or other material; information contained in a document, ES!, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation arising out of a weather event on or about June 14, 2013, in Webb County, Texas; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ES! processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 2 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing 3 Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ES! designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree/Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFI DENTIAL-SU BJ TO PROTECTI yE ORDER IN CAU SE [insert When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post-production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ TO IROTECTI VE ORDER IN CAUSE insert n]” if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or 4 at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identii’ing characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to EST, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identifij the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively 5 designated by the producing party in the manner describe in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return and/or destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, aLl copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individuaJ to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individuaL that 6 inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as ‘confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identifS’ the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notif any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the 7 terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. Il. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information 8 will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have thirty (30) days 9 from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers tiled with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of 10 information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties. their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within forty-five (45) business days after the final resolution of this litigation, the 11 ______ plaintiff(s) shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Infonnation, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiff(s) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after forty-five (45) business days after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in etTect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of , 2014. JUDGE PRESIDING certif 20j ____________________________________ NO. 2OI4CVFOOI 162-DI RALJL RODR[GUEZ AND NOEMI § IN THE DISTRICT COURT RODRIGUEZ, § Plaintiffs § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § FARIAS, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER in order to be provided access to infonriation designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2O14CVFOOI 162-DI represents and agrees as follows: I. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE EXHIBIT A Filed 2/23/2015 11:18:35AM Esther Degollado Raul Rodriguez, eta!. v. State Farm Lloyds et aL (2014-CVF-001162-D1) District Clerk Comparison of Protective Orders 2Q14CVFOO1 162 Di Text without highlights is identical Yellow highlighted text indicates differences Or highlighted text denotes substantially similar text Iiain(if(s’ l’ro(ectie Order Sitc hirni ‘s Proteclive Order 1. All Confidential Information produced or 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation and preparation and trial of this litigation against other related litigation against State Farm State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) Lloyds (including its employees) or any third and/or any third party adjusting firm party adjusting firm (including its (including its employees) (“Defendants”) employees) that adjusted claims arising out that adjusted this claim and for no other [sic] hailstorms and/or windstorms in Texas purpose. Confidential Information, or with a date of loss in 2012, and for no other extracts, summaries, or information derived purpose. “Related Litigation” means a first- from Confidential Information, shall not be party lawsuit in Texas by an insured against disclosed to any person except in accordance State Farm Lloyds and its adjusters or with the terms of this Order. Confidential adjusting companies that produced the Information may only be copied or Confidential Information for damages to reproduced as reasonably necessary for use insured property arising out of hailstorms solely in this litigation. and/or windstorms in Texas with a date of loss in 2012. Confidential Information shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposal is not narrowly tailored to limit the use of Confidential Information to the present litigation with State Farm and does not limit the reproduction of such information. ESI can be duplicated and circulated with ease, and unnecessary duplication increases the risk that confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information will be disclosed in violation of a protective order. The sharing of discovery in “related litigation” is not necessary in order to achieve fairness in the adjudication of this Litigation, nor would it serve any public policy purpose. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ definition of related litigation is not reasonably limited to a time and place. Finally, Plaintiffs’ proposal is inadequate because it fails to limit information extracted from the hard-copy documents or electro sge I of 18 By M Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds eta!. (2014-CVF-001162-D1) Comparison of Protective Orders State Farm’s Proposal is Defendants have tailored the introductory paragraph to reflect that Confidential Information is being disclosed for use in the case at bar, and for no other purpose. In addition, Defendants have added language to reasonably protect any producing party from the unnecessary duplication of Confidential Information. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, Ll Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type which is means any information of any type that is designated as “Confidential” by any of the designated as “Confidential” and/or “Trade supplying areceMng parties, including Secret” by any of the producing ci receiving information received from non-parties, parties, whether it is: a document, whether it is a document, information electronically stored information (“ESI”), or contained in a document, information other material; information contained in a revealed during a deposition, information document, ESI, or other material; revealed in an interrogatory answer or information revealed during a deposition; otherwise. At the sole discretion of the information revealed in an interrogatory producing party, the producing party may answer or written responses to discovery; place on any docunients that are subject to information revealed during a meet and this Protective Order, bates numbers and/or a confer, or otherwise in connection with legend to indicate the document is formal or informal discovery. “Confidential,” subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number; however, the producing party shall not label designated documents with a watermark. Page 2 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, el aL v. Slate Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders ‘ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposal does not specifically address the disclosure of trade secret information, electronically stored information, or the disclosure of information in the context of a meet and confer, all of which are relevant to this case. The second sentence of Plaintiffs’ paragraph two deals with marking Confidential Information, which is the subject of paragraph 6, and should be addressed in that paragraph. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: Under Texas law, all confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information is entitled to protection from the court when such information is relevant to the litigation and must be disclosed in the course of discovery. Specific protections for ESI and trade secret information are imperative to the protection of State Farm’s property interests in its Confidential Information. State Farm’s paragraph 2 expands the definition of Confidential Information to include all types of information (i.e., ESI), and all means through which such information is obtained. Plaintiffs’ Protective Order Stale Fariii ‘s Protective Order 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to pending litigation arising out of hailstorms to this pending litigation arising out of a and/or windstorms in Texas [sic] a date of weather event on or about [date], in [County] loss in 2012; their respective counsel; County, Texas; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service providers and consultants providing service-providers and consultants providing services related to document and ES! services related to document and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated so elects, any other person may be as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, designated as a Qualified Person by order of Page 3 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et al v. State Farm Lloyds et aL (201 4-CVF-001 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders after notice to all parties and a hearing. u Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposal provides the overbroad definition of the litigation as “hailstorms and/or windstorms in Texas [with] a date of loss in 2013.” The Motion to Compel discovery filed with the Motion for Protective Order, however, identifies a “hail storm and/or windstorms damage that occurred on or about June 13, 2012.” More importantly, Plaintiffs proposed paragraph three puts Defendants’ Confidential Information at risk because it allows information produced to be shared with parties in unrelated litigation. In addition, the handling of a weather related claim in Dallas County is not necessarily related to the handling of an unrelated claim in another county. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposed paragraph 3 simply identifies the weather event that precipitated Plaintiffs to make an insurance claim regarding wind and hail damage. 4. The parties generally agree regarding the language of paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 4 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. Plaintiffs’ proposed language, however, contains a typographical error. The word “or” in the first sentence should be changed to “on” so that the sentence reads: Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Le I court for each party sh a 5. C I fbr each party shall provide a copy copy of this Order to any person tO whom of this Order to any person—other than the Confidential Information is to 1,# disclosed, Court, court officials, or the trier of fact— including each party such counsel represents, who will receive Confidential Information in and shall advise such person of the scope and connection with this litigation, and shall effect of the confidentiality piovisions of this -- advise such person of the scope and effect of Page4ofl8 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et aL (201 4-CVF-001 1 62-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders l1aint ills’ Prnleclie Order State Farm’s I’rolective Order -- ----‘- - - —- --- - --,-- -- ---,- -,, --- --- - Order and the possibility of punishment by the pr*et of this Order and the contempt for violation thereof. Further, possibility of punishment by contempt for before disclosing Confidential Information to violation thereof. Further, before disclosing any person, lead counsel for the party Confidential Information to any person other disclosing the information shall obtain the than the Court, court officials, or the trier of written acknowledgment of that person fact, counsel for the party disclosing the binding him or her to the terms of this Order. information shall obtain the written The written acknowledgment shall be in the acknowledgment of that person binding him form of lExhibit Al attached hereto. Lead or her to the terms of this Order. The written counsel for the disclosing party shall retain acknowledgment shall be in the form of the original written acknowledgment, and Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the furnish a copy of the signed written disclosing party shall retain the original acknowledgment to counsel fa the party written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy designating the information as confidential of the signed written acknowledgment to the within ten (10) business days. designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: State Farm will be prejudiced, and its property interests in its Confidential Information are likely to be compromised, if Plaintiffs’ counsel is allowed to share State Farm’s Confidential Information with “each party such counsel represents” or others outside of this litigation. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ proposal does not exempt the Court, court officials, and the trier of fact from the requirement of the paragraph. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s paragraph 5 exempts the Court, court officials, and the trier of fact from the requirement that Qualified Persons execute an acknowledgement of the protective order (Exhibit A). This is merely a practical addition to the paragraph. If similar language is not included, under the terms of the protective order, the Court would be unnecessarily required to execute an acknowledgement of its own order. Page 5 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et at v. State Farm Lloyds eta!. (2014-CVF-001162-D1) Comparison of Protective Orders be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format protocol below that corresponds to the produced: format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates- document and each subsequent Bates- stamped page thereof containing stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or Conf. Agree ./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions by marking b. For static image productions, by the first Bates-stamped page of the marking the first Bates-stamped page of document and each subsequent Bates- the image and each subsequent Bates- stamped page thereof containing stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential& following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree.fProt. Order” or Conf. Agree.fProt. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. obscure the content of the image. c. For native format productions, by c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Proprietary/Produced_Pursuant to a Page 6 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, el aL v. Slate Farm Lloyds el al. (2014-CVF-001162-D1) Comparison of Protective Orders Conf. Agree./ ..Order” or Conf Agree.fProt. Or&or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Coni AgreeiProt. Order.” In addition, at the Agree.fProt. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective Bates identifier) the following protective legend: legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ “CONFIDENTIAL TO_PROTECTIVEjRDER_IN_ SUBJ_TO_PROTECTIVE_ORDER_IN Cause No. 2014-C VF-001162-D1; _CAUSE_[insert #].“ When any file so Noemi Rodriguez and Paul Rodriguez designated is converted to a hard-copy vs. State Farm Lloyds and Felipe Farias document or static image for any In the District Court of Webb County, purpose, the document or image shall Texas, 49 th Judicial District” [sic] When bear on each page a protective legend as any file so designated is converted to a described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a hard copy or static image for any native file containing Confidential purpose, the document or image shall Information is used during a deposition, bear on each page a protective legend as meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a disclosed post-production, the party native file containing Confidential introducing, referencing, or submitting Information is used during a deposition, the native file must append to the file’s meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise name (immediately following its Bates disclosed post-production, the party identifier) the protective legend: introducing, referencing, or submitting “CONFIDENTIAL the native file must append the the [sic] SUBJ_TO_PROTECTIVE.pRDERJN file’s name (immediately following its _CAUSE_[insert #]“ if such legend does Bates identifier) the following protective not already appear in the file name. legend: Any party using a native file containing “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ Confidential Information in a TO_PROTECTIVE_ORDER_IN_ deposition, hearing, or at trial must Cause No. 2014-C VF-001162-D1; indicate the designation on the record so Noemi Rodriguez and Paul Rodriguez that it is reflected in the transcript of the vs. State Farm Lloyds and Felipe Farias Pagelofl8 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. Stale Farm Lloyds et aL (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders In the I rict Court of Webb County, proceedings. Texas, 49th Judicial District” if such d. At the sole discretion of the producing legend does not already appear in the party, the producing party may place on file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order deposition, hearing, or at trial must watermarks or seals to indicate the indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the document is subject to a Protective proceedings. Order and is produced under the specific cause number. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: When Plaintiffs’ proposed legend in subparagraph 6.c is combined with standard path, file name, and Bates identifier information, it is veiy likely the combined information will exceed 255 characters. Since the Windows operating system has a 255 character limit for the combined file name and file path information it will not be possible to use this file naming convention. Why Defendants’ Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposed protective legend will allow the parties to accurately identi1’ electronic files and the matter in which the file was produced, and is not likely to exceed the Windows 255 character limit when combined with standard path, file name, and Bates identifier information. PageS of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et at v. Stale Farm Lloyds el a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders Iiai,it iff.s’ I’iotectiv Order State Farm’s I’ru(ec(ivc Order L. — — — ..,. ‘....- 7. Any party who inadvertently wscioses 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently Confidential Information during the disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified discovery process shall, immediately upon Person, the disclosing party shall discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, ghe immediately upon discovery of the ceinwritingtoith pMyorpliegJfl inadvertent disclosure, send a written possession of such Information that the demand to the non-Qualified Person uiforinanon is designated as Confidential” denisndhig the unmediate return and/or and shall request its I mediateieturn. After destruction of the inadvertently disclosed receipt of such notice, the parties shall treat Confidential Information, all copies made, the information so designated as Confidential and all notes that reproduce, copy, or Information under the terms of this Order, otherwise contain information derived from unless released of this duty by further order Confidential Information. Further the of this Court. Additicsially,any party who disclosing party shall send written notice to bvntlyciConfdentiai the designating part3’s counsel providing: Information during the coveryjrocess rnesin addresses of the entity or shall, immediately upon d1scovey ofthe . Inadvertent disclosure, gIve notice in writing indl’6dualto wm the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. to the party which produced arid proi4ded this information, the names and addresses of b. The date ofthe disclosure, the persons to whom It wasdIsclosed and the date ofthe disclosure totherwith a copy of c. A copy ofthe notice and demand sent to the notice by which the inadvertently the entity or Individual that disclosing party iequestectthelinmediate inadvertently received the Confidential return ofthedoc’its. Information. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: The parties generally agree that this protective order should provide procedures to be followed in the event that Confidential Information is disclosed to a non-Qualified Person. Plaintiffs’ procedure does not contain the detail necessary to ensure that any inadvertent disclosure of Confidential Information is fully remedied. First, the paragraph limits the duties to remedy to “any party.” Confidential Information may be inadvertently disclosed by any Qualified Person, not just a party to the litigation, and not just during discovery. Second, Plaintiffs’ proposal merely provides procedures for disclosure of hard-copy documents or other physically tangible items that can be returned, and does not provide procedures to cover the destruction of ESI. If a non-Qualified Person receives Confidential Information through electronic transmission or copied or reproduced ESI that Page 9 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et a!. v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders is Confidential Information, then the copies could not be returned, but would need to be destroyed. In addition, the second sentence of Plaintiffs’ proposed paragraph 7 appears to address a separate procedure for the parties to follow if Confidential Information is disclosed to a Qualified Person, but that information is not properly designated as confidential. That issue is separate from the issue of inadvertent disclosure of Confidential Information to a non-Qualified Person, and should be addressed in a separate paragraph. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposed paragraph 8 ensures that in the event that Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a non-Qualified Person, there are proper procedures for the destruction of ESI. Defendants also address the issue of disclosure of Confidential Information without a proper designation in a separate paragraph (see State Farm’s ¶ 7). 8. The parties generally agree regarding the language of paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 7 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. The internal reference to subparagraph “7.a.” in Plaintiffs’ proposed subparagraph 8.b., however, should be changed to “8.a.” if Plaintiffs’ paragraph 8 is adopted. To the extent I t the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the Page lOofI8 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders production or osure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, andJor (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to Page 11 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (201 4-CVF-001 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposed protective order fails to address the issue of information produced or disclosed by non-parties. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: To the extent any party will need to produce Confidential Information provided to it by non-parties or use Confidential Information produced by non-parties in discovery, its duties to that third party should be recognized by the protective order. State Farm’s proposal includes these terms to provide that information from third-parties that may be produced will be protected by the order. 9. Any party may request the party designating 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith infomiation as “Confidential” to consent to determination that any materials designated re-deSignate confidental Information as not Confidential Information are not in fact confidential, which request shall not be “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving rejected absent a good-faith determination by party may request that a designating party the designating party that the Cccfldential rescind the designation. Such requests shall Information is entitled to protection. not be rejected absent a good-tuiith detenninatlon by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposal imposes a good-faith standard on the designating party but not on the receiving party. Page 12 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposal includes the requirement that the receiving party can only request that the designating party rescind a Confidential Information designation if that request is made in good- faith. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered deposition transcripts shall be considered confidential until thirty (30) days following Confidential Information until thirty (30) the receipt of the deposition transcript. The days following the receipt of the deposition court reporter shall note on the record the transcript. In the event testimony is designation of said information as designated as Confidential Information, the Confidential and shall separately transcribe court reporter shall note the designation on those portions of the testimony and mark the the record, shall separately transcribe those face of such portion of the transcript as portions of the testimony, and shall mark the “Confidential.” The parties may use face of such portion of the transcript as Confidential Information during any “ConfidentiaL Information.” The parties may deposition, provided the witness is apprised use Confidential Information during any of the terms of this Order and executes the deposition, provided: acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit a. The witness is apprised of the terms of “A.” The parties may use Confidential this Order and executes the Information during a deposition only if the acknowledgment attached hereto as room is first cleared of all persons except the Exhibit A. court reporter, the witness being deposed, counsel for the parties and any expert entitled Page 13 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders to attend, and only if said witness executes b. Ihe room is cleared of the acknowledgement attached as Exhibit who are not Qualified Persons. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposed paragraph 10 does not allow all Qualified Persons in attendance at a deposition to remain in the room while a deponent testifies regarding Confidential Information. Rather, the attendees are limited to “the court reporter, the witness being deposed, counsel for the parties and any expert entitled to attend.” It is common practice to have a party representative present at depositions and party representatives are Qualified Persons under the terms of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order. There is no reason to exclude Qualified Persons from a deposition if they are otherwise entitled to attend the deposition. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposal provides all Qualified Persons may stay in the room if Confidential Information is discussed during a deposition if they are otherwise entitled to attend the deposition. The simplified procedure provided in State Farm’s proposal clarifies the standard procedures and rights related to depositions. 11. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 11 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 12. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 12 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 13. At any time after the dei onfidential r making a good-faith t to resolve Documents, and after making a good-faith any disputes regarding whether any effort to resolve any disputes regarding designated materials constitute Confidential whether any designated materials constitute Information, counsel of the party or parties Confidential Information, counsel of the receiving the Confidential Information may party or parties receiving the Confidential challenge such designation of all or any Page 14 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-Di) Comparison of Protective Orders Documents may challenge the Confidential portion thereof by providing written notice designation of all or any portion thereof by the challenge to the designating party’s providing written notice of the challenge to counsel. The designating party shall have counsel for the party disclosing or producing thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a the Confidential Documents. The party or written challenge to file a motion for specific parties disclosing or producing the protection with regard to any Confidential Confidential Documents shall have twenty Information in dispute. If the party or parties (20) days from the date of receipt of a written producing the Confidential Information does challenge to file a motion for specific not timely file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential protection, then the Confidential Information Documents in dispute. If the party or parties in dispute shall no longer be subject to producing the Confidential Documents does confidential treatment as provided in this not timely file a motion for specific Order. protection, then the Confidential Documents in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: In State Farm’s experience, twenty days is too short a time to complete and file a motion for protective order. Additionally the term “Confidential Documents” is not defined in Plaintiffs’ proposal. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposal provides a designating party thirty days to respond to a written challenge in order to create consistency and provide a reasonable amount of time for a designating party respond to a challenge. In addition it uses the term “Confidential Information,” which is consistent with the other paragraphs in State Farm’s proposed protective order. 14. If a timely motion for speci..c protection is 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed document will remain filed, any disputed Confidential Information Page 15 ofl8 Raul Rodriguez, et a!. v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-OO1 162-fl) Comparison of Protective Orders confidental untila contrary determinatioil will remain subject to this Order until a made by the Court and all such documents, contrary determination is made by the Court. information or testimony shall continue to be At any hearing the designating party shall treated as Confidential Information until this have the burden to establish that party’s right Court makes a contrary decision regarding to protection as if this Order did not exist. A the status of the documents, information or party’s failure to challenge the Confidential testimony. At any hearing to resolve a Information designation of any documents, challenge of a Confidential designation, the ESI, information, or testimony does not party designating the information as constitute an admission that the document, “Confidential” shall have the burden to ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, establish that party’s right to protection as if sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to party waives its right to contend at trial or challenge the designation of documents, hearing that such document, ESI, information, or testimony as “Confidential” information or testimony is not sensitive, information does not constitute an admission confidential, privileged or proprietary, that the document, information or testimony provided the party provides notice of is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or intention to do so at least twenty (20) days proprietary. No party waives its right to before such trial or hearing. contend at trial or hearing that such document, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ proposal does not address electronically stored information. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: Defendants add electronically stored information to the list of relevant information. The parties are in general agreement regarding this paragraph. Page 16 of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et aL v. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-001162-D1) Comparison of Protective Orders 15. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 16 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 16. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 17 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 17. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 18 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 18. The parties agree regarding the language of paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order, which corresponds with paragraph 19 of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order. 20. Wii_tbrt3 - ) business days after the final resolution of this litigation, the plaintiffs) shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiffs) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions Page I7of 18 Raul Rodriguez, et a!. i’. State Farm Lloyds et a!. (2014-CVF-0O1 162-D1) Comparison of Protective Orders of this Protective Order. ..rr’s counsel shall certifr in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after forty-five (45) business days after the final resolution of this litigation. Why Plaintiffs’ Proposal is Not Acceptable: Plaintiffs’ Proposed Protective Order omits clear procedures for the destruction or return of State Farm’s Confidential Information after the resolution of the matter. This unreasonably enlarges the likelihood that Confidential Information could be improperly or in&lvertently disclosed to a non- Qualified Person. Plaintiffs’ proposed order effectively grants an unlimited use license to each plaintiff or their counsel to retain and use all State Farm’s Confidential Information received for an unlimited period of time. That unlimited use is clearly beyond the scope of use necessary for the fair adjudication of this claim. Why State Farm’s Proposal is Better: State Farm’s proposal reasonably limits the use of Confidential Information by requiring that State Farm’s Confidential Information will be destroyed following the resolution of the matter. Page 18ofl8 ___________ Filed 2/23/2015 1118:35AM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001162 Dl IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL CASE NO. Fl-_____ § § § Defendant. § PROTECTIVE ORDER 1. Proceedlnas and InformatIon Governed. This Order (“Protective Order”) is made under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FED. R. CIV. P.”). This Protective Order applies to any document, information, or other tangible or intangible thing (collectively, “documents”) furnished by a party to any other party, as well as documents furnished by non-parties who receive subpoenas in connection with this action, if and when the documents are designated by a party or non-party as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. This Protective Order also applies to copies, excerpts, abstracts, analyses, summaries, descriptions, or other forms of recorded information or data containing, reflecting, or disclosing all or parts of designated documents. 2. DesIgnation and Maintenance of Documents and Information. A. “Con fidential Information” designation means that the document contains trade secrets or commercial information not publicly known, which trade secrets or commercial information is of technical or commercial advantage to its possessor, in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7), or other information required by law or agreement to be kept confidential. B. The “Highly Confidential Information” designation means that the document contains information that the producing party deems especially sensitive, which may include, but is not limited to, confidential research and development, financial, technical, marketing, Patenr Protective Order 12/1/09 any other sensitive trade secret information, or information capable of being utilized for the preparation or prosecution of a patent application dealing with such subject matter. C. “Confidential Information” and “Highly Confidential Information” does not include, and this Protective Order does not apply to, documents already in the knowledge or possession of the party to whom disclosure is made unless that party is already bound by an agreement not to disclose such information, or information that has been disclosed to the public or third persons in a manner making such information no longer confidential. 3. Documents Produced In Discovery and Depositions. A. Documents and things produced during the course of this litigation within the scope of paragraph 2(A) or 2(8) above, may be designated by the producing party as containing “Confidential Information” by placing on each page and each thing a legend substantially as follows: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Documents and things produced during the course of this litigation within the scope of paragraph 2(A) above may be designated by the producing party as containing “Highly Confidential Information” by placing on each page and each thing a legend substantially as follows: HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 8. Depositions (i) For deposition testimony or exhibits to be entitled to protection under this Order, a party must designate the testimony and exhibits disclosed at a deposition as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” by requesting the reporter to so designate the transcript or any portion of the transcript at the time of the deposition. (ii) If no such designation is made at the time of the deposition, any party has fourteen (14) days after delivery by the court reporter of the transcript of the deposition session to designate, in writing to the other parties and to the court reporter, what portions of the transcript and which exhibits the party designates as “Confidential Information” and “Highly Confidential Information.” Patent Protective Oider 12/1109 2 (iii) During the transcription and following fourteen (14) day period after a deposition session, the transcript and exhibits must be treated as Highly Confidential Lnformation, unless the disclosing party consents to less confidential treatment of the information. (iv) Each party and the court reporter must attach a copy of any final and timeLy written designation notice to the transcript and each copy of the transcript in its possession, custody or control, and the portions designated in such notice must thereafter be treated in accordance with this Protective Order. it is the responsibility of counsel for each party to maintain materials containing Confidential Information or Highly Confidential Information in a secure manner and appropriately identified so as to allow access to such information only to such persons and under such terms as is permitted under this Protective Order. (v) If no such designation is made at the deposition or within the fourteen (14) day period following delivery of the transcript, then the entire deposition will be considered devoid of Confidential Information or Highly Confidential Information. 4. Inadvertent Failure to Designate. A. The inadvertent failure to designate a documents as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” will not be a waiver of a claim that the document Contains confidential information, and will not prevent the producing party from designating such information as confidential at a later date in writing, so long as the designation is done with particularity. B. In the event a producing party late designates a document as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information,” the document must be treated by the receiving party as confidential from the time of receipt of the notice of the “Confidential information” or “Highly Confidential Information” designation. 5. Challenges to Designations. A party’s designation of documents “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” is not binding if the procedures below are followed: A. A receiving party may challenge a producing party’s designation at any time. Any receiving party may request in writing that the producing party change the designation. The producing party within fourteen (14) days after receipt of a written challenge, must advise the receiving party whether or not it will change the designation. Patent Protcctive Order 12I/O9 3 B. Jfthe parties are unable to reach agreement after the expiration of this fourteen (14) day period, they shall confer. If they cannot resolve the issue, the receiving party may seek an order to alter the confidential status of the designated information. C. UntiL the presiding judge has ruled on a dispute under this paragraph, the “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” designation will remain in full force and effect, and the document continues to be protected by this Protective Order. 6. Disclosure and Use of Confidential Information. A. Information designated as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” may only be used for purposes of preparation, trial, and appeal of this action. “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” may not be used under any circumstances for prosecuting any patent application, for patent licensing, or for any other purpose. B. Subject to paragraph 9 below, “Confidential Information” may be disclosed by the receiving party only to the following individuals, provided that such individuals are informed of the terms of this Protective Order: (a) two employees of the receiving party who are required in good faith to provide assistance in the conduct of this Litigation, including any settlement discussions, and who are identified as such in writing to counsel for the designating party in advance of the disclosure; (b) two in-house counsel who are identified by the receiving party; (c) outside counsel of record for the receiving party; (d) supporting personnel employed by(b) and (c), such as paralegals, legal secretaries, data entry clerks, legal clerks, and private photocopying services; (e) experts or consultants; and (fl any persons requested by counsel to furnish services such as document coding, image scanning, mock trial, jury profiling, translation services, court reporting services, demonstrative exhibit preparation, or the creation of any computer database from documents. C. Subject to paragraph 9 below, “Highly Confidential Information” may be disclosed by the receiving party only to the following individuals, provided that such individuals are informed of the terms of this Protective Order: (a) outside counsel of record for the receiving party; (b) supporting personnel employed by outside counsel, such as paralegals, legal secretaries, data entry clerks, legal clerks, private photocopying services; (c) experts or consultants; and (d)those individuals designated in paragraph 6(F)(c) below. D. Further, prior to disclosing “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” to a receiving party’s proposed expert, consultant, or employees, the receiving party must provide to the producing party a signed Confidentiality Agreement in the form attached as Exhibit A, the resume or curriculum vitae of the proposed expert or consultant, Pareit Proiccive Order I 2/I /09 4 the expert or consultant’s business affiliation, and any current and past consulting relationships in the industry. The producing party will thereafter have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Confidentiality Agreement to object to any proposed individual. The objection must be made for good cause and in writing, stating with particularity the reasons for the objection. Failure to object within fourteen (14) days constitutes approval. If the parties are unable to resolve any objection, the receiving party may apply to the presiding judge to resolve the matter. There will be no disclosure to any proposed individual during the fourteen (14) day objection period, unless that period is waived by the producing party, or if any objection is made, until the parties have resolved the objection, or the presiding judge has ruled upon any resultant motion. E. Counsel is responsible for the adherence by third-party vendors to the terms and conditions of this Protective Order. Counsel may fulfill this obligation by obtaining a signed Confidentiality Agreement in the form attached as Exhibit B. F. “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” may be disclosed to a person who is not already allowed access to such information under this Protective Order (a) the information was previously received or authored by the person or was authored or received by a director, officer, employee or agent of the company for which the person is testifying as a designee under FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); (b) the designating party is the person or is a party for whom the person is a director, officer, employee, consultant or agent; or (c) counseL for the party designating the material agrees that the material may be disclosed to the person. In the event of disclosure under this section 6(F), only the reporter, the person, his or her counsel, the presiding judge, and persons to whom disclosure may be made and who are bound by this Protective Order, may be present during the disclosure or discussion of Confidential Information. Disclosure of material pursuant to this section 6(F) does not constitute a waiver of the confidential stams of the material so disclosed. 7. Non-Party Information. The existence of this Protective Order must be disclosed to any person producing documents, tangible things, or testimony in this action who may reasonably be expected to desire confidential treatment for such documents, tangible things or testimony. Any such person may designate documents, tangible things, or testimony confidential pursuant to this Protective Order. Pateni Pro1elive Order 12/1/09 5 8. Filing Documents With the Court. Any party may submit Confidential Information to the court under seal by designating the document “sealed” in the CM/lCF system of the court or may deliver the document for filing by the Clerk’s Office. If a party delivers a copy to the court, the document must be in a sealed envelope bearing the caption of this action and a label containing the following: CONFIDENTiAL IN FORMATION [case captioni This envelope, which is being filed under seal, contains documents that are subject to a Protective Order governing the use of confidential discovery material. 9. No Prejudice. Producing or receiving “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information,” or otherwise complying with the terms of this Protective Order, will not: (a) operate as an admission by any party that any particular “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” contains or reflects trade secrets or any other type of confidentiaL or proprietary information; (b) prejudice the rights of a party to object to the production of information or material that the party does not consider to be within the scope of discovery; (c) prejudice the rights of a party to seek a determination by the presiding judge that particular materials be produced; (d) prejudice the rights of a party to apply to the presiding judge for further protective orders; or (e) prevent the parties from agreeing in writing to alter or waive the provisions or protections provided for in this Protective Order with respect to any particular information or material. 10. Conclusion of Litigation. Within sixty (60) days after final judgment in this action, including the exhaustion of all appeals, or within sixty (60) days after dismissal pursuant to a settlement agreement, each party or other person subject to the terms of this Protective Order is under an obligation to destroy or return to the producing party all materials and documents containing “Confidential that Information” or “Highly Confidential Information,” and to certify to the producing party this destruction or return has been done. 1-Jowever, outside counsel for any party is entitled to retain all court papers, trial transcripts, exhibits, and attorney work provided that any such materials are maintained and protected in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. Patent Plotective Order 12/1/09 6 _____day II. Other Proceedings. By entering this Protective Order and limiting the disclosure of information in this case, the presiding judge does not intend to preclude another court from finding that information may be relevant and subject to disclosure in another case. Any person or party subject to this Protective Order who may be subject to a motion to disclose another party’s information designated “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential” pursuant to this Protective Order must pro mptly notify that party of the motion so that the party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard on whether that information should be disclosed. 12. Remedies. It is ORDERED that this Protective Order will be enforced by the sanctions set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) and any other sanctions as may be available to the presiding judge, including the power to hold parties or other violators of this Protective Order in contempt. All other remedies available to any person injured by a violation of this Protective Order are fully reserved. 13. Relief from Protective Order. Any party may petition the presiding judge for good cause shown if the party desires relief from a term or condition of this Protective Order. Signed at Houston, Texas, this of , 20_. [Judge’s Namej United States District Judge Patenc Protective Order I2/iO9 _____________________________,un ___________ ___________ ______ __ _______ __________ _______,da Exhibit A [CAPTION] CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR EXPERT, CONSULTANT OR EMPLOYEES OF ANY PARTY I, penalty of perjury, 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that: 1. Information, including documents and things, designated as “Confidential Information” or “HighLy Confidential Information,” as defined in the Protective Order entered in the above-captioned action (“Protective Order”), is being provided to me pursuant to the terms and restrictions of the Protective Order. 2. 1 have been given a copy of and have read the Protective Order. 3. I am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order and I agree to comply with and to be bound by its terms. 4. I submit to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for enforcement of the Protective Order. 5. 1 agree not to use any “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” disclosed to me pursuant to the Protective Order except for purposes of the above- captioned litigation and not to disclose any of this information to persons other than those specifically authorized by the Protective Order, wIthout the express written consent of the party who designated the information as confidential or by order of the presiding judge. 6. 1 also agree to notify any stenographic, clerical or technical personnel who are required to assist me of the terms of this Protective Order and of its binding effect on them and me. 7. 1 understand that [am to retain all documents or materials designated as or containing “Confidentia Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” in a secure manner, and that all l such documents and materials are to remain in my personal custody until the completion of my assigned duties in this matter, whereupon all such documents and materials, including all copies thereot and any writings prepared by me containing any “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” are to be returned to counsel who provided me with such documents and materials. Signed at this ,20. Signature LA.1’rj c,y of F?P*, cert— theIW’day o’-tt4Aj 2Of Patent Protective Ordcr 7 STH By *puty ____________________________ _______________, _________, ______, Exhibit B [CAPTION] CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THIRD-PARTY VENDOR S 1, penalty of perjury, 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that: 1. tnformation, including documents and things, designated as “Confidential Information” or “Highly Confidential Information” as defined in the Protective Order entered in the above-captioned action (“Protective Order”), is being provided to me pursuant to the terms and restrictions of the Protective Order. 2. 1 have been given a copy of and have read the Protective Order. 3. 1 am familiar with the terms of the Protective Order and I agree to comply with and to be bound by its terms. 4. I submit to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for enforcement of the Protective Order. 5. I agree not to use any ContidentiaL Information or Highly Confidential Infonnation disclosed to me pursuant to the Protective Order except for purposes of the above-captioned litigation and not to disclose any of this information to persons other than those specifically authorized by the Protective Order, without the express written consent of the party who designated the information as confidential or by order of the presiding judge. Signed at this day of —, 20_. Signature Patet Protcctivc 9 Filed 2/23/2015 11:1835 AM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001152 Dl iN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION § § Plaintiff § v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. § § Defendant § CONF[DENTIALITY AND PROTECTIVE ORDER Before the court is the joint motion of the parties for the entry of a confidentiality and protective order (“Protective Order”). After careful consideration, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. Classified information “Classified Information” means any information of any type, kind, or character that is designated as “Confidential”, “For Counsel Only”, or “Attorneys Eyes Only” by any of the supplying or receiving persons, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, information revealed during a deposition, information revealed in an interrogatory answer, or otherwise. 2. Qualified Persons “Qualified Persons” means: a. For Counsel or Attorneys Only information: 1. retained counsel fur the parties in this litigation and their respective staff; ii. actual or potential independent experts or consultants (and their administrative or clerical staff) engaged in connection with this litigation (which shall not include the current employees, officers, members, or agents of parties or affiliates of parties) who, prior to any disclosure of Classified Information to such person, have signed a document agreeing to be bound by the tenns of this Protective Order (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney retaining such person and have been designated in writing by notice to all counsel; iii. this court and its staff and any other tribunal or dispute resolution officer duly appointed or assigned in connection with this litigation. b. For Confidential information: i. the persons identified in subparagraph 2(a); ii. the party, if a natural person; iii. if the party is an entity, such oflicers or employees of the party who are actively involved in the prosecution or dcfense of this case who, prior to any disclosure of Confidential information to such person, have been designated in writing by notice to all counsel and have signed a document agreeing to be bound by the terms of this Protective Order (such signed document to be maintained by the attorney designating such person); iv. litigation vendors, court reporters, and other litigation support personnel; v. any person who was an author, addressee, or intended or authorized recipient of the Confidential information and who agrees to keep the information confidential, provided that such persons may see and use the Confidential information but not retain a copy. c. Such other person as this court may designate after notice and an opportunity to be heard. 3. Designation Criteria a. Nonclassifled Information. Classified Information shall not include information that either: i. is in the public domain at the time of disclosure, as evidenced by a written document; ii. becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the recipient, as evidenced by a written document; iii. the receiving party can show by written document was in its rightful and lawful possession at the time of disclosure; or iv. lawfully comes into the recipient’s possession subsequent to the time of disclosure from another source without restriction as to disclosure, provided such third party has the right to make the disclosure to the receiving party. b. ClassUied Information. A party shall designate as Classified Information only [21 such information that the party in good faith believes in fact is confidential. Information that is generally available to the public, such as public filings, catalogues, advertising materials, and the like, shall not he designated as Classified. Inlbrmation and documents that may be designated as Classified Information include, but are not limited to, trade secrets, confidential or proprietary financial information, operational data, business plans, and competitive analyses, personnel files, personal information that is protected by law, and other sensitive information that, if not restricted as set forth in this order, may subject the producing or disclosing person to competitive or financial injury or potential legal liability to third parties. Correspondence and other communications between the parties or with nonparties may be designated as Classified lnfbrmation if the communication was made with the understanding or reasonable expectation that the information would not become generally available to the public. c. For Counsel or Attorneys Only. Ihe designation “For Counsel Only” or “Attorneys Eyes Only” shall be reserved for information that is believed to be unknown to the opposing party or parties, or any of the employees of a corporate party. For purposes of this order, so-designated information includes, but is not limited to, product formula information, design information, non-public financial information, pricing information, customer identification data, and certain study methodologies. d. Ultrasensitive Informalion At this point, the parties do not anticipate the need for higher levels of confidentiality as to ultrasensitive documents or information. However, in the event that a court orders that ultrasensitive documents or information be produced, the parties will negotiate and ask the court to enter an ultrasensitive information protocol in advance of production to further protect such information. 4. Use of Classified Information All Classified Information provided by any party or nonparty in the course of this [3] litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation, trial, and appeal of this litigation and for no other purpose, and shall not be disclosed except in accordance with the terms hereof 5. Marking of Documents Documents provided in this litigation may he designated by the producing person or by any party as Classified Information by marking each page of the documents so designated with a stamp indicating that the information is “ConfidentiaL”, “For Counsel Only”, or “Attorneys Eyes Only”. In lieu of marking the original of a document, lithe original is not providcd, the designating party may mark the copies that are provided. Originals shall be preserved for inspection. 6. Disclosure at Dcpositions Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employees, agents, consultants, representatives, or independent experts retained by counsel for the purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a nonparty may be designated by any party as Classified Information by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is “Confidential” or “For Counsel Only” and is subject to the provisions of this Order. Any party also may designate information disclosed at a deposition as Classified Information by notifying all parties in writing not later than 30 days of receipt of the transcript of the specific pages and lines of the transcript that should be treated as Classified Information thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of each such written notice to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in that party’s possession, custody, or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as For Counsel Only for a period of 30 days after initial receipt of the transcript. To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts information designated as Classified Information with blank, consecutively numbered pages bcing provided in a riondesignated main transcript. The separate transcript containing Classified Information shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript. Counsel for a party or a nonparty witness shall have the right to exclude from depositions [4j any person who is not authorized to receive Classified Information pursuant to this Protective Order, hut such right of exclusion shall be applicable only during periods of examination or testimony during which Classified Information is being used or discussed. 7. Disclosure to Qualified Persons a. To Whom. Classified Information shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons except as necessary to comply with applicable law or the valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction; provided, however, that in the event of a disclosure compelled by law or court order, the receiving party will so notify the producing party as promptly as practicable (if at all possible, prior to making such disclosure) and shall seek a protective order or confidential treatment of such intbrmation. Information designated as For Counsel Only shall be restricted in circulation to Qualified Persons described in subparagraph 2(a). b. Retenilon of Copies During this Liigation. Copies of For Counsel Only inftrmation shall be maintained only in the offices of outside counsel for the receiving party and, to the extent supplied to experts described in subparagraph 2(a)(ii), in the offices of those experts. Any documents produced in this litigalion, regardless of classification, thai. are provided to Qualified Persons shall be maintained only at the office of such Qualified Person and only necessary working copies of any such documents shall be made. Copies of documents and exhibits containing Classified Information may be prepared by independent copy services, printers, or illustrators for the purpose of this litigation. c. Each party’s outside counsel shall maintain a log of all copies of For Counsel Only documents that are delivered to Qualified Persons. 8. Unintentional Disclosures Documents unintentionally produced without designation as Classified Information later may be designated and shall be treated as Classified Information from the date written notice of the designation is provided to the receiving party. If a receiving party learns of any unauthorized disclosure of Confidential inlbrniation or [5] For Counsel Only information, the party shall immediately upon learning of such disclosure inform the producing party of all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure and shall make all reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure by each unauthorized person who received such information. 9. Documents Produced for Inspection Prior to Designation In the event documents are produced for inspection prior to designation, the documents shall be treated as For Counsel Only during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, Classified Information shall be marked prominently “Confidential”, “For Counsel Only”, or “Attorneys Eyes Only” by the producing party. 10. Consent to Disclosure and Use in Examination Nothing in this order shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this order if each party designating the information as Classified Information consents to such disclosure or if the court, afler notice to all affected parties and nonparties, orders such disclosure. Nor shall anything in this order prevent any counsel of record from utilizing Classified Infonnation in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source, or recipient of the Classified Information, irrespective of which party produced such information. 11. Challenging the Designation a. C1assfled Information. A party shall not he obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation of Classified Information at the time such designation is made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge to the designation. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any stage of these proceedings with the designation of any information as Classified Information, the parties shall first try to resolve the dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as by production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party who designated the document or information as Classified Information. The designating party shall then have 14 days to move the court for an order preserving the designated status of the disputed information. The disputed information shall remain Classified Information unless and until the [6j court orders otherwise. Failure to move for an order shall constitute a termination of the status of’ such item as Classified Information. b. Qualified Persons. In the event that any party in good faith disagrees with the designation of a person as a Qualified Person or the disclosure of particular Classified Information to such person, the parties shall first try to resolve the dispute in good faith on an informal basis. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party shall have 14 days from the date of the designation or, in the event particular Classified Information is requested subsequent to the designation of the Qualified Person, 14 days from service of the request to move the court for an order denying the disposed person (a) status as a Qualified Person, or (b) access to particular Classified Information. The objecting person shall have the burden of demonstrating that disclosure to the disputed person would expose the objecting party to the risk of serious harm. Upon the timely tiling of such a motion, no disclosure of Classified Information shall be made to the disputed person unless and until the court enters an order preserving the designation. 12. Manner of Use in Proceedings In the event a party wishes to use any Classified Information in affidavits, declarations, briefs, memoranda of law, or other papers filed in this litigation, the party shall do one of the following: (I) with the consent of the producing party, file only a redacted copy of the information; (2) where appropriate (e.g., in connection with discovery and evidentiary motions) with provide the information solely for in camera review; or (3) file such information under seal the court consistent with the sealing requirements of the court. 13. Filing Under Seal The clerk of this court is directed to maintain under seal all documents, transcripts of seal in deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and other papers filed under this litigation that have been designated, in whole or in part, as Classified lntbrmation by any party to this litigation consistent with the sealing requirements of the court. 14. Return of Documents Not later than 120 days after conclusion of this litigation and any appeal related to it, any [7] Classified Information, all reproductions of such information, and any notes, summaries, or descriptions of such information in the possession of any of the persons specified in paragraph 2 (except subparagraph 2(a)(iii)) shall be returned to the producing party or destroyed, except as this court may otherwise order or to the extent such information has been used as evidence at any trial or hearing. Notwithstanding this obligation to return or destroy information, counsel may retain attorney work product, including document indices, so long as that work product does not duplicate verbatim substantial portions of the text of any Classified Information. 15. thigoing Obligations Insofar as the provisions of this Protective Order, or any other protective orders entered in this litigation, restrict the communication and use of the information protected by it, such provisions shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except that (a) there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in open court unless such exhibits were filed under seal, and (b) a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the court with respect to dissolution or modification of this, or any other, protective order. 16. Advice to Clients This order shall not bar any attorney in the course of rendering advice to such attorney’s client with respect to this litigation from conveying to any party client the attorney’s evaluation in a general way of Classified Information produced or exchanged under the terms of this order; provided, however, that in rendering such advice and otherwise communicating with the client, the attorney shall not disclose the specific contents of any Classified Information produced by another party if such disclosure would be contrary to the terms of this Protective Order. 17. Duty to Ensure Compliance Any party designating any person as a Qualified Person shall have the duty to reasonably ensure that such person observes the terms of this Protective Order and shall be responsible upon breach of such duty for the failure of such person to observe the terms of this Protective Order. [81 __ ________ 18. Waiver Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502, neither the attorney-client privilege nor work product protection is waived by disclosure connected with this litigation. 19. Modification and Exceptions The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this order and any party may seek an order of this court modifying this Protective Order. It is SO ORDERED this day of , 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE the By [9] Filed 2/23/2015 11:18 35AM Esther Dlado 1/22/2015 3:4qlerk Esther gbliaUstrict 2014 CC*t)Q Dl Webb District 201 4-CVF-0D1 1 62-Di CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001162-D1 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEW § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ, § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § FELIPE FARJAS, § § TH 49 Defendants. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced by the parties and non-parties in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: I. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation and other related litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted claims arising out hailstorms and/or windstorms in Texas with a date of loss in 2012, and for no other purpose. “Related Litigation” means a first-party lawsuit in Texas by an insured against State Farm Lloyds and its adjusters or adjusting companies that produced the Confidential Information for damages to insured property arising out of hailstorms and/or windstorrns in Texas with a date of loss in 2012. Confidential Information shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. EXHIBIT 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type which is designated as “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including information received from non-parties, whether it is a document, information contained in a document, inforniation revealed during a deposition, information revealed in an interrogatory answer or otherwise. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any documents that are subject to this Protective Order, bates numbers and/or a legend to indicate the document is “Confidential,” subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number; however, the producing party shall not label designated documents with a watermark. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Inforniation is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to pending litigation arising out of hailstorms and/or windstorrns in Texas a date of loss in 2012; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person or counsel for the party designating party, and consent shall not he unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the Page 2 designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Lead counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person to whom Confidential Information is to be disclosed, including each party such counsel represents, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the confidentiality provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person, lead counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of “Exhibit A” attached hereto. Lead counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to counsel for the party designating the information as confidential within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Cont Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Page 3 Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFiDENTIAL SUBJ TO PROTECTI yE ORDER IN CA USE NO. 20/4-C VF-001 162-Di; Noerni Rodriguez and Raul Rodriguez vs. State Farm Lloyds and Felipe Farius In th 49 the District Court of Webb County, Texas, Judicial District” When any file so designated is converted to a hard copy or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post- production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append the the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL SU BJ_TO_PROTECTI V EORDER_IN_ CA USE NO. 2014-C VF-001 I 62-Di; Noenii Rodriguez and Razil Rodriguez vs. State Farm Lloyds and Felipe Farias In the District Court of Webb County, Texas, ‘49” Judicial District” if such legend Page 4 does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native tile containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order waterniarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Any party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Information during the discovery process shall, immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, give notice in writing to the party or parties in possession of such information that the information is designated as “Confidential” and shall request its immediate return. After receipt of such notice, the parties shall treat the infonnation so designated as Confidential Information under the terms of this Order, unless released of this duty by further order of this Court. Additionally, any party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Information during the discovery process shall, immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, give notice in writing to the party which produced and provided this information, the names and addresses of the persons to whom it was disclosed and the date of the disclosure together with a copy of the notice by which the inadvertently disclosing party requested the immediate return of the documents. 8. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. Page 5 a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody and possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternatively (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protecti’e Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will relialy identifS’ the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving pan:y must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possess on of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Crder. No party shall be deemed to have e prior to notification of any subsequent violated this Order for any disclosures mac 1 designation. 9. Any party may request the party designating inforriation as “Confidential” to consent to re designate confidential information as not confidential, which request shall not be rejected Page 6 absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered confidential until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. The court reporter shall note on the record the designation of said information as Confidential and shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony and mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided the witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” The parties may use Confidential In formation during a deposition only if the room is first cleared of all persons except the court reporter, the witness being deposed, counsel for the parties and any expert entitled to attend, and only if said witness executes the acknowledgement attached as Exhibit “A.” II. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of the interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a mee. and confer or otherwise exchanged in Page 7 informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the fonii of hard-copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. At any time after the delivery of Confidential Documents, and after making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Documents may challenge the Confidential designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to counsel for the party disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents. The party or parties disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Documents in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Documents does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Documents in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 14. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed document will remain confidential until a contrary determination is made by the Court and all such documents, information or testimony shall continue to be treated as Confidential Information until this Court makes a contrary decision regarding the status of the documents, information or testimony. At any hearing to resolve a challenge of a Confidential designation, the party designating the information as “Confidential” shall have the burden to establish that party’s Page 8 right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the designation of documents, information, or testimony as “Confidential” information does not constitute an admission that the document, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. IS. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their stratus as Confidential Information. 16. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or Page 9 _____ work product protected information. 17. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery request on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 18. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of , 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING Page 10 ___________________________, ___________________________, EXHIBIT “A” CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001969-D4 LUIS MACHADO AND ROSA A. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MACHADO, § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § GILBERT SANTOS, § § Defendants. § 406TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER I, of in order to be provided access to information designated as “Confidential” under the Protective Order entered in the 49th Judicial District Court of Webb County, Texas (the “Court”) in C4USE NO. 2014-C VF-001162-D1; Noe,ni Rodriguez and Raul Rodriguez vs. State Farm Lloydc and Felioe Faria.c In the District Court of Webb County, Texas, Judicial District (the “Lawsuit”), represent and agree as follows: I. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the Lawsuit, I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all “Confidential” information to which I am given access in connection with the Lawsuit, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. 1 agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the Lawsuit. DATED: SIGNATURE: TAB 9 OF THE RECORD Filed 3/3/2015 1 09 14 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 201 4-CVF-001 048-D1 CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-D1 ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER AND PLAINTIFF ’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAN TS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF STATE FARM’S PROPOSED PROTECTIV E ORDER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: COMES NOW, Alma Pena (“Plaintiff’), and files this Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response and Objections to Plaintiffs Alotion for Entiy of Protective Order and Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion/br Entiy ofState Farm ‘s Proposed Protective Order. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court: (1) to deny the Defendants’ Motion for Entiy of State Farm’s Proposed Protective Order filed by State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm” or “Defendant”); (2) to grant Piaintiffs Motion for Entry ofProtective Order, and order Defendants to fully respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests and enter Plaintiff’s proposed Protective Order, attached hereto as Exhibit A. In support thereof and pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff would respectfully show this Honorable Court the following: I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1. State Farm has filed a Response to Plaintiff’s IIotion for Protective Order and its own Motion for Protective Order, wrongly contending that the Court should enter State Farnis Protective Order to effectively protect it from Plaintiff’s discovery that seeks the production of confidential and privileged information, including the production of trade secrets. All of Defendant’s arguments and justifications for its proposed Protective Order are without merit because they have already been adequately addressed by Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective Order. State Farm has previously agreed to and litigated cases under the limitations, disclosures, and protections contained in Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order in substantially similar litigation across this state; therefore, there is no valid reason for Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s proposed protective order, or for the Court to invest time, resources, and efforts its own hi die litigation of the previously agreed-on issues raised now by Defendant in Order. Motion and disputed hi State Fann’s Response to Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective be Accordingly, State Farm’s Motion should be denied and Plaintiff’s Protective Order should entered in this case. II. INTRODUC TION & BACKGROUND 2. The causes of action made the basis of this lawsuit arise out of an insurance claim made by Plaintiff for hail storm and/or windstorm damages to her real property located in Webb County, Texas (“the Property”) sustained on or about June 7, 2013. Defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and failed to pay the frill proceeds of the Policy. As a result, Plaintiff brought suit against all Defendants for damages resulting from the mishandling of Plaintiffs claims for coverage and asserted causes of action against Defendant State Farm for breach of Page 2 contract, breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, common law fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. 3. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Dejbndants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Written Discovery Requests and Motion to Compel Discovery, (“Motion to Compel”), on January 22, 2015, requesting an Order from the Court compelling State Farm to fully respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. 4. Plaintiff contemporaneously filed Plaintifls tiotion for Entry qf Protective Order, (“Motion for Protective Order”) requesting that the Court enter Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective Order, which is consistent with protective orders previously entered and used for substantially similar litigation involving Plaintiffs counsel and State Farm. Plaintiff has attached hereto as Exhibit A the Proposed Protective Order, originally filed with Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order. 5. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as if fully asserted herein, the arguments and authorities, including all attached exhibits, asserted in Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order. 6. Plaintiff would show that Defendant’s Motion for Protection Order should be denied, as Plaintiffs proposed protective order provides all parties, including State Fann Lloyds, adequate protection from disclosure of trade secret and proprietary infonnation. Further, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel should be granted accordingly and Defendants ordered to fully respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests and to prodnce all responsive documents and information in their possession, custody, or control, including responsive materials previously withheld subject to such claims of privilege. Page 3 III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order Wifi Adequately Protect Defendants. 7. Plaintiff asserts that her Proposed Protective Order will adequately address Defendant’s concerns as to trade secrets and adequately protect Defendant.’ Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order is consistent with protective orders previously entered and used for substantially similar litigation involving Plaintiffs counsel and State Farm. and will protect State Farm. with respect to disclosure—in the course of discovery in this case—of documents and information that Defendant claims constitute trade secrets or proprietary material. S. State Farm argues that it needs the Court to enter its Protective Order to provide a shield from parties seeking the discovery of confidential infornrntion and docnments. However, Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order contains numerous protections for the same type of information Defendant refuses to produce because of its confidentiality. For example, Plaintiff’s proposed Protective Order provides the following, among other protections: All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall he used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation and other related litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) or any third party’ adjusting finn (including its employees) that adjusted claims arising out hailstorms and/or windstorms in Texas with a date of loss in 2013, and for no other purpose. “Related Litigation” means a first-party lawsuit in Texas by an insured against State Farm Lloyds and its adjusters or adjusting companies that produced the Confidential Information for damages to insured property arising out of hailstorms and/or windstonns in Texas with a date of loss in 2013. Confidential Information shall not he disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. 2 The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. 3 See Plaintiffs’ “Exhibit A” 2 See Exhibit A. ¶1. See Exhibit A, ¶3. Page 4 Lead counsel for each patty shall provide a copy of this Order to any person to whom Confidential Information is to be disclosed, including each party such counsel represents. and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the confidentiality provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person, lead counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the tenns of this 4 Order. Any party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Information during the discovery process shall, immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, give notice in writing to the party or parties in possession of such information that the information is designated as “Confidential” and shall request its immediate return. Afier receipt of such notice, the parties shall treat the information so designated as Confidential Infonnation tinder the tenus of this Order, unless released of this duty by further order of this Court. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain infonnation derived therefrom, shall he considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 6 9. Plaintiff’s protective order, as written, provides adequate protection of Defendants’ trade secret and/or confidential information.As shown above, many of the issues raised in Defendant’s motion are covered by provisions included in Plaintiff’s proposed protective order. As such, Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order provides basically nothing new and should he denied. See Exhibit A, ¶5. See Exhibit A, ¶7. o Exhibit A. 95. Page 5 B. Texas Law Authorizes Shared Discovery 10. Defendant complains that Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order does not adequately address handling of confidential information because it omits clear procedures for the destruction or return of State Farm’s confidential information after the resolution of the matter. This argument fails because Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order not only effectively addresses the handling of confidential information, as shown above, but also is adequate in light of Plaintiffs need for shared discovery, which Defendants oppose. Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective Order defines “Confidential Information” as any information of any type which is designated as 7 This would include all Confidential “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties. Infommtion. 11. Defendant also complains that Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective Order does not limit the use of State Fan’s trade secret material to this litigation. However. Texas law is clear that public policy favors shared discovery, which permits litigants to share othenvise confidential documents produced in discovery by a common adversary. Shared discovery is not only allowed and appropriate where there are several suits concerning the same subject matter, hut also should he used in those situations because it is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure and make the discovery process more efficient. 8 12. In considering shared discovery, the trial court should balance the competing interests of the parties and approve an order that protects trne trade secrets and confidential information from State Farm’s competitors yet allows for proper use by other litigants involved in actions against this repeat defendant. Under the doctrine of shared discovery, the products of discovery may be See Exhibit A. ¶2 8 See Garcia i Feeples. 734 S.W.2d 343. 348-49 (Tex. 1987). Page 6 disseminated to other litigants and persons who are potential litigants. 9 Here, Plaintiffs attorneys are involved in litigation against insurance companies in several counties throughout Texas. Sharing discovery is appropriate in this circumstance to ensure efficiency in the discovery process, and it will benefit all parties. 13. Despite the cases’ clear endorsement of streamlined discovery, insurance companies, including State Farm, nevertheless often vehemently protest and attempt to deny the applicability of this doctrine. Acceptance of Defendants’ position would significantly limit the ability of policyholders to efficiently and effectively prepare claims based on widespread misconduct such as Defendants’. The danger posed by such widespread and largely uniform misconduct defeats State Farm’s contention that the Court should ignore Garcia because it was a product liability case. 14. The premise of shared discovery is fundamental to the efficient and honest functioning of the judicial process. A presumption of openness applies to all court proceedings in this county, criminal and civil, because “secrecy insulates the participants. masking impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption.”° In addition to making discovery more efficient, the shared discovery provision should make discovery more truthful and lead to full disclosure. “Shared discovery is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure.” It has been the experience of Plaintiffs counsel, in other litigation against insurance companies, that the product of discovery varies greatly in both completeness and scope. Shared discovery is designed to remedy that variance and ensure that all litigants have access to the discoverable infornmtion. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993) (“[U]nder the doctrine of shared discovery, the fruits of discovery are available not only to the parties in a particular case but may be disseminated in turn to other litigants and potential litigants.”). See Brown i. lt7lliamson Tobacco Coip. i FTC, 710 F.2d 1165. 1179 (6th Ca. 1983). ° Garcia, 734 SW, 2d at 347. Page 7 1 5. In cc State Farm Lloyds illustrates that the above-described shared discovery propositions are permissible. There. Defendant State Farm Lloyds sought a writ of mandamus commanding the trial court to vacate a protective order that allowed documents obtained in the case to be used 12 in “related litigation against Defendants in which Plaintiffs’ counsel is an attorney of record.” State Farm wanted a different protective order issued, just like here, which restricted the use and disclosure of certain privileged documents to the specific case before that specific trial court. The Court of Appeals concluded that thc trial court’s order adequately protected the Defendants from the involuntary disclosure of its trade secrets, and therefore. the Court denied the petition 13 for writ of mandamus. 16. Defendants deride the Beaumont Court’s analysis in State Famni Lloyds as “conclusory” and imply that the opinion carries no precedential weight because the Texas Supreme Court did not review it, hut that attack is simply a smoke screen designed to conceal the fact that Defendants have no contrary cases to cite. 17. Plaintiff’s proposed protective order here is substantially similar to the protective order blessed by higher Texas courts. Further, the language of Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order is nearly identical to a protective order recently entered in a similar first patty case involving State 4 and State Farm was actively involved in crafting the language Farm and Plaintiff’s counsel,’ contained in that protective order. In moving for entry of its own protective order before this Court, State Farm protests that it lodged objections before other courts to the language about which it now complains, but those objections have consistently been overruled because they are 12 In tv State Fami Lloyds. 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8115 (Tex. App—Beaumont Sept. 18, 2003). Id 14 See .4lejos Ranñrez and Ofelia Rarni,ez v. State Farm Lloyds and Sylvia Garza, Cause No. C-3828-13-D: In the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. Page 8 unfounded. For these reasons and more, the Court should grant Plaintiffs 1otion for Entry of Protective Order. 18. Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order allows the use of shared discovery, with proper limits and protections that should appease Defendants’ concern about the disclosure of confidential information outside the 2013 hailstorm litigation. 1 The Court should enter Plaintiff’s Proposed Protective Order, attached as Exhibit A. and. subject thereto, order Defendants to produce all documents and information responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests that Defendants previously withheld from discovery based on the aforementioned claims of confidentiality. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court deny Defendant’s Motion for Entiy of State Latin ‘s Proposed Protective Order and grant Plaintiff’s Motion fOr Entiy of Protective Order. Plaintiff further requests that the Court grant and enter Plaintiffs Proposed Protective Order, attached as Exhibit A, and grant Plaintiff any other and further relief, either at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may show herselfjustly entitled. See Exhibit A, ¶1. Page 9 Respectfully submitted. MOSTYN LAw !y7J Steve Aiostyn J. Steve Mostyn State Bar No. 00798389 j srndocketefile(imostvnlaw. corn 3810 West Alabarna Street Houston, Texas 77027 (713) 714-0000 (Office) (713) 714—111 1(Facsirnile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded to all counsel of record on this 3rd day of March. 2015 in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. /ç/ J. Steve Afosorn J. Steve Mostyn Page 10 CAtTSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-Dl ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced by the parties and non-parties in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in confonnity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation and other related litigation against State Fann Lloyds (including its employees) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted claims arising out hailstorms and/or windstonns in Texas with a date of loss in 2013, and for no other purpose. “Related Litigation” means a first-party lawsuit in Texas by an insured against State Farm Lloyds and its adjusters or adjusting companies that produced the Confidential Infonnation for daniages to insured property arising out of hailstorms and/or windstonns in Texas with a date of loss in 2013. Confidential Information shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the tenns of this Order. “Confidential Information.” as any information of any type which is rçrpag4epy of the (NI1C) day By designated as “Confidential” by any of the supplying or receiving parties, including infonnation received from non-parties, whether it is a document, infonnation contained in a document, information revealed during a deposition. infonriation revealed in an interrogatory answer or otherwise At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on anx’ documents that are subject to this Protective Order, bates numbers and/or a legend to indicate the document is “Confidential,” subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number; however, the producing party shall not label designated documents with a watemmrk. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons.” as used herein, means: the parties to pending litigation arising out of hailstorms and/or windstorms in Texas a date of loss in 2013; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI processing. hosting. review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person ma;’ be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court. afler notice to all parties and a hearing. to 4. Aiiy party may sen’e a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Infonnation a person who is not a Qualified Person or counsel for the party designating party. and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives is written consent to further disclose the Confidential Infonnation, the further disclosure hereby prohibited and shall not he made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Page 2 Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Lead counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person to whom Confidential Infonuation is to be disclosed, including each party such counsel represents, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the confidentiality provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person, lead counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall he in the form of “Exhibit A” attached hereto. Lead counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original witten acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to counsel for the party designating the information as confidential within ten (10) business days. 6. Infonnation shall be designated as Confidential Infonnation within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Infonnation with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree. /Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Page 3 Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Infonuation as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Couf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL 5U TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN Cause No. 2014-C JF-00]048-D1: Alma Pena v. State Farm Lloyds and Becky Lan/er; in the 49th District Court, Webb County, Texas.” When any tile so designated is converted to a hard copy or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post-production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append the the tile’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL SUBJ TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN Cause No. 2014-CT F-00] 048-D]; A li;ia Pena v. State Farm Lloyds and Becky Lan/er; in the 49th District Court. Webb County, Texas,” if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Infbrmation in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected Page 4 in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watennarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Any party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Infönnation during the discovery process shall, inunediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, give notice in writing to the party or parties in possession of such infomuttion that the information is designated as “Confidential” and shall request its inimediate return. After receipt of such notice, the parties shall treat the infonnation so designated as Confidential Information under the terms of this Order, unless released of this duty by further order of this Court. Additionally, any party who inadvertently discloses Confidential Information during the discovery process shall, immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, give and notice in writing to the party which produced and provided this infonnation, the names addresses of the persons to whom it was disclosed and the date of the disclosure together with a copy’ of the notice by which the inadvertently disclosing party requested the immediate return of the documents. as 8. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may he agreed upon by the parties. any parties receiving such notice shall return to the Page 5 designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody and possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated infonnation, or alternatively’ (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated infonnation in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identii the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure such designated infbrmation except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any to such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access have such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. to re 9. Any party may request the party designating information as “Confidential” to consent rejected designate confidential information as not confidential, which request shall not be absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. Page 6 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Infonnation under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) htrsiness days after receiving the deposition transcript All deposition transcripts shall be considered confidential until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. The court reporter shall note on the record the designation of said infonnation as Confidential and shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony and mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided the witness is apprised of the tenns of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” The parties may use Confidential Information during a deposition only if the room is first cleared of all persons except the court reporter, the witness being deposed. counsel for the parties and any expert entitled to attend, and only if said witness executes the acknowledgement attached as Exhibit “A.” to 11. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production. and responses requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses speciing that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party to shall place the following legend on each page of the interrogatory answers or responses requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Infonnation.” in 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or othenvise exchanged informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Infonnation. If the Page 7 Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in infonnal discovery is in the form of hard-copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Infonnation pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. At any time after the delivery of Confidential Documents. and after making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Documents may challenge the Confidential designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to counsel for the party disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents. The party or parties disclosing or producing the Confidential Documents shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Documents in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Documents does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Documents in dispute shall no longer he subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 14. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed document will remain confidential until a contrary determination is made by the Court and all such documents, information or testimony shall continue to be treated as Confidential Information until this Court makes a contrary decision regarding the status of the documents, infonnation or testimony. At any hearing to resolve a challenge of a Confidential designation, the party designating the infonnation as “Confidential” shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s thilure to challenge the designation of documents, information, or testimony as “Confidential” information does Page 8 not constitute an admission that the document, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document. infonnation or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) day’s before such trial or hearing. 15. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Infonnation, or contain information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed tinder seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 16. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced infonnation and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected infonnation. 17. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of Page 9 a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery request on any ground. h. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Infonnation in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 18. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED on this day of , 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING C of 9 th(a y N lq,Icertajy-’ the t 1 1ayof “ 2O(\ By Page 10 ___________ __________ ___________________________. EXHIBIT “A” CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-D1 ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § V. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER I, of, in order to be provided access to information designated as “Confidential” under the Protective Order entered in the 49th Judicial District Court of Webb County, Texas (the “Court”) in Cause No. 2014-CVF-001048-Dl, 1 41ma Penn v. State Farm Lloyds andBeckyLanier(the “Lawsuit”), represent and agree as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the Lawsuit, I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its tenns. 2. With regard to any and all “Confidential” information to which I am given access in connection with the Lawsuit, I agree to he bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the Lawsuit. DATED: SIGNATURE: CAUSE NO. 201-I-CVF-001048-D1 AL1IA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § V. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § 49THJUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER Having considered Defendants Motion Jbr Entry of State Farm ‘s Proposed Protective Order the response(s) thereto, and the arguments of counsel as allowed, the Court is of the opinion that said Motion should be DENIED; it is therefore, ORDE RED that De/ndants Motion for Entiy ofState Farm ‘s Proposed Protective Order is hereby DENIED. SIGNED this day of 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING the ‘ 4’ay 17Y t Of t{c )) ceZ 2 /1Y I1 xas By 7M,f$’ TAB 10 OF THE RECORD C NO. 2014CVF001048-Dl ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § vs. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY § LANIER, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT %“JPROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this i- ekf& lq1,o,i / l&o4fc cth’oi litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) a—BvuIcy1ãItiei..- ‘Ii MtAr (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that ait’.y 1 cI%)5’.I+- 4 adjusted this claim and for no other purpose. Confidential Information, or c-st tvt extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall bj c 5tceJ of s1kL not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. -t kstrk Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably bAt necessary for use solely in this litigation. “ •-ça5 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as “Confidential” andJor “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored information (“ESI”), or other material; information contained in a document, ESI, I or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation 4#’ci “(1c-fr li t7°-” V ( 0 ‘‘jce / a— ‘Fi7i,, .r6inuut-of a tiiei—uveut on or abouT June 2OliirWu1b-Gounty, Te*asi— , 4 pt their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other 2 than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & 3 Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree.fProt. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree.IProt. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTJAL-SUBJ_TO_PROTECTIVE_ORDER_1N_CAUSE_[insert #1.” When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post-production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIDENTL&L-SUBJ TO_PROTECTIVEORDER_IN_CAUSE_[insert #J” if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in 4 the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner describe in paragraph 7.a. 5 above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return and/or destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 6 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such infonnation as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, andJor (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such 7 designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. 11. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that 8 the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific 9 protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Infonnation in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Infonnation designation of any documents, ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client 10 privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c, Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. c) yeAI iif 20. Within frtyfl )-ine-dys after the final resolution of this litigation, the p1aintiffIs) shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during 11 _____ this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintifls) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial, record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after forty-five (45) business days after the fmal resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of , 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING NO. 2014CVF001048-Dl ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY § LAMER, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER l 4 frJ T,’ (0 . in order to be provided access to information designated as Confidential Infonnation under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2014CVF001048-Dl represents and agrees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertalcing will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DAIED: / C’192. I ‘E’r — (i EXHIBIT A By________ TAB 11 OF THE RECORD Filed 3/25/2015 517.12 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001048 Dl CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-D1 ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § § § § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS § AND BECKY LANIER, § § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § DEFENDANT STATE FARM’S MOTION TO STRIKE OR RECONSIDER PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: The “Amended Protective Order” filed by Plaintiff on March 24, 2015 complies with neither the agreement the parties made before the Court at the hearing on March 5, 0I5 regarding sharing, nor the Court’s order regarding the same. Plaintiffs “amendments” do not limit the sharing of institutional State Farm discovery to “Related Litigation” as the Court instructed, nor limit the sharing to claims arising from hail storms in June 2013 in Webb County, Texas, handled by the Mostyn Firm. Defendant State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”) respectfully requests that the Court strike or reconsider’ the “Amended Protective Order” Plaintiff filed, and enter State Farm’s Protective Order attached hereto as Exhibit A. State Farm does not know at the time of preparing this motion whether at the time of filing the appropriate procedural vehicle should be a motion to strike or a motion for reconsideration as the Court’s response to Plaintiff’s actions are unknown at this time. State Farm therefore prepared the motion in the alternative to address the different actions available to the Court. STATE FARM’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO CoMPEL PAGE 1 — ( I. INTRODUCTION 1. At the hearing held before the Court on March 5, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel, Andrew Taylor, represented that he was interested in sharing discovery in cases handled by the Mostyn Firm. (Ex. B, March 5, 2015 Hearing Transcript, at 54:22 — 55:13.) In the discussion regarding sharing, Gilberto Hinojosa, who also attended the hearing as counsel for Plaintiff, specifically requested sharing within the Mostyn Firm for the cases in Laredo. (Ex. B, at 42:23- 44:11.) The Court reminded counsel that discovery in one case would not be official discovery in another case, (Ex. B, at 62:2-6), and ruled that sharing would be limited to the Mostyn Firm “not being able to share with even co-counsel in other cases.” (Ex. B, at 65:10-15.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s “Amended Protective Order” does not reflect these limitations. Instead, Plaintiff broadly defines “Related Litigation” as: “a first party lawsuit in TX, against State Farm, by an insured of State Farm, for damages to insured property arising out of windlhail storms in Texas.” (Ex. C, Plaintiff’s Amended Protective Order.) 2. Plaintiff’s “Amended Protective Order” does not limit the sharing of institutional State Farm discovery to “Related Litigation” as the Court instructed or provide reasonable limits to time and geography. The materials produced in this case will not be relevant to all windlhail claims in Texas for all time. In order to protect State Farm’s Confidential Information, it is necessary to limit sharing to wind/hail claims that arose in Webb County in June 2013. In addition, note that it appears that Plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently failed to change the time limit in the last sentence in paragraph 20 of the Amended Protective Order from 45 business days to one year. STATE FARM’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE OBJEcTIoNS AND MOTION TO COMPEL PAGE 2 — a II, ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 3. Plaintiff’s “Amended Protective Order” allows for the improper and widespread distribution of every confidential and proprietary document in this case to all lawyers who file a lawsuit against State Farm on a wind/hail claim in Texas with any date of loss, without regard to the causes of action and factual allegations contained therein and the relationship to the present litigation. Critically, paragraph 1 of State Farm’s Protective Order attached hereto (See Exhibit A) limits the sharing to Institutional Materials that may have some relevance from case to case, and appropriately carves out the case-specific materials that have no relevance across claims. See In re National Lloyds Ins. Co., 2014 Tex, LEXIS 1108, 58 Tex. Sup. J. 64 (Oct. 31, 2014, orig. proceeding) (holding discovery of claims information of unrelated third parties that is not probative to other matters). 4. The Court’s March 5th Ruling reflected that Plaintiff has no right or need to use State Farm’s proprietary and trade secret information for any purpose other than the fair adjudication of this case. (See Ex. B., 62:2-6 and 65:10-15.) A protective order is easily vitiated without specific procedures to enforce the handling of protected information. See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (factors relevant to determining whether a trade secret exists include, among other things, the extent of the measures taken by the party to guard the secrecy of the information). For these reasons, in accordance with the discussion of counsel and ruling of the Court, the sharing of Confidential Information from this case in “Related Litigation” should be limited to institutional materials relevant to wind/hail claims in STATE FARM’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE OBJECTIONS AND MOTIoN TO COMPEL PAGE 3 — Webb County, Texas in June 2013, and conditioned upon the return or destruction of confidential materials at the end of this litigation. III. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants pray this Honorable Court strike or reconsider the entry of Plaintiff’s Amended Protective Order and grant Defendants’ Motion for Entry of Protective Order regarding Confidential Information, enter the Order attached hereto, and for any other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they show themselves justly entitled. Respectfully submitted, HUSEMAN & STEWART 615 N. Upper Broadway, Suite 2000 Corpus Christi, TX 78401-0781 (361) 883-3563; (361) 883-0210 (Fax) VAN SEM State Bar No. 1032350 TIFFANY DEBOLT State Bar No. 24074118 Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Lloyds & Becky Lanier of r)gI) I cer4 the 4 day o 20 ESTHER DE LLAJO .CI rko e itt tirts and By 4)1tJ LTex:s STATE FARM’S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO Cot CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true and correct copy of the foregoing was this 25th day of March 2015, served on the following: VIA E-SERVICE Mr. J. Steve Mostyn The Mostyn Law Firm 3810 West Alabama Street Houston, Texas 77027 STATE FARM’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO COMPEL PAGE 5 — Filed 3/25/2015 5:17 12PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001048 Dl CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-l)I ALMA PENÃ § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER § TH 49 Defendants § .JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation or Related Litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Becky Lanier (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim, and for no other purpose. Subject to paragraphs I .a. and I .b. below, “Related Litigation,” as used herein means a first-party lawsuit tiled in Texas by The Mostyn Law Firm arising out of a claim for damages to residential, commercial, or personal property as a result of a hailstorm that occurred in Webb County, Texas in June 2013. Confidential Information, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. Confidential Informati or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely it Litigation, ‘3py oft ri I i certify— the CNli ?[dayo 2OL) ESTHER DEGO LA 0 Clerk he Di ict o and By______ subject to the limitations contained herein. a. State Farm’s institutional materials that are not claim-speci1c or adjuster- specific will be Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6I3WEBB0000000IPROD - M LFINSTO6 I 3WEBB00000756PROD. Documents Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6 I 3WEBB0000000I PROD - MLFINSTO6 I 3WFBB00000756PROD may be shared among Qualified Persons in Related Litigation so long as The Mostyn Law Firm is representing the Plaintiff(s) in the Related Litigation. If The Mostyn Law Firm withdraws from any case qualifying as Related Litigation or later associates another lawyer or law firm in the Related Litigation, State Farm’s consent to the use of the documents Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6 I 3WEBB0000000 I PROD - MLFINSTO6 I3WEBB00000756PROD in that Related Litigation is automatically revoked. Documents Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6I 3WEBB0000000I PROD - MLFINSTO6I3WEBB00000756PROD shall not be considered to have been produced in and for Related Litigation as “official discoveiy” unless they are responsive to a written discovery request to which State Farm has not objected in that Related Litigation or the Court has overruled State Farm’s objections and ordered production in that Related Litigation. Documents Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6 3WFBR0000000 PROD - MLFINSTO6J 3WEBB00000756PROD that are not official discovery in a Related Litigation may not he used at depositions, hearings or at trial in that Related Litigation unless ordered by the Court or agreed to by State Farm. h. Claim-specific, adjuster-specific, or other materials produced in this litigation that are not Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6 I 3WEBB0000000I PROD - MLFINSTO6I3WEBB00000756PROD may not be shared in Related Litigation, but may only he shared among Qualified Persons in the lawsuit in which the materials were produced. If a receiving party intends to use any document Bates-labeled MLFINSTO6 I 3WEBI30000000 I PROD - MLF1NSTO6IJWEBB000007S6PROD in Related Litigation, that party must first obtain written consent of the producing party or leave of court. 2. ‘Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as ‘Confidential” and/or “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored information (“ESI”). or other material; information contained in a document, ESI, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation arising out of a weather event in June 2013 in Webb County. Texas; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service-providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein, If this Court so elects, any other 3 person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person tinder this Order. 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning 4 of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” hut not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” hut not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the tile’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTlAL-SUBJ_TQPROTECTlVEORDER_IN_CAUSE_2O 14-CVF- 001048-DI”. When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy 5 document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.h. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post- production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CAUSE 20 14-CVF- 001048-Dl”, if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. Al the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Conlidential Information shall he retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information 6 in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Enformation. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may he retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner describe in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person 7 demanding the immediate return and/or destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy. or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as ConfldentiaJ Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) clays of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) 8 shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the tenis of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated inft)rmation of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the 9 designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony. and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. h. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. 11 In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production. and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will he made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests lbr admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential In formation. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall he designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials 10 designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or trade secret,’ the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Intbrmation may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer he subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. Al any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI. information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged Ii or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Contidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties. their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: 12 a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. h. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the lurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation, the plaintiff(s) shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiff(s) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated 13 _____ ____ ____ by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court. pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of JUDGE PRESIDING 14 _____________________________________ CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-DI ALMA PENA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § V. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYI)S ANI) § BECKY LANIER 4 T Il Defendants JUDICIAL I)ISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER in order to be provided access to infbrmation designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 20 14- CVF-001048-Dl represents and agrees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. 1 agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE hh EXHIBIT A Filed 3/25/2015 5:17 12PM Esther Degollado Dtrict Clerk We& District 2014CVF00 048 Dl 1 REPORTER’S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUME 2 CAUSE NO, 2014-CVF-O01O48-D1 3 ALMA PENA, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, 4 v. ) WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS 5 STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY 6 LANIER, Defendants. ) 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7 8 CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001162-D1 9 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT 10 RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, 11 WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS V. 12 STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE 13 FARIAS, ) 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendants. 14 15 16 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 21 On the 5th day of March, 2015, the following proceedings red cause 22 came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbe held in 23 before the Honorable Jose A. Lopez, Judge presiding, 24 Laredo, Webb County, Texas; 25 Proceedings reported by machine shor the By I 2 1 APPEARANCES 2 FOR PLAINTIFFS: SBOT NO. 09701100 3 JUDGE GILBERTO HINOJOSA LAW OFFICE OF GILBERTO HINOJOSA & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 4 622 E. Saint Charles St. Brownsville, Texas 78520-5218 5 Phone: (956) 544-4218 6 SBOT NO. 24070723 MR. ANDREW TAYLOR 7 THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM 3810 West Alabama Street 8 Houston, Texas 77027 Phone: (713) 714-0000 9 Fax: (713) 714-1111 10 FOR DEFENDANT, STATE FARM: SBOT NO. 10323500 11 MR. F. VAN HUSEMAN SBOT NO. 24074118 12 MS. TIFFANY DEBOLT HUSEMAN & STEWART, PLLC 13 615 N. Upper Broadway, Suite 2000 Corpus Christi Texas 78401 , 14 Phone: (361) 883-3563 Fax: (361) 883-0210 15 FOR DEFENDANT, STATE FARM: 16 SBOT NO. 21190600 MR. BRUCE J. WERSTAK, III 17 SAMES & WERSTAK, L.L.P. TCB Financial Center 18 6721 McPherson Road, Suite 360 Laredo, Texas 78041 19 Phone: (956) 728-0011 Fax: (956) 727-3085 20 FOR DEFENDANT, STATE FARM: 21 SBOT NO. 24038746 MR. FELIX ARAMBULA, III 22 JONES, ANDREWS & ORTIZ, P.C. 10100 Reunion Place, Ste. 600 23 San Antonio, Texas 78216 Phone: (210) 344-3900 24 Fax: (210) 366-4301 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LEt, CS a— 3 1 A P P E A R A NCE S (continued) 2 FOR STATE FARM: (Pro Hac Vice) MR. JONATHAN M. REDGRAVE 3 REDGRAVE, LLP 14555 Avion Parkway, Suite 275 4 Chantilly, Virginia 20151 Phone: (703) 592-1155 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 4 1 CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX VOLUME 1 OF 1 2 PROCEEDINGS 3 MARCH 5, 2015 Pag Vol 4 Case called 5 5 Proceedings concluded 78 6 Court Reporter’s Certificate 79 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 5 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Alma Pena versus State Farm 3 Lloyds. 4 MR. HINOJOSA: Gilberto Hinojosa and Andrew 5 Taylor for the plaintiffs, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Good morning. And you have 7 several motions. It seems that -- let’s see. I might miss 8 something. But let’s see if I did. A motion to compel by 9 defendants; defendant’s plea in abatement; plaintiff’s motion 10 for entry of protective order; plaintiff’s motion to compel 11 and plaintiff’s motion to strike. Anything else? 12 MR. HUSEMAN: Your Honor, if I might, I am Van 13 Huseman. Van’s my first name, sort of like the shirt, except 14 Vans -- 15 THE COURT: Vans -- 16 MR. HUSEMAN: -- is my first name. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. HUSEMAN: And I am here with all sorts of 19 able help here on behalf of State Farm, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HUSEFIAN: And what we’ve got basically, 21 -- 22 we’re not going to pursue the abatement. Enough time has 23 passed where that’s sort of a dead issue. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 FIR. HUSEMAN: To getting the case resolved. CYNTE-IIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 6 1 THE COURT: All right, very well. 2 MR. HUSEMAN: So I think what the Court has is 3 basically countervailing opposing sort of symmetrical motions 4 on discovery and motions for protection. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Have you all conferred on 6 your discovery problems? 7 MR. HUSEMAN: We have, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. HUSEMAN: And not only that, but we can 10 give you a two-for-one package. You notice on your docket you 11 have another case involving basically the same cast of 12 characters. 13 THE COURT: State Farm Lloyds, Raul 14 Rodriguez -- 15 MR. HUSEMAN: That’s right. 16 MR. TAYLOR: Same motions, same issues. 17 MR. HUSEMAN: And these are parallel -- 18 THE COURT: You were here on that last time, I 19 think, on one of these. 20 MR. TAYLOR: It was on Pena, yes, Your Honor, 21 a couple of weeks ago. 22 MR. HUSEMAN: And the motion is going back and 23 forth. They’re essentially the same between the cases. 24 MR. WERSTAK: I was here as well , Judge. THE COURT: Yeah, you were here on that. I 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CS?. 7 1 think it was you all - 2 MR. WERSTAK: We asked for a little more time to set all the hearings on the same date so we could have -- 3 4 ThE COURT: Are these similar -- do you have 5 -- are there more of these -- this isn’t one of cases that was 6 on the MDL - - 7 MR. WERSTAK: You asked us that last time. 8 And - - THE COURT: litigation. And you all had no 9 -- 10 idea about that. 11 MR. TAYLOR: I think those are Farmers, 12 THE COURT: Those are Farmers. 13 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So then aside from the -- motion for protective 15 the competing motions to compel, on your discovery issue as 16 order, I suspect that that deals with the 17 well? 18 MR. HUSEMAN: It does. 19 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HINOJOSA: It’s just -- it’s a simple 20 order. 21 issue as to language in the protective 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. HINOJOSA: An issue of shared discovery. long. 24 I don’t think the hearing should take that 25 MR. HUSEMAN: Not an hour. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 8 1 THE COURT: You want to be before that hour 2 people - that hour folks. The motion to strike, it deals with 3 the motion to abate, or what does that -- 4 MR. TAYLOR: Compel. 5 THE COURT: Oh, the motion to compel 6 MR. HUSEMAN: These are mainly 7 discovery-based. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. HUSEFIAN: The issues are about what has to 10 be disclosed back and forth and the form in which it’s done. 11 THE COURT: So do you -- well, give me an 12 estimate. 20 minutes, 25 minutes? 13 MR. HINOJOSA: That will work. MR. TAYLOR: I think that will handle -- I 14 15 mean, once we -- 16 THE COURT: 20 to 30 then. I’ll put you down 17 20 to 30. 18 MR. HUSEMAN: With the representation, Judge, 19 you know lawyers lie about that. THE COURT: No, I and the worst -- see, 20 -- 21 that’s why I bought this now. And actually I didn’t buy it. I didn’t buy it. Somebody am going to tell you the truth. -- 22 23 an anonymous person left it here. And I never told this story, it on the 24 but, about a year, year and a half ago somebody left a 25 bench. And I suspect that it was either a staff member or CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 9 1 lawyer that got tired of me saying, okay, I am going to give 2 you 20 minutes, and an hour later we’re still at the hearing. 3 So, I -- I’d rather not know who left it here, but I use it a 4 little bit more now to remind myself. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: At least they didn’t give you an 6 hourglass with sand in it. 7 THE COURT: Thank you all. I’ll get back to 8 you. 9 MR. ARAMBULA: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: So I’m going to -- that’s going to 11 be those two cases, right? 12 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 13 MR. HINOJOSA: We can do them at the same 14 time. 15 THE COURT: At the same time. 16 MR. HUSEMAN: They’re the same issues, same 17 parties, basically. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. 19 (Case recessed while other unrelated matters 20 were called.) 21 THE COURT: Okay. 20, 30 minutes. 22 Alma Pena, State Farm Lloyds. Raul Rodriguez, 23 State Farm Lloyds. 2014-CVF-1048; 2014-CVF-1162. 24 MR. HINOJOSA: Gilberto Hinojosa and Andrew 25 Taylor, on behalf of the plaintiffs. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 10 1 THE COURT: Oh, wait a minute. I think I 2 borrowed your book. 3 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, Your Honor. May I 4 approach, Your Honor? 5 THE COURT: Yes, of course. 6 MR. HINOJOSA: Your Honor, on this one, I 7 think probably it would be more efficient for us if the Court 8 would please -- if the Court could handle their motion to 9 compel first, and then the protective order, because I think 10 the motion to compel is relatively simple, I think. And then 11 the -- the issue of the protective order is a little bit more 12 complicated. 13 MR. HUSEMAN: For again - - perhaps, for us to 14 introduce ourselves. Cyndy, my name is Van Huseman 15 representing State Farm. 16 THE COURT: Let me do -- yeah, let’s do that. ody on 17 Let’s get everybody on the defense side, and then everyb 18 the plaintiff’s side. MR. REDGRAVE: Jonathan Redgrave. I am 19 20 appearing Pro Hac Vice for State Farm. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. WERSTAK: Bruce Werstak for State Farm as 23 well, Judge. 24 MR. ARAMBULA: Felix Arambula, III also for 25 State Farm, Your Honor. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 11 1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 MS. DEBOLT: Tiffany DeBolt for State Farm. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 MR. HUSEIIAN: 1ay I explain. He knows all 5 about computers and that type of stuff more than we do. She’s 6 the one that filed the answer. 7 THE COURT: Did you say DeBolt? 8 MS. DEBOLT: D-E-BO-L-T. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. HUSErIAN: She’s done the redactions, done 11 the physical discovery. And these guys over here are the ones 12 who are supposed to advise me not to say anything stupid. 13 But, well, I think, Your Honor, that -- 14 that -- 15 THE COURT: And let me get those - - you 16 already made your appearance earlier, but just -- 17 MR. HINOJOSA: Gilberto Hinojosa and Andrew 18 Taylor, Your Honor. 19 MR. HUSEMAN: Judge 1-linojosa may be right on 20 this. I think going straight into discovery, the extent of the 21 discovery, the scope of it is probably a good place to start on 22 it. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. HUSEMAN: And basically there is a case 25 which Felix -- he still has my copies on this. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 12 1 MR. ARAMBULA: May I approach, Your Honor? 2 THE COURT: Please. And approach liberally, 3 please. 4 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, sir. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Which Felix was leading to, 6 which gives you a good overall view of what you need to do on 7 this case. And what this case, which is from the end of n 8 October of last year, Texas Supreme Court’s per curiam opinio 9 on the case very similar to this one. And the bottom line -- 10 THE COURT: Before we start, tell me what -- 11 what this case is. 12 MR. HtJSEMAN: Okay. THE COURT: And then you can that way I 13 -- 14 can -- 15 MR. HUSEMAN: Sure. 16 THE COURT: -- determine whether it’s similar 17 or not. 18 MR. HUSEMAN: Both of these cases are what , one of 19 would be considered fairly small wind hail type claims e; did not think 20 which State Farm figured did not have to examin 21 it went over the deductible. And the other one, under 20, well, it’s plaintiff’s oriented so they’re both under the -- 22 -- 23 very small wind -- THE COURT: So one of them they are both 24 - - 25 wind hail cases, or claims. One of them State Farm claims was CYNTHIA PERHZ LENZ, CSR 13 1 under deductible. And the other one was what? 2 MR. HUSEMAN: Well, we met several thousand 3 dollars owed possibly in damages. And they had estimated their 4 estimate was about 20000. 5 THE COURT: So then there is a provision in 6 your -- in your -- in the insurance provision that - - that 7 whenever there is a distinction between what you all believe 8 value is, that you’re able to then file this lawsuit with 9 regard to it, or is it just what -- 10 MR. HUSEMAN: Well, you’re getting into where 11 the nut of this issue is. The issue, to put it simply, is they 12 claim we didn’t pay enough for the claim. 13 THE COURT: Oh, so you ended up paying for it? 14 MR. HUSEMAN: No. No, these are still in 15 dispute. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. HUSEMAN: They’re in dispute. 18 THE COURT: Didn’t pay anything. 19 MR. HINOJOSA: If I may, Your Honor. THE COURT: Hold on. I’ll get I’ll get -- 20 -- 21 I think. Let me -- I’ll get to you in a minute. Let me just 22 hear Mr. Vance [sic] -- Vance is not -- yeah, Vance is your 23 first name. MR. HUSEMAN: Van is my first name. Yeah. 24 25 THE COURT; Tell me your last name again. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 14 1 MR. HUSEMAN: Huseman. Huseman. 2 THE COURT: Huseman. AH right. 3 MR. HUSEMAN: Yeah. And what these are 4 about - - 5 THE COURT: I think there’s a Huseman -- 6 represented Huseman out of Houston. You’re not -- but that’s 7 8 MR. HUSEMAN: That was a criminal. 9 THE COURT: I think that’s Housernan, not 10 Huseman. Go ahead. 11 MR. HUSEMAN: No, Judge. This is basically a 12 question about how much is owed, if anything, on it. 13 THE COURT: That’s it. 14 MR. HUSEIIAN: And that’s it. It’s a contract 15 claim -- 16 THE COURT: So maybe it wasn’t paid, but you 17 all offered to pay a certain amount of money. They didn’t take 18 it because it wasn’t enough. 19 MR. HUSEMAN: Some -- 20 THE COURT: Their inspectors said it was going 21 to take a lot more money. 22 MR. HUSEMAN: Should -- 23 MR. HINOJOSA: It’s a breach of contract and 24 insurance, closed quote, claim, Your Honor. 25 MR. HUSEMAN: Yes, that’s right. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 15 1 MR. HINOJOSA: Under the policy. Were 2 homeowners. And our homeowner’s policy gives us the right to 3 collect certain amounts of money based upon what the damage 4 was. And -- 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. HINOJOSA: -- they paid a certain amount, 7 but it wasn’t sufficient. So we filed a lawsuit under the 8 insurance code and -- 9 THE COURT: Did you say they paid, again, you 10 said? 11 MR. HINOJOSA: On some of them. On one of 12 them they denied the claim, you know. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 14 MR. HUSEMAN: Here -- to answer it in a 15 graphic sense. These are the competing estimates on the two 16 cases. As I was talking about, the deductible exceeds what the 17 -- was owed under the policy on these. These are the 18 plaintiff’s gross claims. These are what their hired expert 19 says might be owed. And the point on this is that these are 20 not huge lawsuits, under anybody’s estimation. And that is 21 germane to what we’re talking about here, because the purpose, 22 at least in my perception, what the Court needs to do is to 23 dispose of what the argument is, and the discovery - - 24 THE COURT: That’s a huge disparity between 25 the values. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 16 1 MR. HUSEMAN: There is. But in terms of 2 absolute dollars, what they are asking for us to do, is 3 basically to spend more and respond in discovery that is 4 totally in issue. That’s -- that’s in a nutshell. And as I 5 started to tell you a minute ago, there is a Texas Supreme 6 Court case that addresses this. 7 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 8 MR. HUSEMAN: On this - - 9 THE COURT: This is the one that you handed to 10 me. National Lloyds. 11 MR. HUSEMAN: That’s right. October 31 of 12 last year, which basically -- and this is a per curiam opinion 13 involving all -- claims very similar to these, in which they mus to 14 basically direct the trial court, in this case, by manda are 15 focus it on the claims that are involved, the issues that 16 involved. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. HUSEMAN: There is another case which is 19 contained in our response. And I believe this is in Alma of federal 20 Pena’s case, which is an even more recent case out other 21 court in McAllen involving the lawyers who are on the side of this involving our client and this case. And it 22 23 involves another wind hail case. It’s about as close as you’re 24 going to get, in terms of it. And in that, Judge Alvarez does sought. 25 a 27, 28-page analysis of discovery that was being CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 17 1 THE COURT: The Fourth Court? 2 MR HUSEMAN: Pardon? 3 THE COURT: Did you say Judge Alvarez? 4 MR. HUSEMAN: En federal - - 5 MR. HINOJOSA: Federal judge in McAllen. 6 THE COURT: I’m sorry. 7 MR. HUSEMAN: In McAllen. And she goes 8 through these claims back and forth. 9 THE COURT: A district court judge, right? MR. HUSEMAN: That’s right, Your Honor, And 10 11 she goes through and does an exhaustive analysis of what’s 12 discoverable and what isn’t. And it involves -- THE COURT: Why why do you do the -- why do 13 -- to 14 you give us the federal judge’s opinion, and why not stick 15 what the state court said? 16 MR. HUSEMAN: All right. First of all, Your rds for 17 Honor, the Texas Supreme Court said that the standa essentially 18 discovery between the federal and state rules are 19 the same. They are -- it is a case that says exactly that. 20 Secondly, Judge Alvarez went through the in claims that are being made here, and were being made -- 21 22 THE COURT: But it’s not a Fifth Circuit case? 23 MR. HUSEMAN: It’s not. 24 THE COURT: It’s just a district court judge’s 25 opinion. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 18 1 MR. HUSEMAN: It’s not. And bear with me just 2 for a second. Let me sort of round out my thought on this. 3 She goes through the exact issues that you’re confronted with 4 on these competing motions; discusses each one of them; talks 5 about what the law is; what the relevancy is; the importance of 6 it. So I’m not suggesting to you that you need to defer to a 7 federal judge, or that they have any sort of a whip hand over 8 you or anything like that. What I am suggesting is that the 9 reasoning that she used, the analysis which is exhaustive on 10 this, and be instructed in regard to the parties’ positions 11 here. 12 MR. HINOJOSA: If I may, Your Honor, the 13 more relevant - - 14 THE COURT: Give -- 15 MR. HINOJOSA: Okay, I’m sorry. 16 THE COURT: I’d rather not go back and forth 17 yet until I kind of finish my thought as to what their position 18 is, And I’ll -- 19 MR. HINOJOSA: Sure. 20 THE COURT: I’ll get back to you. Just, I 21 know that it’s kind of -- I know, sitting there before -- or 22 standing there before as you all used to, I did used to get a 23 little bit frustrated with that type of process. But now that 24 I am sitting on this side, it kind of helps me finish my 25 thought. And then I -- I definitely don’t -- CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 19 1 MR. HINOJOSA: I thought he was turning it 2 over to me. That’s why I -- 3 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 4 MR. HUSEMAN: I will tell you. 5 THE COURT: But please don’t forget your 6 thought, you know. 7 MR. HUSEMAN: Hold that thought. 8 ThE COURT: All right. 9 MR. HUSEMAN: Okay. And perhaps we can show 10 what we have produced. 11 THE COURT: So, okay. So far -- so far we 12 have the Supreme Court case that basically says that in -- in 13 these uninsured -- I’m sorry, on these underpaid insurance 14 claims -- 15 MR. HUSEMAN: Right. 16 THE COURT: -- or non-payment of insurance 17 claims - - 18 MR. HUSEMAN: You need to stick to the facts 19 in this case. 20 THE COURT: The holding -- well, there’s three 21 things that it says. And I am not sure they’re -- they are 22 conjunctive or disjunctive, because it doesn’t really give you 23 that here in the initial holding. And I haven’t read the rest 24 of the body of the case. But basically it says in the case 25 involving underpayment of insurance claims, the appellate court CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 20 1 concludes that the trial court abused discretion in ordering 2 defendants to produce evidence related to insurance claims 3 other than plaintiff. 4 MR. HUSEMAN: Right. 5 THE COURT: And I dont even know what you all 6 are complaining about. You’re just giving me the rules first. 7 MR. HUSEMAN: Right. 8 THE COURT: You havent given me the issue. 9 MR. HUSEMAN: I gave you the -- we will 10 discuss the details. 11 THE COURT: So now I am going to assume that 12 the issue deals with the fact that plaintiffs have requested 13 information on other claims. And I am going to assume that 14 that in fact is the case because you’re giving me this case. 15 But in any event, so that’s one thing. And then it says -- and 16 it has a semicolon and says, Two, defendant’s overpayment, 17 underpayment, or proper payment of claims and unrelated third 18 parties was not probative. And then a semicolon. Three, 19 because the information plaintiff sought was not reasonably 20 calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. 21 So, to me, I need to read this as what is it 22 -- is it conjunctive or disjunctive? Is it if any one of these 23 fit, you’re out, or do all three of them have to fit to be out? 24 So, what I’m -- I read it, and I think as well, I think all 25 three of them have to be -- have to fit in order to be out. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 21 1 MR. HUSEMAN: M’hum. 2 THE COURT: That’s the way I sort of see it 3 from here. I haven’t read the rest of the case. You tell me 4 what it means. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Yeah. And the lesson that we 6 learned from it is that you are directed, or the trial court is 7 directed generally, to focus the discovery on the dispute that 8 they have before them. 9 THE COURT: Right. That’s one of them. But 10 it also has three other, or two other -- 11 MR. HUSEMAN: And none of those are 12 inconsistent with that principle that I am aware of. 13 THE COURT: Well, number three says the 14 information plaintiff sought was not reasonably calculated to 15 lead to discovery of admissible evidence. 16 MR. HUSEMAN: That’s right. That’s right. 17 THE COURT: So was that the holding, or that’s 18 not really a rule that they are coming up with? 19 MR. HUSEMAN: It’s certainly a ruling in that 20 case, that, regard to the claim going out of the pasture beyond 21 where the fight was to something that discovery should not -- 22 THE COURT: And tell me where -- tell me in 23 the body of the case where it actually discusses -- cause you 24 said something about that they had actually addressed the issue 25 that when there is a case of -- the value of the case actually CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 22 1 has a lot to do with this holding, and it does not. 2 MR. HUSEMAN: It does. It does. And in the 3 context of the supreme court case, whether or not State Farm 4 underpaid; overpaid; didn’t pay somebody else is 5 THE COURT: Do you know what type of case this 6 was? Was it just a simple breach of contract case? 7 MR. HUSEMAN: No. I think it also had the 8 extra contractual issues in it as well, the National Lloyds 9 case with holding -- 10 THE COURT: So the same issues they have here. 11 MR. HUSEMAN: Exactly. This is -- this is 12 very close to Whitehorse (phonetic) case, the other one I 13 referred to, being the same plaintiff’s lawyers, the same exact 14 defendant, is probably even more of a Whitehorse -- 15 THE COURT: The one with the district court 16 from McAllen? 17 MR. HUSEMAN: That’s right. This is even 18 closer to the facts to this one. 19 And if I might, Your Honor, something that 20 might be useful to the Court, to see what, for example, what we 21 have produced, to the other side. This was not a situation 22 where we’re saying, You don’t get anything. The other side, 23 except for the matters that are redacted, the other lawyers 24 have gotten the same things that I’ve gotten on this. We have 25 our -- have our production here. This might be something the CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 23 1 Court wants to see. 2 Your Honor, if I might -- 3 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 4 MR. HUSEMAN: For your reference, in case you 5 have some questions on this, this is what we have produced in 6 each of these cases. 7 THE COURT: Oh. 8 MR. HUSEFIAN: See what we’ve done. 9 And Jonathan, do you have your computer? 10 We can show you also -- 11 THE COURT: Tell me what is it that -- first 12 -- let’s start with what -- 13 MR. HINOJOSA: You need to hear -- 14 THE COURT: What are they seeking? 15 MR. HUSEMAN: They want us to - - 16 THE COURT: Hold on a second. Let me do this. 17 Let me do this. Since you all are giving me what you think the 18 rules apply, I am going to tell them -- I am going to give them 19 a shot at that. And then I am going to come back to you all so 20 you can tell me specifically -- well, actually, I am going to are 21 go to them now, so that they can tell me what exactly they why you 22 seeking and why, and then you will be able to tell me 23 believe that you shouldn’t have to produce it. Go ahead. MR. HINOJOSA: Thank you, Your Honor. And 24 25 I’ll have Mr. Taylor jump in to clarify more. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 24 1 The case - - the Supreme Court case that was 2 handed to you by counsel for State Farm deals with this: In 3 that case, someone had a claim. And they asked, through 4 discovery, for claims by a whole bunch of other people that 5 hadn’t filed involving the same storm, right. And -- and the 6 Supreme Court said, without more, you can’t do that. There is 7 no reason for you to get all these other claims that were 8 filed, What does it have to do with your particular claim. 9 That’s all that case is about. So, and the Supreme Court made 10 a decision that you have to have something else in order to 11 show your entitlement to claim files of other individuals. 12 We’re not anywhere near that on this case, in 13 terms of what we’re requesting. What we’re requesting are -- 14 are policies and procedures of State Farm that will help us to 15 analyze how they took a look at this claim; what they did tly 16 properly adjust the claim; whether or not there’s inheren alue 17 within their process a system that allows them to underv 18 claims, and -- and allows us to show that this is not only a and 19 breach of a contract, but a violation of the insurance code 20 its intentional willful conduct as well. So we’re not asking 21 for other people’s claims. 22 THE COURT: But you had -- that last part, you 23 have that in your pleadings as a cause of action? 24 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s part of our claim, Your 25 Honor. That’s part of our claim. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 25 1 Now, so this case is absolutely totally 2 irrelevant to the particular issue in this particular -- in 3 this case. 4 Secondly, Your Honor - - 5 THE COURT: But wait, before you move on, why 6 is it completely irrelevant? 7 MR. HINOJOSA: Because we’re not asking for -- 8 the settlement - - 9 THE COURT: This guy -- these people here on 10 the Lloyds case, the supreme court case, ask for - - 11 MR. HINOJOSA: Other claim files. 12 THE COURT: -- other claims filed by third 13 parties against them, and then also asks for -- I want to find 14 out what this particular adjustor -- these particular 15 adjustors, what they have been doing on these type of cases 16 over the last six years. 17 MR. HINOJOSA: Oh, no. We’re not asking for 18 that. We’re asking for training materials, you know, policies 19 and procedures and how they handle these claims and so forth. 20 And let me -- I mean, I didn’t interrupt you. 21 MR. HUSEMAN: I haven’t said a word. 22 MR. HINOJOSA: He’s got that thing -- 23 THE COURT: Can you put it down, please? 24 MR. HUSEMAN: Okay. 25 MR. HINOJOSA: Your Honor, and he cites to you CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 26 1 a case from federal district court Judge Alvarez that says that 2 the stuff that we’re asking for in this particular case is not 3 stuff that we should get. The other side of that coin, Your 4 Honor, is there is an MDL court in McAllen -- in Edinburg right 5 now that’s handling thousands and thousands of hailstorm cases. 6 THE COURT: The same thing that’s going on 7 here. That’s why I said, “Is this the MDL case”? 8 MR. HINOJOSA: And that MDL judge said that 9 the materials that we’re requesting are relevant. And in fact, 10 the court put together - - 11 THE COURT: Is a three-judge panel there or 12 four-judge panel? 13 MR. HINOJOSA: No, it’s -- the supreme -- the 14 MDL panel appointed Judge Rose Reyna to be the MDL judge for 15 all the hailstorm cases in the Rio Grande valley. And what -- state 16 what happened in that particular case is that judge, that 17 district judge, determined that discovery of these issues was 18 absolutely relevant to these hailstorm cases. Even though 19 they’re -- you have -- you’re entitled to do discovery on 20 individual claims, you can also do discovery on policies and 21 procedures that will illuminate how they are handling these 22 particular claims. 23 In fact, Your Honor, the court developed that 24 master discovery that included all the identical questions on 25 are part of the issue in this motion to compel and the issue CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 27 1 the protective order, and allowed the parties, both the 2 plaintiffs and the defendants to propose -- propound discovery 3 among -- along the lines of that master discovery. So, even 4 though there is a state federal district judge that says you 5 can’t do it, there is a state district judge that says you can, 6 and that state district judge’s decision on whether or not you 7 can proceed forward on this kind of discovery has not been 8 appealed. That issue is not on appeal. There is issues on 9 appeal with respect to whether or not the terms of the 10 protective order are legal ; but whether or not we can propound 11 this discovery, that’s not -- that’s not -- not been questioned 12 by anyone. 13 You know, we sat down -- I mean, I am involved 14 in the Multi District Litigation since day one. In fact, I 15 wrote the brief to the MDL panel on whether or not there should 16 be an MDL created. And, in fact, we recommended that if there 17 was going to be an MDL, that to avoid forum shopping, they 18 should appoint a district judge from Hidalgo County, and in 19 fact they did. 20 But -- but what -- what has happened here, 21 Your Honor, is that that share -- that discovery that we have 22 propounded in that particular case, has allowed us to resolve 23 probably two-thirds of all the cases that are pending all -- in 24 the multi-district litigation. 25 THE COURT: All right. Let’s move on then. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 28 1 So then you were saying -- so far you tell me that the things 2 that you’re requesting are -- are training materials, policy 3 and procedures, things of that nature. 4 MR. TAYLOR: Let me chime in. There’s 5 actually a couple more. And I’ve actually -- I’ve had 6 conversations with Ms. DeBolt. I’ve sent letters to 7 Mr. Huseman’s firm looking for training materials pertain to 8 wind and hail claims in Texas for five years; looking for the 9 personnel files for the adjustors who were involved in handling 10 the claim, and I can explain why we think that’s relevant. 11 THE COURT: The what files? 12 MR. TAYLOR: The personnel files for the 13 adjustors. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. TAYLOR: The underwriting files where the 16 claims at issue. An example is one of the claims -- I think 17 it’s Pena -- there is a prior claim that was a lot of property 18 -- I don’t even have that prior claim file, even though I’ve 19 asked for it, So the underwriting file for these two policies. 20 And then any documents that are related to my client’s -- 21 non-privileged documents related to my clients, the property, 22 the address, the policy, or the claim number. So I’ve narrowed 23 it down to basically those five categories. 24 THE COURT: From all -- from all that I am 25 hearing you say on these five categories, I don’t see anything CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 29 1 in here that talks about third parties. 2 MR. HUSEMAN: Okay. May -- you want to hear 3 from me on that, Your Honor? 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Okay. 6 THE COURT: And I am not even sure why we 7 wasted our time on that issue if in fact they are not 8 requesting that from you. 9 MR. HUSEMAN: Well -- 10 THE COURT: Cause you said that they were - - 11 you seem to be alluding to the fact that they were requesting 12 similar information that was requested on that particular case. 13 MR. HUSEMAN: I did, Your Honor. And if I may 14 begin within this, and rather than characterize what they told 15 you versus what I am telling you, let’s just go to what -- 16 THE COURT: You know what I usually start 17 with? I usually just start with your discovery requests. And 18 then, you know, we will just -- instead of doing what I -- and 19 when I make the mistake of starting with what you all’s rules 20 or believe what the rule is on particular issues, it normally 21 takes a lot longer. But in any event, I’ll let you respond to 22 that. And then I am going to get to the questions. 23 MR. HUSEMAN: All right. If you look, for 24 example, having been told that they have nothing about other 25 people besides themselves involving this, Interrogatory Number CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 30 1 Seven to my client says -- 2 THE COURT: Wait a minute. Are you objecting 3 to everything? 4 MR. HUSEMAN: No, sir. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. HUSEMAN: No, sir. We’ve produced in 7 our -- now we’ve also produced - - 8 THE COURT: No, but with regard to the - - the 9 motion to compel now. 10 MR. HUSEMAN: No, not everything, obviously. 11 We’re willing to, for example -- 12 THE COURT: The motion to compel , I want to 13 get to something that’s a little bit more concise. Your motion 14 to compel, what numbers are you compelling? 15 MS. DEBOLT: Your Honor, if I may, here’s a 16 copy of their motion to compel and our response. 17 THE COURT: Okay, good. Thank you. 18 MR. TAYLOR: Motion to compel, Request For 19 Production Number Two, produce the underwriting files and 20 documents relating to the underwriting of all insurance 21 policies -- 22 THE COURT: Let me follow along here. 23 Request for production, is that what it was? 24 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Judge, to State Farm. 25 THE COURT: Number Two, right? CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 31 1 MR. TAYLOR: Right. 2 THE COURT: All license and certifications 3 identified in response to Interrogatory Number 3, is that what 4 it is? No. 5 MR. TAYLOR: No. That’s the one of 6 defendants. Keep -- it’s probably -- here’s State Farm. 7 THE COURT: Produce underwriter files? 8 MR. TAYLOR: Yeah, Number Two. 9 THE COURT: Number Two. 10 MR. TAYLOR: And I don’t see -- 11 THE COURT: So that one was one that they -- 12 MR. HUSEMAN: We’ve done. 13 MR. TAYLOR: They objected to that as being 14 overly broad, burdensome, vague -- 15 THE COURT: Oh, but you may have produced it, 16 but they set your objection on motion to compel . Are you 17 sticking to your objection on that? 18 MR. HUSEMAN: As so far as what we have not 19 produced, yes, sir. 20 THE COURT: So then we have to address it, 21 MR. HUSErIAN: We’ve produced -- 22 THE COURT: You make it sound like if we don’t 23 have to address it when you say we’ve produced it. No, we have 24 to address the objection unless you’re withdrawing it. 25 MR. HUSEMAN: Maybe I didn’t make myself CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 32 1 clear, Your Honor. We have responded with the bulk of what 2 they wanted. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So you’re not withdrawing 4 your objection? 5 MR. HUSEMAN: No. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So we have to address 7 Number Two. 8 MR. HUSEMAN: And -- 9 THE COURT: Go ahead. 10 Wait, wait. I’m sorry. 11 MR. HUSEMAN: You had asked me a minute ago 12 about what discovery they had to fit within the supreme court 13 case. And I was getting ready to read some of their discovery 14 to us about that, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Well, we’re going to go down the 16 numbers. We’ll just go down the numbers. 17 MR. TAYLOR: We’re not compelling that -- 18 THE COURT: Let’s go down the number. I think 19 we’re not making much progress. And we’re 17 minutes into 20 our conversation - - 21 MS. DEBOLT: Your Honor, I think it’s worth 22 mentioning which case we’re arguing, because the motions to 23 compel are different for both cases. So I think we need to 24 make clear. Are we talking about the Raul Rodriguez case? 25 MR. TAYLOR: Right. That’s the one the judge CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 33 1 has in front of him. 2 MS. DEBOLT: Okay. 3 THE COURT: 2O14-CVF-1162, sorry, for the 4 record. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: M’hum, 6 THE COURT: That’s Request For Production 7 Number Two. Okay, so Request For Production Number Two. And 8 their response is here. Is that correct, Ms. Dupont? Du- -- 9 MR. HUSEMAN: DeBolt. 10 MS. DEBOLT: DeBolt. 11 THE COURT: DeBolt. Well, how hard is that? 12 That’s not hard at all. Okay. So, your response is here, 13 right? 14 MS. DEBOLT: Yes. 15 MR. TAYLOR: Your objections. 16 MS. DEBOLT: They were in an exhibit to his 17 motion, yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Here it is. Response. And then, 19 let me see if there is an objection. There is an objection. 20 Okay. So, let me read -- go ahead, Mr. Taylor. 21 MR. TAYLOR: So, you know, I need the 22 underwriting file because I’d like to -- at least before I put 23 my clients up for deposition know about the condition of the 24 property, at least what’s the information State Farm has on the 25 condition of the property. They have produced some documents, CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 34 1 which apparently they say could be the underwriting file. But 2 as long as they’re standing behind these objections, I don’t 3 feel comfortable with that. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Let’s talk about your 5 objections. You’re saying it’s not relevant? 6 MS. DEBOLT: It’s not relevant. They haven’t 7 explained why they need it; what the relevance is of -- 8 THE COURT: Isn’t it the other way around? 9 You have to explain why it’s not relevant. 10 MS. DEBOLT: It’s irrelevant to their case; 11 it’s not relevant to the correct claim. 12 THE COURT: The underwriting file? 13 MR. HUSEMAN: Right. Whether or not we paid 14 too much or too little or whatever -- 15 THE COURT: On their claim? 16 FIR. HUSEMAN: Right. It has nothing to do 17 with that. 18 MR. HINOJOSA: No. 19 MR. HUSEMAN: As to how the policy was 20 originally sold. Their claims of that we didn’t pay enough. 21 That’s all -- 22 THE COURT: But, no, they also say that -- 23 that there is a cause of action for -- tell me again what that 24 is. 25 MR. TAYLOR: Bad faith, insurance code CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 35 I violations. 2 MS. DEBOLT: All related to the claim. 3 THE COURT: Right. But they don’t have to 4 start with what you all agree to do? 5 MR. HUSETIAN: All of their extra contractual 6 claims are things that arise after the loss, not before. And 7 what -- how we underwrote their claim, if there is anything 8 that we didn’t give them, I am not sure. There’s a lot in 9 there that we didn’t give them that has nothing to do with how 10 we handled the claim. 11 THE COURT: How do -- do they just take your 12 word for it? 13 MR. HUSEMAN: No. The underwriting file is 14 State Farm deciding whether or not to write the policy in the 15 first place. There is no issue on it that I can see on this 16 that gets submitted to the jury. Not even close. It’s simply 17 a fishing expedition trying to find something perhaps for 18 another case. And while I am on that subject -- 19 THE COURT: But why would they - - why would 20 anybody be in -- why would anything be in there for another 21 case? 22 FIR. HUSEMAN: Well, why would there be 23 anything for this case either? 24 THE COURT: Well, because it dealt with the 25 underwriting of this particular property. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 36 1 MR. HUSEMAN: Which bears not at all on any 2 issues that they are making claims on. 3 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s not true, Your Honor. 4 MR. HUSEMAN: At all. 5 FIR. HINOJOSA: They haven’t -- they do 6 inspections of the house. The way they make a determination of 7 how -- what to value, how much to charge, they do a complete 8 inspection of the house. They send an inspector to the house, 9 Your Honor. And so the condition of the house is at the 10 time -- 11 THE COURT: And that’s in the underwriting 12 file? 13 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s in the underwriting 14 file, Your Honor. 15 MR. TAYLOR: Judge, you know -- 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. TAYLOR: I’ve tried one of these cases, 18 and I’ve been a part of trials for these State Farm cases. 19 Inevitably you’ve already seen it. This is a small case. 20 They’re going to say that my clients didn’t take cake of their 21 house; this is a crappy house in Laredo. And it’s going to be 22 based on the condition of -- that are listed in the 23 underwriting files. I want to know now what is going to be 24 there before - - 25 THE COURT: Oh, in other words -- in other CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 37 1 words, if they -- part of the reason of why they may be paying 2 so little because there was possibly replacement cost value is 3 because it was worth little? 4 MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 5 MR. HINOJOSA: Yes. 6 THE COURT: So, there may be some information 7 in the file when it was originally written that indicates what 8 they thought that the house condition was. 9 MR. TAYLOR: Right. The condition of the 10 file. I want -- 11 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 12 MR. HUSEMAN: And we have no problem with 13 that. 14 THE COURT: Your objection then is -- with 15 regard to relevance is -- is overruled. I am not sure how much 16 the problem would be, because you don’t maintain a physical 17 file. Whatever it is. Electronic file or physical file, as 18 long as you call it an underwriting file. That’s the problem 19 is you don’t know what’s an underwriting file. 20 MR. HUSEMAN: No. 21 THE COURT: You don’t know what that is? 22 MR. HUSEMAN: We do have -- we do have some 23 things which could be considered underwriting files that we 24 have given to them in paper and electronically. 25 THE COURT: Is that -- is that possible that CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 38 1 the insurance company doesn’t know what an underwriting file 2 is, what you mean by that? 3 MR. HINOJOSA: I would have a really hard time 4 accepting that, Your Honor. I mean - 5 THE COURT: I think you know what an 6 underwriting file is, whatever you all -- however you define it 7 -- not you, but your client. 8 MR. HUSEMAN: Yeah. 9 THE COURT: If it’s a -- if it’s a file 10 that’s -- if it’s -- what -- however we -- however people 11 define underwriting file. You didn’t define it under your 12 discovery rules. 13 MR. HUSEMAN: And I think that’s what we gave 14 them -- 15 MR. TAYLOR: In terms of -- I mean, it’s an 16 insurance term. 17 THE COURT: I think it is. And so the way you 18 all -- your client defines underwriting file, whether it’s a 19 physical file or an electronic file, I think that will apply. 20 MR. HUSEMAN: If you will look at what we 21 produced, Your Honor, that we gave you. 22 THE COURT: I’m not going to look at what 23 you - - 24 MR. HUSEMAN: There are tabs under that 25 which -- has the underwriting documents -- CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 39 1 THE COURT: I am not going to address what you 2 produced. I’ll let them address that. I am addressing only 3 the objections. Because that’s what I am addressing today. If 4 you’re telling me, Judge, we’ve produced everything, then 5 great. Then that means, we -- you’re withdrawing -- the only 6 thing I want to know is I have to address your objections, 7 unless you withdraw them. That’s it. Whether you produced it 8 or not, I am not going to go through that right now and find 9 our whether that - - because they are not saying you haven’t 10 produced it. They are saying, I want to address your 11 objections. So that’s that’s what I need to do. And we’re 12 on the first one. 13 So, what I am going to do is -- I am not sure 14 if there is a problem with the definition. I am just basically 15 going to say whatever the definition is underwriting file for 16 your client, that’s what it’s basically going to be. So -- 17 MR. TAYLOR: I’ll cut this down. 18 THE COURT: Let’s see. It’s relevance, and 19 what else was there? I think that was it. Yeah. Okay. 20 MR. TAYLOR: Let me go to Request For 21 Production Number Six, Judge. All documents used to instruct, 22 advise, guide, inform, educate, or assist, provided to any 23 person handling the claim made the basis of this lawsuit 24 related to the adjustment of this type of claim, i.e. hail 25 damage. What I’ve done is I’ve limited that through several CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 40 1 letters to counsel. I want instructional guidelines, 2 documents, materials related to wind and hail claims in the 3 State of Texas for five years. 4 THE COURT: And your theory behind that is 5 that’s going to be instructive to the adjustors who handled 6 this claim to find out exactly how they did it. 7 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s right. 8 MR. TAYLOR: That’s going to go to both causes 9 of action to each contract and as to productions. 10 MR. HUSEMAN: What counsel didn’t tell you is 11 we are agreeable. AdditionaHy, I think five years is the year 12 that -- as long as we have a protective order in place that 13 keeps our proprietary information out of the public domain and 14 being used other places. And we have a proposed order before 15 the court, which if we can get an agreement on that, we can 16 produce that to them. 17 THE COURT: Did you all object to that? 18 MR. TAYLOR: Judge, this is the first time 19 I’ve heard of that. 20 THE COURT: Did you object to Number Six on 21 that? 22 MS. DEBOLT: Yes, Your Honor. We objected 23 because it -- 24 THE COURT: No, no. But specifically, for 25 that privilege. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 41 1 MS. DEBOLT: Yes. We stated the privilege. 2 And then we also in the objection state that we would produce 3 the documents. 4 THE COURT: There it is. I see it. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Yeah. 6 MS. DEBOLT: And then, Your Honor, I think 7 that we may streamline a lot of this because Exhibit B to our 8 response is all of the documents that we’ve offered to produce 9 once there is a protective order that’s entered. And there are 10 a lot of documents that we will produce once we get that 11 protective order. 12 MR. TAYLOR: I’ve seen their list. And that’s 13 -- what I am requesting are all the documents related to wind 14 and hail claims for the last five years. I don’t -- 15 THE COURT: Not the wind and hail claims. 16 You’re requesting 17 MR. TAYLOR: How to handle wind and hail 18 claims. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. TAYLOR: I don’t necessarily want the 21 documents -- I’ll take them -- that they have hand picked as actually 22 being relevant, because I want what these people are So what’s available to them, and what they’re taught on. -- 23 -- 24 THE COURT: Right. MR. TAYLOR: I’ll take what they have. But 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 42 1 what I want them to do is do a search for those documents for 2 five years. And I want that to be produced. And I think it’s 3 relevant. 4 MR. HUSEMAN: This takes us -- circles back to 5 the rule about them asking for things beyond this lawsuit. 6 THE COURT: No. Well, this is specifically in 7 this lawsuit, because the instructions that you give your 8 adjust- -- not you, your client gives your adjustors, and the 9 guidance that your company, that your client give the adjustors 10 on how to handle this claim, ultimately will deal with how they 11 handle this particular claim. 12 MR. HUSEMAN: Don’t have a problem with that. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Then let’s go. 14 MR. HUSEMAN: The problem we’ve got is when 15 they ask us to identify by name, address, phone number, 16 anybody -- 17 THE COURT: We are talking about Number Six, 18 right? 19 MR. HUSEMAN: No, this is Seven. 20 THE COURT: Cause we’re on Six. 21 MR. HUSEMAN: This is -- 22 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I am not compelling 23 Number Seven. 24 MR. HUSEMAN: What I’m saying, Your Honor -- 25 THE COURT: They’re not compelling Seven. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 43 1 Let’s not go to Seven. Let’s stick to Six, because Six is what 2 they’re compelling. 3 MR. HUSEMAN: Well, this ties in to our 4 complaint about them wanting things beyond the scope of this 5 claim. 6 THE COURT: But Seven they are not requesting 7 -is what they’re -- is what he’s asking me. So, I’d rather not 8 chew on something that we don’t need to right now. We’ve got 9 plenty. 10 MS. DEBOLT: Your Honor, in our -- we 11 responded to them and offered with the entry of a protective 12 order to produce relevant education and training or training 13 tracker records, if any, of the assigned adjustor to directly 14 handle plaintiff’s hail claim. 15 MR. HUSEMAN: Right. 16 MR. HINOJOSA: Well, Your Honor, but they are 17 determining what relevant is in that respect. We just want 18 them to produce what we’ve asked for. And, unless they have a 19 specific objection -- 20 THE COURT: Okay. You don’t have any 21 objection to entering into the confidentiality agreement or a 22 protective order? 23 MR. HINOJOSA: The only thing on that, Your 24 Honor -- and I guess we can take it up real quick on that. 25 We’ve asked -- there’s I think a total of ten hailstorm claims CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 44 1 here in Laredo as a result of a series of hailstorms that 2 occurred over a period of time. And we’re asking so that we 3 don’t have to be coming back every time on this particular 4 issue, that we allow -- be allowed shared discovery; that if we 5 get this discovery in this particular case, that we can -- we 6 can use -- this law firm, the Mostyn Law Firm can use the same 7 discovery responses or documents that were produced in any of 8 the other ten cases. And subject to that, we would -- we don’t 9 have a problem with the protective order. And I think 10 that’s -- there’s a big argument against that that they are 11 making now. 12 The -- the 13th Court of Appeals has already 13 ruled on that issue. But we’re not in the 13th Court, I 14 understand that. And it has allowed that. That’s probably the 15 main issue of dispute with respect to the training documents 16 and the information -- the information that the adjustors are 17 to review to guide them in -- 18 THE COURT: Okay. What I see on the 19 objections so far is you’re objecting to vague and ambiguous. 20 Apparently Mr. Taylor says he’s clarified that with some 21 follow-up narrowing of the request, or clarification of the 22 request. Overly broad is another objection. Relevant is 23 another objection. Based on what Mr. -- what they say that 24 they have -- in the manner in which they have, I guess, 25 narrowed the issue on Number Six, and as modified, I will CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 45 1 overrule the objection with regard to vague and ambiguous; 2 overrule it with regard to overbroad; and overrule it with 3 regard to relevant; however, subject to the -- the protective 4 order. 5 Now, let’s talk about this other issue. 6 MS. DEBOLT: Just for your reference, these 7 are the documents that we’re going to be potentially arguing 8 about, and that we’ve offered to produce with the protective 9 order. 10 THE COURT: I’m not -- I’m not -- I’m not 11 discussing this, I’m discussing what’s in the response and on 12 your objections. 13 MS. DEBOLT: Yes, Your Honor. And that’s what 14 we’ve offered to produce. 15 MR. HINOJOSA: But they’ve offered to produce 16 because they have the objection. You’ve already removed the 17 objection. 18 THE COURT: The ruling that I am giving -- 19 MS. DEBOLT: Okay. 20 THE COURT: -- is basically the Request For 21 Production Number Six, whether you should have to respond to it 22 in the modified version that Mr. Taylor -- it is Taylor, isn’t 23 it? 24 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: -- has in fact indicated to the CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR :atYo;:H:y:or;ndic::d:o::46 ::1tC:trt::thesmT:::fC::;ROT 5 way of e-mail or letter or whatever it was, that he clarified 6 as. And based on that, I am making the ruling on your 7 objection. 8 MR. ARAMBIJLA: Your Honor, if I may, the 9 clarification from plaintiff’s counsel was what again? 10 THE COURT: Modification, 11 MR. ARAMBULA: Or modification that you 12 wanted, what was -- 13 MR. TAYLOR: Instructional guidelines and handling wind and hail claims 14 materials related to wind and -- 15 in Texas for the last five years. MR. ARAMBULA: For the adjustors in these - - 16 MR. HUSEMAN: This case? 17 MR. ARAMBULA: In this case? 18 MR. TAYLOR: No, for State Farm. 19 MR. HINOJOSA: Their policies. 20 MR. TAYLOR: The policies and procedures. 21 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s pretty clear in the 22 23 request for production. MR. HUSEMAN: It’s pretty broad. 24 Well, do you all train do you THE COURT: -- 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 47 1 all train your adjustors -- not you all, but does your client 2 train your adjustors differently in different parts of the 3 state? 4 MR. HIJSEMAN: Probably. 5 THE COURT: Why? 6 MR. HUSEMAN: Well because they have 7 different conditions at different times. 8 THE COURT: So the homes in south Texas get 9 adjusted one way, and the homes in north -- north Dallas get 10 adjusted a different way? 11 MR. HUSETIAN: I would think that they have a 12 lot more interest in tornadoes in Dallas than they do down 13 here. 14 MR. HINOJOSA: Your Honor, there is no -- 15 there is no evidence of that. I’ve been through all these cases, Your Honor. They have never raised that issue. This is 16 17 the first time I’ve ever heard that. 18 MS. DEBOLT: And Your Honor, his modification 19 is broader than -- 20 THE COURT: You still haven’t convinced me of 21 why you would train your adjustors differently. 22 MR. HUSEMAN: Different places, different 23 needs, at different times. 24 THE COURT: On underwriting a particular 25 house? CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 48 1 MR. HUSEMAN: Well underwriting is not 2 something an adjustor does. That’s -- 3 THE COURT: Okay. Well then or on -- on 4 appraising a particular house with regard to the destruction. 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Well, for example, if -- and I 6 don’t even know this is a fact. If -- if -- 7 THE COURT: So then an expert from - - an 8 expert that’s brought in here to testify in south Texas about a 9 particular damage -- 10 MR. HUSEMAN: fihum. 11 THE COURT: Would have to be somebody who is 12 trained in south Texas wind damage, as opposed to north Texas 13 wind damage? 14 MR. HUSEMAN: Well, I could perceive, for 15 example, Your Honor, there being differences in prices between 16 Dallas and south Texas. 17 THE COURT: But don’t they all use the same 18 computer model that they use? 19 MR. HINOJOSA: Yes. 20 MR. HUSEMAN: They have some similarities, but 21 there are reasonable differences. 22 THE COURT: I’ve had -- and I know I don’t 23 have testimony with regard to that here. But I’ve had plenty 24 of trials in which I’ve had issues of value come up. And I’ve 25 heard people object to experts that are brought in from perhaps CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 49 1 Michigan or other parts of the country. But I have never heard 2 of them object to experts that are in fact doing work in and 3 around the State of Texas, whether it be Dallas or Houston 4 or -- 5 MR. HUSEMAN: Maybe I haven’t made the point 6 clearly. The objection here is what they are wanting to do is 7 know about training of adjustors other than those that are 8 involved in this lawsuit. 9 MS. DEBOLT: And, Your Honor, actually, that’s 10 all they ask for in the request. His modification is broader 11 than their request, because they only asked for training 12 documents to any person handling the claim. So, his 13 modification wanting all adjustors around the -- 14 THE COURT: All right. Let’s look at that. 15 MS. DEBOLT: Okay. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Taylor. It seems that 17 that’s in fact what you requested. 18 MR. TAYLOR: One second. I think there is 19 another request. 20 THE COURT: Good point. Okay. With regard to 21 Number Six then, we’ll deal with it in that manner. If you 22 have another one, then we’ll deal with it at that point. 23 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s fine, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Now, it is eleven o’clock. 25 I need to have a discussion with counsel that are waiting for a CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 50 1 hearing, and then I’ll bring you guys back. 2 MR. HINOJOSA: Okay, Your Honor. 3 MR. ARAMSULA: Yes, Your Honor, 4 THE COURT: And while I do that, I suggest 5 that you try and confer. 6 (Case recessed while other unrelated matters 7 were called.) 8 THE COURT: All right. Let’s continue. 9 And you all can stick around, please. I am 10 trying to get to you before lunch -- 11 MR. GEORGE: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: -- or before I break for lunch. 13 MR. TAYLOR: One last request. And it’s the 14 training material -- all training and educational materials 15 which instruct claim adjustors or claim handlers in handling 16 hail claims for property damage cover under homeowners policy 17 18 THE COURT: What number is that? 19 MR. TAYLOR: This is on Pena. 20 MR. HINOJOSA: Pena. The other one was more 21 narrow. That’s why we were -- 22 MR. TAYLOR: Pena Number Five. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So Pena Number Five is not 24 the same one as Rodriguez Number - - 25 MR. HINOJOSA: Rodriguez narrower - - CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, TSR 51 1 THE COURT: Number Six, I believe it was. 2 MR. TAYLOR: And I think we’ve agreed to that, 3 pending the protective order. We conferred a little bit. 4 THE COURT: Well, there was a little bit of a 5 - there was a little bit of a -- from what I remember, there 6 was a little bit of disagreement. I don’t want to say they 7 agreed to it. There was a little bit of disagreement with 8 regard to -- remember that I said that we’d like to limit it to 9 adjustors who handled that -- that particular adjustment, or 10 that particular claim. And there was a -- there was a -- there 11 was a discussion about that. And then at the very end, she 12 said that by my ruling I was making it broader than what you 13 were requesting. So here we are on Number Five. Then now I 14 can actually do what my original ruling was. So, anything else 15 to add? 16 MS. DEBOLT: We have the same objections as we 17 discussed earlier. 18 THE COURT: Sure. Sure. And I will allow for 19 the record to show that the objections are - - that were made on 20 Number Six for Rodriguez case are now made on Number Five for 21 the Pena case. And I’ll bring those over and make them part of 22 the record. And in fact, you’ve -- you’ve -- you brought that 23 in. My rulings are exactly the same as the Pena rulings Number 24 Six -- no, as the Rodriguez ruling, Number Six, into the Pena 25 Request Number Five. And my original ruling on that case will CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 52 1 stand on the Number Five -- on the Pena Number Five, which will 2 be -- unless you can show me that in fact there is a 3 distinction in which you all do that, train your adjustors, I 4 don’t see how that in fact can be the case. 5 I would think that -- especially on these hail 6 damage cases, they -- you know, there is no evidence of this 7 for purposes of this hearing, but I -- some of the things that 8 I’ve seen in the past, and I hear in the courtroom and 9 otherwise is that sometimes there are teams of people that are 10 brought down to particular areas when these type of claims 11 occur, and they don’t necessarily live here in Laredo or 12 whatnot, when a claim is in Webb County. So -- 13 MR. HINOJOSA: So the only issue is -- 14 THE COURT: Yes, sir. He wanted to say 15 something. Mr. Huseman? 16 MR. 1-IUSEMAN: If I might. I want to make sure 17 the Court’s clear about a position. We’re not fussing at all, where 18 subject to the protective order, about producing things 19 adjustors were involved in this claim at all. 20 MR. HINOJOSA: But I think you already ruled, 21 Your Honor, and -- THE COURT: No, I give me a second. Don’t 22 -- 23 -- the frustrated guy should be me, not you. Give me a second. 24 MR. HINOJOSA: I’m sorry. 25 MR. HUSEMAN: Truly so. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 53 1 THE COURT: Thank you. So I understand 2 completely, And I am just saying I just don’t think it’s going 3 to be -- there’s -- there is nothing on the record that shows 4 that these people, these folks are trained any differently. So 5 your search of one should be, you know, the trainings that 6 people go to, or that you may require them to go to, or the 7 material that you send out to them, if any. There may not be 8 any. In fact, are the same for one or the other, And I don’t 9 suspect that anybody should - - should - - because, you know, the 10 other argument that can be made is, somebody may have missed a 11 session, but doesn’t mean that they’re not still stuck to what 12 -- in other words, that they’re not in fact required to know 13 exactly what it is that -- that the company requires. So 14 that’s -- that’s -- 15 MR. 1-IUSEIIAN: We’re going to give them the 16 materials. That’s not the problem. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MR. HUSEMAN: But by the same order of 19 thinking, if they’re all the same, then giving them ones in 20 this case will get the job done. 21 THE COURT: I understand your objection. I 22 made my ruling. Next one. 23 MR. HINOJOSA: The issue of the protective 24 order, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Protective order. You all don’t CYNTHIA PEREZ ENZ, CSR 54 1 agree on that? 2 MR. ARAMBULA: No, Your Honor. 3 MR. HINOJOSA: The only issue is the shared 4 discovery issue. And that’s -- 5 THE COURT: Now, you remember what the courts 6 have said with regard to shared discovery. There’s -- there is 7 a public -- what is the word that the case law says? And I 8 deal with these issues, not necessarily on these hail and wind 9 damage, but on products liability cases. A lot. We’ve had a 10 lot of products liabilities trials. 11 MR. HUSEMAN: Tire roll outs or whatever. 12 THE COURT: Products liability. I tell you 13 what, I’ve had, you know, all sorts of products liability cases 14 between Webb and Zapata Counties. You’d be surprised. So we 15 have that. But that, I believe, may be a standard that is 16 different to -- that is - - that is more concentrated or more to 17 that the rules apply to products liability cases, as opposed 18 anything else. 19 MR. HUSEMAN: That’s exactly. 20 THE COURT: Can you - - do you disagree with 21 that? MR. TAYLOR: I do, Judge. And I can let 22 -- 23 me - - If -- I think what the supreme court -- and you know, at 24 least in the People’s case was favoring shared discovery was 25 for efficiency. And I can give an example here. We have CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 55 1 probably a hundred cases that I am handling around the State of 2 Texas where I am going to be compelling training materials for 3 wind and hail claims against State Farm. I recognize that 4 they - - they have a proprietary right. And I want to protect 5 that as well. I don’t want that stuff getting out. 6 But for purposes of efficiency and not having 7 to waste the Court’s time and going to compel at different 8 places, let’s produce it once. They can stamp it however it needs to be stamped to protect it, and to recognize it. I am 9 10 not going to send it anywhere outside of my firm. 11 THE COURT: In other words, you’re not going 12 to share it with other plaintiff’s counsel -- 13 MR. TAYLOR: Just me, my firm. 14 THE COURT: - - with your associations, and 15 things of that nature. Is that -- 16 MR. TAYLOR: It’s just more to save my clients 17 money from traveling, to save my money and time. 18 THE COURT: But from traveling here? 19 MR. TAYLOR: Yeah, from having to come down -- 20 THE COURT: You’re talking about Webb cases 21 only? 22 MR. TAYLOR: No, no, all around. THE COURT: You’re not just I thought you 23 -- Webb, and 24 said that there was about ten cases filed here in here. 25 that you wanted to basically be able to do them CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 56 1 MR. TAYLOR: Well, I proposed one that would 2 allow me to share my cases only for first party cases against 3 State Farm in the State of Texas. And, you know, there’s 4 probably ten different counties that I have cases in. 5 THE COURT: Oh, is that what you said - ten 6 different counties? I thought you said ten different cases. 7 MR. HINOJOSA: I said ten cases, Your Honor. 8 MR. TAYLOR: I do have ten cases currently in 9 litigation in Webb County. I have some more that I haven’t 10 filed yet, but I’m in probably about ten different counties. 11 And so that’s what I started at, and -- THE COURT: Okay. Tell me what what the 12 -- 13 rules say about that. How is it that you’re protected for this 14 material? Why is this material so -- so protectable? 15 MR. REDGRAVE: The material itself, I don’t , as far as 16 think there is actually a dispute between the sides ing materials 17 the protection for the material itself, the train I’m sorry, 18 that provide State Farm with a confidential or -- state. 19 competitive advantage, vis-à-vis other insurers in the 20 That’s part of their trade. 21 THE COURT: Well, they’re not asking for like 22 your actuaries or anything like that. They’re asking for how 23 do you train your people. 24 MR. REDGRAVE: That -- that material itself, And in 25 Your Honor, State Farm has asserted in multiple cases. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 57 1 fact, plaintiffs have agreed that they recognize the trade 2 secret value of those materials. The way in which State Farm 3 trains -- 4 THE COURT: Trade - - supreme court has come 5 down with what is actually a trade secret here recently, 6 remember that. Do you meet that criteria with how you train 7 your people? 8 MR. HUSEMAN: fl’hum. 9 THE COURT: This isn’t -- this isn’t -- this 10 isn’t, you know -- what’s the latest thing that was said with a 11 trade secret? This isn’t the -- the geology for, you know, 12 what’s 13,000 feet below the surface, and, or what may be and 13 13,000 feet below the surface, and where a lot of value of 14 cost and whatnot has gone into all that type of development 15 the particular areas. I mean, this is, you know, how do you a look 16 train somebody to go look at a roof, and what to take 17 at. I mean, it’s not - how long would you actually take to do 18 that? How much investment do you take to actually put that 19 together? 20 MR. REDGRAVE: Your Honor, actually there’s a 21 lot of investment State Farm does, first of all. 22 THE COURT: To protect -- 23 MR. REDGRAVE: Secondly, I recognize it’s not 24 a formula case. I’ve been involved in formula cases for, you 25 know, a particular product. We know that’s not what this case CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 58 1 is, in terms of confidentiality. But keeping the material 2 confidential and out of the public view is a competitive issue 3 for State Farm, because other insurers would love to get their 4 hands on how State Farm trains adjustors. There’s a lot of 5 effort that goes into making the materials so that adjustors 6 understand the process, understand the workloads within State 7 Farm, and in fact the way the adjustors then interact with the how 8 enterprise claim system; how they put the information in; s 9 it goes into the system so State Farm can adjust and proces 10 the claims with a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other 11 insurance carriers. So from State Farm’s perspective and I 12 -- 13 believe we put in evidence on this as well, that is a 14 competitive trade secret. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Let’s just suppose for a 16 moment - - because there is no objection on that side with 17 regard to -- 18 FIR. REDGRAVE: Correct. 19 THE COURT: - - putting it in the hands of your 20 competitors obviously. They are more -- that’s not what they’re concerned about. And I haven’t that was my first -- 21 -- 22 the first way to be able to -- to deal with the situation is -- 23 well, does it even meet the criteria. And if it doesn’t, let’s 24 just move on. Okay. Let’s just suppose it meets the criteria. with these 25 That’s not the criteria that you have to worry about CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 59 1 folks, do you? I mean, because they are willing to say, I’ll 2 sign off on that. What they’re wanting to do is, I am involved 3 in other cases, I am already going to see your material in this 4 case, I would like to be able to use it in a different case. 5 Now I have a different question to you with 6 regard to that, but that’s more procedural in nature than 7 anything else. 8 You’re basically saying -- you’re saying, I 9 don’t want -- I don’t want you to share it with yourself in 10 other cases. 11 MR. REDGRAVE: Your Honor, two things first. 12 Your break actually helped us go out and confer a little bit on 13 this very point. 14 THE COURT: Okay, good. 15 MR. REDGROVE: It was very helpful, because 16 Mr. Taylor kind of zeroed in on this provision as being the one 17 and only one in dispute. So really, we have a lot of others we 18 we have in our papers. But I think they are willing to say 19 they want to have this resolved, whether they can share within 20 the Mostyn firm. And that was a helpful clarification to us. 21 THE COURT: Okay, good. 22 MR. REDGRAVE: Because the language they had 23 in the original protective order they proposed didn’t have that 24 restriction just to the Mostyn firm. I think with respect to 25 our position, as a matter of principle, we think discovery in CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 60 1 these cases should be limited to these cases. However, I 2 recognize that Your Honor might just overrule that very 3 quickly. 4 MR. HINOJOSA: That will resolve the issue. 5 THE COURT: Sometimes I surprise you. 6 MR. REDGRAVE: You did have a question for 7 Mr. Taylor. And you wanted to ask a question. 8 THE COURT: Well, my question to him was, I 9 mean, you’re -- you’re saying so that I wouldn’t have to come 10 back to court and have these documents produced. I mean, it 11 could be a very -- it could be another firm in another case. 12 And here you are with the documents. And you want to say, other case in 13 well, Judge, they agreed to produce these in the 14 Webb County, and -- 15 FIR. HUSEMAN: That’s -- 16 THE COURT: I mean, it’s not really going to ents that they 17 be continued under the discovery rules as docum 18 produced in that case. Its just something that you can use. 19 MR. HINOJOSA: Right. 20 THE COURT: Right. But not that’s going to be well, it’s 21 -- not that’s going to be available for you to say, under the rules 22 admissible because they produced it, you know, 23 that when you when you produce the document, that now you -- ing bringing don’t have to do all the rigamarole of bring -- 24 whatnot. But 25 somebody down to testify on its authenticity and CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 61 1 so, this isn’t something that you are going to be able to use 2 in that matter. 3 MR. TAYLOR: It gives me a baseline, for 4 example. 5 THE COURT: For asking some questions. 6 MR. TAYLOR: For -- oh, no, no. For actually Hey, 7 going to opposing counsel in another case and saying, ed it in 8 here’s what I know exists; has been produced; we produc 9 this case. 10 THE COURT: Sure. I understand that. 11 MR. TAYLOR: Yeah. And that’s really what 12 I -- THE COURT: I’ll get to you, Felix. Give me a 13 14 second. 15 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, Your Honor. 16 MR. TAYLOR: And that’s really my goal, is because I like to have some consistency. And -- 17 THE COURT: I understand that. But I just 18 that I wasn’t that you wanted to make sure that we -- 19 - - 20 weren’t expecting -- even if I go that route, an order that discovery that will 21 basically says these documents will be now firm is involved 22 be officially usable in all cases that Mostyn 23 in. That’s not the order you’re going to get. 24 MR. TAYLOR: Not admissible, but I can use 25 them in depo for example -- CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 62 1 MR. ARAMBULA: Here we go. 2 THE COURT: Well, I am not talking about 3 admissibility. Maybe I should have said it differently. That 4 they would be considered official discovery of another case. 5 It’s really not going to be official discovery. It’s just 6 going to be something that you can use - - 7 MR. TAYLOR: Yeah. 8 THE COURT: And then -- in other words, if 9 they -- if they say -- if in other cases in the firm that 10 they’re not -- that they may not be involved in, and I am say talking about the defense firm before the court now, and -- 11 12 and you asked for these documents. And they say, Well, we have be 13 none. You can say, What do you mean you have none; don’t going 14 silly. These were produced to me in Webb County, so I am 15 to use these documents. You can use it like that. 16 MR. TAYLOR: Right. 17 MR. HINOJOSA: Yes. MR. TAYLOR: And that’s what I -- I want to be 18 say, here 19 -- maybe skip the whole motion to compel thing and 20 are the documents - - 21 THE COURT: Mr. -- Felix, go ahead. 22 MR. ARAMBULA: Your Honor - - 23 THE COURT: I am sorry to call him Felix, but 24 I’ve known him for -- MR. ARAMBULA: That’s okay, Your Honor. Thank 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 63 1 you. 2 I know opposing counsel speaks to wanting to 3 get these documents to make it easy on the court, things of 4 that sort. But if we were to follow what plaintiff’s counsel 5 wants, we would produce these documents, but then the other 6 firm would say -- my firm, which -- I am not with -- 7 THE COURT: Right, with the Huseman. 8 MR. ARAMBULA: My firm, we would be in court would get 9 again fighting over the same documents, because we that he may 10 the written discovery for those exact documents So, there is no this have gotten from this other firm. -- 11 12 argument about making it easier for the court. 13 THE COURT: Because now you’re requesting And you’re 14 documents that are relevant to the proceedings. going to know now that they have that. Is that what you’re 15 16 saying? MR. ARAFIBULA: No, no, no. What I am saying 17 18 is they’re -- more than likely they are going to ask for the use that 19 exact same stuff because they know they can’t 20 document. 21 THE COURT: Right. But the distinction is -- 22 and I understand that. 23 MR. ARAMBIILA: Correct. 24 THE COURT: They are going to have to ask for 25 it. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 64 1 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, sir, 2 THE COURT: But the distinction is now that 3 you’re not going to object to it, because -- because -- 4 MR. HINOJOSA: We know it’s there. 5 THE COURT: They know it’s there, one. You 6 may object to it; may have different judge, you know -- 7 MR. ARAMBULA: That’s exactly right, Your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: You may object to it, and you nay 10 get a different ruling. I mean, everybody’s been using other 11 judge’s rulings to tefl me that I should rule one way or 12 another. But, you know, that happens, and you’re not the first 13 folks that do that. 14 MR. ARAMBULA: I guess my point -- 15 THE COURT: Federal district court judge or 16 state district court judge. I happen to know Judge Reyna more 17 than I know Judge Alvarez, but -- you know, when you’re a state 18 court judge, you usually know more state court judges. 19 MR. HUSEMAN: I think I chose the wrong -- 20 MR. HINOJOSA: If I may, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Let me just have Felix finish his 22 thought. 23 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, Your Honor. I was just 24 responding to the argument that it would be easier for 25 everybody. It’s not going to be easier. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 65 1 THE COURT: It may not be easier. Go ahead. 2 MR. HINOJOSA: I understand that - - that the 3 issue with whether or not it was going to stay within the firm 4 -- and I think we all agree that its going to stay within the 5 Mostyn firm, and there is not going to be any sharing with any 6 other lawyers outside of those particular - - 7 THE COURT: And that’s -- and that’s going to 8 be my ruling. 9 MR. HINOJOSA: Thank you. 10 THE COURT: So that’s my ruling as to your it will stay in the firm. It 11 objections, is it will stay -- el in other 12 will stay not being able to share with even co-couns 13 cases -- I mean, in -- co-counsel that you may have been 14 involved in. It stays in the firm. And that’s the bottom line 15 on it. 16 MS. DEBOLT: And just for clarification, the State Farm 17 rest of the protective order is going to be the 18 submitted protective order? 19 FIR. TAYLOR: Well, apart from the part that we is done. I don’t 20 have to return the stuff after the litigation 21 want to have to do that. 22 MR. ARAMBULA: Well, that’s another point at 23 issue, Your Honor. They still want to keep the documents after 24 this lawsuit has resolved itself. We would want to in a done. 25 typical protective order get it back after it’s CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 66 1 MR. HUSEMAN: Standard. 2 MR. ARAMBULA: Standard. Standard protective 3 order. 4 THE COURT: Well, it’s not that much. But I 5 mean, I’ve gone both ways on that issue. In fact, Ms. De Llano 6 was here earlier. She’d tell you what I fumbled with on that 7 issue. 8 MR. TAYLOR: I’ve had -- in the hurricane/ice 9 litigation, had millions of documents that were produced. Some 10 of them were produced in a federal court case. And I had to 11 basically swear that -- that I destroyed everything and sent 12 everything back. And it’s just -- it’s -- the way that it 13 is -- it’s very complicated, and it’s -- it makes me nervous. 14 And if I’m protecting it anyways, and they are not going 15 anywhere, I don’t see the need for that. 16 THE COURT: Well -- 17 MR. HINOJOSA: The problem is it’s a -- it’s 18 a -- 19 THE COURT: I mean, you all have a cause of 20 action regardless, don’t you? 21 MR. HINOJOSA: Yeah. THE COURT: I mean, the whole idea was -- and 22 23 I read an article recently -- the whole idea is going to be 24 now -- okay, you’re not guaranteed that in fact your cause of 25 action will be heard here. But that’s a different story. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 67 1 MR. HINOJOSA: It’s a logistical nightmare, 2 Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: It is, 4 MR. HINOJOSA: Because we’re in the middle of 5 litigation -- 6 THE COURT: But I understand their -- once it 7 goes to a file, do you really think it’s going to go out 8 anywhere else? 9 MR. ARAMBULA: If I may, Your Honor, it’s no 10 different, once the case settles, we ask for the settlement and 11 release documents, give us everything back, with that -- with 12 the same documents once we settle the case. Whatever we 13 exchange in discovery, give it back with the -- with the 14 settlement release. 15 MR. HINOJOSA: But if you have shared 16 discovery, Your Honor, I mean, the whole purpose of the shared 17 discovery, which is limited in the -- in to this particular law 18 firm -- 19 THE COURT: Okay, guys. 20 I -- I understand. Okay. We started talking 21 about things very broadly. We narrowed it down to, okay, I some 22 really just want them so that I can use them to facilitate 23 of the cases that I am already working on, and for the 24 convenience of not only perhaps maybe this court in other 25 cases, but other judges in, I guess, the state. We talked to CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 68 1 that. 2 So, how long can that go for? You know, it’s 3 like you’re going to have how many cases going on; you may have 4 other State Farm cases in the future. I mean, its going to be 5 perpetual, it seems like it could be. 6 MR. HINOJOSA: But if it stays with the firm, 7 and it can’t be used, I mean, maybe you can put a time limit on 8 it, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: That’s even worse. Because then 10 you lose track of what -- what - - when these cases end and 11 whatnot. So, what I’ll do is I’ll put a time limit, but it 12 will be this way. It will be one year -- has to be either 13 destroyed or returned one year after this case is resolved. 14 MR. HINOJOSA: That’s fine. 15 MR. ARAMBULA: That will work for us, Your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MR. REDGRAVE: If we can address the two aphs 20 19 things you just ruled upon are paragraphs one and paragr 20 of the proposed order, we can submit - - 21 THE COURT: You can either interlineate or 22 submit it to me for -- 23 MR. REDGRAVE: We’ll submit it. 24 MR. TAYLOR: Last thing, Judge. 25 THE COURT: I thought that was the last thing. CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 69 1 MS. DEBOLT: There is one mother motion. 2 MR. TAYLOR: Under 196.4, I requested that any 3 of the electronically stored information to these training 4 materials be produced in native format. 5 THE COURT: What’s the problem with that? 6 MR. REDGRAVE: Your Honor - - 7 MR. ARAMBULA: I am going to step out on this 8 one, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: I just went through an e-discovery 10 training not too -- 11 MR. ARAMBULA: Judge’s conference, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: No, I had to actually go out of 13 state for that. 14 MR. REDGRAVE: Well, Your Honor, this gets to 15 be my issue. And the issue really is about this word “native 16 file”, and whether you can -- should have everything produced 17 in native files. We -- we made our objections. So, I want to 18 cut it down to really what -- what the objections are really 19 about. Under 196.4, as well the other rules of civil 20 procedure, we are allowed to object. And we did make those 21 objections. And the objections are based upon the facts we put as well 22 in the record, the affidavit paragraphs 25 through 32, y in the 23 as the affidavit talks about how information is actuall to this 24 company moved from things like e-mail and other places 25 thing called the enterprise screen system. There it’s locked CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 70 1 down into a read-only format. 2 And when litigation like this ensues, the 3 information is then pulled out to a particular form, or 4 processed. And then we produce it. In this case, we got 5 searchable PDFs. So you can search within, and things like 6 that - - 7 THE COURT: So you gave them -- what type of 8 file did you give them? 9 MR. REDGRAVE: PDF. It’s searchable. There’s 10 some pages that are -- like a picture, you can’t search a 11 picture, right. 12 THE COURT: Why do you want the native format? 13 What information do you want that -- 14 MR. TAYLOR: Well, for example, on the 15 training materials, the PowerPoints, I want any of those 16 documents in native format. The color - 17 THE COURT: You want one in native format 18 precisely for what reason? 19 MR. TAYLOR: Oh, so for example, there are a will 20 lot of versions of a particular training material that 21 come up, and comments or red lines. A lot of times in other be 22 litigation, State Farm has produced a memo, and there will 23 a -- at the top of the memo it will say, the things in red we can’t 24 need to discuss or change, but it’s black and white so I 25 see it. CYNTHtA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 71 1 THE COURT: I tell you what I’m going to do. 2 I will allow for you to bring this up again after you receive 3 it. And if you have reasons to suspect that there is something 4 like that that may be occurring, then bring it up to my 5 attention, and I’ll allow that to -- to potentially be given to 6 you in native format. 7 MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Judge. 8 MR. REDGRAVE: Your Honor, that’s exactly what 9 the courts have done. Thank you. 10 MS. DEBOLT: And then the last thing is our 11 defendant’s motion to compel discovery responses. And I can -- 12 THE COURT: And you agreed to it already? 13 MS. DEBOLT: No. 14 MR. HUSEMAN: We agreed to -- 15 THE COURT: No, I’m sorry. So there’s 16 objections on your part? 17 MR. ARAMBULA: That’s correct. 18 MR. TAYLOR: And we supplemented, and amended, 19 and we produced everything that we -- 20 THE COURT: Do you want to withdraw some of 21 your objections? 22 MR. TAYLOR: Yeah, we did actually. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MS. DEBOLT: Did you provide that to the 25 Court? CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 72 1 Because I don’t have the most recent copy. We 2 got it yesterday. We were already on our way to Laredo when we 3 got all -- 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. HINOJOSA: We’ll give you something 6 without the objections. 7 MS. DEBOLT: Oh, there’s still objections to 8 every request and interrogatory. 9 MR. TAYLOR: Okay. 10 THE COURT: Well , but I don’t want to hear -- 11 I only want to hear the ones that you -- that you put today for 12 the compel -- for a hearing on the motion to compel 13 MS. DEBOLT: Oh. 14 FIR. HUSEMAN: Its their objections, right, to 15 our -- 16 MS. DEBOLT: Their objections. 17 THE COURT: No, I know that. But you set it 18 for a hearing. 19 MS. DEBOLT: Right. This is our motion -- 20 MR. HUSEFIAN: If they withdraw the objections, 21 that makes everybody’s life easier. 22 MR. HINOJOSA: With respect to that issue that 23 you were talking about. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Let’s go through them. 25 Let’s see what -- CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 73 1 MS. DEBOLT: Here are your courts copies. 2 MR. ARAMBULA: Which case are we going to hear 3 first on our motion to compel? 4 THE COURT: Rodriguez and Pena, right? 5 MS. DEBOLT: It is -- we can do Rodriguez 6 first. 7 THE COURT: I think they snuck in. They 8 bamboozled you all. They said 20, 30 minutes. 9 MS. DEBOLT: This really should -- 10 THE COURT: I’ll be right with you all. 11 MR. HINOJOSA: What did you -- may I talk to 12 counsel? What did you want -- 13 MS. DEBOLT: Every single one of our requests 14 was objected to. 15 THE COURT: I tell you what I’m going to do. 16 I’m going to take a real quick one -- I’m going to take this and 17 divorce here that’s going to be given to me real quick, 18 then go -- maybe you can talk about it. 19 MS. DEBOLT: We can confer. 20 THE COURT: Please. 21 MR. ARAMBULA: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: And then maybe I can sneak you in. 23 You all talk about it for a little bit please, 24 but outside of -- not here. 25 (Case recessed while other unrelated matters CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 74 1 were called.) 2 THE COURT: You all want to come back over 3 here? I am about to start this other hearing. 4 MR. HINOJOSA: Your Honor, with respect to the 5 motions to compel -- I think we need -- there really hasn’t 6 been the right kind of conferring in this case with respect to 7 her motion to compel, or their motion to compel. I believe 8 that if we do have that opportunity, we can resolve almost all 9 of them. 10 THE COURT: Y’all want to stick around 11 lunchtime, get you back this afternoon, and we can -- 12 MR. HINOJOSA: Well, I mean, I don’t -- I 13 don’t know that that’s -- 14 MS. DEBOLT: We’re here. Might as well just 15 hash it out. Let’s get it going. 16 MR. HINOJOSA: Well, I mean, a lot of the 17 stuff is stuff that -- for example, documents. They are asking 18 for certain documents to support your claim on this. A lot of 19 those documents are documents that we haven’t gotten yet. 20 We’re going to answer “will supplement”. 21 MS. DEBOLT: They didn’t respond that, Your 22 Honor. And if they’re going to answer “will supplement”, let’s 23 get them to answer “we’ll supplement”. They didn’t respond to 24 anything. 25 FIR. HINOJOSA: Then if we’re going to do this CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 75 1 -- if they are going to insist on doing this, Your Honor, 2 you’re not talking about half-an-hour hearing. You’re talking 3 about a two-hour hearing. That’s what they are asking you to 4 do. But I am -- 5 THE COURT: I am not going to give you a 6 two-hour hearing. I am going to send you back there. You can 7 stick around here this afternoon. And you’re going to have to 8 hash it out. Because I am not going to sit here for a two-hour 9 hearing on little issues, especially when you tell me that you 10 haven’t quite done the right type of conferring. 11 MR. HINOJOSA: There is no question that they 12 have not. MS. DEBOLT: We’re here, Your Honor. We can 13 if 14 go hash it out back, and then get what we need on the record 15 you’d like that. 16 THE COURT: I -- I’d like for you all to be 17 able -- I really believe that in most of these cases there is a lot of room for you all to try and get this done you know, a 18 -- 19 lot of room for you all to work on, And I -- you know what, if your own 20 the choice that I have is you spending two hours on which 21 out there conferring, or me spending it with you, guess 22 one I am going to actually fall on. So, I really do think that 23 if -- MS. DEBOLT: And we have conferred. And I 24 25 have listed -- I sent them a letter telling them what issues we CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 76 1 had, and with which -- with which discovery requests. And so 2 there has been - - 3 THE COURT: All right, guys. 4 MR. HINOJOSA: Conferring is not sending an 5 e-mail. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Let’s not -- give me a 7 second. 8 MR. ARAMBULA: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: I’m -- I’ve got some time 10 constraints of my own here. So, you all -- I wish I could tell 11 you there is a sandwich shop across the street, but there 12 isn’t. So, you decide what you all want to do. I am going to 13 be here all afternoon. You can go -- I have more room in the 14 - - in the jury room. You can use that. You can break for a 15 little bit for lunch or go get something to eat, and then see 16 yourselves back over here here. But I think that you may be 17 able to perhaps maybe sit right now. And then if you really 18 reach it, and you think you need more time, then maybe take it 19 from there. But -- 20 MR. TAYLOR: Thank you. 21 MS. DEBOLT: Thank you. 22 THE COURT: So I’ll see you -- I want a report 23 back from you all with regard to what you’re doing. I am going 24 to -- after this hearing, I am going to go to lunch, and then 25 Ill be back here at 1: 30. So i f you want to be back here at CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 77 1 1:30, and tell me what you’re doing, great. 2 MS. DEBOLT: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 MR. ARAF’lBULA: Yes, Your Honor. 4 May I be excused? 5 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 MR. ARAMBULA: See you back at 1:30. 7 (Case recessed while other unrelated matters 8 were called.) 9 THE BAILIFF: All rise, please. Court is back 10 in session. 11 (No attorneys present.) 12 THE COURT: Thank you. Have a seat, please. 13 I understand that the folks from this morning that were left 14 conferring reached an agreement on the issue of the motion to 15 compel. So I understand that they -- did they file a -- an 16 agreement? Do you know? Just - - they were working on 17 something in written form. They didn’t file it with you? 18 THE CLERK: No. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Maybe Chayo knows. 20 Chayo, do you know if they filed the Rule 11 21 agreement on the motion to compel? 22 THE COORDINATOR: I did not see it. On this 23 case? 24 THE COURT: Not this case. On -- I wish it 25 was something on this case. But not this case, On the Pena -- CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 78 1 Pena, Rodriguez. 2 THE COORDINATOR: They were here, They were 3 going to announce something to you, but they didn’t submit 4 anything to me. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 THE COORDINATOR: I never saw the attorneys. 7 But maybe - - 8 THE COURT: All right. I am going to assume 9 that they in fact have an agreement; that they’re comfortable 10 with what they’ve reached; and what they had to be able to 11 enforce that, and move on. 12 (Proceedings concluded.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR 79 1 REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE 2 THE STATE OF TEXAS 3 COUNTY OF WEBB 4 I, Cynthia Perez Lenz, Official Court Reporter in and for 5 the 49th District Court of Webb and Zapata Counties, State of 6 Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains 7 a true and correct transcription of proceedings requested in 8 writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this 9 volume of the Reporter’s Record, in the above-styled and 10 numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in 11 chanibers and were reported by me. 12 I further certify that this Reporter’s Record of the 13 proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, 14 admitted by the respective parties. 15 I further certify that the total cost for the preparation 16 of this Reporter’s Record is $711.00 and will be paid by 17 Mr. Van Huseman______ 18 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this the 9th day of March, 2015. 19 20 Is! Cynthia Perez Lenz Cynthia Perez Lenz, Texas CSR 6746 21 Expiration Date: 12/31/2015 Official Court Reporter 22 49th District Court 1110 Victoria St., Suite 304 23 Laredo, Texas 78040 Phone: (956) 523-4240 24 Fax: (956) 523-5051 25 CYNTHIA PEREZ LENZ, CSR Filed 3/25/2015 5:17:12 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District 2014CVF001048 Dl NO. 2014CVF001048-DI ALMA PENA, § iN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY § LANIER, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT , ’ 4 JPROTECT1VE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, Texas Rules limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDER.ED that: of this I. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial p,’Z..t 4 ‘-el% / &1c+c\ 4,,c(ji litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) yees) that kLl Pie4r (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its emplo 1 (.j— iii (?fl adjusted this claim and for no other purpose. Confidential Information, or i, ist tti extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Inform ation, shall 1 b of this Order. of sf;4(. r,f•( not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms (ftJ 15 as reasonably -I.e Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced 1fo?e4l1 necessary for use solely in this litigation. .4(k.l ç#1bL4S 1 ; 3 . of any type . -‘ 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information “Confidential” andJor “Trade Secret” by any of the that is designated as nically stored producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electro a document, ESI, information (“ESI”), or other material; information contained in lBlT or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation k 4 J “(Z q; dt.f,( /.., irp — (‘W•%ç ‘arr5lflWuU4 of a-wvathei cvcut on or about June 2OIiwWt1b-Gounty, fes— r4 their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI ls processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officia (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a scaling order; and any any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. ential 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confid for the Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel er, designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Howev e the until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclos shall not Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and grants its be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party under consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person this Order. —other 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person 2 than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall ailvise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shalt retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. g 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meanin the of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the ing document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof contain Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree.fProt. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trale Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of ing the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof contain Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & 3 Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree.IProt. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree.fProt. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE AgreeiProt. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic fi’e may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJJO_PROTECTIVEJ)RDERJN_CAUSE_[insert #1.” When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post-production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the ive file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protect legend: “CONFEDENTIAL-SUBJTO_PROTECTIVE_ORDER_IN_CAUSEjinsert #j” if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or in at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected 4 the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly ) designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, andlor (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identifS’ the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. t b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced withou being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively 7.a. designated by the producing party in the manner describe in paragraph 5 above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8, If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return and/or destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of thc disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 6 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ES1, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such 7 designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shalT be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. II In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that 8 the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Information, lithe Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in infonnal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a,, b., and/or c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific 9 protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order, 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, ES!, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ES!. information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of t information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-clien 10 privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. ‘J Yb” es-4ays if] after the final resolution of this litigation, the 20. Within %rty fly 43 plaintiffIs) shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during 11 _____ __________ this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiff(s) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiffs) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after forty-five (45) business days after the final resolution of this litigation. or vacated This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, filed with the Court, by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ITISSOORDEREDthis dayof JUDGE PRESIDiNG NO. 2014CVF001048-Dl ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § VS. § OF WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND BECKY § LANIER, § Defendants § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER 4 u i ‘(J T, 10 . in order to be provided access to information designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2014CVF001048-Dl represents and agrees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of junsdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. ;] //5 DA ED: cog,qcel f,r 2 7 k 1 e(c:, EXHIBIT A Susan McRoberts From: No-Reply@eFileTexas.gov Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:46 AM To: Susan McRoberts Subject: eFleTexas.gov Notification of Service — - 4613315 Notification of Service Envelope Number: 4613315 This is a notification of service for the filing listed. Please click the link below to retrieve the submitted document. Filing Details Case Number 2014-CVF-001048-D-1 Case Style Date/Time Submitted 3/24/2015 9:45:16 AM Filing Type Proposed Order Filed By Gina Ramirez Other Service Contacts not associated with a party on the case: Van Huseman (vhusemanhusemanstewart.com) Service Contacts Tiffany DeBolt (tdebolt(ãThusemanstewart,com) Susan McRoberts (smcrobertshusemanstewart.com) Document Details https://efile.txcourts.qovNiewServiceDocuments.aspx?ADMlN0&SlD=9a9a74ad- F’I 0 ampe d 7be2-4070-a9fd-f3bl b04ecc75&RlD=0ba8ecca.c35741 1 3-b5bb-b55eaefl al cc OPY This link is active for 7 days. Please do not reply to this email, It was generated automatically by eFileTexas.gov TAB 12 OF THE RECORD 2015-05-27 05:15 49TH DISTRICT COURT 9565234234 >> ÷9566825275 P 2/2 CAUSE NO. 2014CVF0$ Dl ALMA PENA, IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT PlaintLff * § vs. 49th JUDICIAL DISTRICT § STATE FARM LLOYDS ANT) BECKY LAMER, § Detndants § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS UNOPPOSED ORDER GRANTiNG MOTION OF ATTORNEYS HUSEMAN & STEWART P.LL.C. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS - Came on to be heard the Unopposed Motion of Attorneys Husernan & Stewart P.LLC., including Van Huseman and Tiffany DeBolt to Withdraw as Attorneys of Record and for Substitution of counsel for Defendants. The Court, having considered the Motion, finds that it is well taken. IT [5, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the law finn of L-IIISEMAN & STEWART, P.LJ..C. including attorneys Van Huseman and Tiffany Dc Bolt, are withdrawn us attorneys for Defendants and are substituted by the law firm of ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP and Sofia A. Rarnon and Dan K. Worthington as attorneys for Defendants. SIGNED the day of A-k4 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING xc: J. Sitv- MltLyn, ‘flIE MOS-rYN LAW FIRM, 38)0 Wcg Ala,xm Sire, riotojon, T u 7027: (7)3) 861-6616: . Attorney Cur PluintiCIi Vto Husemno and Tiffany DcBnh, HUSEMAN & SThWAR’L’, 6)5 N. Upper Broadway, Suite 2 Fax; 361-883-0210, id u.’c,I,atotes,II.rn,n. Aooi’ney4 for Defendanb. Corpuschrist), TX 78401-0781; Sofut P Rauxus. Dan K. Worthington, Elizabeth S. Ctntu, ATLAS, ETALL & RODKIOUEZ, LU . 818 West Pecan Boulevard, 5 McA)k’n. Tuxto 78501; Iax: (956) 6116-6109; srstnnn88aiIshu1l’oi;L dlcw@atlss)uhl,Lorn. C thiis)slat1l,p; Attorneys mr Dcfcndsnis, Received May—27—2015 10:OOag From—4ITH DISTRICT COURT To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 002 TAB 13 OF THE RECORD 2015-05-27 05:10 49TH DISTRICT COURT 9565234234 >> ÷9566825275 P 2/2 CAUSE NO. 2014CVFOOI (62 Dl RALJL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI * IN THE DISTRICT COURT RODRIGUEZ, * Phiintiffs § 1h 49 § JUDICIAL DISTRICT vs. * STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § FELIPE FARIAS, * Defendants WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION OF ATTORNEYS RUSEMAN & STEWART P.LLC. TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS Caine on to be heard the Unopposed Motion of Attorneys Husernan & Stewart P.LLC., including Van Huseman and Tiffany DeBolt to Withdraw as Attorneys of Record and for Substitution of counsel for Defendants. The Court, having considered the Motion, finds that it is well taken. IT IS, THEREPORE, ORDERED that the law firm of HUSEMAN & STEWART, P.L.LC. including attorneys Van Huseinan and Tiffany De Bolt, are withdrawn as attorneys for Defendants and are substituted by the law firm of ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ. LLP and Sofia A. Ranion and Dan K. Worthington as attorneys for Defendants. SIGNED (he 2. day of __ C-f 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING C: i. Steve Mottyn, ThB MOSTYN LAW FIRM. 3510 Weal Alabama Stnttt, Iloueton. 02 Faa: (713) 861-6616; p.nlock.IJ,nyajawi!an; Altornoy for PIliiiiffs. Van Hu,cmjuz und ‘Tiffany DeBolt, HUSEMAN & SThWAR’I’, 615 N, Upper Broadway, Suite Curpuu Cbsiuti. TX 15401-0781 Faa: 361.883-0210, IdbulE@h majj8!pwur.eom, Attorneys fo Palendunis. Sofia A. Ramon, Dan K. Worthington, Elizabeth S. CaMu, ATLAS. HALL & RUDRLt3UEZ, LU’, 818 West Pecan Soulevani, McAIlen, Tetius 18501; Fax: i056) 6$6-6I08 501 nn@r1asflajjctini. g’dkih&Leom. ecsnl dIaahatI,’-, Aw.ancys for DcfcndarlLc. R6ceived May—27—2015 09:S5arn Fro,n—4OTH DISTRICT COURT To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Pags 002 TAB 14 OF THE RECORD Filed 6/16/2015 2:29:23 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Michelle Garza CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-D1 2014-CVF-001048-D1 ALMA PENA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER, § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Alma Pena (“Plaintiff”), and files this Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition, complaining of State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”), Becky Lanier (“Lanier”), and Ray Padilla (“Padilla”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”), and for cause of action, Plaintiff would respectfully show this Honorable Court the following: DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 1. Plaintiff intends for discovery to be conducted under Level 3 of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This case involves complex issues and will require extensive discovery. Therefore, Plaintiff will ask the Court to order that discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery control plan tailored to the particular circumstances of this suit. PARTIES 2. Plaintiff Alma Pena is an individual residing in Webb County, Texas. 3. Defendant State Farm is an insurance company engaging in the business of insurance in the State of Texas. This defendant has appeared and answered herein. No citation is requested at this time. 4. Defendant Becky Lanier is an individual residing in and domiciled in the State of Texas. This defendant has appeared and answered herein. No citation is requested at this time. 5. Defendant Ray Padilla is an individual residing in and domiciled in the State of Texas. This defendant may be served with personal process by a process server at his place of residence at 3718 Prince George Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78230. JURISDICTION 6. The Court has jurisdiction over this cause of action because the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court. Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief over $200,000 but not more than $1,000,000. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her petition during and/or after the discovery process. 7. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant State Farm because this defendant is a foreign insurance company that engages in the business of insurance in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. 8. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Lanier because this defendant engages in the business of adjusting insurance claims in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. 9. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Padilla because this defendant engages in the business of adjusting insurance claims in the State of Texas, and Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. Page 2 VENUE 10. Venue is proper in Webb County, Texas, because the insured property is situated in Webb County, Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §15.032. FACTS 11. Plaintiff is the owners of a Texas Homeowners’ Insurance Policy (hereinafter referred to as “the Policy”), which was issued by State Farm. 12. Plaintiff owns the insured property, which is specifically located at 1014 Reagan Dr., Laredo, Texas 78046, in Webb County (hereinafter referred to as “the Property”). 13. State Farm sold the Policy insuring the Property to Plaintiff. 14. On or about June 7, 2013, a hail storm and/or windstorm struck Webb County, Texas, causing severe damage to homes and businesses throughout the area, including Plaintiff’s residence (“the Storm”). Specifically, Plaintiff’s roof sustained extensive damage during the Storm. Water intrusion through the roof caused significant damage throughout the entire home including, but not limited to, the home’s ceilings, walls, insulation, and flooring. Plaintiff’s home also sustained substantial structural and exterior damage during the Storm, as well as damage to the play set. After the Storm, Plaintiff filed a claim with her insurance company, State Farm, for the damages to her home caused by the Storm. 15. Plaintiff submitted a claim to State Farm against the Policy for Other Structure Damage, Roof Damage, Structural Damage, Water Damage, and Wind Damage the Property sustained as a result of the Storm. Page 3 16. Plaintiff asked that State Farm cover the cost of repairs to the Property pursuant to the Policy, including but not limited to, repair and/or replacement of the roof and play set and repair of the and interior water damages, pursuant to the Policy. 17. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendant Lanier as the adjuster on the claim. The adjuster assigned to Plaintiff’s claim was improperly trained and failed to perform a thorough investigation of Plaintiff’s claim. On or about December 3, 2013, Lanier conducted a substandard inspection of Plaintiff’s Property. For example, Lanier spent a mere fifteen (15) minutes inspecting Plaintiff’s entire Property for Storm damages. Furthermore, Lanier was uncooperative and quick to discount any damages that Plaintiff pointed out. The inadequacy of Lanier’s inspection is further evidenced by her report, which failed to include all of Plaintiff’s Storm damages noted upon inspection. For example, Lanier failed to include many of the damages to the home’s roof and interior, as well as the damages to Plaintiff’s play set. Moreover, the damages that Lanier actually included in her report were grossly undervalued, in part because she both underestimated and undervalued the cost of materials required for necessary repairs, incorrectly applied material sales tax, and failed to include contractor’s overhead and profit. Ultimately, Lanier’s estimate did not allow adequate funds to cover the cost of repairs to all the damages sustained. 18. Padilla also actively participated in the handling of Plaintiff’s claim but failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Specifically, he reviewed reports, documents and/or information regarding the claim. Defendant Padilla also failed to thoroughly review and properly oversee Lanier’s work, ultimately approving and/or submitting an improper adjustment and an inadequate resolution to Plaintiff’s claim. Had Defendant Padilla Page 4 performed even a cursory review of Lanier’s work on Plaintiff’s claim, it would have been clear that Plaintiff’s claim was completely mishandled. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, this did not happen. Lanier’s and Padilla’s inadequate investigation was relied upon by Defendant State Farm in this action and resulted in Plaintiff’s claim being undervalued and underpaid. 19. Padilla failed to adequately supervise Lanier resulting in the unreasonable investigation and improper handling of Plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, State Farm and Padilla, along with other State Farm personnel, failed to thoroughly review and properly oversee the work of the assigned claims representative and adjusters, including Defendant Lanier, ultimately approving an improper adjustment and an inadequate, unfair settlement of Plaintiff’s claim. As a result of this unreasonable investigation, Plaintiff was considerably underpaid on her claim and has suffered damages. 20. Together, Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla set out to deny and/or underpay on properly covered damages. As a result of this unreasonable investigation, including the under-scoping of Plaintiff’s Storm damages during the investigation and failure to provide full coverage for the damages sustained, Plaintiff’s claim was improperly adjusted, and she was denied adequate and sufficient payment to repair her home. The mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim has also caused a delay in her ability to fully repair her home, which has resulted in additional damages. To date, Plaintiff has yet to receive the full payment to which she is entitled under the Policy. 21. As detailed in the paragraphs below, State Farm wrongfully denied Plaintiff’s claim for repairs of the Property, even though the Policy provided coverage for losses such as those suffered by Plaintiff. Furthermore, State Farm underpaid some of Plaintiff’s claims by Page 5 not providing full coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiff, as well as under- scoping the damages during its investigation. 22. To date, State Farm continues to delay in the payment for the damages to the property. As such, Plaintiff has not been paid in full for the damages to her home. 23. Defendant State Farm failed to perform its contractual duties to adequately compensate Plaintiff under the terms of the Policy. Specifically, it refused to pay the full proceeds of the Policy, although due demand was made for proceeds to be paid in an amount sufficient to cover the damaged property, and all conditions precedent to recovery upon the Policy had been carried out and accomplished by Plaintiff. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract between State Farm and Plaintiff. 24. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla misrepresented to Plaintiff that the damage to the Property was not covered under the Policy, even though the damage was caused by a covered occurrence. Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 25. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla failed to make an attempt to settle Plaintiff’s claim in a fair manner, although they were aware of their liability to Plaintiff under the Policy. Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 26. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla failed to explain to Plaintiff the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla failed to offer Plaintiff adequate compensation, without any explanation why full Page 6 payment was not being made. Furthermore, Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiff’s claim. Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, and Padilla’s conduct is a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 27. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla failed to affirm or deny coverage of Plaintiff’s claim within a reasonable time. Specifically, Plaintiff did not receive timely indication of acceptance or rejection, regarding the full and entire claim, in writing from Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla. Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 28. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla refused to fully compensate Plaintiff under the terms of the Policy, even though Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Specifically, Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla performed an outcome-oriented investigation of Plaintiff’s claim, which resulted in a biased, unfair, and inequitable evaluation of Plaintiff’s losses on the Property. Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). 29. Defendant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding timely acknowledging Plaintiff’s claim, beginning an investigation of Plaintiff’s claim, and requesting all information reasonably necessary to investigate Plaintiff’s claim, within the statutorily mandated time of receiving notice of Plaintiff’s Page 7 claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.055. 30. Defendant State Farm failed to accept or deny Plaintiff’s full and entire claim within the statutorily mandated time of receiving all necessary information. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.056. 31. Defendant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding payment of claim without delay. Specifically, it has delayed full payment of Plaintiff’s claim longer than allowed, and, to date, Plaintiff has not received full payment for her claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. 32. From and after the time Plaintiff’s claim was presented to Defendant State Farm, the liability of State Farm to pay the full claim in accordance with the terms of the Policy was reasonably clear. However, State Farm has refused to pay Plaintiff in full, despite there being no basis whatsoever on which a reasonable insurance company would have relied to deny the full payment. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. 33. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla knowingly or recklessly made false representations, as described above, as to material facts and/or knowingly concealed all or part of material information from Plaintiff. 34. As a result of Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, Padilla’s wrongful acts and omissions, Plaintiff was forced to retain the professional services of the attorney and law firm who are representing her with respect to these causes of action. Page 8 35. Plaintiff’s experience is not an isolated case. The acts and omissions State Farm committed in this case, or similar acts and omissions, occur with such frequency that they constitute a general business practice of State Farm with regard to handling these types of claims. State Farm's entire process is unfairly designed to reach favorable outcomes for the company at the expense of the policyholders. CAUSES OF ACTION: CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST LANIER AND PADILLA NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAIR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 36. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendant Lanier and Padilla to adjust the claim. Defendants Lanier and Padilla were improperly trained to handle claims of this nature and performed an unreasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s damages. During the investigation, the adjusters failed to properly assess Plaintiff’s hail storm and/or windstorm damages. The adjusters also omitted covered damages from their reports, including many of Plaintiff’s interior damages. In addition, the damages that the adjusters did include in the estimate were severely underestimated. 37. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §541.151. 38. Defendants Lanier and Padilla are each individually liable for their unfair and deceptive acts, irrespective of the fact each was acting on behalf of State Farm, because each is a “person” as defined by TEX. INS. CODE §541.002(2). The term “person” is defined as “any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, Lloyds plan, fraternal benefit society, or other legal entity engaged in the Page 9 business of insurance, including an agent, broker, adjuster or life and health insurance counselor.” TEX. INS. CODE §541.002(2) (emphasis added). (See also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998) (holding an insurance company employee to be a “person” for the purpose of bringing a cause of action against him or her under the Texas Insurance Code and subjecting him or her to individual liability)). 39. Falsehoods and misrepresentations may be communicated by actions as well as by the spoken word; therefore, deceptive conduct is equivalent to a verbal representation. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s misrepresentations by means of deceptive conduct include, but are not limited to: (1) failing to conduct a reasonable inspection and investigation of Plaintiff’s damages; (2) stating that Plaintiff’s damages were less severe than they in fact were; (3) using their own statements about the non-severity of the damage as a basis for denying properly covered damages and/or underpaying damages; and (4) failing to provide an adequate explanation for the inadequate compensation Plaintiff received. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above and the example given herein, of misrepresenting to Plaintiff material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 40. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, even though liability under the Policy is reasonably clear, constitutes an unfair Page 10 method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 41. Defendants Lanier and Padilla failed to explain to Plaintiff the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendants Lanier and Padilla failed to offer Plaintiff adequate compensation without any explanation as to why full payment was not being made. Furthermore, Defendants did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiff’s claim. The unfair settlement practice of Defendants Lanier and Padilla as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiff with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the offer of a compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 42. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiff, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiff, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 43. Defendants Lanier and Padilla did not properly inspect the Property and failed to account for and/or undervalued many of Plaintiff’s exterior and interior damages, although reported by Plaintiff to State Farm. Defendants Lanier’s and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiff’s claim without conducting a Page 11 reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 44. Plaintiff is not making any claims for relief under federal law. FRAUD 45. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla are liable to Plaintiff for common law fraud. 46. Each and every one of the representations, as described above, concerned material facts for the reason that absent such representations, Plaintiff would not have acted as she did, and which Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla knew were false or made recklessly without any knowledge of their truth as a positive assertion. 47. The statements were made with the intention that they should be acted upon by Plaintiff, who in turn acted in reliance upon the statements, thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer injury and constituting common law fraud. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FRAUD 48. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla are liable to Plaintiff for conspiracy to commit fraud. Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla were members of a combination of two or more persons whose object was to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. In reaching a meeting of the minds regarding the course of action to be taken against Plaintiff, Defendants State Farm, Lanier, and Padilla committed an unlawful, overt act to further the object or course of action. Plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result. Page 12 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST STATE FARM ONLY 49. Defendant State Farm is liable to Plaintiff for intentional breach of contract, as well as intentional violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and intentional breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. BREACH OF CONTRACT 50. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract made between State Farm and Plaintiff. 51. Defendant State Farm’s failure and/or refusal, as described above, to pay adequate compensation as it is obligated to do under the terms of the Policy in question, and under the laws of the State of Texas, constitutes a breach of State Farm’s insurance contract with Plaintiff. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAIR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 52. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §541.151. 53. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of misrepresenting to Plaintiff material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 54. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, even though State Farm’s liability under the Policy was reasonably clear, constitutes an Page 13 unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 55. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiff with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for its offer of a compromise settlement of the claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 56. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiff, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiff, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 57. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiff’s claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS 58. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. All violations made under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §542.060. 59. Defendant State Farm’s failure to acknowledge receipt of Plaintiff’s claim, commence investigation of the claim, and request from Plaintiff all items, statements, and forms that it reasonably believed would be required within the applicable time constraints, as Page 14 described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of claims and a violation of TEX. INS. CODE §542.055. 60. Defendant State Farm’s failure to notify Plaintiff in writing of its acceptance or rejection of the claim within the applicable time constraints constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.056. 61. Defendant State Farm’s delay of the payment of Plaintiff’s claim following its receipt of all items, statements, and forms reasonably requested and required, longer than the amount of time provided for, as described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. ACTS CONSTITUTING ACTING AS AGENT 62. As referenced and described above, and further conduct throughout this litigation and lawsuit, Lanier and Padilla are agents of State Farm based on their acts during the handling of this claim, including inspections, adjustments, and aiding in adjusting a loss for or on behalf of the insurer. TEX. INS. CODE §4001.051. 63. Separately, and/or in the alternative, as referenced and described above, State Farm ratified the actions and conduct of Lanier and Padilla, including the completion of their duties under the common law and statutory law. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 64. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds in insurance contracts. 65. Defendant State Farm’s failure, as described above, to adequately and reasonably investigate and evaluate Plaintiff’s claim, although, at that time, State Farm knew or Page 15 should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that its liability was reasonably clear, constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. KNOWLEDGE 66. Each of the acts described above, together and singularly, was done “knowingly,” as that term is used in the Texas Insurance Code, and was a producing cause of Plaintiff’s damages described herein. DAMAGES 67. Plaintiff would show that all of the aforementioned acts, taken together or singularly, constitute the producing causes of the damages sustained by Plaintiff. 68. As previously mentioned, the damages caused by the June 7, 2013 hail storm and/or windstorm have not been properly addressed or repaired in the months since the Storm, causing further damages to the Property, and causing undue hardship and burden to Plaintiff. These damages are a direct result of Defendants State Farm’s, Lanier’s, and Padilla’s mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim in violation of the laws set forth above. 69. For breach of contract, Plaintiff is entitled to regain the benefit of her bargain, which is the amount of her claim, together with attorney’s fees. 70. For noncompliance with the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices, Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, which include the loss of the benefits that should have been paid pursuant to the policy, mental anguish, court costs, and attorney's fees. For knowing conduct of the acts described above, Plaintiff asks for three times her actual damages. TEX. INS. CODE §541.152. 71. For noncompliance with Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims, Plaintiff is entitled to the amount of her claim, as well as eighteen (18) percent interest per annum on Page 16 the amount of such claim as damages, together with attorney's fees. TEX. INS. CODE §542.060. 72. For breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, including all forms of loss resulting from the insurer's breach of duty, such as additional costs, economic hardship, losses due to nonpayment of the amount the insurer owed, exemplary damages, and damages for emotional distress. 73. For fraud, Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages and exemplary damages for knowingly fraudulent and malicious representations, along with attorney’s fees, interest, and court costs. 74. For the prosecution and collection of this claim, Plaintiff has been compelled to engage the services of the attorney whose name is subscribed to this pleading. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum for the reasonable and necessary services of Plaintiff’s attorney in the preparation and trial of this action, including any appeals to the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court of Texas. JURY DEMAND 75. Plaintiff previously requested that all causes of action alleged herein be tried before a jury consisting of citizens residing in Webb County, Texas. Plaintiff has tendered the appropriate jury fee. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that upon trial hereof, said Plaintiff have and recover such sums as would reasonably and justly compensate her in accordance with the rules of law and procedure, as to actual damages, treble damages under the Texas Insurance Code, and all punitive and exemplary damages as may be found. In addition, Page 17 Plaintiff requests the award of attorney’s fees for the trial and any appeal of this case, for all costs of Court on her behalf expended, for prejudgment and postjudgment interest as allowed by law, and for any other and further relief, either at law or in equity, to which she may show herself justly entitled. Respectfully submitted, MOSTYN LAW /s/ J. Steve Mostyn J. Steve Mostyn State Bar No. 00798389 rmsdocketefile@mostynlaw.com 3810 W. Alabama Street Houston, Texas 77027 (713) 714-0000 (Office) (713) 714-1111 (Facsimile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded to all counsel of record on this 16th day of June, 2015 in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. /s/ J. Steve Mostyn J. Steve Mostyn Page 18 TAB 15 OF THE RECORD Filed 6/16/2015 2:24:29 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Michelle Garza CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001162-D1 2014-CVF-001162-D1 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ, § Plaintiffs, § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § FELIPE FARIAS, § Defendants. § 49TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COME NOW, Raul Rodriguez and Noemi Rodriguez (“Plaintiffs”), and file this Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition, complaining of State Farm Lloyds (“State Farm”), Felipe Farias (“Farias”), and Raymond Padilla (“Padilla”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”), and for cause of action, Plaintiffs would respectfully show this Honorable Court the following: DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 1. Plaintiffs intend for discovery to be conducted under Level 3 of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This case involves complex issues and will require extensive discovery. Therefore, Plaintiffs will ask the Court to order that discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery control plan tailored to the particular circumstances of this suit. PARTIES 2. Plaintiffs Raul Rodriguez and Noemi Rodriguez are individuals residing in Webb County, Texas. 3. Defendant State Farm is an insurance company engaging in the business of insurance in the State of Texas. This defendant has appeared and answered. No citation is requested at this time. 4. Defendant Felipe Farias is an individual residing in and domiciled in the State of Texas. This defendant has appeared and answered. No citation is requested at this time. 5. Defendant Ray Padilla is an individual residing in and domiciled in the State of Texas. This defendant may be served with personal process by a process server at his place of residence at 3718 Prince George Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78230. JURISDICTION 6. The Court has jurisdiction over this cause of action because the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court. Plaintiffs are seeking monetary relief over $200,000 but not more than $1,000,000. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend their petition during and/or after the discovery process. 7. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant State Farm because this defendant is a foreign insurance company that engages in the business of insurance in the State of Texas, and Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. 8. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Farias because this defendant engages in the business of adjusting insurance claims in the State of Texas, and Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. 9. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Padilla because this defendant engages in the business of adjusting insurance claims in the State of Texas, and Plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of this defendant’s business activities in the State of Texas. Page 2 VENUE 10. Venue is proper in Webb County, Texas, because the insured property is situated in Webb County, Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §15.032. FACTS 11. Plaintiffs are the owners of a Texas Homeowners’ Insurance Policy (hereinafter referred to as “the Policy”), which was issued by State Farm. 12. Plaintiffs own the insured property, which is specifically located at 3120 Zacatecas St., Laredo, Texas 78043, in Webb County (hereinafter referred to as “the Property”). 13. State Farm sold the Policy insuring the Property to Plaintiffs. 14. On or about June 7, 2013 and/or June 14, 2013, a hail storm and/or windstorm struck Webb County, Texas, causing severe damage to homes and businesses throughout the area, including Plaintiffs’ residence (collectively “the Storm”). Specifically, Plaintiffs’ roof sustained extensive damage during the Storm. Water intrusion through the roof caused significant damage throughout the entire home including, but not limited to, the home’s ceilings, walls, insulation, and flooring. Plaintiffs’ home also sustained substantial structural and exterior damage during the Storm including, but not limited to, the stucco siding. Shortly after the Storm, Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company, State Farm, for the damages to their home caused by the Storm. 15. Plaintiffs submitted a claim to State Farm against the Policy for Roof Damage, Structural Damage, Water Damage, and Wind Damage the Property sustained as a result of the Storm. Page 3 16. Plaintiffs asked that State Farm cover the cost of repairs to the Property, including but not limited to, repair and/or replacement of the roof and repair of the siding and interior water damages, pursuant to the Policy. 17. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendants Farias and Padilla as the individual adjusters on the claim. The adjusters assigned to Plaintiffs’ claim were improperly trained and failed to perform a thorough investigation of Plaintiffs’ claim. On or about June 26, 2013, Farias conducted a substandard inspection of Plaintiffs’ Property. For example, Farias spent a mere hour inspecting Plaintiffs’ entire Property for Storm damages. The inadequacy of Farias’ inspection is further evidenced by his report, which failed to include all of Plaintiffs’ Storm damages noted upon inspection. For example, Farias failed to include the damages to the home’s roof and siding in his report. Moreover, the damages that Farias actually included in his report were grossly undervalued, in part because he both underestimated and undervalued the cost of materials required for necessary repairs and incorrectly applied material sales tax. Ultimately, Farias’ estimate did not allow adequate funds to cover the cost of repairs to all the damages sustained. Farias’ inadequate investigation was relied upon by State Farm and Padilla in this action and resulted in Plaintiffs’ claim being undervalued and underpaid. 18. Defendant Padilla also actively participated in the adjustment of Plaintiffs’ claim but failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Specifically, Padilla was the State Farm manager assigned to Plaintiffs’ claim and reviewed reports, documents, and information regarding the claim. Padilla approved Farias’ estimate, even though it failed to include many of Plaintiffs’ damages, undervalued the damages it did include, and incorrectly Page 4 applied material sales tax. Ultimately, Padilla failed to thoroughly review Farias’ assessment of the claim and approved an inadequate adjustment of Plaintiffs’ claim. 19. Together, Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla set about to deny and/or underpay on properly covered damages. As a result of these Defendants’ unreasonable investigation of the claim, including not providing full coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiffs, as well as under-scoping the damages during their investigation and thus denying adequate and sufficient payment to Plaintiffs to repair their home, Plaintiffs’ claim was improperly adjusted. The mishandling of Plaintiffs’ claim has also caused a delay in their ability to fully repair their home, which has resulted in additional damages. To this date, Plaintiffs have yet to receive the full payment to which they are entitled under the Policy. 20. As detailed in the paragraphs below, State Farm wrongfully denied Plaintiffs’ claim for repairs of the Property, even though the Policy provided coverage for losses such as those suffered by Plaintiffs. Furthermore, State Farm underpaid some of Plaintiffs’ claims by not providing full coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiffs, as well as under- scoping the damages during its investigation. 21. To date, State Farm continues to delay in the payment for the damages to the Property. As such, Plaintiffs have not been paid in full for the damages to their home. 22. Defendant State Farm failed to perform its contractual duties to adequately compensate Plaintiffs under the terms of the Policy. Specifically, it refused to pay the full proceeds of the Policy, although due demand was made for proceeds to be paid in an amount sufficient to cover the damaged property, and all conditions precedent to recovery upon Page 5 the Policy had been carried out and accomplished by Plaintiffs. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract between State Farm and Plaintiffs. 23. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the damage to the Property was not covered under the Policy, even though the damage was caused by a covered occurrence. Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 24. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla failed to make an attempt to settle Plaintiffs’ claim in a fair manner, although they were aware of their liability to Plaintiffs under the Policy. Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 25. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla failed to explain to Plaintiffs the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla failed to offer Plaintiffs adequate compensation, without any explanation why full payment was not being made. Furthermore, Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiffs’ claim. Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s conduct is a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 26. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla failed to affirm or deny coverage of Plaintiffs’ claim within a reasonable time. Specifically, Plaintiffs did not receive timely indication Page 6 of acceptance or rejection, regarding the full and entire claim, in writing from Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla. Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 27. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla refused to fully compensate Plaintiffs under the terms of the Policy, even though Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Specifically, Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla performed an outcome-oriented investigation of Plaintiffs’ claim, which resulted in a biased, unfair, and inequitable evaluation of Plaintiffs’ losses on the Property. Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). 28. Defendant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding timely acknowledging Plaintiffs’ claim, beginning an investigation of Plaintiffs’ claim, and requesting all information reasonably necessary to investigate Plaintiffs’ claim, within the statutorily mandated time of receiving notice of Plaintiffs’ claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.055. 29. Defendant State Farm failed to accept or deny Plaintiffs’ full and entire claim within the statutorily mandated time of receiving all necessary information. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.056. 30. Defendant State Farm failed to meet its obligations under the Texas Insurance Code regarding payment of claim without delay. Specifically, it has delayed full payment of Page 7 Plaintiffs’ claim longer than allowed and, to date, Plaintiffs have not received full payment for their claim. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. 31. From and after the time Plaintiffs’ claim was presented to Defendant State Farm, the liability of State Farm to pay the full claim in accordance with the terms of the Policy was reasonably clear. However, State Farm has refused to pay Plaintiffs in full, despite there being no basis whatsoever on which a reasonable insurance company would have relied to deny the full payment. State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. 32. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla knowingly or recklessly made false representations, as described above, as to material facts and/or knowingly concealed all or part of material information from Plaintiffs. 33. As a result of Defendants State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s wrongful acts and omissions, Plaintiffs were forced to retain the professional services of the attorney and law firm who are representing them with respect to these causes of action. 34. Plaintiffs’ experience is not an isolated case. The acts and omissions State Farm committed in this case, or similar acts and omissions, occur with such frequency that they constitute a general business practice of State Farm with regard to handling these types of claims. State Farm's entire process is unfairly designed to reach favorable outcomes for the company at the expense of the policyholders. Page 8 CAUSES OF ACTION: CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT FARIAS AND PADILLA NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAIR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 35. Defendant State Farm assigned Defendants Farias and Padilla to adjust the claim. Defendants Farias and Padilla were improperly trained to handle claims of this nature and performed an unreasonable investigation of Plaintiffs’ damages. During his investigation, the adjusters failed to properly assess Plaintiffs’ Storm damages. The adjusters also omitted covered damages from their report(s), including the damages to the home’s roof and siding. In addition, the damages that the adjusters did include in the estimate were severely underestimated. 36. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §541.151. 37. Defendants Farias and Padilla are each individually liable for their unfair and deceptive acts, irrespective of the fact they were acting on behalf of State Farm, because they are each a “person” as defined by TEX. INS. CODE §541.002(2). The term “person” is defined as “any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, Lloyds plan, fraternal benefit society, or other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including an agent, broker, adjuster or life and health insurance counselor.” TEX. INS. CODE §541.002(2) (emphasis added); see also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998) (holding an insurance company employee to be a “person” for the purpose of bringing a cause of Page 9 action against him or her under the Texas Insurance Code and subjecting him or her to individual liability). 38. Falsehoods and misrepresentations may be communicated by actions as well as by the spoken word; therefore, deceptive conduct is equivalent to a verbal representation. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s misrepresentations by means of deceptive conduct include, but are not limited to: (1) failing to conduct a reasonable inspection and investigation of Plaintiffs’ damages; (2) stating that Plaintiffs’ damages were less severe than they in fact were; (3) using their own statements about the non-severity of the damage as a basis for denying properly covered damages and/or underpaying damages; and (4) failing to provide an adequate explanation for the inadequate compensation Plaintiffs received. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above and the example given herein, of misrepresenting to Plaintiffs material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 39. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, even though liability under the Policy is reasonably clear, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 40. Defendants Farias and Padilla failed to explain to Plaintiffs the reasons for their offer of an inadequate settlement. Specifically, Defendants Farias and Padilla failed to offer Plaintiffs adequate compensation without any explanation as to why full payment was not Page 10 being made. Furthermore, Defendants Farias and Padilla did not communicate that any future settlements or payments would be forthcoming to pay for the entire losses covered under the Policy, nor did they provide any explanation for the failure to adequately settle Plaintiffs’ claim. The unfair settlement practice of Defendants Farias and Padilla as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiffs with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the offer of a compromise settlement of Plaintiffs’ claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 41. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiffs, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiffs, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 42. Defendants Farias and Padilla did not properly inspect the Property and failed to account for and/or undervalued many of Plaintiffs’ exterior and interior damages, although reported by Plaintiffs to State Farm. Defendants Farias’ and Padilla’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiffs’ claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 43. Plaintiffs are not making any claims for relief under federal law. Page 11 FRAUD 44. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla are liable to Plaintiffs for common law fraud. 45. Each and every one of the representations, as described above, concerned material facts for the reason that absent such representations, Plaintiffs would not have acted as they did, and which Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla knew were false or made recklessly without any knowledge of their truth as a positive assertion. 46. The statements were made with the intention that they should be acted upon by Plaintiffs, who in turn acted in reliance upon the statements, thereby causing Plaintiffs to suffer injury and constituting common law fraud. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FRAUD 47. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla are liable to Plaintiffs for conspiracy to commit fraud. Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla were members of a combination of two or more persons whose object was to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. In reaching a meeting of the minds regarding the course of action to be taken against Plaintiffs, Defendants State Farm, Farias, and Padilla committed an unlawful, overt act to further the object or course of action. Plaintiffs suffered injury as a proximate result. CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST STATE FARM ONLY 48. Defendant State Farm is liable to Plaintiffs for intentional breach of contract, as well as intentional violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and intentional breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Page 12 BREACH OF CONTRACT 49. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the insurance contract made between State Farm and Plaintiffs. 50. Defendant State Farm’s failure and/or refusal, as described above, to pay adequate compensation as it is obligated to do under the terms of the Policy in question, and under the laws of the State of Texas, constitutes a breach of State Farm’s insurance contract with Plaintiffs. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: UNFAIR SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 51. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a). All violations under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §541.151. 52. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of misrepresenting to Plaintiffs material facts relating to the coverage at issue, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(1). 53. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim, even though State Farm’s liability under the Policy was reasonably clear, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(2)(A). 54. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing to promptly provide Plaintiffs with a reasonable explanation of the basis in the Policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for its offer of a compromise settlement of the Page 13 claim, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(3). 55. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of failing within a reasonable time to affirm or deny coverage of the claim to Plaintiffs, or to submit a reservation of rights to Plaintiffs, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(4). 56. Defendant State Farm’s unfair settlement practice, as described above, of refusing to pay Plaintiffs’ claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE §541.060(a)(7). NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS INSURANCE CODE: THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS 57. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes multiple violations of the Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims. All violations made under this article are made actionable by TEX. INS. CODE §542.060. 58. Defendant State Farm’s failure to acknowledge receipt of Plaintiffs’ claim, commence investigation of the claim, and request from Plaintiffs all items, statements, and forms that it reasonably believed would be required within the applicable time constraints, as described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of claims and a violation of TEX. INS. CODE §542.055. 59. Defendant State Farm’s failure to notify Plaintiffs in writing of its acceptance or rejection of the claim within the applicable time constraints constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.056. Page 14 60. Defendant State Farm’s delay of the payment of Plaintiffs’ claim following its receipt of all items, statements, and forms reasonably requested and required, longer than the amount of time provided for, as described above, constitutes a non-prompt payment of the claim. TEX. INS. CODE §542.058. ACTS CONSTITUTING ACTING AS AGENT 61. As referenced and described above, and further conduct throughout this litigation and lawsuit, Farias and Padilla are agents of State Farm based on their acts during the handling of this claim, including inspections, adjustments, and aiding in adjusting a loss for or on behalf of the insurer. TEX. INS. CODE §4001.051. 62. Separately, and/or in the alternative, as referenced and described above, State Farm ratified the actions and conduct of Farias and Padilla, including the completion of their duties under the common law and statutory law. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 63. Defendant State Farm’s conduct constitutes a breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds in insurance contracts. 64. Defendant State Farm’s failure, as described above, to adequately and reasonably investigate and evaluate Plaintiffs’ claim, although, at that time, State Farm knew or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that its liability was reasonably clear, constitutes a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. KNOWLEDGE 65. Each of the acts described above, together and singularly, was done “knowingly,” as that term is used in the Texas Insurance Code, and was a producing cause of Plaintiffs’ damages described herein. Page 15 DAMAGES 66. Plaintiffs would show that all of the aforementioned acts, taken together or singularly, constitute the producing causes of the damages sustained by Plaintiffs. 67. As previously mentioned, the damages caused by the Storm have not been properly addressed or repaired in the months since the Storm, causing further damages to the Property, and causing undue hardship and burden to Plaintiffs. These damages are a direct result of Defendant State Farm’s, Farias’, and Padilla’s mishandling of Plaintiffs’ claim in violation of the laws set forth above. 68. For breach of contract, Plaintiffs are entitled to regain the benefit of their bargain, which is the amount of their claim, together with attorney’s fees. 69. For noncompliance with the Texas Insurance Code, Unfair Settlement Practices, Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages, which include the loss of the benefits that should have been paid pursuant to the policy, mental anguish, court costs, and attorney's fees. For knowing conduct of the acts described above, Plaintiffs ask for three times their actual damages. TEX. INS. CODE §541.152. 70. For noncompliance with Texas Insurance Code, Prompt Payment of Claims, Plaintiffs are entitled to the amount of their claim, as well as eighteen (18) percent interest per annum on the amount of such claim as damages, together with attorney's fees. TEX. INS. CODE §542.060. 71. For breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages, including all forms of loss resulting from the insurer's breach of duty, such as additional costs, economic hardship, losses due to nonpayment of the amount the insurer owed, exemplary damages, and damages for emotional distress. Page 16 72. For fraud, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual damages and exemplary damages for knowingly fraudulent and malicious representations, along with attorney’s fees, interest, and court costs. 73. For the prosecution and collection of this claim, Plaintiffs have been compelled to engage the services of the attorney whose name is subscribed to this pleading. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover a sum for the reasonable and necessary services of Plaintiffs’ attorney in the preparation and trial of this action, including any appeals to the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court of Texas. JURY DEMAND 74. Plaintiffs have requested that all causes of action alleged herein be tried before a jury consisting of citizens residing in Webb County, Texas. Plaintiffs previously tendered the appropriate jury fee. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs pray that upon trial hereof, said Plaintiffs have and recover such sums as would reasonably and justly compensate them in accordance with the rules of law and procedure, as to actual damages, treble damages under the Texas Insurance Code, and all punitive and exemplary damages as may be found. In addition, Plaintiffs request the award of attorney’s fees for the trial and any appeal of this case, for all costs of Court on their behalf expended, for prejudgment and postjudgment interest as allowed by law, and for any other and further relief, either at law or in equity, to which they may show themselves justly entitled. Page 17 Respectfully submitted, MOSTYN LAW /s/ J. Steve Mostyn J. Steve Mostyn State Bar No. 00798389 jsmdocketefile@mostynlaw.com 3810 West Alabama Street Houston, Texas 77027 (713) 714-0000 (Office) (713) 714-1111 (Facsimile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been forwarded to all counsel of record on this 16th day of June, 2015 in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. /s/ J. Steve Mostyn J. Steve Mostyn Page 18 TAB 16 OF THE RECORD Filed 7/2/2015 4:41:49 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Jeanie Aguilar 2014CVF001048D1 CAUSE NO. 2014-C VF-001048-D1 ALMA PENA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER § T11 49 Defendants § JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Infonnation, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation or Related Litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Becky Lanier (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim, and for no other purpose. Subject to paragraphs l.a. and 1 .b. below, “Related Litigation,” as used herein means a first-party lawsuit filed in Texas by The Mostyn Law Firm arising out of a claim for damages to residential, commercial, or personal property as a result of a hailstorm that occurred in Texas. Confidential Information, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely in this litigation or Related Litigation, subject to the 1 limitations contained herein. a. State Farm’s institutional materials that are not claim-specific or adjuster- specific will be Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD may be shared among Qualified Persons in Related Litigation so long as The Mostyn Law Firm is representing the Plaintiff(s) in the Related Litigation. If The Mostyn Law Firm withdraws from any case qualifying as Related Litigation or later associates another lawyer or law firm in the Related Litigation, State Farm’s consent to the use of the documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD in that Related Litigation is automatically revoked. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD shall not be considered to have been produced in and for Related Litigation as “official discovery” unless they are responsive to a written discovery request to which State Farm has not objected in that Related Litigation or the Court has overruled State Farm’s objections and ordered production in that Related Litigation. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD that are not official discovery in a Related Litigation may not be used at depositions, hearings or at trial in that Related Litigation unless the plaintiffs in the Related Litigation have made a valid request for production of such documents, the date for the response to such request(s) 2 has passed, and The Mostyn Law Firm has given notice of intent to use the document at a deposition or other proceeding fourteen (14) days prior to the proceeding. b. Claim-specific, adjuster-specific, or other materials produced in this litigation that are not Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD may not be shared in Related Litigation, but may only be shared among Qualified Persons in the lawsuit in which the materials were produced. If a receiving party intends to use any document Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTXO 0000001 PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD in Related Litigation, that party must first obtain written consent of the producing party or leave of court. 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as “Confidential” and/or “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored information (“ESI”), or other material; information contained in a document, ESI, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation; their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI 3 processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, 4 and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name 5 (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ TO PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CAUSE 20 14-CVF- 001048-Di”. When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post- production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ_TQPROTECTIVE_ORDER IN CAUSE 20 14-CVF- 001048-Di”, if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential 6 Infonnation. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures 7 made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return and/or destmction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may 8 be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, andlor (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court 9 reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. 11. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard 10 copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., andlor c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that patty’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, 11 ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that 12 reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within one (1) year after the fmal resolution of this litigation, the plaintiff(s) and The Mostyn Law Firm shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiff(s) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they 13 _____ contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of • 2015. JUDGE PRESIDING APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY: J. Steve Mostyn Sofid* Ramon State Bar No. 00798389 State ar No. 00784811 Andrew P. Taylor Dan I. Worthington State Bar No. 24070723 State Bar No. 00785282 THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM Elizabeth S. Cantu 3810 W. Alabama Street State Bar No. 24013455 Houston, Texas 77027 Charles W. Downing (713) 861-6616 Phone — State Bar No. 24069631 (713) 861-8084 Fax — ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 818 Pecan Blvd. McAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 Phone — (956) 686-6109 Fax — ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 14 __________________________________ Filed 7/2/2015 4:41:49 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Jeanie Aguilar 2014CVF001048D1 CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-D1 ALMA PENÃ § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LANIER § TH 49 Defendants § JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER in order to be provided access to infonnation designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 20 14- CVF-00 1 048-D 1 represents and agrees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE EXHIBIT A TAB 17 OF THE RECORD CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001162-D1 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ, § § Plaintiff, § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § FARIAS, § § TH 49 Defendants. JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation or Related Litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Felipe Farias (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim, and for no other purpose. Subject to paragraphs l.a. and I .b. below, “Related Litigation,” as used herein means a first-party lawsuit filed in Texas by The Mostyn Law Firm arising out of a claim for damages to residential, commercial, or personal property as a result of a hailstorm that occurred in Texas. Confidential Information, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms of this Order. 1 Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely in this litigation or Related Litigation, subject to the limitations contained herein. a. State Farm’s institutional materials that are not claim-specific or adjuster- specific will be Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROD - PEN ARODMLFTX00000756PROD. Documents Bates-labeled PEN ARODM LFTX0000000 I PROD - PENARODM LFTX00000756PROD may be shared among Qualified Persons in Related Litigation so long as The Mostyn Law Firm is representing the Plaintiff(s) in the Related Litigation. If The Mostyn Law Firm withdraws from any case qualifying as Related Litigation or later associates another lawyer or law firm in the Related Litigation, State Farm’s consent to the use of the documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD in that Related Litigation is automatically revoked. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODM LFTX0000000 1 PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD shall not be considered to have been produced in and for Related Litigation as “official discovery” unless they are responsive to a written discovery request to which State Farm has not objected in that Related Litigation or the Court has overruled State Farm’s objections and ordered production in that Related Litigation. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000 1 PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD that are not official discovery in a Related Litigation may not be used at depositions, hearings or at trial in that Related Litigation unless the 2 plaintiffs in the Related Litigation have made a valid request for production of such documents, the date for the response to such request(s) has passed, and The Mostyn Law Firm has given notice of intent to use the document at a deposition or other proceeding fourteen (14) days prior to the proceeding. b. Claim-specific, adjuster-specific, or other materials produced in this litigation that are not Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD may not be shared in Related Litigation, but may only be shared among Qualified Persons in the lawsuit in which the materials were produced. If a receiving party intends to use any document Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000 I PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD in Related Litigation, that party must first obtain written consent of the producing party or leave of court. 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as “Confidential” and/or “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored information (“ES!”), or other material; information contained in a document, ESI, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation; 3 their respective counsel; counsel’s staff; expert witnesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the further disclosure is hereby prohibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The 4 written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowledgment, and furnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Information shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret!Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following Legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade SecretlProduced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file format productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to 5 a Conf. Agree./Prot. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the electronic file may have appended to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBJ_TO PROTECTI yE ORDER IN CAUSE 20 14-CVF- 001 162-Di”. When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post- production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CON FIDENTIAL-SUBJ TO_PROTECTIVE ORDER IN CAUSE 20 14-CVF- 001162-Di”, if such Legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order watermarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days 6 of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, andJor (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person 7 not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. 8. If Confidential Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return andlor destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Information. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such information shall be treated as Confidential Information in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by 8 the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identifi the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated information of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not pennitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order 9 only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential Information.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the tenns of this Order and executes the acknowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. 11. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is 10 Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., andlor c. above, depending on the format of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. If the party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion tbr specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court. At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to 11 establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ES!, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Infonnation, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Information and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel andlor any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of 12 Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation, the plaintiff(s) and The Mostyn Law Firm shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiff(s) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition 13 _____ transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after one (I) year after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ITISSOORDEREDthis dayof ,2015. JUDGE PRESIDING APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY: J. Steve Mostyn Sofia A. Aamon State Bar No. 00798389 State Batklo. 00784811 Andrew P. Taylor Dan K. Worthington State Bar No. 24070723 State Bar No. 00785282 THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM Elizabeth S. Cantu 3810 W. Alabama Street State Bar No. 24013455 Houston, Texas 77027 Charles W. Downing (713) 861-6616—Phone State Bar No. 24069631 (713) 861-8084 Fax — ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 818 Pecan Blvd. McAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 Phone — (956) 686-6109 Fax — ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS _____________ ______________________ Filed 7/2/2015 439:03 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Jeanie Aguilar 2O14CVFOO1 162D1 CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001162-D1 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ, § § Plaintiff, § V. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § FARIAS, § § § TH 49 Defendants. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER in order to be provided access to information designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2014- CVF-001l62-Dl represents and agrees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am familiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise of junsdiction over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. 1 agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE A :rt,wI 1/ Filed 7/212015 4;39;03 PM Esther Degollado District Clerk Webb District Jeanie Aguilar ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP 2O14CVFOO1 162D1 ATTORNEYS AT LAW P.O. BOX 3725 (78502-3725) 818W. PECAN BLVD. (78501-2418) SOFIA RAMON McALLEN. TEXAS srarnon@(aI(asIIaII.corn TEL. (956) 682-5501 FAx (956) 686-6109 ATLAsHAU..COM July 2, 2015 WA ELECTRONIC FILING Esther Degollado Webb County District Clerk 1110 Victoria Street, Suite 203 Laredo, Texas 78040 Re: Cause No. 2014CVF001162 Dl; RauI Rodriguez and Noemi Rodriguez v. State Farm Lloyds and Felipe Farias; In the 49th District Court of Webb County, Texas Dear Ms. Degollado: Attached please find the proposed Protective Order which has been signed by both parties. I would appreciate it very much if you would forward the document to the court for consideration and entry. Thank you very much for your attention to this matter. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call our office. Very truly yours, ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP By: Sofi SARJbc Enclosure cc: J. Steve Mostyn and Andrew Taylor (via Fax 713/8618084) Dan. K. Worthington (Firm) BROWNSVILLE OUNCE UVALDE OFFICE AUSTIN OUNCE P.O. BOX 6369 (76523-6369) (24 N. EASTSFREET 7200 N MOI’AC EXFY, STE 430 SOW. MORRISON RD ,STE A UVALDE. TEXAS 78501-5312 AUSTIN, TEXAS 7873-2696 BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS 7S520-7262 TOE (830)278-3100 TEL (512)583-0579 TEl. (956) 574-9333 FAX (044) 272-4209 FAX (956) 574-9337 TAB 18 OF THE RECORD CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-001048-Dl ALMA PENA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff § § v. § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LAMER § Tfl 49 Defendants § JVDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTIVE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is wairanted to protect Confidential hifonnation, which will be produced or exchanged in this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that; 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall he used solely for the purpose of the preparation and trial of this litigation or Related Litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Becky Lanier (“Defendants”) or any third party adjusting firm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim, and ft>r no other purpose. Subject to paragraphs Ia and Lb. below, “Related Litigation,” as used herein means a first-parry lawsuit flied in Texas by The Mostyn Law Finn arising out of a claim for damages to residential, commercial, or personal property as a result of a hailstorm that occurred in Texas. Confidential Inforznatou, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the tenDs of this Order. Qrnfldential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely in this litigation or Related litigation, subject to the 1 Received Jul—13—2015 02:56pm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL LiP. Page 001 limitations contained herein. a. State Farm’s institutional materials that are not clan-specific or adjuster- specific will be Bates-labeled PENARODMIFTXOOOOVO0IPROD - PENARODMLFTX00000756PROD. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROP - PENAKODMLFTX000007$6PROD may be shared among Qualified Persons in Related Litigation so long as The Mostyn Law Finn is representing the Plaintiff(s) in the Related Litigation. If The Mostyn Law Firm withdraws from any case qualifying as Related Litigation or later associates another lawyer or law firm in the Related Litigation, State Farm’s consent to the use of the documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROD - PENARODMLFTX000007S6PKOD in that Related Litigation is automatically revoked. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLPTX0000000IPROD PENARODMLFTX000007S6PROD shall not be considered to have been produced in and for Related Litigation as “official discovery” unless they are responsive to a written discovery request to which State Farm has not objected in that Related Litigation or the Court has overnilcd State Farm’s objections and ordered production in that Related Litigation. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPRCD - PENARQPMLflX00000756PR.OO that are not official discovery in a Related Litigation may not be used at depositions, hearings or at trial in that Related Litigation unless the plaintiffs in the Related Litigation have made a valid request for production of such documents, the date for the response to such request(s) 2 Received Jul—13—2015 02:56pm Frorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 002 has passed, and The Mostyn Law Firm has given notice of intent to use the document at a deposition or other proceeding fourteen (14) days prior to the proceeding, b. Claim-specific, adjuster-specific, or other materials produced in this litigation that are not Bates-labeled PENARODMLETX0000000WROJ) - PENARODMLFTX00000756PRCD may not be shared in Related Litigation, but may only be shared among Qualified Persons in the lawsuit in which the materials were pmduced. If a receiving party intends to use any document Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000 1 PaOD ?ENAROOMLFTX000007S6PROD in Related Litigation, that party must first obtain written consent of the producing party or leave of court. 2. “Confidential Information,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is designated as “Confidential” and/or “Tzade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is: a document, electronically stored infonnation (“ESI”), or other material; information contained in a docuinen.t, ESI, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restricted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means: the parties to this pending litigation; their respective counsel; counsel’s sraff expert witnesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ESI 3 Receivd Jul—13—2015 02:SSpm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Pan 003 processing, hosting, review, and production the Court; other court officials (including court reporters); the trier ot’ fact pursuant to a sealing order; and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the desiiating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesting party receives written consent to further disclose the Confidential Information, the fluter disclosure is hereby pwhibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent, then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5 Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fuct—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by coutenipt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel fbr the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this Order. The written acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing pasty shall retain the original written acknowledgment, 4 Received Jul—13—2015 02:56pa Frorn—95$ 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 004 and furnish a copy of the signed written aclaowledgment to the designating party’s counsel within ten (10) business days. 6. Infonnation shall be designated as ConfIdential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that cotresponds to the format produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the foUDwing legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConL Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Conf. AgreejProt. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE AgreefProt Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file fbi-mat productions, by promineuLly labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & ProprietaryiProduced Pursuant to a ConE AgreefProt. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Tnde Secret/Produced Pursuant to a ConE AgreelProt. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the eleconic file may have appended to the file’s name S Received Jul—13—2015 02:S6prn Froin—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L-P. Page 005 (immediately fouowing its Bates identifier) the following protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL$1.J5J_TQ_PROTECTIVE_QRDER_ltq_CAU$E_2014-CVF- 001048-131”. When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any puose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective leg&nd as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above. If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, trial, or is otherwise disclosed post- production, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIPENTIAL-SUBJ_TQPROTECrIVE_ORDER_INJDAUSE_2014-CVF- 001048-01”, if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Information in a deposition, bearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any bard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order waterinarks or seals to indicate the document is subject to a Protective Order mid is produced under the specific cause number. 7. Information previously produced during this litigation and not already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively designated within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bares identifier or other identifying characteristics for the Confidential 6 Received Jul—13—2015 O2:S6prn Frorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 006 Information. a Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such inThrmation in their custody orpossession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (I) affix the legend to aM copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the tents of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identit’ the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential !nforznation. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Tnlbrmanion may be retroactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paragraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (I) make no fi.uther disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this OMer (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated intbnnation of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No party shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures 7 Received Jul—13—2015 0Z:5Gpm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL LLP. Page 007 made prior to notification of any subsequent designadoa 8. If Confidential hiforination is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return andior destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential lufonuation, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise contain information derived from Confidential Information. Further the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed. b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and denand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Inlbrmation. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received fivm non-parties that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such inxmation shall be wetted as Confidential Information in accordance with the tenus of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a on.pany, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may 8 Received Jul—13—2015 02:56pm Frorn—956 623 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Pan 008 be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to tbe designating party all undesignated copies of such infonnation in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated idormation, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or control consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/cr (ii) with respect to ESI, mice such reasonable steps as wiU reflably identify the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation pursuant to this Paragraph, the patties also shall: (i) make no further disclosure of such designated inrmation except as allowed under this Order (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such designated infoniiation of the terms of this Order; and (iii) cake reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated infbrniation in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. d. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Jnfonnation under the terms of this Order only if counsel for a pasty advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court 9 Received Jul—19—2015 02:5Gpe Frorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.LP. Page 009 reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Infonnation until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition uanscript. In the event testimony is designated as Confidential Information, the court reporter shall note the designation on the recoix. shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shaU mark the face of such portion of the transcript as “Confidential thförmation,” The parties may use Confidential Jnfonnation during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the aclwowlcdgmern attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is first cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons. 11. In the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for production, and responses to requests for adtnissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing party shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admission: “Contains Confidential Information.” ii Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving pasty the information is Confidential Information. If the Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard- 10 Received Jul—19—2015 02:SBpm From—966 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 010 copy documents, static images, or native files, that information shall be designated as Confldenciai Information pursuant to paragraphs 6 a., b., and/or c. above, depending on the fonnat of the materials introduced. 13. If a receiving party makes a good-ith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “trade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by che designating party that the Confidential lnfbrmation is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Cozifidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating party shall have twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Information in dispute. Lithe party or parties producing the Confidential Information does not timely me a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this OMer. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is flied, any disputed Confidential Jafonnation will remain subject to this Order until a contrary determination is made by the Court At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A party’s failure to challenge the Confidential Information designation of any documents, 11 Received Jul—13—2015 0Z:56p,n FromiSS 523 5200 Ta—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 011 ESI, information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No party waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such thai or hearing. 16. Any papexs filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Coafidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or infonnation derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential 1nfomation and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the Disthct Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Information. 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the panics no disclosure, production, or exchange of information in this case shalt constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceeding. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving pasty must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that 12 Received Jul—13—2015 02:SSpn Frorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 012 reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected information. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order compelling discovery with respect to any discovery request. c. Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains infomiation pursuant to this Order eosenzs to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation, the plaintiff(s) and The Mostyn Law Firm shall return or destroy Confidential Information they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the plaintiftZs) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintis) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contains information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers med with the Court, deposition transcripts, and the thai record even if such materials contain Confidential Information, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they 13 Received Jul—13—2015 02:SSpm From—955 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 013 contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiff’s counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paraaph after one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain in effect unless or until amended, altered, modified, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Cowl, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ‘-it 3 dayof IT[SSOORDEREDth1s/ ! 9 Vu 2015. JUDGE nil / APPROVED AS TO tORM ONLY: y/Mn I. Steve Mostyn Sofld-4f Ranion State BarNo. 00798389 State arNo. 00784811 Andrew P. Taylor Dan IC. Worthington State Bar No. 24070723 State Bar Nc. 00785282 THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM Elizabeth S. Cantu 3810W. Alabama Street State Bar No. 24013455 Houston, Texas 77027 Charles W. Downing (713)861-6616—Phone State Bar No, 24069631 (713) 861-8084—Fax ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP AflORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF gjg Pan Blvd. MeAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 —Phone (956) 686-6109 Fax — ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 14 Received Jul—13—2015 02:Stprn From—g56 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Paga 014 Fil d 712/20154:41:49 M Esther Degolla o District CI rk Webb Dist ct Jeenle Agul er 2014CVr001o48 i CAUSE NO. 2014•CVF4O1O4S-DI ALMA PENÃ § IN THE DISThICT COURT Plaintiff § § § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND § BECKY LAMER § 49111 Defendants § JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER hi order to be provided access to information designated as Confidential Information under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2014- CVF-001048-D 1 represents and aees as follows: 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Court in ‘he above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am fniiiar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Pwtecrive Order. 3. I consent to the eezeise ot’jurisdicticn over me by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. I agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of recoM for all parties in the above Litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE EXHIBIT A Raceived Jul—13—2015 02:5$pm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 015 TAB 19 OF THE RECORD CAUSE NO. 2014-CVF-00fl62-D1 RAUL RODRIGUEZ AN]) NOEMI § IN TUE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ § § Plalutiff, § § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND FELIPE § EARThS, § § Defendants. 49 JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROTECTWE ORDER This Court finds that a Protective Order is warranted to protect Confidential Information, which will be produced or exchanged In this litigation, and that the following provisions, limitations, and prohibitions are appropriate pursuant to and in conformity with the Texas Rifles of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: I. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the ccuzse of tIds litigation shall be used solely for the pwpose of the preparation and nial of this litigation or Related Litigation against State Farm Lloyds (including its employees) and Felipe Parias (“De&ndarns”) or any thin! party adjusting Urm (including its employees) that adjusted this claim, and for no other puipose. Subject to paragraphs l.a. and Lb. below, “Related Litigation,” as used herein means a first-party lawsuit filed in Texas by The Mostyn Law Firm arising out of a claim for damages to residential, coinniercial, or personal pmperty as a result of a hailstorm that occurred in Texas. Confidential Information, or extracts, summaries, or information derived from Confidential Information, shall not be disclosed to any person except in aecordance with the terms of this Order. Received Jul—13—2015 02:4Ypm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 001 Confidential Information may only be copied or reproduced as reasonably necessary for use solely in this litigation or Related Litigation, subject to the limitations contained herein. a. Slate Farm’s institutional materials that are not claim-specific or adjuster- specific will be Bates-labeled PENAROPMLFPX0000000IPROD - PENARODMLFTX000007S6PROD. Dociwzents Bates-labeled PENARC)oMLrrX0000000 1 fliOf) - PENARODMLFTX000007Z6PROD may be shared among Qualified Persons in Related Litigation so long as The Mostyn Law Firm is representing the Plaintiff(s) in the Related Litigation. If The ?vtostyn Law Firm withdraws from any case qualifying as Related Litigation or later associates anotha- lawyer or law firm in the Related Litigation, State Farm’s consent to the ase of the documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX00000001PROD - PENARODMLFTX00000Y56PROD in that Related Litigation is automatically revoked. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLk’TX0000000IPROI) - PENARODMLFTX000007S6PRQP shall not be considered to have been produced in and for Related Litigation as “official discovexy” unless they are responsive to a written discovery request to which State Farm has not objected in that Related Litigation or the Court has overruled State Farm’s objections and ordered production in that Related Litigation. Documents Bates-labeled PENARODMLFIX0000000IPROI) - PENARODMLFTX000007S6PROD that are not official discovery in a Related Litigation may not be used at depositions, hearings or at trial in that Related Litigation unless the 2 Rsceived Jul—13—2015 02:49pm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL LLP. Page 002 plaintiffs in the Related Litigation have made a valid request for production of such documents, the date for the response to such request(s) has passed, and The Mostyn Law Finn has given notice of intent to use the document at a deposition or other proceeding fourteen (14) days prior to the proceeding. b. Clairn-specitic, adjuster-specific, or other matthals produced in this litigation that are not Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000IPROD - PENARODMLFTX000007S&PROO may not be shared in Related Litigation, but may only be shared among Qualified Persons in the lawsuit in which the materials were produced. If a receiving party intends to use any document Bates-labeled PENARODMLFTX0000000INLOI) - PENARODMLFTX000007S6PROD in Related Litigation, that party must first obtain written consent of the producing party or leave of court 2. “Confidential Infonnation,” as used herein, means any information of any type that is desiiated as “Confidential” and/or “Trade Secret” by any of the producing or receiving parties, whether it is; a document, electronically stored information (“ESI”), or other material; information contained in a document, ESI, or other material; information revealed during a deposition; information revealed in an interrogatory answer or written responses to discovery; information revealed during a meet and confer, or otherwise in connection with formal or informal discovery. 3. The disclosure of Confidential Information is restñcted to Qualified Persons. “Qualified Persons,” as used herein, means; the parties to this pending litigation, 3 Received Jul—13—2015 0Z:49pm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 003 their respective counsel; counsel’s staft expert wimesses; outside service- providers and consultants providing services related to document and ES! processing, hosting, review, and production; the Court other court officials (including court reporters); the trier of fact pursuant to a sealing order and any person so designated pursuant to paragraph 4 herein. If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and a hearing. 4. Any party may serve a written request for authority to disclose Confidential Information to a person who is not a Qualified Person on counsel for the designating party, and consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, until said requesthag party receives written consent to ñinher disclose the Confidential Infonnation, the thrther disclosure is hereby pmhibited and shall not be made absent further order of this Court. If the designating party grants its consent. then the person granted consent shall become a Qualified Person under this Order. 5. Counsel for each party shall provide a copy of this Order to any person—other than the Court, court officials, or the trier of fact—who will receive Confidential Information in connection with this litigation, and shall advise such person of the scope and effect of the provisions of this Order and the possibility of punishment by contempt for violation thereof. Further, before disclosing Confidential Information to any person other than the Couit, court officials, or the trier of fact, counsel for the party disclosing the information shall obtain the written acknowledgment of that person binding him or her to the terms of this OrderS The 4 Received Jul—13—2015 02:4Opn Frorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL LL.P. Page 004 tnitteu acknowledgment shall be in the form of Exhibit A attached hereto. Counsel for the disclosing party shall retain the original written acknowlednent, wit! fhrnish a copy of the signed written acknowledgment to the designating pasty’s counsel Mthin ten (10) business days. 6. biformation shall be designated as Confidential Information within the meaning of this Protective Order by following the protocol below that corresponds to the ibnnat produced: a. For hard-copy documents, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the document and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agree/Fret. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secrct’Produced Pursuant to a Conf Agrea/Prot. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the document. b. For static image productions, by marking the first Bates-stamped page of the image and each subsequent Bates-stamped page thereof containing Confidential Information with the following legend: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to a Couf. AgreeiProt. Order,” but not so as to obscure the content of the image. c. For native file fonnat productions, by prominently labeling the delivery media for ESI designated as Confidential Information as follows: “Confidential & Proprietary/Produced Pursuant to a ConE Agree./Prot. Order” or “Confidential Proprietary & Trade Secret/Produced Pursuant to 5 Received Jul—13—2015 02:49p,n From—956 523 5200 ToATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 005 a Cord. AgreciProt. Order.” In addition, at the election of the producing party, the clcconio file may have appended to the me’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the following protective legend; toNnDENTLc-suBJjo_rRoTEcrlvE_oRnEaJN_cMJsE_2ol4.cvF- 001162-Di”. When any file so designated is converted to a hard-copy document or static image for any purpose, the document or image shall bear on each page a protective legend as described in 6.a. and 6.b. above If a native file containing Confidential Information is used during a deposition, meet and confer, thai, or is otherwise disclosed post pwduction, the party introducing, referencing, or submitting the native file must append to the file’s name (immediately following its Bates identifier) the protective legend: “CONFIDENTIAL-SUBLTO_PROTECFIVE_ORDERJNCAUSE_2014-CW- 001162-Dr. if such legend does not already appear in the file name. Any party using a native file containing Confidential Infonnation in a deposition, hearing, or at trial must indicate the designation on the record so that it is reflected in the tanscript of the proceedings. d. At the sole discretion of the producing party, the producing party may place on any hard-copy documents that are subject to this Protective Order wateiuiarlcs or seals to indicate the docunern is subject to a Protective Order and is produced under the specific cause number. 7. lifonnation previously produced during this litigation and nor already marked as Confidential Information shall be retroactively desiated within thirty (30) days 6 Received Jul—13—2015 O2:49pj Frorn—956 523 5200 Ta—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 0CC of entry of this Order by providing written notice to the receiving parties of the Bates identifier or other identi5’ing characteristics for the Confidential Information. a. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other lime as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the aeement of the parties) shall (i) affix the legend to all copies of such designated information in the party’s possession, custody, or contol consistent with the Wins of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ESI, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identify the item(s) s having been designated as Confidential Infoimation. b. Information that is unintentionally or inadvertently produced without being designated as Confidential Information may be retoactively designated by the producing party in the manner described in paraph 7.a. above. If a retroactive designation is provided to the receiving party in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) the receiving party must (i) make no fkuther disclosure of such designated information except as allowed under this OMer (ii) take reasonable steps to notify any persons who were provided copies of such desiated inforniation of the terms of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person 7 Received Jul—13—2015 02:49pa From—955 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 007 not permitted access to such information wider the terms of this Order. No pasty shall be deemed to hive violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designatica 8. 11 Confideaial Information is inadvertently disclosed to a person who is not a Qualified Person, the disclosing party shall immediately upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure, send a written demand to the non-Qualified Person demanding the immediate return andfor destruction of the inadvertently disclosed Confidential Information, all copies made, and all notes that reproduce, copy, or. otherwise contain information dezived from Confidential Information. Fuither the disclosing party shall send written notice to the designating party’s counsel providing: a. The names and addresses of the entity or individual to whom the Confidential Information was inadvertently disclosed, b. The date of the disclosure. c. A copy of the notice and demand sent to the entity or individual that inadvertently received the Confidential Infonnation. 9. To the extent that the parties produce information received from non-panics that the non-parties have designated as “confidential” such iafbrmatiou shall be treated as Confidential Infosmariou in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order. a. With respect to any document, ESI, or other material that is produced or disclosed by a non-party, any party may designate such information as Confidential Information within thirty (30) days of actual knowledge of the production or disclosure, or such other time as may be agreed upon by S Received Jul—13—2015 02:4gpni From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 008 the parties. b. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, or such other time as may be agreed upon by the parties, any parties receiving such notice, shall return to the designating party all undesignated copies of such information in their custody or possession, in exchange for the production of properly designated information, or alternately (upon the agreement of the parties) shall (I) affix the legend to all copies of such designated infounation in the party’s possession, custody, or eontol consistent with the terms of this Protective Order, and/or (ii) with respect to ES!, take such reasonable steps as will reliably identi& the item(s) as having been designated as Confidential Information. c. Upon notice of designation ptrsuant to this Paragraph, the parties also shall: (1) make no further disclosure otsuth designated infonnation except as allowed under this Order; (ii) take reasonable steps to notifSr any persons who were provided copies of such designated infOrmation of the tenns of this Order; and (iii) take reasonable steps to reclaim any such designated information in the possession of any person not permitted access to such information under the terms of this Order. No person shall be deemed to have violated this Order for any disclosures made prior to notification of any subsequent designation. ci. The parties shall serve a copy of this Order simultaneously with any discovery request made to a non-party. 10. Deposition testimony is Confidential Information under the terms of this Order 9 Received Jul—13—2015 02:49pm From—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.LP. Page 009 only if counsel for a party advises the court reporter and opposing counsel of that designation at the deposition, or by written designation to all parties and the court reporter within thirty (30) business days after receiving the deposition transcript. All deposition transcripts shall be considered Confidential Information until thirty (30) days following the receipt of the deposition transcript. In the event testimony is designated as Con5dential Infomialion, the court reporter shall note the designation on the record, shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony, and shall mark the face of such portion of the tanscript as “Confidential Infinmzation.” The parties may use Confidential Information during any deposition, provided: a. The witness is apprised of the terms of this Order and executes the aclaiowledgment attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. The room is tint cleared of all persons who are not Qualified Persons 11. Tn the case of interrogatory answers, responses to request for produotion, and responses to requests for admissions, the designation of Confidential Information will be made by means of a statement in the answers or responses specifying that the answers or responses or specific parts thereof are designated as Confidential Information. A producing pazty shall place the following legend on each page of interrogatory answers or responses to requests for admissiozt “Contains Confidential Infbrmatioa” 12. Confidential Information disclosed during a meet and cothr or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery, shall be protected pursuant to this Order if counsel for the disclosing party advises the receiving party the information is Jo Received Jul—13—2015 D2:4Opm Froin—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.LP. Page 010 Confidential Information. If the confidential Information disclosed during a meet and confer or otherwise exchanged in informal discovery is in the form of hard copy documents, static images, or native files, that infirmation shall be designated as Confidential Information pursuant to paraaphs 6 a., b., and/or a. above, depending on the format of the materials introduce& 13. If a receiving party makes a good-faith determination that any materials designated Confidential Information are not in fact “confidential” or “nade secret,” the receiving party may request that a designating party rescind the designation. Such requests shall not be rejected absent a good-faith determination by the designating party that the Confidential Information is entitled to protection. 14. After making a good-faith effort to resolve any disputes regarding whether any designated materials constitute Confidential Information, counsel of the party or parties receiving the Confidential Information may challenge such designation of all or any portion thereof by providing written notice of the challenge to the designating party’s counsel. The designating parry shall have twenty (20) days tm the date of receipt of a written challenge to file a motion for specific protection with regard to any Confidential Informat.ion in dispute. Lithe patty or parties producing the Confidential Intbrmation does not timely file a motion for specific protection, then the Confidential Information in dispute shall no longer be subject to confidential treatment as provided in this Order. 15. If a timely motion for specific protection is filed, any disputed Confidential Information will remain subject to this Order until a eontraiy determination is made by the Court At any hearing the designating party shall have the burden to 11 Received Jul—13—2015 02:4Opm Frani—955 523 5200 Ta—ATLAS & HALL L.LP. Page 011 establish that party’s right to protection as if this Order did not exist. A pasty’s failure to challenge the Confidential Inloimadon designation of any documents, ES!. information, or testimony does not constitute an admission that the document, ESI, information or testimony is, in fact, sensitive, confidential, or proprietary. No pany waives its right to contend at trial or hearing that such document, ESI, information or testimony is not sensitive, confidential, privileged or proprietary, provided the party provides notice of intention to do so at least twenty (20) days before such trial or hearing. 16. Any papers filed with the Court in this action that make reference to Confidential Information, or contain extracts, summaries, or information derived therefrom, shall be considered Confidential Infonnation and shall be governed by the terms of this Order. These papers shall be filed under seal and shall remain sealed with the District Clerk’s Office so long as the materials retain their status as Confidential Jnformatiott 17. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties no disclosure, production, or exchange ot’ information in this case shall constitute a waiver of any applicable attorney-client privilege or of any applicable work product protection in this or any other federal or state proceediu8. This Protective Order applies to any information disclosed, exchanged, produced, or discussed — whether intentionally or inadvertently — among the parties, their counsel and/or any agents (such as vendors and experts) in the course of this litigation. Upon learning of a production of privileged or work product protected information, the producing party shall within ten (10) days give all counsel of record notice of the production pursuant to Texas Rule of 12 Receiyed Jul—13—2015 02:49pm Frarn—956 523 5200 Ta—ATLAS 4 HALL L.L.P. Page 012 Civil Procedure 193.3(d). The receiving party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the produced information and all copies and destroy any notes that reproduce, copy, or otherwise disclose the substance of the privileged or work product protected nfbmwion. 18. Further, production pursuant to this Protective Order shall not be deemed a waiver of: a. Any party’s right to object to any discovery requests on any ground. b. Any party’s right to seek an order coiupellrng discovery with respect to any discovery request. c Any party’s use and review of its own Confidential Information in its sole and complete discretion. d. The status of any material as a trade secret. 19. Any Qualified Person who obtains information pursuant to this Order consents to submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement of this Order. 20. Within one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation, the plaintifIs) and The Mostyn Law Finn shall return or destroy Confidential Infbrmation they received during this litigation. As to those materials that contain or reflect Confidential Information, but that constitute or reflect the pIaintis) counsel’s own work product, counsel for the plaintiff(s) are entitled to retain such work product in their files in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order, so long as the work product is clearly marked to reflect that it contaIns information subject to this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to retain pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, other papers filed with the Court, deposition 13 Received Jul—13—2015 02:49p,n Prorn—956 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 013 transcripts, and the trial record even if such materials contain Confidential Infonnation, so long as such materials are clearly marked to reflect that they contain information subject to this Protective Order and are maintained in accordance with the provisions of this Protective Order. Plaintiffs counsel shall certify in writing compliance with the provision of this paragraph after one (1) year after the final resolution of this litigation. This Order shall remain iii effect unless or until amended, altered, modifled, or vacated by the Court or by the written agreement of all parties to this action filed with the Court, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ff13 SOORDERBD this / ayof__________,2015. 614 APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY; 3. Steve Mostyn State Bar No. 00798389 Aaxnon Sofia A. Stare BaffrJo. 00784811 Andrew P. Taylor Dan K. Worthington State Bar No. 24070723 State Bar No. 00785282 THE MOSTYN LAW FIRM Elizabeth S. Cantu 3810 W. Alabama Street State Bar No. 24013455 Houston, Texas 77027 Charles W. Downing (713) 861-6616—Phone State Bar No. 24069631 (713) 861-8084—Fax ATLAS, HALL & RODRIGUEZ, LLP ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 818 Pecan Blvd. McAllen, Texas 78501 (956) 682-5501 Phone — (956) 686-6109 Fax — ATTORNEYS FOR PEEENDANTS 14 Received Jul—13—2015 02:4Opm From—56 523 5200 To—ATLAS & HALL L.L.P. Page 014 Fied 7I2.2O15 4:39:03 M Esther DegoIIwJo Dist,ict C’erk Webb Disbict .Jeanie Aguar 2O14CVFOO1 162D1 CAUSE NO. 2014-CVE-001162-DI RAUL RODRIGUEZ AND NOEMI § IN TILE DISTRICT COURT OF RODRIGUEZ, § § Plaintiff, § § WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS § STATE FARM LLOYDS AND YELIPE § FARIAS, § § Defendnts. § 49 JUDICIAL DZSTRICT AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY PROTECTIVE ORDER in order to be provided access to informadon designated as Confidential Infonuation under the Protective Order entered in Cause No. 2014- CVF-0Ol 162-DI represents and agrees as follows; 1. I have been provided with a copy of the Protective Order entered by the Couit in the above matter. I have reviewed said copy and I am ftmiliar with its terms. 2. With regard to any and all Confidential Information to which I am given access in connection with the above matter, I agree to be bound by the provisions of the Protective Order. 3. I consent to the exercise ofjurisdiction over inc by the Court with respect to the Protective Order. 4. 1 agree that copies of this undertaking will be sent to counsel of record for all parties in the above litigation. DATED: SIGNATURE EXHIBIT A Received Jul—13—2015 02:49pm From—955 523 5200 Ta—ATLAS & HALL L.LP. Page 015