ACCEPTED
13-15-00033-CV
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
6/24/2015 11:19:03 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK
No. 13-15-00033-CV
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
In the Court of AppealsCORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
For the Thirteenth Judicial District of6/24/2015
Texas 11:19:03 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Texas Clerk
Adan Perez, Jr.,
Appellant
v.
Weslaco Independent School District,
Appellee
On Appeal from Cause No. C-641-11-F
In The 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas
The Honorable Judge Mario Ramirez, Jr., Presiding
Appellant’s Reply Brief
Hawash Meade Gaston
Neese & Cicack LLP
Andrew K. Meade
Texas Bar No. 24032854
Samuel B. Haren
Texas Bar No. 24032854
2118 Smith Street
Houston, Texas 77002
713-658-9001 (phone)
713-658-9011 (fax)
sharen@hmgnc.com
Attorneys for Appellant
Oral Argument Not Requested
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................i
Index of Authorities .................................................................................................. ii
Argument.................................................................................................................... 1
I. The trial court has jurisdiction over Perez’s whistleblower claim .................. 1
A. Perez reported WISD’s illegal acts before his termination ........................ 1
B. Perez satisfied Whistleblower Act’s grievance-initiation
requirement ................................................................................................. 3
1. The Whistleblower Act only requires initiation of the grievance
process ................................................................................................... 3
2. Perez participated in the grievance process despite WISD’s
intransigence .......................................................................................... 5
C. The Whistleblower Act’s statute of limitations is not jurisdictional ......... 7
II. The trial court has jurisdiction over Perez’s due process claims .................... 8
A. Perez did not receive notice and a fair hearing .......................................... 9
B. Perez has a property interest in renewal of his contract ........................... 10
C. Perez was not required to exhaust his remedies before bringing his
due process claims .................................................................................... 12
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 13
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 15
Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 16
i
Index of Authorities
Case Page(s)
Aguilar v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist.,
296 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) ................................. 8–9
Bates v. Tex. State Tech. Coll.,
983 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied) ............................... 14
Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972)....................................................................................... 14
Chance v. Elliot & Lillian, LLC,
No. 08-13-00248-CV, 2015 WL 1570228 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr.
8, 2015) ............................................................................................................ 6
City of Corpus Christi v. Pub. Utility Com’n of Tex.,
51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) ........................................................................... 13
Comb v. Benji’s Special Educ. Acad., Inc.,
745 F. Supp. 2d 755 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ........................................................... 15
Dallas Cnty. v. Hughes,
189 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) ........................11–12
Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gayle,
371 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) ........ 8–9
Friona Indep. Sch. Dist. v. King,
15 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) ................................... 16
Gosney v. Sonora Indep. Sch. Dist.,
603 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1979) ......................................................................... 15
Govant v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys.,
72 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) .................. 14
Gregg Cnty. v. Farrar,
933 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) ............................... 8
ii
Leyva v. Crystal City,
357 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) ............................... 9
Martine v. Bd. of Regents, State Senior Tech. Coll. of Tex.,
578 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ................. 15
Martinez v. Donna Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 13-03-300-CV, 2004 WL 1852969 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-
Edinburg Aug. 19, 2004, pet. denied) ........................................................... 16
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,
372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) ........................................................................... 6
Nelson v. Clements,
831 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) .......................14–15
Olivarez v. La Villa Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 13-04-345-CV, 2007 WL 925648 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-
Edinburg Mar. 29, 2007, no pet.) .................................................................. 16
Rusk State Hosp. v. Black,
392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) .....................................................................12–13
Sullivan v. Univ. Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston Dental Branch,
No. 01-08-00327-CV, 2008 WL 5179023 (Tex. App.—Houston] Dec.
11, 2008, pet. denied) .................................................................................... 15
TEA v. Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D.,
830 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1992) .....................................................................16–17
Tex. A&M Univ. at Corpus Christi v. Hamann,
3 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) ..................... 11
Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Olofsson,
59 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. dismissed) ........................... 11
Univ. Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Barrett,
159 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 2005) ....................................................................... 7–8
iii
W. Houston Charter Sch. Alliance v. Pickering,
No. 01-10-00289, 2011 WL 3612288 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, no pet.) ................................................................................................... 8
Statute/Rule Page(s)
Tex. Gov. Code § 554.006 ..................................................................................... 7–8
iv
Argument
I. The trial court has jurisdiction over Perez’s whistleblower claim.
This case presents a straightforward application of the Texas Whistleblower
Act: WISD’s management illegally misappropriated funds, Perez notified the TEA,
and WISD fired Perez in retaliation. WISD’s brief does not change these simple
facts or otherwise show that the trial court lacks jurisdiction.
A. Perez reported WISD’s illegal acts before his termination.
WISD is correct that Perez must show that he blew the whistle on WISD
prior to his termination. Perez did exactly that. Perez’s affidavit both unequivocally
states that he made his initial report to the TEA ―before [he] received his negative
performance evaluation‖ from WISD. CR 256 at ¶ 9. This pre-evaluation report is
all that is necessary to establish causation for jurisdictional purposes.
WISD argues that the Court should ignore Perez’s petition and affidavit
because it purportedly contradicts the following exchange from his deposition:
Q: Prior to February 5th, 2010, you did not report any illegal
conduct to anybody, did you?
Mr. Haren: Objection to the form.
A: No.
CR 189:6–9. Because the question is worded negatively, it is somewhat difficult to
parse. But a close reading shows that Perez denied that he had not yet blown the
1
whistle on WISD before February 5, 2010. As such, there is no contradiction
between Perez’s affidavit and his answer to WISD’s deposition question.
But even if Perez’s affidavit contradicts the double-negative in his
deposition, WISD waived any objection thereto. WISD acknowledges that, if a
plea to the jurisdiction involves the submission of evidence, the ―review of the
evidence generally mirrors the summary judgment standard.‖ See WISD’s Brief
at 11. While this is something of an over-simplification, this statement is largely
correct.1
In evaluating the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, a court
of appeals must make its decision based on all of the admitted evidence in the
summary judgment record. See Chance v. Elliot & Lillian, LLC, No. 08-13-00248-
CV, 2015 WL 1570228, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 8, 2015). Perez submitted
his affidavit in his response to WISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. See CR 255–54.
WISD’s response does not include any objection to the admission of Perez’s
affidavit.2 See CR 416–26. Accordingly, Perez’s unobjected-to statement that he
1
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that a plea to the jurisdiction ―must not involve a
significant inquiry into the substance of the claims‖ at issue and that a court may decide ―that the
inquiry is reaching too far into the substance of the claims and should therefore await a fuller
development of the merits. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635
(Tex. 2012).
2
Had WISD made such an objection, Perez would have been able to ask the trial court for leave
to supplement his affidavit with an explanation for the alleged contradiction.
2
blew the whistle to the TEA before his performance evaluation is a part of the
record and should be considered by the Court.
B. Perez satisfied Whistleblower Act’s grievance-initiation
requirement.
WISD does not dispute that Perez (1) initiated the grievance process
and (2) was not required to exhaust that process prior to filing his whistleblower
claim. Instead, WISD argues that he did not ―meaningfully participate in the
administrative process.‖ WISD’s Brief at 16. This argument is both legally and
factually wrong.
1. The Whistleblower Act only requires initiation of the
grievance process.
The Whistleblower Act only requires an employee to ―initiate action under
the grievance or appeal procedures‖ of his employer. Tex. Gov. Code § 554.006(a).
As stated in the University of Texas Medical Branch case cited by WISD:
Section 554.006 does not require that grievance or appeal procedures
be exhausted before suit can be filed; rather, it requires that such
procedures be timely initiated and that the grievance or appeal
authority have 60 days in which to render a final decision.
Univ. Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Barrett, 159 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. 2005).
Accordingly, the First Court of Appeals refused in Fort Bend to impose any
non-textual participation requirement:
While the Legislature may have envisioned not merely sixty-days’
notice but also sixty-days’ participation in the administrative process,
the statute requires only “initiat[ion],” and we are bound by that
3
language. A court should interpret a statute by reference to its
language alone when the court can do so. The meaning of “initiate”
is plain: it means to commence the process.
Second, engrafting a requirement of meaningful participation into the
initiation requirement is contrary to the history of the words used in
the statute itself. Not only did the legislature use the word initiate, it
replaced the word exhaust and even changed the title of section
554.006 from ―Exhaustion of Grievance or Appeal Procedures‖ to
―Use of Grievance or Appeal Procedures.‖
Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gayle, 371 S.W.3d 391, 397–98 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
The court further recognized that, ―[o]nce a grievance is s initiated, the
governmental unit has notice of the claim so it can begin its own investigation of
the claim‖ regardless of the participation by the claimant. Id. at 397 n.2.
None of the cases cited in WISD’s brief impose the meaningful participation
requirement advocated by WISD. In fact, most merely state that an employee must
properly initiate a grievance procedure in accordance with the employer’s
procedures. See, e.g., W. Houston Charter Sch. Alliance v. Pickering, No. 01-10-
00289, 2011 WL 3612288, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)
(employee failed to properly initiate grievance in accordance with employer’s
procedures); Gregg Cnty. v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Austin
1996, writ denied) (employee failed to initiate grievance proceeding at all).
Aguilar is the only case cited by WISD which requires anything more than
proper initiation of the grievance process. See Aguilar v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist.,
4
296 S.W.3d 785, 789–90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). But even that case
did not require ―meaningful participation.‖ In Aguilar, the employee ―did not fully
cooperate with the arbitrator’s‖ requests during an arbitration proceeding. Id. at
789–90. The employee’s attorney even ―admitted that the grievance was filed
simply to comply with the administrative procedures and that the proper forum
would be a court of law.‖ Id. at 790. The court ultimately held an employee does
not comply with the initiation requirement of the Whistleblower Act when he
―refuse[s] to participation in the grievance hearing . . . .‖ Id.
Although Aguilar does not impose a meaningful participation requirement, it
does impose an extra-statutory duty beyond mere initiation. This imposition
contradicts the basic rule that ―the purpose of the [Whistleblower] Act is remedial,
and it should be liberally construed in favor of jurisdiction.‖ Leyva v. Crystal City,
357 S.W.3d 93, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). Accordingly, Perez
urges the Court to adopt the textual approach of Fort Bend instead of the more
restrictive Aguilar.
2. Perez participated in the grievance process despite WISD’s
intransigence.
Perez can meet his jurisdictional burden regardless of whether the Court
choses to impose (1) the initiation requirement of the Whistleblower Act and Fort
Bend, (2) the cooperation requirement of Aguilar, or (3) the meaningful
participation requirement suggested by WISD.
5
WISD alleges that Perez ―delayed any Level One meeting with the school,
dragging out the process until he could file suit.‖ WISD’s Brief at 18. In support,
WISD cites to (1) an affidavit by a WISD administrator stating that the initial
grievance hearing was delayed because of ―various scheduling issues and the
parties[’] numerous attempts to resolve the matter informally,‖ (2) a series of
letters and emails discussing those scheduling issues and settlement attempts,
and (3) an allegation from WISD’s plea to the jurisdiction which does not cite to
any exhibit or authority. See id. (citing CR 140–41, 298–339, 420). Simply put,
WISD has not cited to any fact in the record showing that Perez either refused to
cooperate or failed to participate in the grievance procedures.
By contrast, Perez has alleged that, after he commenced the grievance
process, ―WISD ignored [the grievance] procedures and refused to grant Perez a
hearing.‖ CR 412 at ¶ 18. Once the hearing was finally held, Perez did not
participate because he had been led to believe that the meeting was a mere
settlement conference and not the actual hearing. See CR 83 at ¶ 9. WISD asks the
Court to ignore these uncontradicted allegations and instead infer that the
―scheduling issues‖ and ―attempts to resolve the matter informally‖ were somehow
nefarious and did not constitute meaningful participation. Such an inference in
favor of the party seeking to avoid jurisdiction is not permitted in resolving a plea
to the jurisdiction, and Perez respectfully asks the Court to refuse to do so. See Tex.
6
A&M Univ. at Corpus Christi v. Hamann, 3 S.W.3d 215, 216–17 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (―The dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction
must be based solely on the pleadings. We accept all allegations in the plaintiff’s
petition as true.‖) (emphasis in original).
Finally, WISD’s plea to the jurisdiction alleged only that Perez was required
to fully-exhaust his administrative remedies. See CR 127–32, 420. WISD did not
make its meaningful participation argument until its opening brief. Because the
exhaustion argument fails as a matter of law, Perez did not need to present
evidence to the trial court of the extent of his participation. If necessary, Perez
would be happy to do so in the future. See infra § II (explaining the burden of
proof for arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
C. The Whistleblower Act’s statute of limitations is not
jurisdictional.
WISD further alleges that Perez’s grievance was untimely. But as stated in
Perez’s opening brief, this issue is not relevant to a plea to the jurisdiction. Failure
to comply with the ninety day deadline ―gives rise to the affirmative defense of
limitations, but it is not grounds for a plea to the jurisdiction.‖ Tex. Dept. of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation v. Olofsson, 59 S.W.3d 831, 832–33 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, pet. dismissed). See also Dallas Cnty. v. Hughes, 189 S.W.3d 886,
888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (―Because limitations is a defensive
issue, not a jurisdictional issue, the trial court correctly denied Dallas County’s
7
assertion of the limitations bar through a plea to the jurisdiction.‖). WISD cannot
use a plea to the jurisdiction as a motion for summary judgment on an unpled
affirmative defense. See CR 24–26.
II. The trial court has jurisdiction over Perez’s due process claims.
WISD challenges Perez’s due process claim for the first in its response brief.
Accordingly, Perez has not had the opportunity to (1) assemble evidence and
affidavits to support his claim or (2) amend his pleading to remedy any defects
alleged by WISD. Perez will address WISD’s challenge given the current state of
the record.
WISD is correct that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first
time in an interlocutory appeal. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 96
(Tex. 2012). Such challenges are, however, held to a higher standard than those
raised in a trial court:
[I]f the pleadings and record neither demonstrate jurisdiction nor
conclusively negate it, then in order to obtain dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claim, the defendant entity has the burden to show either
that the plaintiff failed to show jurisdiction despite having had full and
fair opportunity in the trial court to develop the record and amend the
pleadings; or, if such opportunity was not given, that the plaintiff
would be unable to show the existence of jurisdiction if the cause
were remanded to the trial court and such opportunity afforded.
Id.
WISD’s allegation that ―Perez must prove‖ ―his prima facie due process
claim‖ inverts this standard. See WISD’s Brief at 20. WISD ―has the burden‖
8
prove the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Rusk State Hosp., 392 S.W.3d at
96. It has failed to do so.
A. Perez did not receive notice and a fair hearing.
WISD complains that ―Perez did not plead that he did not receive notice or
did not receive a hearing.‖ WISD’s Brief at 21. As discussed above, failure to
plead an allegation will not support a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction which
has been raised for the first time on appeal.
Even the current record shows that Perez did not receive sufficient notice
and opportunity to be heard:
[WISD’s] administrative procedures required that they give Perez a
hearing on his Level 1 Complaint by July 30, 10 . . . . [WISD] waited
over 130 days before finally holding a ―hearing‖ on December 1,
2010, which Perez did not even attend because he believed the
scheduled meeting was a settlement conference and not the long-
overdue Level 1 Complaint hearing.
CR 83 at ¶ 9. Moreover, Perez was not merely entitled to a hearing; he was entitled
to ―a full and fair hearing on disputed fact issues.‖ City of Corpus Christi v. Pub.
Utility Com’n of Tex., 51 S.W.3d 231, 262 (Tex. 2001). And had WISD raised its
challenge with the trial court, Perez would have been able to offer even more
pleadings and evidence showing why his hearing was insufficient and unfair.
Ultimately, neither party has briefed nor discussed the issue of whether
Perez received adequate notice and a fair hearing. Accordingly, this issue should
be resolved in the trial court and not in this appeal.
9
B. Perez has a property interest in renewal of his contract.3
WISD broadly asserts that ―[a] contract of definite term that expressly states
the employment was only for the length of the contract does not create a
reasonable expectation of renewal.‖ WISD’s Brief at 22. In the abstract, this is
correct: a contract with a definite length will not, standing alone, create a property
interest. Similarly, a contract with a definite length will not, standing alone,
preclude a property interest.
The cases cited by WISD do not hold otherwise. Bates was decided on the
statute of limitations, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not expect continued
employment based on his contract. See Bates v. Tex. State Tech. Coll., 983 S.W.2d
821, 830 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). The plaintiff in Govant did not
have a property interest in continued employment because his contract stated that
he ―shall have no expectation of continued employment or property interest in his
employment . . . .‖ Govant v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 72 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (internal modification omitted). The
plaintiff in Nelson lost because he claimed that a single payment by his employer
3
Perez also claimed that WISD’s fraudulent performance review destroyed his reputation and
deprived him of ―his liberty interest in serving as a risk manager for another
school/governmental body . . . .‖ CR 413 at ¶ 25. WISD has not argued that this liberty interest is
not constitutionally-protected. If made, however, such an argument would have failed. See Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972) (―Where a person’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential.‖).
10
created a property right in future payments. Nelson v. Clements, 831 S.W.2d 587,
591 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied). Finally, the defendant in Sullivan
―merely declined to offer‖ a renewal; there was no discussion of any other factors
which could have created an interest. Sullivan v. Univ. Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at
Houston Dental Branch, No. 01-08-00327-CV, 2008 WL 5179023, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston] Dec. 11, 2008, pet. denied).
A property right can exist when there are factors beyond the mere non-
renewal of a contract. For example, a ―de facto system of tenure‖ can create ―an
expectancy continued employment.‖ Martine v. Bd. of Regents, State Senior Tech.
Colls. of Tex., 578 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d
n.r.e.). Similarly, an administrator’s non-binding statement that a contract would be
renewed can ―trigger[] due process protection‖ for an expectation of renewal.
Gosney v. Sonora Indep. Sch. Dist., 603 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1979). Even a
―mutual understanding‖ that an employee will not be terminated can create an
property right in continued employment. Comb v. Benji’s Special Educ. Acad.,
Inc., 745 F. Supp. 2d 755, 763 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
Perez’s right to renewal is based on far more than the mere non-renewal of
his contract. He alleges a ―longstanding unwritten policy by WISD of
automatically renewing contracts of its non-teacher employees every[y] year,
barring cause, misconduct, or budgetary constraints.‖ CR 257. This tacit policy
11
became express when WISD ―represented to [him] that it would follow this policy
with [him].‖ Id. Together, these allegations are more than sufficient to create a fact
issue regarding whether Perez had a reasonable and protected interest in continued
employment.
C. Perez was not required to exhaust his remedies before bringing
his due process claims.
WISD finally argues that Perez was required to exhaust his administrative
remedies before bringing his constitutional claims. WISD acknowledges that
different courts of appeals have come to different conclusions on this issue.
Ultimately, however, the split of authority is irrelevant.
Both the Texas Supreme Court and this Court agree that ―an exception to the
requirement of pursuing administrative relief is found where the claims are for a
violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights.‖ Olivarez v. La Villa Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 13-04-345-CV, 2007 WL 925648, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Mar. 29, 2007, no pet.) See also Martinez v. Donna Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. 13-03-300-CV, 2004 WL 1852969, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-
Edinburg Aug. 19, 2004, pet. denied) (same); Friona Indep. Sch. Dist. v. King, 15
S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (because federal and state
constitutional rights ―do not arise under Titles 1 and 2 of the Education Code,‖
exhaustion was not required)
12
In Texas Education Agency, for example, several school employees from
claims under the Texas and United States Constitutions. TEA v. Cypress-Fairbanks
I.S.D., 830 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Tex. 1992). The Texas Supreme Court stated (albeit in
dicta) that the ―constitutional claims are not affected by the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies such that they must be originally considered by the
[reviewing agency]. Because of the nature of such claims, prior resort to the
administrative process is not usually required.‖ Id. at 91 n.3.
Thus, under the rules announced by the Texas Supreme Court and this
Court, Perez was not required to exhaust his remedies, and WISD’s argument fails
accordingly.
Conclusion
Perez satisfied the requirements of the Whistleblower Act by reporting
illegal activity prior to his performance review and by initiating the grievance
procedure. Perez alleges that he did not receive notice and a fair hearing, and he
can provide additional facts and allegations in the trial court if necessary. Perez has
a property interest in continued employment due to (1) WISD’s longstanding
pattern and practice of automatic renewals and (2) WISD’s representations to Perez
that it would follow that practice with him. Finally, controlling precedent states
that Perez was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing
13
his due process claims. Perez prays that the Court reverse the trial court’s order and
remand the case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
Hawash Meade Gaston
Neese & Cicack LLP
/s/ Samuel B. Haren
Andrew K. Meade
Texas Bar No. 24032854
Samuel B. Haren
Texas Bar No. 24032854
2118 Smith Street
Houston, Texas 77002
713-658-9001 (phone)
713-658-9011 (fax)
sharen@hmgnc.com
Attorneys for Appellant,
Adan Perez, Jr.
14
Certificate of Compliance
This brief complies with the length limitations of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 3,235 words, excluding the parts of the
brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Samuel B. Haren
Samuel B. Haren
15
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on
the following via electronic service on June 24, 2015:
Stacy Tuer Castillo
Texas Bar No. 00796322
D. Craig Wood
Texas Bar No. 2188870
Miguel A. Saldaña
Texas Bar No. 17429450
Walsh, Anderson, Gallegos, Treviño, Russo & Kyle, P.C.
100 NE Loop 410, #900
San Antonio, Texas 78216
210-979-6633 (phone)
210-979-7024 (fax)
scastillo@wabsa.com
cwood@wabsa.com
msaldana@wabsa.com
/s/ Samuel B. Haren
Samuel B. Haren
16