Maria De Jesus Garza, Guillermo Torres, and Joe E. Vega, in Their Individual Capacities v. Juan Jose "JJ" Zamora, Sr. and Martin C. Cantu

ACCEPTED
13-15-00237-CV
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
7/1/2015 9:29:56 AM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK

NO. 13-15-00237-CV

FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF7/1/2015
TEXAS 9:29:56 AM
AT CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURGCECILE FOY GSANGER
Clerk

CITY OF PORT ISABEL, TEXAS, MARIA DE JESUS GARZA,
GUILLERMO TORRES AND JOE E. VEGA
Appellants,

VS.

JUAN JOSE "JJ" ZAMORA, SR., AND MARTIN C. CANTU
Appellees.

From Cause Number 2015-DCL-02342
In the 444th Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas

APPELLANTS MARIA DE JESUS
GARZA AND JOE E. VEGA’S BRIEF

Michael Cowen
Texas Bar No. 00795306
The Cowen Law Group
62 E. Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78521
Telephone (956) 541-4981
Facsimile (956) 504-3674
E-Mail: Michael@CowenLaw.com
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellants Counsel for Appellants
City of Port Isabel Robert L. Collins
Texas Bar No. 04618100
Audrey Guthrie
Texas Bar No. 24083116
P.O. Box 7726
Houston, Texas 77270-7726
(713) 467-8884
(713) 467-8883 Facsimile
houstonlaw2@aol.com

Maria de Jesus Garza Michael R. Cowen
Joe Vega Texas Bar No. 00795306
62 E. Price Road
Brownsville, TX 78521
(956) 541-4981
(956) 504-3674 Facsimile
michael@cowenlaw.com

Guillermo Torres Frank E. Perez
Texas Bar No. 15776540
300 Mexico Boulevard
Brownsville, TX 78520
(956) 504-5403
(956) 504-5991 Facsimile
fperez@feperezandassociates.com

Appellees Counsel for Appellees
Juan Jose "JJ" Zamora Gilberto Hinojosa
Martin C. Cantu 622 East St. Charles St.
Brownsville, Texas 78520
956-544-4218
Fax: 956-544-1335
ghinojosa@ghinojosalaw.net

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel 2
Index of Authorities 4
Statement of the Case 6
Statement Regarding Oral Argument 6
Issues Presented 7
Statement of Facts 8
Summary of Argument 11
Arguments and Authorities 12
I. The Trial Court Had No Legal Authority to Issue a 12
Temporary Injunction Returning Cantu and Zamora to Office
During the Pendency of this Case
II. The Trial Court Erred In Basing the Temporary Injunction 13
on Grounds Not Pled by Appellees
III. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Cantu and Zamora 15
Were Removed in Violation of the City Charter
A. The City Charter Provides Two Separate Ways that a 16
Commissioner Can Be Removed from Office
B. The City Commission Had the Authority to Remove 18
Cantu and Zamora at the April 13, 2015 Meeting
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Finding the Cantu and Zamora 20
Were Deprived of Due Process
V. Section 2.02 of the City Charter is Constitutional 21
VI. The City Commission Can Remove a Commissioner 22
Without Resorting to Quo Warranto

3
 VII. The Temporary Injunction is Overly Broad because It 23
Permits Appellees to Vote on Matters Regarding this Lawsuit
Conclusion and Prayer 24
Certificate of Service 25
Certificate of Compliance 24
Appendix 26

4
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) 23, 24
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1981) 17
City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.–Corpus 11, 12, 13,
Christi 1997) 15, 21, 23
City of Laredo v. Villarreal, 81 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.–San 15
Antonio 2002)
EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 309 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.–Houston 13
[14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
Jones v. City of Arcola, 1999 Westlaw 546965 (Tex. App.–Austin 15
1999)
Hamman v. Hayes, 391 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1965, 23
writ refused)
Huntress v. McGrath, 946 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth 1997, 15
orig. proceeding)
Riggins v. City of Waco, 93 S.W. 426 (Tex. 1906) 15, 22

Statute and Charter Provision

Tex. Local Gov’t § 171.007 22
Port Isabel City Charter, Section 2.02 passim

Attorney General Opinion

Tex. Atty. Gen. Opin. GA-0068 (2003) 22

5
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of underlying proceeding: Appellees, Juan Zamora and Martin Cantu
were removed from their offices as City
Commissioners for violations of the Port
Isabel City Charter. Appellees filed suit
against Relators, the City of Port Isabel, two
City Commissioners, and the Mayor in their
personal and official capacities claiming that
Appellees should not have been removed
from office and seeking an injunction to
undue the vote and reinstate them into their
offices.

Action complained of: On April 24, 2015, a hearing was held on
Appellants Plea to Jurisdiction and Appellee's
Temporary Injunction. The Temporary
Injunction was erroneously granted on April
24, 2015.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

There is sufficient applicable and well-established law to decide this issue

without oral arguments. However, if Appellees are granted oral arguments, then

Appellants request an equal opportunity to be heard and present argument.

6
 ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Given this Court’s prior holding a city councilman removed pursuant to a city
charter provision does not have the right to a temporary injunction while he
pursues judicial review of the removal, did the trial court err in granting such
an injunction?

2. Can a trial court grant a temporary injunction based on grounds not plead by
movants as a basis for injunctive relief?

3. Did the City of Port Isabel properly remove appellees from their positions as
city commissioners when appellees admittedly violated the city charter by
doing business with the city while serving as commissioners?

4. Did appellees receive due process when they had notice, an opportunity to
speak and be heard, and actually attended and participated in the meeting in
which they were removed?

5. Can a home rule city require a higher ethical standard than the minimum
required by state law?

6. Can a home rule city enforce its own charter without having to depend on a
district attorney or the attorney general to file a quo warranto action?

7. Can plaintiffs use a temporary injunction to preclude appellate review or an
effective defense by using the injunction to appoint their attorney as the
defendant’s city attorney, to replace defendant’s attorney with an attorney
chosen by plaintiffs and their attorney, and to vote to abandon appeals and to
prevent the city from defending the lawsuit plaintiffs filed against it?

8. How can Appellees claim that the City Commission acted arbitrarily and
illegally in removing them under Section 2.02 when they themselves attempted
to remove another commissioner under Section 2.02 at the same meeting?

7
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Section 2.02 of the Port Isabel City Charter prohibits City Commissioner’s

from doing business with the City. RR 136-137, 147. Section 2.02 further provides

that any City Commissioner who does business with the city vacates his or her

position. Id. Appellees Martin Cantu and Juan Jose Zamora have admitted doing

business with the City of Port Isabel while serving as City Commissioners. RR 84,

86-87, 108. The issue in this appeal is whether the City of Port Isabel can enforce the

anti-corruption provisions of its own charter by removing City Commissioners who

do business with the city.

Martin Cantu and Juan Jose Zamora were Port Isabel City Commissioners.

While serving as City Commissioners, they both did business with the city through

their respective auto repair businesses. RR 84, 86-87, 108. Both Cantu and Zamora

testified under oath that they did business with the city while serving as

commissioners, and there was no factual dispute as to whether they violated Section

2.02 of the City Charter.

A Port Isabel City Commission meeting was scheduled for April 13, 2015. RR

126-129, 175-178. Prior to that meeting, Cantu placed an item on the agenda calling

for a vote to remove Torres from office for allegedly violating Section 2.02 of the

City Charter. RR 85, 127. Torres subsequently placed an item on the agenda for the

8
same meeting to remove Cantu and Zamora for violating the same Section of the

Charter by doing business with the City. RR 177.

Both Cantu and Zamora had notice of the April 13, 2015 meeting, and of the

fact that an item was placed on the agenda calling for their removal. RR 77-78, 112,

126-129, 175-178. The agenda stated that proposed removal was based on Cantu and

Zamora’s violation of Section 2.02’s prohibition of doing business with the city. RR

177.

Cantu and Zamora both attended the meeting, and had the opportunity to speak

and be heard. RR 78, 112. At the meeting, Zamora moved to remove Torres from

office pursuant to Section 2.02. RR 112. The commission voted 3-2 against

Zamora’s motion. The commission then determined that Cantu and Zamora had

violated Section 2.02 by doing business with the city, and voted to remove them from

office. CR 93, ¶ 12.

Cantu and Zamora filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to

undo their removal from office. On April 24, 2015, the trial court held an evidentiary

hearing, at which Cantu and Zamora both testified that they had done business with

the city while serving as commissioners. RR 84, 86-87, 108. Despite this confession,

the trial court granted a temporary injunction ordering that they be returned to the

City Commission. CR 103-105.

9
 Cantu and Zamora, together with a newly-elected commissioner who replaced

Torres, have since used the temporary injunction to try to preclude any appellate

review in this case. Despite being parties to this lawsuit, they have voted on matters

related to this lawsuit, including hiring their attorney as the new city attorney, firing

the former city attorney, and voting to stop any appeals of the lawsuit they filed.

Based on appellees’ use of the injunction, the city commission is now advised on

matters related to this lawsuit by the same attorney who represented Cantu and

Zamora in the trial court.

10
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Port Isabel’s City Charter prohibits city commissioners from doing business

with the City, and provides that commissioners who violate this provision forfeit their

office. Appellees admittedly did business with the city while serving as

commissioners, and were properly removed from their office pursuant to the City

Charter. The trial court erred in granting a temporary injunction returning them to

office.

Both this Court and the Texas Supreme Court have held that a city commission

has the authority to remove a commissioner. Judicial review of such removals is

limited to two issues: (1) whether the commission acted arbitrarily; and (2) whether

appellees received due process. The undisputed evidence shows that the city

commission did not act arbitrarily in removing appellees because appellees admittedly

violated the City Charter’s prohibition against doing business with the city.

Appellees received due process because they had notice and an opportunity to be

heard prior to the vote on their removal

Moreover, this Court has previously held that a city commissioner judicially

challenging his removal has no right a temporary injunction maintaining him in

office. City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d 221, 223-24 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi

1997).

11
 Finally, this Court should not permit appellees to usurp the Court’s appellate

jurisdiction by allowing appellees to use the temporary injunction to take over

appellant’s defense and abandon this appeal. Temporary injunctions should only be

used to preserve the status quo, and not to create final, unappealable orders.

Appellees are abusing the process by using the temporary injunction to hire their

attorney as the new city attorney, and to vote to force appellants to discontinue this

appeal.

ARGUMENT

I. The Trial Court Had No Legal Authority to Issue a Temporary Injunction
Returning Cantu and Zamora to Office During the Pendency of this Case

(Issue No. 1)

The trial court did not have the legal authority to issue a temporary injunction

ordering that Cantu and Zamora return to their offices during the pendency of this

lawsuit. The City Commission, pursuant to the City Charter, has the power to remove

commissioners, and Texas law only grants the courts the power to review for abuse

of discretion and lack of due process. Moreover, “the right to a review by a judicial

body does not entitle appellees to a temporary injunction, the effect of which is the

perpetuate them in office pending that review.” City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d

12
221, 223-24 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1997). An injunction is only appropriate

when the city charter itself is unconstitutional so that it does not constitute “lawful

authority” to remove someone from office Id. at 226-27.

In the temporary injunction order, the trial court did not find that the city

charter itself was unconstitutional, or that the charter did not provide the city

commission with the lawful authority to remove a commissioner. CR 103-105.

Rather, the trial court merely found that the charter was not followed, and that there

was a lack of due process.1 CR 104. Because the trial court did not find that the

charter was unconstitutional or otherwise did not constitute a lawful authority, it had

no power to issue a temporary injunction. City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d at

223-224.

II. The Trial Court Erred In Basing the Temporary Injunction on Grounds
Not Pled by Appellees

(Issue No. 2)

To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead a cause of action

against the defendant and show both a probable right to recover on that cause of

action. EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 309 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

1
Appellants’ disagree with those findings, and have challenged them in this Brief.

13
Dist.] 2010, no pet.. To show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead

and present evidence to sustain the pleaded cause of action. Id.

In their Third Amended Petition, Appellees only pled one basis for having a

probable right to recovery in support of their request for a temporary injunction:

20. It is probable that Plaintiff will recover from Defendants after a trial
on the merits because the law is clear that only a successful quo
warranto proceeding brought by the appropriate authority, which does
not include Defendants, can remove Plaintiffs from their respective
offices. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Section 66 et. seq; Hamman v
Hayes, 391 S.W. 2d 73, 74 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1965, writ refused).

CR 98. However, the trial court, in granting the temporary injunction, did not find

that appellees could only be removed by a quo warranto proceeding. CR 103-104.

Rather, the trial court found a probable right to recover based on two grounds not

pled as bases for injunctive relief: lack of compliance with the charter and lack of due

process. CR 104. Because appellees failed to prove the cause of action for injunctive

relief they actually pled,2 the temporary injunction should be dissolved.

2
Appellees did seek declaratory (but not injunctive) relief based on alleged non-compliance
with the City Charter. RR 96. Appellees did not plead a lack of due process. RR 90-100.

14
III. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Cantu and Zamora Were Removed
in Violation of the City Charter

(Issue No. 3)

The Texas legislature vested the power to remove a mayor or commissioner in

the city council, and no power of review is given to the courts. Jones v. City of

Arcola, 1999 Westlaw 546965 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999); see Huntress v. McGrath,

946 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex. App.—Ft Worth 1997, orig. proceeding); Riggins v. City

of Waco, 93 S.W. 426, 427 (Tex. 1906). As this Court stated in City of Alamo v.

Garcia, “Texas courts, in recognition of the autonomy and separate powers of

municipal legislatures, will not interfere to protect a person from removal from office

by a man or body of men to whom to power to remove is given by law.” 960 S.W.2d

at 223. Judicial review is limited to whether the city commission committed an

abuse of discretion or violated due process. Id. “ The most that could be asserted in

favor of the power of the courts is that they may inquire whether or not charges were

duly preferred, a hearing had, and evidence adduced tending to sustain them.”

Riggins, 93 S.W. at 32-33.

A city’s construction of it’s own charter or ordinance is entitled to serious

consideration as long as it is reasonable. City of Laredo v. Villarreal, 81 S.W.3d 865

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002). Moreover, because the trial court’s review of the

15
removal was limited to whether the city commission acted arbitrarily, the city

commission’s interpretation of the City’s charter should be accepted unless there was

no basis for that interpretation.

Appellees plead two reasons why they claimed the City Charter was not

followed: (1) they argued that the City Commission did not have the power to remove

a commissioner unless that commissioner was first convicted of a crime; (2) they

argued that the City Commission could not remove a commissioner at a “special

meeting.” Both of these arguments fail.

A. The City Charter Provides Two Separate Ways that a
Commissioner Can Be Removed from Office

The Port Isabel City Charter authorized the City Commission to remove Cantu

and Zamora at a commission meeting.

Section 2.02 of the City Charter provides, “The Mayor, Commissioners, and

other officers and employees . . . shall not be interested in the profits or emoluments

or any contract, job, work, or service for the City of Port Isabel. . . .” RR 136.

Section 2.02 then provides two mechanisms by which an elected official who violated

the charter can be removed from office. First, the City Commission can vote to

remove that person for violating the charter. Specifically, Section 2.02 provides, “If

16
the Mayor or any City Commissioner fails to maintain, the foregoing qualifications

. . . the City Commission shall at its next regularly scheduled meeting declare a

vacancy to exist and shall fill said vacancy as set forth in Section 2.03 of this

Charter.” RR 137.

A second method by which a person can be removed is if there is a criminal

conviction. Section 2.02 provides, “Any violation, of this Section shall be a

misdemeanor, and on conviction for such violation such office or employment shall

be forfeited.” RR 137.

Appellees argue that the second method is the exclusive method of removing

a commissioner. However, this interpretation would render the provision requiring

the City Commission to declare a vacancy at the next regularly scheduled meeting and

fill the vacancy meaningless. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d

535, 540 (Tex.1981) (“It is a rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute

must be presumed to have been used for a purpose”). Moreover, the provision

providing that a mayor or city commissioner may be removed at a meeting is limited

to the mayor and the commissioners. In contrast, the criminal conviction provision

applied to all officers and employees as well. Therefore, the Port Isabel City

Commission did not act in an arbitrary manner when it interpreted Section 2.02 as

permitting a commissioner to be removed at a city council meeting.

17
 Further proof that the City Commission’s interpretation of the charter as

authorizing the removal was not “arbitrary” is the fact that Cantu and Zamora invoked

the same procedure at the same meeting in an attempt to remove Torres. RR 85,

104-105, 111-112. Appellees interpreted the charter in the same way as appellants

until they ended up on the losing side of the removal issue. Because a reasonable city

commission could have interpreted Section 2.02 of the charter as giving the

commission the power to remove commissioners for violating Section 2.02 at a

regularly-scheduled “special” meeting, the removal was neither arbitrary or

capricious, and should be respected by the courts.

There is also no question that the evidence supports the City Council’s findings

that Cantu and Zamora violated the charter by doing business with the city while

serving as commissioners. Cantu and Zamora both testified that they did business

with city while commissioners. RR 84, 86-87, 108.

B. The City Commission Had the Authority to Remove Cantu and
Zamora at the April 13, 2015 Meeting

The City Commission did not act arbitrarily in treating the April13, 2015

meeting as a “regularly scheduled” meeting at which it could remove Cantu and

Zamora under Section 2.02. The Port Isabel City Commission normally meets on

18
Tuesdays, but met on April 13, 2015 (the Monday before the previously-scheduled

Tuesday meeting) to accommodate all of the commissioners’ schedules. The meeting

was not called specifically to call for the removal of Cantu and Zamora. In fact, it

was already scheduled for Monday, April 13, 2015 before the agenda item to remove

Cantu and Zamora was added. See RR 126-128 (draft agenda, faxed at 4:49 on April

10, showing that the meeting was scheduled for April 13; the item to remove Cantu

and Zamora was not on the agenda); RR 175-178 (agenda for April 13, 2015 meeting,

including item to remove Cantu and Zamora, posted at 6:20 p.m. on April 10).

Section 2.02 does not state that a commissioner can only be removed at a

“Regular Meeting” or that a commissioner cannot be removed at a “Special

Meetings.” A reasonable interpretation of the term “regularly scheduled meeting” is

that the meeting has to be scheduled in the normal order of business, and that the

commission cannot call a new meeting just for the purpose of removing

commissioners. Given that Cantu and Zamora placed on item to remove Torres

pursuant to Section 2.02 at the April 13 meeting, and that they did not object to the

consideration oft he removal items at the April 13 meeting on the ground that it was

a “Special Meeting,” it is evident that Cantu and Zamora interpreted the April 13,

2015 meeting as a “regularly scheduled” meeting at which a commissioner could be

removed. It is only after they failed to remove Torres, and they themselves were

19
removed that they complained about the process they themselves first invoked.

Moreover, Cantu and Zamora cannot show any harm from the fact that the

meeting was held on April 13 rather than April 14. They both had notice of the

meeting, and of the agenda item regarding their proposed removal. They both had an

opportunity to speak and be heard. They both attended and spoke. And most

importantly, they were both admittedly guilty of violating the charter by doing

business with the city, and they would have been as guilty on Tuesday as they were

on Monday.

IV. The Trial Court Erred in Finding the Cantu and Zamora Were Deprived
of Due Process

(Issue No. 4)

The trial court’s second ground for finding a probable fight to recover was that

appellees due process rights under the Texas Constitution were allegedly violated.

This finding was erroneous for two reasons. First, appellees never pled that their due

process rights were violated. RR 90-100. Second, Cantu and Zamora received the

due process required by law because they had notice of the April 13 meeting and an

opportunity to be heard at that meeting.

“Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at

20
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960

S.W.2d at 225. In the City of Alamo case, this Court found that there was due process

when a city commissioner had the right to appear at a city commission meeting and

to be heard on the issue of his removal. Id. Cantu and Zamora had notice of the

hearing and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing. More over, they cannot claim

that they were prevented from presenting some evidence that would have changed the

outcome of whether they were found to have violated the City Charter. They both

admitted to doing business with the city while serving, which violates Section 2.02.

Therefore, as a matter of law appellees received due process, and the trial court erred

in finding otherwise.

V. Section 2.02 of the City Charter is Constitutional

(Issue No. 5)

Appellees pled, as a basis for declaratory judgment, that Section 2.02 of the

City Charter was unconstitutional. CR 96. The trial court did not find that Section

2.02 was unconstitutional, and appellees did not plead unconstitutionality as a basis

for injunctive relief. CR 97-99, 103-105. Therefore, any argument that Section 2.02

is unconstitutional should not serve as a basis for affirming the temporary injunction.

However, out of an abundance of caution, Appellants have set out the authority for

21
why it complies with the Texas Constitution.

Section 2.02 of the Port Isabel City Charter is constitutional. Appellees claim

that Section 2.02 is unconstitutional and preempted because it imposes a greater

restriction of an official’s ability to do business with the city than provided by state

law. However, home rule cities are permitted to have ethical requirements that

exceed those imposed by state law. Tex. Atty Gen. Opin GA-0068 (2003). Local

Government Code Section 171.007(b) provides that the conflict-of-interest provisions

of chapter 171 are “cumulative of municipal charter provisions and municipal

ordinances defining and prohibiting conflicts of interests.” Therefore, neither state

statutory nor constitutional law prohibits Port Isabel from prohibiting its

commissioners from doing business with the city.

VI. The City Commission Can Remove a Commissioner Without Resorting to
Quo Warranto

(Issue No. 6)

The city commission has the power to remove a commissioner from office for

violating the charter. Quo warranto is not the sole method of removing a

commissioner. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed a city’s right to remove its own

elected officials over a century ago in Riggins v. City of Waco, 93 S.W. 426 (Tex.

22
1906). More recently, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the city has that right

in City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997).

In contrast, none of the quo warranto cases cited by appellees involved a city

commission removing an elected official pursuant to a municipal charter. Rather,

every one of those cases related to a private citizen’s attempt to file a lawsuit to

remove a public official from office. E.g. Hamman v Hayes, 391 S.W. 2d 73, 74

(Tex. App. Beaumont 1965, writ refused).

VII. The Temporary Injunction is Overly Broad because It Permits Appellees
to Vote on Matters Regarding this Lawsuit

(Issue No. 7)

Arguing in the alternative, in the event that the Court affirms the temporary

injunction, the Court should reform and narrow the scope of the injunction. As the

injunction now stands Appellees can vote on this lawsuit. They have voted to fire the

city attorney, to make the attorney representing them in this lawsuit into the new city

attorney, to have the attorney representing them in this lawsuit advise the commission

in executive session regarding matters pertaining to this lawsuit, to retain counsel

chosen by their attorney to represent the City in this lawsuit, and to abandon this

appeal. A temporary injunction is only supposed to preserve the status quo. Butnaru

23
v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). It should not be used as a means

to secure a final adjudication, or to prevent appellate review of the trial court’s orders.

Therefore, in the event that the Court affirms the granting of the temporary injunction,

Appellants ask that the Court also modify the injunction to prohibit Appellees from

voting on matters pertaining to this action or otherwise trying to prohibit the City

from appealing or defending itself in the lawsuit Appellees filed.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

Appellants Maria de Jesus Garza and Joe E. Vega respectfully pray that the

Court reverse the trial court’s granting of an injunction.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael Cowen
Texas Bar No. 00795306
The Cowen Law Group
62 E. Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78521
Telephone (956) 541-4981
Facsimile (956) 504-3674
E-Mail: Michael@CowenLaw.com

24
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b), (d), (e), I
certify that I have served this document on all other parties, on this 24th day of June,
2015:

Gilbert Hinojosa
622 East St. Charles St.
Brownsville, Texas 78520
Fax: 1-956-544-1335
ghinojosa@ghinojosalaw.net

Robert L. Collins
P.O. Box 7726
Houston, Texas 77270-7726
(713) 467-8884
(713) 467-8883 Facsimile
houstonlaw2@aol.com
ATTORNEYS FOR CITY OF
PORT ISABEL

Frank E. Perez
FRANK E. PEREZ & ASSOCIATES, PC
300 Mexico Boulevard
Brownsville, TX 78520
(956) 504-5991 Facsimile
fperez@feperezandassociates.com

/s/ Michael Cowen

25
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than
14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the
word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(I), if applicable, because it contains
4,797 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Michael Cowen

26
 NO. 13-15-00237-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

CITY OF PORT ISABEL, TEXAS, MARIA DE JESUS GARZA,
GUILLERMO TORRES AND JOE E. VEGA
Appellants,

VS.

JUAN JOSE "JJ" ZAMORA, SR., AND MARTIN C. CANTU
Appellees.

From Cause Number 2015-DCL-02342
In the 444th Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS MARIA
DE JESUS GARZA AND JOE E. VEGA’S BRIEF

Michael Cowen
Texas Bar No. 00795306
The Cowen Law Group
62 E. Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78521
Telephone (956) 541-4981
Facsimile (956) 504-3674
E-Mail: Michael@CowenLaw.com

27
 CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

1. Temporary Injunction Order

2. Page containing Section 2.02 of the Port Isabel City Charter

3. City of Alamo v. Garcia, 960 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1997)

28
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····-· :w~~?,~i!JS:w2
412S/201S 5:19:0<1 ~M
ErfeGotzo
cameron County Dietrict Clerk
CAUSE NO.lOlS-DCJ.-.2342 By S.o~"iel Zofl"O• l:leputy CIGrk
5072380

JUAN JOSE "JJ" ZAMOltr Apl'il 13,
,
2015; and (2) Without this temporary injunction, Plaintiffs will lose their righm to be included in
llie ongomg business of city government as Port Isabel City Commissio11ers and will lose their
.

right to vote on matters concerning Port Isabel ciiy gov=ent. Therefore, the Court finds tnat

hann is hntrrinent to l:'laimi:ffS if the court does not Jssuo. the t.emporary illj1mctio11 and that

p]a,!!1:ifis Wlil oe lll'eporaoly liarmed b<:cause (!) Plaintiffs were auJy electel:l to their respective

office~ as Port Isabel City Commissioners Places 1 antl3; (2) Defendants do not regard Plaill.t.iffs

as City Commissioners llt!y longer and will not allow Plointiffs to continue to oct as Ci;;•

Comnus:noners; an(] (3) Defendants' actions m ous~ng Plaurtit!S !rom tlietr pos!bO'ns as Port

Isabel City Commissioners dcpri""' Plaintiffs :from tbeir interests, righ.ts and entitlements as

afforded to Plai!ltiffs under tl1e law and Conoti.tution of the Sta:te of Te1>:as. The Court finds that

. . . .... ttle "!llJlllj' ana: ·nann to Plawttm· a6sent "tilL<" temporary 1DJWlCil.CID, Will· oe tmmeirulte ana - -' . -

103
05/12/2015 15:51 9563837608 139TH PAGE 02/03
K''' •.·;~15/"UE
,fl.' . "'' .... • . 1 i)3 Gl P!! GILBERTO HJNDJOSA LP •IF 'I 95""44
,',A ,· 0,b~ I .,.
;JJ P. CQ4

"

irreparable. Plaintiffs have established a probable right to reoovery since Plaintiffs were

-ved by D~fendaals os oil:! eoml!lissi011C!5 hl violatkm of lhe City ofi'ort .tsabel Horue RUle

Charter, mrte law and in violation of their d.ue process rlglm; protected under tbe Texas

ConstitntioJl,

IT IS TEEl/JlfORE omD, ADJ'UPGED A~ID DBCRBED that Defendmllo City of

Port Isabel, Maria de Jesus Ga."'Za in her individu~ capacity and her cnpaci1y as Port Isabel City

Commiosiouer Pla"e 2, Guilli!:!mo Toll'es in his individual capodty and his capacity as Port

Js,,bel Cify c":tllmissioner Pl""" 4 anf Port lsab=l &llol tt... l'91t Isabel Ciiy

Commission; (4) takin,g any action to replace Plaintiffs as Pon: !&abel City Co!lllllissioners Places

1 and 3; (5) declaring vac1111cies for Port Isabel City Comtnissioncr Places 1 and 3, and (6)

including as an !l(l•ndo item on any fntm• agencJ•. fo• removal ofPloimi:ffs !rom t:ll