ACCEPTED
01-15-00373-cv
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
8/10/2015 5:13:17 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-15-00373-CV
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR HOUSTON, TEXAS
THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS 8/10/2015 5:13:17 PM
AT HOUSTON CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
MARY RUST
Appellant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas
Trial court cause no. C-1-CV-14-010108
Hon. Todd T. Wong, Presiding
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE
Mark D. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 00793975
Shelley L. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 24036497
Hopkins Law, PLLC
12117 Bee Caves Rd., Suite 260
Austin, Texas 78738
(512) 600-4320- Telephone
(512) 600-4326- Facsimile
mark@hopkinslawtexas.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
August 10, 2015
1
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(l), Appellee certifies
that the following is a complete list of all parties and counsel:
1. Appellee: Bank of America, N.A.
Represented at trial
and on appeal by: Mark D. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 00793975
Shelley L. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 24036497
Hopkins Law, PLLC
12117 Bee Caves Rd., Suite 260
Austin, Texas 78738
(512) 600-4320- Telephone
(512) 600-4326- Facsimile
2. Appellant: Mary Rust
Represented at trial
and on appeal by: David A. Rogers
Texas State Bar No. 2401089
Law Office of David Rodgers
1201 Spyglass Drive, Suite 100
Austin Texas 78746
(512) 923-1836- Telephone
(512) 777-5988- Facsimile
Firm@DARogersLaw.com
3. Trial Judge: Hon. Todd T. Wong
County Court at Law No. 1
Travis County, Texas
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE ................................................................................. 1
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 7
ISSUES PRESENTED .............................................................................................. 8
1. Did the Trial Court appropriately enter judgment for Appellee on
its forcible detainer suit based upon the documents admitted into
evidence establishing Appellee's superior right to immediate
possession of the Property, such evidence being: (a) a deed of trust
with tenancy at sufferance clause, (b) a substitute trustee's deed,
and (c) a notice to vacate? ............................................................................... 8
2. Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee Attorney's Fees
pursuant to Texas Property Code 24.006(b )? .................................................. 8
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 10
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 11
PRAYER ................................................................................................................. 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 22
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................. 23
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE(S)
Bierwirth v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n.,
2014 WL 902541 (Tex. App.- Austin 2014)(mem. op.) .................................... 18
Bittinger v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,
2011 WL 4793828 (Tex. App- Houston [14th Dist] 2011) .................................. 14
Black v. Washington Mut. Bank,
318 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) .. 12, 13
City ofKeller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex.2005) ................................................................................ 11
Clarkson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'/ Trsut Co.,
331 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet) ....................................... 17
Crumpton v. Stevens,
936 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ) ..................................... 13
Deubler v. Bank ofNew York Mellon,
2011 WL 1331540 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (mem.op.) ............... l6
Fandy v. Lee,
880 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ) ........................................... 12
Fleming v. Fannie Mae,
2010 WL 4812983 (Tex. App.-Waco 2010, no pet. h.) (memo. op.) ............... 15
Haith v. Drake,
596 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) ........... 13
Hartzog v. Seeger Coal Co.,
163 S.W. 1055 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, no writ) ....................................... 13
4
Home Sav. Ass 'n v. Ramirez,
600 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e) ............ 13
Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen,
229 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ......................... 13
Hornsby v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
2012 WL 3525420 (Tex.App.-Dallas Aug. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) .... 15, 17
Intercontinental Grp. Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P.,
295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................................... 18
Jaimes v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n,
2013 WL 7809751 (Tex. App.- Austin 2013(mem. op.) ................................... 18
Kaldis v. Aurora Loan Servs.,
2010 WL 2545614 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 24, 2010, pet. dism'd
w.o.j.) (mem.op.) ................................................................................................. 16
Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc.,
650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.1983) .................................................................................. 11
Martinez v. Beas ley,
572 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) .......................... 13
Middleton v. Crestar Mortgage Corp.,
2000 WL 298694 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (mem.op.) ....................... 15
Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortg. Co.,
192 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) ........................................... 18
Powelson v. US. Bank Nat'/ Ass'n,
125 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) ........................................... 18
Reardean v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp.,
2013 WL 4487523 (Tex. Civ. App.- Austin, 2013) ........................................... 15
Rice v. Pinney,
51 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) ............................ 12, 13, 14, 16
5
Rodriguez v. Citimortgage,
2011 WL 182122 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, no pet.)(memo. op.) ......... 13, 15, 18
Rust v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A.,
573 Fed. Appx. 343 (5th Cir. 2015) ................................................................. 7, 15
Scott v. Hewitt,
90 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1936) ........................................................................... 12, 13
Smith v. KNC Optical, Inc.,
296 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2009, no pet) .............................................. 11
Stephens v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp.,
2011 WL 1532384 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 21, 2011, no pet.) ..................... 15
STATUTES PAGE(S)
Statutes
TEX. PROP. CODE §24.002(a)(2) .............................................................................. 16
Tex. Prop. Code §24.006(a) .................................................................................... 19
Tex. Prop. Code §24.006(b) .......................................................................... 8, 18, 19
TEX. R. CIV. P. 746 ............................................................................................ 12, 15
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Mary G. Rust ("Appellant" or "Rust") from a final
judgment [CR 376] entered by the County Court at Law Number One in Travis
County, Texas, granting Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America" or
"Appellee") immediate possession of property located at 2623 Alcott Lane, Unit A,
Austin, Texas 78748 (the "Property"). Bank of America purchased the Property at
a foreclosure sale on September 4, 2012, and Appellant refused to vacate the
Property after Bank of America's demand. Appellant Rust separately challenged
the underlying foreclosure sale of the Property with a district court lawsuit, the
result of which was an opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirming the validity of the foreclosure sale. See, Appendix Ex. A,
Rust v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A., 573 Fed. Appx. 343 (5th Cir. 2015).
7
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the Trial Court appropriately enter judgment for Appellee on its forcible
detainer suit based upon the documents admitted into evidence establishing
Appellee's superior right to immediate possession of the Property, such
evidence being: (a) a deed of trust with tenancy at sufferance clause, (b) a
substitute trustee's deed, and (c) a notice to vacate?
2. Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee Attorney's Fees pursuant to Texas
Property Code 24.006(b )?
8
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After Appellant Mary Rust ("Appellant" or "Rust") defaulted on her
mortgage, Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") purchased the real property and
improvements commonly known as 2623 Alcott Lane, Texas 78748 (hereafter,
"Property") at a non-judicial foreclosure sale on September 4, 2012. [CR 346-348]
[Appendix Ex. B]. The Deed of Trust signed by Appellant stated that if the
Property were sold via a non-judicial foreclosure, that she would "immediately
surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale." [CR 336-344]
[Appendix Ex. C]. The Deed of Trust also states that if possession is not
surrendered, "Borrower [Rust] or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance and
may be removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding." [CR 341-342].
BANA sent Appellant written notice to vacate the Property via regular and
certified mail on August 15, 2012. [CR 349-355] [Appendix Ex. D]. BANA also
sent a notice to vacate to the "Occupant(s) and/or Tenant(s)" via regular mail on
the same date. !d.
After Appellant refused to vacate, BANA obtained a Forcible Entry and
Detainer Judgment in its favor from the Justice Court, Precinct 3, Place 1, of Travis
County, Texas. [CR 13]. Appellant appealed the judgment to the County Court at
Law No. 1. [CR 10].
9
The County Court held a de novo hearing on March 5, 2015. [RR vol. 2] and
during that hearing the Court admitted into evidence the Substitute Trustee's Deed
showing BANA's purchase of the Property at the foreclosure sale and the Deed of
Trust showing Appellant's tenant at sufferance status. !d. After those two exhibits
were admitted the County Court admitted the business record affidavit of Vaughan
over Appellant's hearsay objection. !d. Subsequently, the County Court awarded
immediate possession of the Property to Fannie Mae. [CR 376] [Appendix Ex. E].
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Evidence Supports Judgment in Favor of Appellee. The Trial Court's
judgment in favor of Appellee is supported by sufficient evidence showing
Appellee's superior right to immediate possession of the Property. Appellee
introduced documentary evidence showing that it had purchased the Property at a
foreclosure sale, that the Deed of Trust to the Property made Appellant a tenant at
sufferance after the foreclosure, that Appellee demanded that Appellant vacate, and
that Appellant refused to do so. Appellant produced no evidence that would
suggest that the Trial Court's decision is so contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.
10
Attorneys Fees on Appeal. Appellee proved-up through competent
testimony its attorney's fees. The court did not commit error in awarding those
fees.
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES
I. Standard of Review
Rust, on appeal, attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Trial
Court's award of possession of the Property to Bank of America. When, as here, a
party challenges the evidence supporting a finding upon which she did not bear the
burden of proof, the appellate court will sustain the challenge if the evidence
offered to support the finding is no more than a scintilla. Smith v. KNC Optical,
Inc., 296 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2009, no pet.). Evidence is no more
than a scintilla if it is so weak that it does no more than create a surmise or
suspicion of its existence. !d. (citing Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61,
63 (Tex.1983)). In conducting its review, the appellate court considers the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, indulging every reasonable
inference in support. !d. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822
(Tex.2005)). In short, Rust asserts that she offered evidence through an offer of
proof that challenged the validity of the foreclosure sale through which Bank of
America obtained title. See, Appellant's Brief at S-6. However, the law is prohibits
Appellant from attacking Bank of America's title in this way. Rather, the only
11
Issue m a forcible detainer case is the party's superior right to immediate
possession of the property. Continuing, Appellant did file a separate district court
lawsuit challenging the foreclosure, and judgment was granted against her therein.
II. Nature of a Forcible Detainer Action
The forcible detainer action was created to provide a speedy, simple and
inexpensive means for resolving the question of the right to immediate possession
of real property without resorting to an action upon the title. Scott v. Hewitt,
S.W.2d 816, 818-19 (Tex. 1936); Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2001, no pet.). To preserve the simplicity and speedy nature of the remedy,
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 51 0.3( e) provides the following regarding a forcible
detainer action:
Only Issue. The court must adjudicate the right to actual
possession and not title. Counterclaims and the joinder
of suits against third parties are not permitted in eviction
cases. A claim that is not asserted because of this rule
can be brought in a separate suit in a court of proper
jurisdiction.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e).
Thus, "the sole issue in a forcible detainer action is who has the right to
immediate possession of the premises." Rice, 51 S.W.2d at 708; see also Fandy v.
Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ); Black v. Washington
Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd
w.o.j.). No other issues, controversies or rights of the parties related to the
12
property, including title\ can be adjudicated in such a suit. Hong Kong Dev., Inc.
v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). In
simpler terms, a forcible detainer suit asks one simple and specific question: "who
has right to possess the property now?" Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417.
III. ISSUE NO. 1
Did the Trial Court appropriately enter judgment for Appellee on its
forcible detainer suit based upon the documents admitted into evidence
establishing Appellee's superior right to immediate possession of the
Property, such evidence being: (a) a deed of trust with tenancy at
sufferance clause, (b) a substitute trustee's deed, and (c) a notice to
vacate?
1
The appellate jurisdiction of a statutory county court in a forcible detainer action is confined to
the jurisdictional limits of the justice court. Crumpton v. Stevens, 936 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ). Since a justice court is expressly denied jurisdiction to
determine or adjudicate title to land, accordingly and notwithstanding a county court's grant of
general jurisdiction, a statutory county court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate title to real estate in
a de novo trial following an appeal of a forcible detainer suit from justice court. See Rice, 51
S.W.3d at 708.
A forcible detainer action is not exclusive, but cumulative, of any other remedy that a
party may have in the courts of this state, and the displaced party is entitled to bring a separate
suit in the district court to determine the question of title. Scott, 90 S.W.2d at 818-19; Rice, 51
S.W.2d at 708; Home Sav. Ass 'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e); Martinez v. Beasley, 572 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, no writ). The Texas Legislature purposely established a system for parallel,
concurrent actions in the district and justice courts to resolve issues of title and immediate
possession, respectively. Scott, 90 S.W.2d at 818-19; Rice, 51 S.W.2d at 708. Thus, forcible
detainer actions in justice court may be brought and prosecuted concurrently with suits to try title
in district court. Rice, 51 S.W.2d at 708; Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Hartzog v. Seeger Coal Co., 163 S.W. 1055, 160
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, no writ); Rodriguez v. Citimortgage, 2011 WL 182122 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2011, no pet.)(memo. op.).
13
A. Appellant's Improper Attack on Title
To prevail in its forcible detainer action, Bank of America was not required
to prove title at trial (or the validity of the foreclosure sale through which it took
title to the Property) but was only required to show sufficient evidence of
ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. See Rice, at
709; see also Bittinger v. Wells Fargo, N.A. 2011 WL 4793828 at *2 (Tex. App.-
Houston, 2011, no pet. )(mem. op. ).
Despite the narrow scope of forcible detainer proceeding, Rust seeks to
improperly attack Bank of America's title as she:
a. Alleges that the foreclosure sale was invalid through her proffered
documentary evidence depicting that she and her mortgagee had an
ongoing debt collection dispute over the mortgage debt even after the
foreclosure sale2; and
b. Challenges the wording of the affidavie attached to the Substitute
Trustee's Deed, the affidavit containing various recitals that the
2
Even if Appellant's letters with Bank of America regarding her debt dispute were admitted into
evidence those letters alone would be insufficient to cause the reversal of the Trial Court's
Judgment given the standard of review set out in Section I above. More than a scintilla of
evidence supports the Trial Court's judgment.
3
The affidavit admitted into evidence was attached to the substitute trustee's deed and was part
of the actual Substitute Trustee's Deed recorded within the Travis County Real Property
Records. A certified copy of the record was introduced at trial. [RR Vol. 3, Ex. 1], [CR 346-
348]. Appellant's attack on the affidavit is nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack
on the foreclosure sale, and even if the challenged portions of the affidavit were struck, the
information contained therein was duplicative of the information contained within the remainder
of the Substitute Trustee's Deed, Deed of Trust and Notices to Vacate. Therefore, any error
created through the admission of the affidavit would have been harmless error as the testimony
was duplicative of other evidence within the record. Further, Appellant has already and lost her
district court lawsuit regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale. The Fifth Circuit, in
evaluating Rust's attack on the foreclosure sale concluded, "Rust's arguments as to why Bank
14
foreclosure sale occurred in compliance with Texas statute and the
Deed of Trust.
Numerous Texas courts, including this Court, and have consistently held that a
party does not need to prove up the validity of the underlying foreclosure sale
within the context of a forcible detainer proceeding. See e.g., Reardean v. Federal
Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2013 WL 4487523 (Tex. App.--Austin 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, 318 S.W.3d 467, 470 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (validity of foreclosure and sale cannot be
challenged in forcible detainer proceeding); Williams v. Bank ofNew York Mellon,
315 S.W.3d 925, 926-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.) (same); Rodriguez v.
Citimortgage, 2011 WL 182122, *3 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, no pet.) (memo.
op.)(same); Fleming v. Fannie Mae, 2010 WL 4812983, *5 (Tex. App.-Waco
2010, no pet.) (memo. op.) (same); Middleton v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 2000
WL 298694, *4 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Hornsby v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 2012 WL 3525420, *3 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no
pet.) (mem. op.) ("Although [appellant] challenges the chain of title to the
property, 'the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated' in a forcible detainer
action.") (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 746)); Stephens v. Federal Home Loan Mortg.
Corp., 2011 WL 1532384, *2 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
of America's foreclosure sale was invalid lack merit ... " See, Rust v. Bank of America, NA.,
573 Fed. Appx. 343 (5 1h Cir. 2015) (emp. added).
15
(holding Federal Home not required to "connect the dots" between original lender
and mortgage servicer regarding title; substitute trustee's deed evidenced Federal
Home purchased property following plaintiffs default); Deubler v. Bank of New
York Mellon, 2011 WL 1331540, *2 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Kaldis v. Aurora Loan Servs., 2010 WL 2545614, *3 (Tex. App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (holding whether substitute trustee's
deed was "void" or "deficient" or there was a "gap in the chain of title/ownership"
was outside of the scope of the forcible detainer action).
B. Bank of America Met Its Burden of Proof at Trial
A forcible detainer action is "a summary, speedy, and inexpensive"
procedure for determining the right to immediate possession of real property where
no claim of unlawful entry exists. Williams v. Bank of NY Mellon, 315 S.W.3d
925, 926-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Exactly as is the circumstance
herein, "Forcible detainer occurs when a person, who is a tenant at sufferance,
refuses to surrender possession of real property after his right to possession has
ceased." TEX. PROP. CoDE §24.002(a)(2); Aspenwood Apartment Corp. v.
Coinmach, Inc., 349 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.
denied). To prevail in its forcible detainer action, Appellee was not required to
prove title at trial, but was only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership
to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice at 709.
16
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Hornsby v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs
succinctly set out what is required of a litigant to meet its burden of proof in a
forcible detainer action. 2012 WL 3525420 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.)
(mem. op.). In Hornsby, the Court set out that, "To prevail on its claim [movant]
was required to present more than a scintilla of evidence showing it had a right to
possession of the property, [non-movant's] right of possession had ended, and
[non-movant] refused to vacate." Id. at *5. The Court provided that a movant can
meet its burden of proof by introducing the very same class of documents that were
used to establish Appellee's claim herein. The documents sufficient to establish
the elements of a cause of action for forcible detainer are: ( 1) a deed of trust that
establishes a tenancy at sufferance relationship post-foreclosure [CR 336-344]
[Appendix Ex. C], (2) a substitute trustee's deed [CR 346-348] [Appendix Ex. B],
and (3) notices to vacate sent to the tenant at sufferance [CR 349-355] [Appendix
Ex. D]. See Hornsby at *5; Clarkson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'/ Trust Co., 331
S.W.3d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet); Shutter v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 318 S.W.3d 467,471 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j).
The appellate record in this case squarely reflects that Appellee met its
burden of proof in establishing its right to immediate possession of the Property in
this forcible detainer action.
17
Appellant failed to introduce any evidence of a superior right to possession
of the Property, and the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Deed of Trust
(with tenancy at sufferance clause), Substitute Trustee's Deed, and written notices
to vacate sufficiently established Appellant's superior right to possession of the
Property. See Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortg. Co., 192 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Powelson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 125 S.W.3d 810,
812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); Rodriguez v. Citimortgage, 2011 WL
182122 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding substitute trustee's
deed, deed of trust and notices to vacate sufficient evidence to establish superior
right of possession post-foreclosure) (mem. op.); Jaimes v. Federal Nat. Mortg.
Ass'n, 2013 WL 7809751 (Tex. App.--Austin 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bierwirth
v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n., 2014 WL 902541 (Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op.). For these reasons, the Trial Court's judgment awarding possession of
the Property to Appellee should be affirmed.
IV. ISSUE NO.2
Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee Attorney's Fees
pursuant to Texas Property Code 24.006(b)?
Rust asserts that Appellee is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
despite Appellee's successful prosecution of its case at trial. Attorney's fees are
typically not recoverable unless the recovery is authorized by statute or a contract
between the parties. Intercontinental Grp. Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P.,
18
295 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2009). However, statute specifically provides for the
recovery of attorney's fees in eviction matters.
Bank of America provided Rust with a Notice of Vacate, and the Notice set
out that Rust was to vacate the Property within three days. [CR 349-355]
[Appendix, Ex. D]. Appellant cites this court to Section 24.006(a) of the Texas
Property Code which provides,
(a) Except as provided by Subsection(b) ... The demand must state that
if the tenant does not vacate the premises before the 11th day after the date of
receipt of the notice and if the landlord files suit, the landlord may recover
attorneys fees ....
Tex. Prop. Code §24.006(a)(emp. added). Appellant argues that since Bank of
America's Notice to Vacate only provided for a three day period to vacate [C.R.
349-355], the Notice was defective under Section 24.006(a).
Of course the very first clause of Section 24.006(a) provides that the ten day
period only applies to situations not covered by Subsection (b). In reading
Subsection (b) it provides,
(b) If the landlord provides the tenant notice under Subsection (a) or if a
written lease entitles the landlord to recover attorney's fees, a prevailing
landlord is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the tenant.
Tex. Prop. Code §24.006(b). The Deed of Trust, paragraph 18, specifically
provides for the collection of attorney's fees in the event litigation is required to
remove a tenant at sufferance after foreclosure. [CR 336-344]. As such, Bank of
19
America is entitled to its award of attorney's fees provided for within the
Judgment.
PRAYER
For these reasons, Appellee Bank of America, N.A. respectfully requests
that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. Appellee also
requests any other relief, at law or in equity, to which it may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Hopkins Law, PLLC.
12117 Bee Caves Rd. Suite 260
Austin, Texas 78738
(512) 600-4320- Telephone
(512) 600-4326- Facsimile
mark@hopkinswilliams.com
By: Is/ Mark D. Hopkins
Mark D. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 00793975
Shelley L. Hopkins
Texas State Bar No. 24036497
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that Appellee's Brief for No. 01-15-00373-CV has been
forwarded to the following via certified mail, return receipt requested and via e-
service on this lOth day of August 2015:
Via E-service
and CMRRR #7012 1640 0001 7114 7484
David Rogers
Law Office of David Rogers
1201 Spyglass Suite 100
Austin, Texas 78746
Is/ Mark D. Hopkins
Mark D. Hopkins
21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned
certifies this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4.
1. Exclusive of the exemption portions in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.4(i)(1), the brief contains: 4, 105 words
2. THE BRIEF HAS BEEN PREPARED in proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2011 in Times New Roman font, with 14 pitch font
for text and 12 pitch font for footnotes.
3. IF THE COURT SO REQUESTS, THE UNDERSIGNED WILL PROVIDE
AN ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THE BRIEF AND/OR A COPY OF
THE WORD OR LINE PRINTOUT.
4. THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTANDS A MATERIAL MISREPRESEN-
TATION IN COMPLETING THIS CERTIFICATE, OR CIRCUMVEN-
TION OF THE TYPE-VOLUME LIMITS IN TEXAS RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4, MAY RESULT IN THE COURT'S
STRIKING THE BRIEF AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
PERSON SIGNING THE BRIEF.
Is/ Mark D. Hopkins
Mark D. Hopkins
22
APPENDIX
Exhibit "A": Rust v. Bank of America, NA.,
573 Fed. Appx. 343 (5th Cir. 2014)
Exhibit "B": Substitute Trustee's Deed
Exhibit "C" Deed ofTrust
Exhibit "D" Notices to Vacate
Exhibit "E" Judgment Awarding Possession
23
Exhibit "A"
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A.
573 Fed. Appx. 343 (5th Cir. 2014)
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A., 573 Fed.Appx. 343 (2014)
573 Fed.Appx. 343 West Headnotes (5)
This case was not selected for
publication in the Federal Reporter.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter. [1] Mortgages
See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 <®= Wrongful Foreclosure
generally governing citation of judicial Affidavit of assistant vice president of mortgage
decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See servicer was based on personal knowledge,
also Fifth Circuit Rules 28.7, 47.5.3, 47.5-4. and thus admissible in mortgagor's wrongful
(Find CTAs Rule 28 and Find CTAs Rule 47) foreclosure action against mortgage servicer
United States Court of Appeals, under Texas law; affidavit stated that it was
Fifth Circuit. "based upon personal knowledge of [her] review
of [mortgage servicer]'s business records."
Mary G. RUST, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. l Cases that cite this headnote
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.
[2] Mortgages
No. 13-50961 Summary <®= Wrongful Foreclosure
Calendar. I June 17, 2014.
Copy of assignment of deed of trust to mortgage
Synopsis servicer was properly authenticated, and thus
Background: Mortgagor brought wrongful foreclosure admissible in mortgagor's wrongful foreclosure
action against mortgage servicer. The United States District action against mortgage servicer under Texas
Court for the Western District of Texas granted mortgage law; even if copy was not certified, affidavit
servicer's motion for summary judgment. Mortgagor of assistant vice president of mortgage servicer
appealed. swore that it was true and correct copy of
assignment.
l Cases that cite this headnote
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:
(3] Mortgages
[I] affidavit of assistant vice president of mortgage servicer
<®= Scope and mode of review
was based on personal knowledge;
Any error in district court's consideration of two
[2] copy of assignment of deed of trust to mortgage servicer copies of promissory note was not reversible
was properly authenticated; error in mortgagor's wrongful foreclosure action
against mortgage servicer under Texas law; only
131 any error in district court's consideration of two copies of difference in content of two copies was that one
promissory note was not reversible error; included endorsements and other did not, and
central issue in action, i.e., whether mortgage
141 any error in district court's failure to strike affidavit was servicer had authority to foreclose under deed
not reversible error; and of trust, did not depend on whether note was
endorsed.
[51 mortgage servicer had authority to foreclose on
2 Cases that cite this headnote
mortgagor's property.
[41 Mortgages
Affirmed. <®= Scope and mode of review
Any error in district court's failure to strike
affidavit was not reversible error in mortgagor's
WestlawNexr@ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A., 573 Fed.Appx. 343 (2014)
wrongful foreclosure action against mortgage Rust obtained a loan from Austin National Mortgage Limited
servicer under Texas law, where neither (ANML) to acquire property in Austin, Texas. Rust signed
mortgage servicer nor court relied on affidavit a promissory note and also signed a deed of trust naming
for any purpose. ANML as the lender, Ron Harpole as the trustee, and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as
Cases that cite this headnote the beneficiary and nominee of ANML. The deed of trust
gave MERS the power to foreclose and sell the property.
[5] Mortgages MERS later assigned "all beneficial interest under [the] Deed
<®= Right to foreclose of Trust ... together with the note(s) and obligations therein
Mortgages described" to Bank of America. Bank of America additionally
acted as the mortgage servicer.
<®= Under mortgage
Under Texas law, mortgage servicer had
Beginning in early 2011, Rust failed to make her mortgage
authority to foreclose on mortgagor's property,
payments, and Bank of America notified Rust she was in
although mortgage servicer did not possess
default. In July 2012, Bank of America's agent ReconTrust
original promissory note, where beneficiary and
Company, N.A. informed Rust that the property would be
nominee of lender, which was given power in
sold at a foreclosure sale if the default was not cured. Rust
deed of trust to foreclose and sell property,
did not cure her default and the property was foreclosed in
assigned its interest in deed of trust to mortgage
September 2012.
servicer.
2 Cases that cite this headnote Several months later, Rust sued Bank of America in Texas
state court, asserting various state law claims arising out of
the foreclosure of the property. Bank of America removed
the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
and moved for summary judgment, which the district court
Attorneys and Law f'inns
granted. Rust appealed.
*344 William Bcmell Gammon, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
II
Nathan Templeton Anderson, Attomey, Richard Dwayne
Danner, Litigation Counsel, McGlinchey Stafford, P.L.L.C., We first consider whether the district court erred in
Dallas, TX, Courtney Leigh Ebeier, McGlinchey Stafford, considering certain summary judgment evidence. We review
P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 1
Appeal from the United States District Court for the W estem Rust objects to several documents attached to Bank of
District of Texas, USDC No.1: 13-CV-78. America's motion for summary judgment. She argues: (1)
the affidavit of Kelly M. *345 Thompson, an Assistant
Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. Vice President for Bank of America, was not based on
personal knowledge; (2) the copy of the assignment of
Opinion the deed of trust by MERS to Bank of America was not
certified and Thompson's affidavit was insufficient to certify
PER CURIAM:* its authenticity; (3) the two copies of the note attached to
Thompson's affidavit are materially different; and (4) the
After Bank of America, N.A. foreclosed on Mary G. Rust's
affidavit of Carolyn Holleman does not rely on personal
home, she sued under various state laws. The district court
knowledge and contains legal conclusions. All of these
granted summary judgment for Bank of America. We affirm.
contentions lack merit.
[1] [2] [3] [4] First, we agree with the district court
I that there was no reason to exclude Thompson's business
records affidavit. The affidavit stated it was "based upon
WestlawNexr C9 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A., 573 Fed.Appx. 343 (2014)
personal knowledge of [her] review of Bank of America's on the property after Martins defaulted, and Martins brought
business records"; her position at Bank of America made her suit claiming wrongful foreclosure. 12 Affirming summary
competent to testify regarding the Bank's relationship with judgment in favor of BAC, the Fifth Circuit held that
Rust; and Rust produced no reason to doubt the veracity of "MERS and BAC did not need to possess the note to
Thompson's testimony. 2 Additionally, even if the copy of the foreclose," rejecting the view "that the note and deed of trust
assignment of the deed of trust was not certified, Thompson's must both be held by the foreclosing entity." 13 The court
affidavit swore that it was a true and correct copy of the relied on the Texas Property Code, which provides that a
assignment, so the district court did not abuse its discretion mortgage servicer may administer a foreclosure on behalf of
in considering it. 3 Rust's contention that there were two a mortgagee if there is an agreement granting the mortgage
different copies of the note also fails. The only difference in servicer authority to service the mortgage. 14 The Code
the content of the two notes is that one includes endorsements defines a mortgagee to include "the grantee, beneficiary,
and the other does not. The analysis of the central question in owner, or holder of a security instrument" and "a book entry
this appeal- Bank of America's authority to foreclose under system" like MERS, and it defines a mortgage servicer as the
the deed of trust-does not depend on whether the note was "last person to whom a mortgagor has been instructed" to send
endorsed. 4 So any error in considering both notes is not mortgage payments. 15 The Code also allows a mortgagee to
5
reversible error. Finally, as neither Bank of America nor the be its own mortgage servicer. 16 The court determined that,
district court relied on Holleman's affidavit for any purpose, under the Code, BAC could foreclose, presumably as MERS's
declining to strike it was also not reversible error. 6 Rust's mortgage servicer or as the mortgagee after the mortgage was
evidentiary objections are therefore meritless. assigned to it by MERS. Neither MERS nor BAC would have
17
to hold or own the note for the foreclosure to be valid.
III Under a straightforward application of Martins here, Bank of
America had authority to foreclose on Rust's property without
We next consider whether the district court erred in granting holding or owning the original note between ANML and Rust,
summary judgment. "We review de novo a district court's since Bank of America was in the same position as BAC. Rust
award of summary judgment, applying the same standard as nonetheless asserts several arguments as to why Martins does
the district court." 7 Summary judgment is only appropriate not govern here. Rust first contends that Bank of America
"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to was a mortgagee, not a mortgage servicer. However, the two
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a roles are not mutually exclusive under the Property Code,
and here, Bank of America served as both the mortgagee
matter of law." 8
(after the deed of trust was assigned to it as a beneficiary)
18
[5] As the district court explained and Rust acknowledges, and its own mortgage servicer. Indeed, Bank of America
her state law claims tum on whether Bank of America had the presented evidence that it was the mortgage servicer, and Rust
authority to foreclose on her property. If Bank of America's does not cite any contrary evidence. Rust cannot distinguish
foreclosure was authorized, then her Texas Debt Collection Martins on this basis.
Act claim, her Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim,
her fraudulent presentment claim, and her quiet title action *347 Rust also cites portions of the concurring opinion
19
fail. 9 *346 Rust's briefing focuses almost entirely on this in Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. The
question, so that is the issue we examine first. language in that one-judge opinion, concurring in the
majority's judgment but disagreeing with some of its
This court recently considered a very similar case in which reasoning, is not binding. Also, to the extent the opinion states
the plaintiff alleged his property had been wrongfully that a party in Bank of America's position must always hold
foreclosed. In Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P .,
10 the note to foreclose, 20 it would be inconsistent with the
Martins refinanced a mortgage on his home through a lender earlier holding in Martins.
and executed a security instrument naming MERS as the
Rust relies on a number of other cases that did not address
beneficiary and nominee for the lender. 11 MERS then
assigned the security instrument to BAC, BAC foreclosed the question here. 21 Rust cites this court's unpublished
WestlawNexr@ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A., 573 Fed.Appx. 343 (2014)
though the deed of trust gave that power to the lender.
decision in Reeves v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 22 for the
While the lender did hold that power, the Texas Property
proposition that a "party seeking to foreclose must have the
Code provides that, "Ln]otwithstanding any agreement to
right to enforce the debt it seeks to satisfy." 23 There, the the contrary, a mortgagee may appoint or may authorize a
court held that the plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of .
mortgage serv1cer . a sub stltute
to appomt . trustee. " 29 Th us as
material fact as to whether Wells Fargo owned the note before
mortgagee, Bank of America was within its power to appoint
it began foreclosure proceedings, and that the ownership of
a substitute trustee.
the note was sufficient to foreclose. 24 But it did not consider
the situation presented here, in which the foreclosing party Rust's arguments as to why Bank of America's foreclosure
argues that holding the note is not necessary to foreclose. was invalid lack merit, and she raises no other grounds for
reversing the district court's judgment, other than challenging
Rust further argues that, under Colton v. U.S. National Bank the district court's alternative ground for granting summary
25
Association, the deed of trust here grants only the original judgment on her Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim.
lender the power to foreclose her property. In Colton, as here, Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
MERS assigned its interest as nominee in a deed of trust to a judgment.
bank, and the property owner, Colton, claimed that the bank
did not have authority to enforce the deed of trust because it
was not the holder of the original note. 26 The court explained IV
that "although Texas law does not require a party to be a
holder of a note in order to foreclose," Colton alleged that the Rust, by separate motion, asks this court to take judicial notice
specific language in the deed of trust did require the bank to be of new evidence in assessing her claims. As none of the
evidence affects the merits of Rust's state law claims, we deny
the holder of the note to do so. 27 Because it was considering
the motion.
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and neither party provided
the deed of trust, the court accepted as true the allegations
regarding the deed of trust's terms and thus declined to dismiss ***
28
the claim. Here, by contrast, the deed of trust was in the
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and Rust's
summary judgment record and Rust points to no provision in
motion for judicial notice is DENIED.
it that requires Bank of America to be the holder of the note to
enforce the deed of trust. Rust cannot rely on Colton to defeat
summary judgment here. All Citations
*348 Finally, Rust contends that the foreclosure was invalid 573 Fed.Appx. 343
because Bank of America appointed a substitute trustee even
Footnotes
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 United States v. Meza. 701 F.3d 411, 425 (5th Cir.2012).
2 See FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d 1249, 1254 n. 12 (5th Cir.1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Camp, 965
F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir.1992).
3 See FED.R.EVID. 901(b)(1).
4 See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
5 See Meza, 701 F.3d at 425 ("[F]or any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the evidence
in question must have substantially prejudiced [the defendant's) rights.") (alterations in original, internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
6 See id.
7 Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co., 592 F.3d 687, 690 (5th Cir.2010).
8 FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a).
WestlawNe.xr@ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Rust v. Bank of America, N.A., 573 Fed.Appx. 343 (2014)
9 See TEX. FIN.CODE ANN. § 392.301(b)(3) (West 2013) (allowing debt collectors to exercise non-judicial contractual
rights of sale); TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (West 2013) (providing a cause of action for false,
misleading, or deceptive acts); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN.§ 12.002(a) (West 2013) (making a person liable
for using a document with knowledge the document is a fraudulent lien or claim against real property, with intent for
the document to be given the same legal effect as a court record, and intent to cause injury); Wright v. Matthews, 26
S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) ("The plaintiff in a suit to quiet title must allege right, title, or
ownership ... with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see he ... has a right of ownership that will warrant judicial
interference.").
10 722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.2013).
11 Martins, 722 F.3d at 252.
12 /d.
13 /d. at 252, 254-55.
14 /d. at 255 (citing TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 51.0025 (West 2013)).
15 /d. (quoting TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 51.0001(3)-(4) (West 2013)).
16 /d. (citing TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 51.0001 (3) (West 2013)).
17 /d.
18 TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 51.0001(3)-(4) (West 2013) (defining mortgagee to include beneficiaries of security
instruments and allowing a mortgagee to be its own mortgage servicer).
19 735 F.3d 220 (2013).
20 See Reinagel, 735 F.3d at 229 (Graves, J., concurring).
21 E.g., Nueces Cnty., Tex. v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-131, 2013 WL 3353948, at *4-5 (S.D.Tex. July 3,
2013) (considering whether the Texas Property Code "permits MERS to designate itself as a grantee/grantor of record ...
in the real property records"); Henning v. OneWest Bank FSB, 405 S.W.3d 950, 958-59 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(considering wrongful foreclosure claim when bank was current holder of the note and the deed of trust, and property
owner claimed there was a defect in the note's chain of title); Robeson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 02-10-
227-CV, 2012 WL 42965, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Ft. Worth Jan. 5, 2012, pet denied) (considering whether there was a fact
issue as to when the mortgagee had the authority to foreclose, given that the mortgagee was first assigned the lender's
interest in both the note and the deed of trust, but later assigned MERS's interest as beneficiary in the deed of trust).
22 544 Fed.Appx. 564 (5th Cir.2013).
23 Reeves, 544 Fed.Appx. at 569 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
24 /d. at 569-70.
25 No. 3:12-CV-3584, 2013 WL 5903618 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 4, 2013).
26 Colton, 2013 WL 5903618. at *1, *3-4.
27 /d. at *4.
28 /d.
29 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 51.0075(c) (West 2013).
End of Document @ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
WestlawNext C9 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
Exhibit "B"
Substitute Trustee's Deed
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 2012161505
TRV 3 PGS
NOT1CEOI'CONJ11Dm'f.IIAJ ,l'IYRIGJnS: IF YOU AUBANATURAL PlRSON, YOU MAY :REMOVE OR
SI'R.1Kil:ANYORAI..I...Oli'JREFOl,LOWING L"'Ui'OIDf.IADONFROJ\1.ANYINSTRUMENTTIIAT
nt.".NS'IIERS ANll'•i"IERF.STIN J\EAL PROl'ELIT\' lll'..FOR.E IT IS FIL£,0 FO:R. RI'.CORD IN l1'f.& PUBLIC
REOORilS: YOUR SOU.4LSECIJIUJYNUMIJUR OR \'OUR DltlVJ>I~S UCENS~ ~'~UMBER.
12-0IJJ£714 l"JIA.
12-GID43S9.01
2G23ALCoTTI.A'm, AUSTIN, TX78741
SUBSTITTITE TRUSTEE'S DEJ<:U ..·
Deed of'I •ust Date: Sole ofProperty Dute:
July 29,2004 Sll[llember 4, 2012 ,
:::;7•--
Grantor(s)/Mortgagor(s): 'J:imeofSrue:~1, fv
MARY Ci RUST, A SINGLE WOMAN
Otigiuitl Mortgngee: l'lace oJ Sale:
MORTGAGEELECIRON.ICREOISJ'RATION 'The rear "SaRyport" of lhC County Couclhouso
SYSTEMS, INC. located on 1he ,..,-est side- of1he COl111:house
imrnaJjlll.ely south of and slightly east
of1he .,
-~-
inmrscction of llth sb=t and &In Antonio Street.
ORAS DESlGNATED BY THE COUN1Y
C0~1MISSIONERS.
Cnrreut Mortgngee: Gl"'aniee/Buyl!r.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. BAJ-;'X OF AMERICA, N.A.
Morq,oage Servlccr.
Bank ofAmerica, N.A.
Recorded on: August 18, 2004 . Gmutee/Buyer's ]\{.-.iling: Adtlrca.'l:
AJJ Qcrk's F'llc No.: 2004158729 400 NATJONAL WAY, SV-3S
R&-ReconJI'1l SIMI VALLEY, CA 93065 L
l'rolJ"rty CoWlty: .AnwtmtofSale: !.
Travis $175,162.62
Lcgnl Descrlplinu: LOT2, l:li.OCK "G", TANGLEWOOD FORBSl~ &'ECTJONElGHT, A
SUBDMSION'L\' TRAv1S COUNIY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE MAP OR PlAT
THEREOF, RECORDED JNVOUJME 83, PAGE 213A, PLAT RECORDS Ofl"RAVIS COUNTY,
·IEXAS.
Grantor conveyed lhe property to Tn!Stee in 1rust to seeure paym..--nt Qftbe Note. Mortgagee, through 61e
M\'lrtgage Serviccr, declllr<:d that Grantor defuulteioor, accordingly bas IIPPoitrted Substi.rute
Truslee and requested Substitute 'lrusmc to enforce lhe lnl3L
Noti.oet statioglhetimc, place and ll>mlsofsalc: of the property wu-emailed. posted and file lhe pun:hn.<;er at the purrha~ds own risk, Jll.lrSUIUlt
~tt~2
·= anexasPropertyCodc § .5L002 and§ 51.009.
.~
l'ogcJ of2 8L IA'51I> 011411 (111(11j
··--.
----··;·:~.··.:. ·.:
STATR(lll~1:1 (
COUNTY OF _pet'.
Delbre me~IJ12_f/_~/ , the \mdmignc11'cd to me tbl'ough a vaUd
S1.1te driver'alicenso or olher official identilicalion described •• to be 1he pel'S(Jn
~oso MillO is Sllb&cribod to 1he fnregalns- ioo!rull!Ont rmd :IJlkn()tol•dged to ~t~o Ilia.! he/aile CM~cuted tile some for
tbft purpo:MS anrl cnnsi~erntion tbc.rcin C::llf'1'mll'~~
. c- . J '?!£ _.,
GM:aundtrmyband ana seal of office onc~U • .-<.ei;:0-,.."<'41.~
My CortllD.inion E:q>ires: __.('J/jJ.:J.~~~ra~~'i~~~~~~--
Notary rub lie for tbc State of'T~.xas,
rllnted.Namc of Notal; I'ubllc
Prc(GNdby:
r·
4.>00 ~~··c .....
BeecPtrast Company, N.A.
~!vel.
Ft. Worth., 1'X 76155
~·~~.. 1HOMI•S M~Al
··~
··· ···it~ Nota!v P.t.'::lic. S(ettl": of T!U.S
Artor U.Otonlipg,..ttu'P to : W.y C~mmhs.R.ion E,_pjri)S
SonI.A., Substirute Trurt;:c, at !he lime ofthe evonts
hereinafter set forth and make this affidavit for Ute purpo•e of docluriog lhe ineldellt• of Otta.tmmy and
c0111rud.uuleomplio.noe of the entity or entities set mt below.
2. 'ibis afiidl\vit i& mltdc with r"'pecttothe foreoloeure oftllat certain DeefTn1sl duted July 29, 2004,
rernrded oo At>gus! U,Z004, as C.1ertc's FilcHu.1004l58729, Real Pouperty:B.ecords,1'Ia~is County,
Texas, execorted by MA:B.Y G. RUST, A Sll\GLE WOMAN to RON HARPOLE, orlgin.'ll Tn•le)'Wide Homo-Loaos Servicing, LP is the Ylortgagc Scrvicer tbr l:li\...'\IK
OF AMERJCA, K.l\ .. the Mortgagee ofilie ind6bttdness secured by •~id Deed ofT rust. The Mortg.1go
SerVitcr i•IU11hor~ to tepresem tbe Mortg-•:;oe by virtue of n curTcnt :;ervicing agreement wlth tbc
Mongngec.
4. To the b..:t- of my bowled~ and belief, pt<'t notice of dt.foult was •~.rvro prk'.- lu "C(:elen~tinn of the
indabtcdnesa. AU obligations IPld duli"" of the Mortguge Servicer were performe.:l in tll< manner Jtquited
l>y law and aU DUlices were >f>l'\-ed Oil eaoti dobtornt tbc lont known udt.b'l.-... uf ooolo swh debtor.
~- To1h< best of my knc.>Yledge a"d belie!; the mo~" bolding an itrtcrost in lht> tlbove dMcnbod propetty
wora nat on oel.iw duty with any bmncll oflhe /~ormea Fore..,. uflloe tlnitell State• or"'"'" not protected by
the Scrvicu).!embers Civil 'Relief ACt on thn dnteofthc Trustee's Solo ll!ld W«e alive on tbewol~ u£ •ucb
•ale.
6. At tho instruction•:md on behalfnfthc Mo1.tgage Sctvie<:r, notice ofact>:lerntloll (lfindchtcdness and
Trosu:c•s Ra1e wua s.cr;c:d on each. debtor obligalec:l on the debt. in rtrict compliance with the TcJ.HS
l'ropaty <.:ode, by certifud mrul ot lenilunted nnd "''t'ie< thert<>f
posted of said eondl>.,u•e(•) ·~requited l>ytbo Jnw nnd m tbe mann"' sp•cifiecl by ordinance alld CU>-rom.
OATED:ScpteDlber4,2012 · By; ~id;,~ 1'~.z..
AFFlA -~11J~Holleman
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OFT ARRAI-1
s""ro to and mohscn'bed. before me, ~nelia O~.nise Edwal'ds ilie ondersi(llled 1\'otmy Public, on this day
porronally appeared carolyn HOlleman .lrnnwn to me to be the JX.TI<.(-fq-u.{ ~ Mv CQmm. ~ireo , 78* •••• ,,;, c¥M'>J~/.;.,:;: •• ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · appurterilinces ainJ. :;tixtuies: tiriw. :or: her.enfter: a :part of iiu! pi'(ip'~i-ty: :Alhf:plao~tJeti.ts· ·and· adoitiens ·sliall also· 'be · · · · · · · ·
..... : : : : : : : ~over~cl'by flJ!~ se~):lrjty·lns~rurne'J!t: Alt on.lie',fqregoii1g •is: refei::h~d Jo: i~ this Securrt)~.lnstrUituirifas :th·e :'Pi-c!per,Y: ··~ : : . : : : : :
::::::::: ·:: :~~r\ow~r. '!lilCJerst;t~s UiJd':agrees:th~'t :MERS !;olci~>:Qrtiy-:kgal.:t;itlc :r~:.tt~·ir1Je~eS"r~ gtliiit!:d. by :Bouower·:·in' tllis:: · · · · · ·
: : : : · · : : : : : : S'e~iiri:~~: ~~~~~~e~t·; :b~i. if ~~~Sllry- :to· co~P,lY ~ith. l~w .o~ custor~~ :!>1-ER~)j~~ P~l,ll)i}ee: ~~f:l.,~nd.er ;m.::J :t;end~~r' s : : .
: : : : · · · · · · · :S!l~sors f.operry.; and to ta.t.;e ·ar~~· ac1'i~ti .leq·uirei.I:t.ifLendi::i: rnch1di11g,: IJJit.bot .li!riite(Lt~, ~leasing ·t.¢ ·rn1d anf tate: ~hrirf?es; ll ::;u11l. (C>r.(~Ha,x\!~ ·<:~nd : .
· · · · · · · . · . · · ·!ip.etJa}. 11ss$smenis levred: .or .·to be. le\'ied. ag".:tinst .the .. Ptope~:ty,. (b) l.e!I.SehOicl. ·ptl!fiTieilts or .:grou~~ ·r-cn~s -:on lhc, · ·
::: : :::. ::: : .P.rojl¢y;·~p: (c;):prentium5 Joi".in$!1runce requirei:l:il11der'.pal':igr.apti 4.: Jn:any:·)ieaf':ir..:.:,~llicll:th¢ Lenc,l.er.must pay, a·: ·
: · : : : · : : : : · · :mor.~gag~: irL~Ur~Uu;.e premi!Jm to lhe· S'etFeta(y p-f. HL'I\(Si,log· and, 1Jrbao b.t~t¢1~ F!>i~S. ~.··: .. : : : : : : : ............ .
• • • • 0 •••••• ' •••••• 0 •• •• ••• 0
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: : :: ·: : : :: · : ::: .. · 17.0_Jj-:3-@)' :wld: W.!th the: pri~?r. : : ·
:::::::::::::::::fr~~v:a~:~f- n~~ ~c~:et~9·:J :i·tJ9~)r9 ~~~1:1~~iatt ~~~i~~~ :i~l :f~l:t :(,f:Y:·:regul.i1-ti¢ri~:
. ::: .: . .. .. . : :;,J:tfui Sec;ref.ary: ::::::::.: ::..... . .. ·........... · .. · .............. : : : : :. :·: : · : : : : ·: : : : : ...... .
: : : : : : : ·: : : : : : : : · : le) M.otlgligc.NQllnsurc£L· Bor.tq\:V~t ~rees lhat·i,(diis:Seci;a.rhy liistr:Umentai1!Hhe Note we::nt>t determin.ed
::: ::::::::::::::: :t~:l:.b~- ~Hgibl.e: foi:fnsuJ-aq~.:e: .iinder:the:NaHol)al. J!eu~rig Ad:,;.Vi'i.iiin·:"Oo: day$ froiri the.· datc·:hereof; .Lciioei"
:::: :::.: ::: :::::: :nitly,.,.:a:t ·itS' Oj>.Hllu_.· iei]~lii'e:.irrinl~Qjate:pay.i-rient.~in::ruu:.o:r all.SUfn$.SeCLJY.ed··ey ·tni.S·:Se£Ud;ty: ltlstrUTt:le"nl.:.A: ...... .
: : : : · : : . : : : : · · · · · : ·~~·r1nen st3tei:ri.e'rri:'of any· ai.Jthnri'zed.. agerif.Oh:he: Secretary Jate.O: s>lliseqrient tri Go·uays from the' dit€ ·hereof,: : : : : : · : : :
: : : : : : : . : : : : : : : .. : .decli~iing. to .i.n$ui·& :this: SecliritY.: IIistri.un:eni •and: th'e: Nt>te,: slil'iH be: dect~)ed 'conclusive •·rr~f :or sti.;h: : : : . : : . :
i::::ii~:::~, · · .e\•.en after :foreclosure. pr.oct:edings. ilr.e instittrted. ·To: ·refnstatc the SecurHv. ·Ihsti:ument;. ·-Borrower ·slrall· ter.tde~ in
:;~::;
11: · ·
: : : : : : : :·~~~P s~;n: ~ti ~~~o·u,)ls: ~eq~,ir~4 :to. :bd.li. a~~r~~e·~· ~ :ae9~~~~ :c~rre~~- j·~cl~4i ng,; ~q th~ 1:!~-t~i tb~Y. :~~:ob!is~i.!ons: q[ : : ·
.... : : : : : : : : ~orto~er tin~er. tb_i~ ~~ur~ty inst~uant;~l_(,: f~tei?l~!>'lc!r'e :c.'0sts ~n~ _tc;asorJ:i!hly·.arr~ ~l,l~t9!llliTY. ~t,ll?r;riey~· ::~ees ~nd·-~x:pen~t!s: : : .
: : . : : : : : : : . : .'prqperly as~r;>CQgoW~(.: @~ ~e~J,lrhy :l.nstrl.lm~nr:anQ
: : : . : : : : . : . :·[lie XiPligafii:lf.l~· thar:ii. _sec.\.!tl!!i _sh.cr!I. :r.ema'in .in :ef.f~i:t :~jf.·~.ender:D,act: no( -~~i?~. i!nmG;().~il,tl:r p~yrnent. \!.\·run.·
:::::::::::: He.\V.ey¢r;· :Lender: .i~.:tlO:t requiteo:: \~ pc~:111(1: ~eif!sJati'irrient i_(i: (i):: LeJJdet: h.as ·a~-~;epteg xeit)statemt:nra•\e;r. th~
: : : : · : : · : : : ··tommenceme•)t. of for-e~to_sllre: :pl'O'ee®ings :willllo ·tv.'() yew~ .trriir.lediately:_pr.eced!ng.- Lh~ eGmmenc~nencdf- a. ·cum:rit . :
: · · : · : : · : : : . foreclosure· proreeding._,_ {ii}. r.i:insEatt:m~itt: wiLl precluUe 'foreclosure .on· ·.rlift'ei:e,1t !VOl.irids: in tlie :f11turc,. or :.(iii) . : : : :
: : : : . : .... : : .·Feir:u'>l,isferrier~n.,;tn ai:Ji.>:crsli:ly'affect the: pr-ior.it)'tif the lien .created by dl'i!i Security lnstnimetit: ... : : . : . · : . : : · · . · · · . : ·
:.:::: : . : : : : . i'1:· Boh·uWet:i Not :Reli!:.lletl; Fu'rbL'at"Aisai-s hi i:nler~: Ariy::tb!'bearnnce :~y: Lct1der h1 ·eicercrsi~g : : •
: : · : : : · · : : · : ~Y- rjght or··temedy shall: 1iotlie If wa!vl!i-·of or prei.lhide:the exerCise .of an~· :rlght'-'oi-·roi:tnedy.: : : : : · : : : · • : · : : : : : · : : : .
. :: : . : : : : : : : : :: : :li.: s~~~e.~~~~rs:a:n~: ""~lg~~·n:o.,_!'~i:-lo~~t;~nti s~~etlli-:t;iabi1l~r; C:o~i~n¢:.~~-:T-he:~ov.en.iiits-nn~·~gr.eeJ:l1ellts: : : ..
. : : : : : : : : : : : oqhis ·$~t:l1ritY Instrument _shml bin~ and ~eoefit th\!-;5\-ICGes:;or.s and assigns ol' Lender -aml-.BOrr.ower~ shl?J.~t to~ :.
: : : : · : : · · · · · ~~~i~i9ns- of:. p~agraj:¥9(b)< :·sorro\ver's· ~overia,Rts iuiu irgrccinent& :shi!IJ: be· joint .arid' severaL Any:Bt=~nowe~ wlm_ :::·
: : : : : : : . : : : :.<_,a~sigbs.'thls St:curitj.dnS!~uti:li~n~: bu{ does ncit·:eiecute: the .Notei (a:)'ts.. cci-s\gning thls ·securitY :I'I\Str.un1Cn~ oii.Iy to: :::.
· · · · · · : · : · m!iriga'g~; g~arit ~d ::;:o(lycy that. Boi·rowds i:ntereSt:.in :the.'lhopcrry ~n1der ::the teriJis··nf this Seeurity.lnstrument; (b} ·
: : : : : : : : : : : j~·OQt pe~9n~OY. ~b)) gate~. to -p-~§'the sums: 'seciured-b)dbis.'.SeciiTitY, ·fristrlimen1;: iuid (c) agrees tnat Lender: arid ·ari;Y .
· · : : · : : : .. : : o~her :~orrower r.rmy. :agr~' 1:0· extend,: 1nodi.i'Jt, forbear-: or: make: iuiy· tu:comn,6datioris. with :r~ard :tcdhe ter:t.ns .oHlus
••..••••••• S=m"' tmr.,,;,e;, OCto<"''"""000> iliM Bo>•OWrro~v.der~t Ia\~ 'f:l:lld u~e.. 'law. of: : : . . . . . . .
: ·:: : .~~~.q.u,qs~I~~~O!)·II~ Wht~?·~~~LP~(JP.~r~Y·~~ Jooa~~~l.. l~·the. event-that .il'nY.:P.~O.VlSton:~r:~~laus:e:of,t?ts, Se~~~·ty.lnsu:umel'lt:: ·
· ....~. ~t; .:No!e .~n.tc.tl;_ v.,th;apph~able law; ·not·~fl'\'!ct: pther: f>T:l?VI.St.Op!':· or such,cQnfttct:shall
S~~uvlty·lns).);'llme~.~ ~'r ·
. :::: .~Jlc,:~~~e. ~h~c~ '?il:n: b.e·lli:vcn effeci-without th.;; Po.AtJ.i~til\g, pr~lilsi.et~": 1"{}'this ~s'id ..tl~r:; P.rovisiQ'iJs,{?f ~~i.~ S~trit,Y:
ilit,s.
: · · · · ·lnsfrument and the l'•l'ote· are·declared :ro :be ·sei.rerah:li : : : : : · : : : : : · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · ·· · · · · ·
:::::;: i ~ j . )tJ~L~~~~~~~r~w~r:·~ :c~~Y:·.: ~~r~~e~: s~a~~.~ ~ gi~~~· :.m~¢: ~?~~n~~:-~·~:f~Y: :r:·th:: ::·f: .a~~: ~·: :t:i~~: ::-:1:r:t~ ~ ....
: : : : : : : : : : : :·,:6'.: Hal:;i.r~·o1is'SJ1bshi6ccs.: ~til'i"{j~er:.~half:non:~s~ :pr:pei'Jnirth~.:presence, use~ dispo:;~al, .stotage. ,Cifti'il¢!\Se: : : : :
.. · : : : : : : :~Can~ Haz<,u'doi:Js St!b~tailce·!Sc:·ori oi· in:lbe Pr.o~ty:· :Borhiw~;r: $hall not: <10, nc)r: al)qw :a!tYP~~ .!!!s.~ to :i\0', :t~Y:ti'!ing: : . :
. _: . · · · · · atre"Gh:ng·~he. Prpperzy that: iS: in. violati·ort:-of·BI'!y:.En\tiron:tntmtal:l'~'"~ .: :The:t)recedi·l:lftw9 seni~hc;es·shall ,nof:;ipply·to · · · .
:::: ~ ~ ~:: ~: :~~~!~i~J~t~ ~~~~~~~~~:~~;·:n~~~:=t~j~;~;i~;~~~:~s:0~\~q;a1~~~~~t~::}~~~;~f~~st~c:~·:rhu~: :a~.e g:e~~·::a~I~·::.
: : : : : : : : : : : :. : : : : Bo~rQ~er ~haH' pr,;>m~tl:y, giy~ :L:en,l~r: wMeo: :npti~·:pf any inv.e!'l,'igat!on;. ~)iii'!';· ()eiiJaiJd,: la\.'l:iu~t :~r':o~her .a;;;lioli · :
: : : - · : : : : : . : ~y .~!lY.rr. ~ut/"9r:it).~,. Jha.t.:an)': r~itio''~ 6i Nht:r. i-eii1ei!(a~ic;>li. ~t ~.}!roJie'r~: 'is: : : :
: : · : : : : : · : : ::l_'l~"c,~~acyi:!3qr~qwet; shall pr-om'ptl:hake ~~!'r~sary'r(,iriedlal acti6ris:.in:.a'u-;,Qr'.dance with EnV.iio'nnieiltal :L:l.w.. : : :: : : : : .
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :~~ :~~~· :ih: thi$. p~~~~apl~· :, ~~ •·:H~·~dou~= Stibst'~itccs!' :,ru:~: ihQse s~I:Js~aricesline,: ·keiosi:lie.. otr1er· :fltirin'oi!ble: or tpxic: : : ...... .
: : : : . : : : : : : : :petrol~um· product$;. t~xtc Pti,'l(id~~ ar:JO: ll~i'oicides,: vcila!ile solv.cnts;, :n'Hiler'ia,l,S. L"l,)ntai.tling· asbestos:pr: ft;mnal~epyde. :
: :... : . :::: · · ·:iin~:t~diO,acti.V(niiata·jalsi .A~:U..;red Ui this::paragt.~f!h .Je,; "£1ivri=6mnenta1 La'v~' :nitaf.lt;.:federal laWs and. 13.~·5 .Qt'the
: : : : : : · : : : : >j'\.i(i$dicli;oit\V;here :u:n~'=Pr6pei:t)'' is lliC.-Iled·tba.t relate 10 hi::'.alth, :sa'fet)H:in~n~lr¢mt1enirtl:prt:Jic:¢1\()p~ : : : : : : . : : : : : : · :
: : : : . ::3ioi\J.~(r}lifoRM C.ovf.NANTs.; ~tr!:.~·t:f ~i:td'J~nd~r:.fH~th~ co~en:nnf:,tiri(agrf:e ~ fallo\.Vs~: : : : · : : : : : : : ..... .
: :: . : : : : : : . : : : : J1,: ASdgnmtilt.'llf. RtiriJ:s.: :.B'QrtliCt. 'l.n~gliditi,cmally as~igns ·9,tld transfers to. Lender:all the rents·.iln~: .re:v~nucs: · ·
: : : : : : : : : : : : bf tb~ Ph'>~t!Yi ,.B.or;o~v~r .=~u~qr.i~~ :Le.nder. or ~;en~e(s agetlts to: cc>llccl· !he: rents. am!! .re"enue~ J:~nd hereby :~':l'eqts, · . : .
::::::::::: :.e;Wh: teriliJ)t 9f'.th.!! P~op<:~ty. t<:l pay· the -rerits·to·Lender ·()r. :t.enclei's·..:;~gems. ·However;; prior·fO.·L~n,d.;i'il·!lQtJC~·Jo · · · ·
::: ·:::: ·:: ::Borrower·of'a'orr-ow.er~·s ..breacli .Of<~nY.•cov.enant:Or agreem~nHn:·tl)e sect!dtY, Insti0~11. cone:~~·alid· . : · ·
. : : : :f~.eh~e· all :rents and rcveni.1~i o.filie Propi:ltili~)i'.~stac: for. ~he 'ber~~fi~-:ot: U~!1~9(1!ild. :6or:r6~:¢~~ :this n5sigrin1emtof . . .
. . . . . .. : : · : renf~ Ci:ms'tillit~S art:8hso'Jt\tb- assigrlll~ent !l£ld liqto~ :assig!lrli~l)i f<~(.ail ie~ts· f.i<;e.i:v~·j:\Jy· ~~":ri:>w~r.·5i1~t! ~:held b~ .J)c;r.t.nlt.t..,ci- ~.Y. :.appli.c11·!*: l.a~':·· · I;,f;nd,e~ .s.}t.n~l :b:~. c~~:t!tled; t~ ·~-?nJ~~t · ..... .
. :. :::all expenses lnttir:red in ..put~u~ng.tb.c: ~en\edies P.ruvjdcd.in t~ti~ p~ragrap!l:l~,:'l~cluding,, ~~~~.not ~~nt~·t.o; · · ·.:: ·::
: : : : : : .I:~:llS!).uablll. at~r.n.~~·s'. fc~ \\n~ .~.o~t~:panels ·and· in· any ·order ::·
: : : : · : : : : : : : ·Truste~ detcrrnincs•. Lti•ider :nr·:itidesig~ie'e 'may·pui:~liase.:the Pr.()-p:~rty ~t. ~'nY:sidc.: : : :· : . : : : : : : : : : : . · · ·
: : : : : : : : · · : : : : : · T,rostce :sbaU.. deiiy.c:r.: ~u. lhri iiy.:r~h:i~~r :rru_steci•s ·tiet·~l .c!)nv.cy\J1g: in(H!fej~~.i~~~ title. :t9 •fi.~· :P,ropi.1J'tY.···witb: ::
: : · · .... : : . -:to~~n·anfs.o.r.cge.ntra:twn:rrli'l:l'lty;_ :U<~r.ro\ver:covcnlfnU·,MtJ:-ag'rces: to' clefend:gt;nerauy. Uie purcn!lser's.uoe: fo·the: : : ....... .
. . : : : : : : : : : ::P.r9p:ctt~ :aMiJ:i?t -~~~·~l~im,.<> :md.Jic;ma:uds.: Tli~.t!!Cih!I~· in: :tf1~ trus~;ee':s: de~q'·slt~ll :~e; p.~itrtu fncie oevldetice of tbe ···
. : : : : : : : : : · : lt:nth·~f th.~:statement.~ lU:.Ul~.·1herdn. TntsiCl!:'!lh~.H ·apply .tlie J,r(H::eeds .of'tJJe snt.e ·in the:foUowing orr.operey· is ·s61d · pursit~ilf 10'. i~is: par~g/l'iJili 18~ ·m,tr~~vcl" o~ 'any: per~on ~~~liJii.'!il;: poss~~siQ~: t,.f t~i ::
.. - ........ ...r~o_p~rfY: .t~rf)ugll :Qo.J"r_Q\'t.!er-~ba~I: "J~~~lethpt-~ly- .sut~reAdcr :p~ss~ss_lQtt: of··tl•~ ProP,crtY'k~ ::tile: ng:nj~rdicial .power of s~le · ...... .
. . . . . . : : : : : : :prov•decnn :tl1dilngle :F.aJniJy· M Oi'tll:.t'gc 'Fori:closure Act ·or 1.99 It:("1.\.i:t''.) :( JZ :U .=s~e; 3751 et s<'q>) ~y· :requ~stiitg .
::::::::::: :-a:~~n'eolo~ui:e. ~r-eC:I9SU.1'~:.'!'!per(y J!S : ..... .
:: :: : :.:::: : ::lff.'?'~ided-ln ~he· Atlt;. -~cHbing hr-tb:e·_tJr-tttdiiig·.s~uten<:e·sbaU. ~cp~h·"'· the S!-'crc~~r.y o( any- r:ight~ :~t\J~re~·~~: ·: : :
.. ::a,·ailob.le·:tG:a: Lender•.u:i!ler:d.t,. J"ar..'gra:pJdS:o·r:npplicable'law.: : : : : : : : : · : : · : ·: : · · . : . .
.:. \\\·: -'~s:t;~~:~:.~e:~~~l~~~~;K';~~Q~~:/t~~~~~~~u;~~~t~aj!in~:it~~1~*~Z~~t: ·~~:~d~: ~~~h~~e.~~ :~~~ ~~~r~~: . ···
· . .. · · · · · · · ·
: : : : : : : : : :. : zo:.: SubstHi.lte i.r.ust-ee. :Lend~r.'.at:its,opticin and: -ivit~~·or\¥ithoLiCciause, :may froiri tline:to:time:remove l'r.tisice · :
.: : :::: :::: : :an4 :app~nt; :OY.::po'¥ft::r.:c/ att<.i~)ey :qr.:o~her:wj~. a. w«~sor: :t~\l~re~: !t> MY..Tf.ll~tl::~: appoi:r~t.ed.l}e~elifld~r; .\\litllout :: ....... .
: : : : : : : : : : : :-~1)\:ey~~e. ~f' t~i; :Prop(!rt;', :~he suc.cessor. ~f.U$l.e~ ::Sll!lf! :s.uc~ee.d. t;a :alf :'t!1e :t1t!e.•: P.OW~(~d mrt;i~~ ~9f!~c;:r.e~ :·up.o:n: : : · : : : : : : :
::::::::::::l'~l,l~tee~et~\n.a~d:~~·appli~iili!e:law: . . ::·:: .. · . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
: : : . : . : : : : . : : . : : 21 •. Snbrti'g~t'i()JI: Any·:of:t\,e.pi'O'lieeds ohhe NothiSed ro·t:IJki:Yupt)lrtstandingXtens.against:ali:or:wiy_part of the:
:::::: ·:::: :·Proper-cy hiwe·lieen:6ffV.ailt~d:bY: L.ellw.:lenit..BotnJ\"er'.s/requ.ast nl)d {).I~Ot:t,Borrtn~'C(~ reP,ri:S~•'lt~tion.t!J.O'lt_:su~h:runou~l~
: : : : : ·a•:~ du~ f:tl.tls .Secinit)i l)istruil'ieni' itdf 1h~ vider:(s} Were :a :)iatl' of th1s ·Sttunt)l.
·· · ::::::::: l'nsttun~t:nt.: [Che.cl<~~p.pll~hk l>ox(~)l :·:.:::. ·· ····· ·· ····· · ·· ··· ··· · · ·· ·
j~:. ~;: j::::.: 8: ~~~b~~~~~D~~~b~t~l~t:F:i~e~:: 8. ~~~;~~;~~~~~~~~~~~d~~~r;::.: .. :[]: ot~rls~iryi:::::
. · : : : : : : : : : 2~,: p~r~!'!as~: M~n~y;: :Ven.!lor•:s' Lien~:R.ei1~W.:.1 inl1i: Ext.erisiiiri; :g::ompi61e:as -appropriatef : : : : . : : · :. : · :
· : : : : : : ·: .''f.fle)uni:ls. ad11~mci*J to: 8.6rtower t'n'lder the No·te wer.€ ·used t6: pay .atf or part of the·P.urchase: price o:f th~. · . . ..
: : : : : : : : : : : :.Pr.OP.e:rtv:':The:Note atsi:tis. pnh:Tatl~y· secur¢cLoy tM veMor.s. li.en :tEJtaineo .in ttitH:Ie~a :qf.~ll~rr:da:t~ wt~h ~ms· .... : : : .
: : : : : : : : : : : :-S~currty, l.n~trumen~ corweyjng!h.~ P..rope;rty ~Q ~9rr9w:er, V>'h1ch:y~nqqr!) :U!&/'\::f').C!~ peen .assrQn.ed. to. ~e!)c:!er, tl'!rs ....
: : : : : : : : : : : :·~.e:c~r~Y l_ris~r.u(m;~~~be:i~g .rS'l(e:~.: : : : ··· ··· · ····· · ····
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A. FAA'INEl!.SKir IXCLUDINO SUITE 100, DEPARTMENT •100
PROfESS!OliAL CORI'OMT!ONS ADDISON, TEXAS 7SIXII
TELEPHONE: (972) JS6-SO.IO
ATTORNE\'S ANDCOUNSRLORS AT LAW
TELECOriER: (9-72) l4t-07.H
November 29, 2012
00000003366986
IF YOU AREA TENANT OF THIS PROPERTY YOU 1\IAY HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS AS SET OUT IN SECTION II
OR SECTION Ill BELOW.
OCCUPANT(S) ANDIOR TENANT(S)
2623 ALCOTT LANE UNIT A
AUSTIN, TX 78748
RE: Premises located at
2623 ALCO'IT LANE TINIT A. AUSTIN. TX 78748
(hereinafter referred to in this letter as "the property" or the "premises"),
Please be advised this firm represents DANK OF AMI!.RICA, N.A. who Jmrclmscd the property nt a foreclosure snle held on
Tuesdav. September 4 2012. or is the successor in interest to the party who purchased the J>roperty.
PROTECI'JNG 1."'ENANTS AT FORECLOSURE ACT OF 2009
If you ore a Tenant of the property, you may \1ave certain rigl1ts under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009. Please
coutnct us inuuediately to let us know if you are a Tenant :md please provide us wilh proof of your tenancy, such ns a copy of your
Lease or copies of rent receipts.
Stctionl.
NOIJQ; TO VACATE TO OCCUPAl'ITCS> WHO ARE NOT TEN~
Unless you 11re 11 TenAnt as described in Seclion II or Section Ill below, this leiter constitutes formal and final demand that )'Otl
VACATE TilE PREI\llSI~S located at 2623 ALCOTT LANE UNlT A, AUSTIN, TX 78748. If you f.1il to \"olcnle the premises
three (3) days after delivery of this 110\ice, our firm hns been authorized to file a forcible detainer suit agnins\ you for possession
of the propetty.
Section 11.
NOTICE TO VACATE TO TENANTCSl\VrTHOUT A LEASE
If you are a Tenant •witbout n Lense or with a Lcnse terminable al will tlllder applicable Texas law, please be ad,•ised 1hnt
pursuant to the Protecting Tenants 11t Foreclosure Act of 2009, you must vacate d1e premises witl!in ninety (90) days from the date
you receive this notice. If you fail to comply with tllis demand, our firm bas been authorized to file a forcible detniner suit against
you £or possession of the prope1ty. Tf suit is brought against you, you may be liable for the attorney's fe~ and court costs
incurred.
Section III.
NOTICE TO VACATE TO TEN ANTIS\ WJl'II A LEASE
1r you arc a 1enant and yon are occuflying the premises under a Lease that you entered into before the foreclosure, please he
adl'ised that pursuant to the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 ("the Act"), you are entitled to occupy tbe premises for
ninety (90) days at\er you receive this letter or until the end of the remaini.ng tenn of the Lease, whichever is longer. If you are n
Tenant who hns o Section 8 Voucher, you b..we additional rights to continue to occupy the property_ In order to conrinn you~
status ns Tena11t, you must provide t\1is finn with a copy of your Lease Agreement or other evidence of yo11r tenancy including
evtdcllce of yonr Section 8 Vouclter (if that applies) within ten (10) dnys from the date of this notice. If we do not receive
evidence of your tenaucy wilbin ten {10) daj•s, our finn has been authorized to file n forcible detainer suil against you for
possession of tbe :property. If suit is bro\1gbt against you, you may be liable for tbe attomey's fees and costs of courl inct1rred ·
Your failure to contirm your stnlus ns n Tenant wilbiu teu (10) days will not net ns n waiver of)•our rights under I he Act.
rase t of1
El' _Notie<:ToV:ScaleManual.rpl(l2/ll/2011) I Ver. 33 000110003366986
Section IV.
SERVICEI.\:IEI'tiDERS Cl VJL RELIEF ACT
Service•nembers who are on active duty, including active n1ilitary duty a.~ a member of the Texns National Guard or the National
Guard of aatotbcr slate or as a member of a reserve component of the armed forces of the United States, have been recently
discbargcd from active duty or a persou who is a dependent of such a scrvicemcmber may be entitled to certain legal protections
pursuanl to the Servicemembcrs Ci\'il Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501-596). Please contact us immediately if one of the
categories above applies to you. Iu addition, please pro\•ide us a copy of the military orders establishing that you nrc ou uctive
duty, your discharge papers or proof that you are a dependent of such a serviccmcmber.
The seriousness of the actions suggested in this letter warrant your immediate attention. If you have any questions, plcnse contact
the Evictions Department at (972) 386-5040.
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT TillS LAW FIRM IS A DEBT COLLECTOR AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED
FROM YOU Wli.L BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.
Sincerely,
BARRETI' DAFFIN FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP
Copy via regular mall
Loan#:
BDFTE#: OOOOOOB3366986
Pngtlnrl
EV_Notic~ToVncoteManual.l]ll (121!31201 1)/ Vcr. 3l 000000033669&6
MAAYG RUST 00000003366986 EVCT
2623 ALCOTI lANE UNlT A
AUSTIN, TX 78748
NOTICE TO TENANTS REGARDING THE
"PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE ACT OF 2009"
ARE YOU A TENANT OF THE ABOVE REFERENCED PROPERTY? IF SO
IMPORTANT INFORMATION IS
CONTAINED WITHIN THE ATTACHED
NOTICE.
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
IS'TC
BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPlER TURNER &
ENGEL, LLP IS A DEBT COLLECTOR
ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT. ANY
INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR
THAT PURPOSE.
EV_Tennni$ACOUNSELORSATLAW
TEI.F.COPIER: (97Z) 341·0734
November 29, 2012
00000003366986
IF YOU AREA TENANT OFTBIS PROPERTY YOU MAY HAVE CERTAIN IUGliTS AS SET OUT IN SECTION II
OR SECTION m BELO'''·
1\"I"ARYGRUST
2623 ALCOTT LANE UNIT A
AUSTIN,TX 73748
RE: Premises located at
2623 ALCon· LANE UNIT A. AUSTIN. TX 78748
{hcreinnfter referred to iltlbis leUer as "the property" or the "premises").
Pleuse be ndvised this firm represents DANK OF AI\'IERICA, N.A. who purchased the property nt a foreclos11re sale held 011
Tucsdny, Scotember 4 2012. or Is the successor in interest to the party who purchased the property.
PROTECTJNG TENANTS AT FO.Rii:CLOSURE ACT ·oF 2009
lf you are a Tenant of the t>ropcrt)•, you may l•nve certain. rights under the Protecting Tenants nt Foreclosure Act of 2009. Please
contnct us immedintely to let LIS know if you are a Tconnt and J>lense provide us with proof of your tenancy, snch 11s a copy of your
Lease or COJlies of rent receipts.
Secliunl,
NOTICE TO VACATE TO OCCUI'AN1TS> WHO .ARE NOT TENANTS
Unless )'OU al'e ll Tcnnut ns described in Section II or Section Ill below, this letter constitutes formnl oml final dcmnnd th3t YO\\
VACATE TilE PRE1\1JSF-c; located at 2623 Al-COTI LANE UNIT' A, AUSTIN, TX 78748. If you fall to \'acate the premises
three (J) day.~ after delh-ery of this notice, our finn b:rs been authorized to file a forcible detainer suit against you for possession
of the property.
Section H.
NOTICE TO VACATE TO TEN ANTIS> WITHOUT A LEASE
If you are a Tenant without a Lease or with a Lcnse terminable nt will under applicable Texas law, please be ad1•iscd that
purs11nnt to the Protecting Tenanls at Foreclosure Al:.t of 2009', you must vocate the premises within ninety (90) dRys from the d;11c
you receive this notice. If you fail to comply wi!h Ibis demand, our fim1 has bees1 nu!horized to fil~ a forcible detainer suit ngoios!
you for possession of the property. If suit is brought ngninst ymt, yotl may be liable for the attomey's fees nod court costs t·
;
incurred. :.•
I;
Section. Ill. '·
NOTICE TO VACATE 1'0 TENANT(S) WITH Al.EASE
If you me a Tcuant and you are occupyi.Jlg the prcmisu under a Lease that you erttered into before the foreclosure, please be
ad\'iscd thnt pursuant to the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 ("the Act"), you arc entitled to occupy the ptcmi.scs for
ninety (90) days after you receive llris letter or until the end of tlte remaining term of the Lease, whichever is longer. If you are a
Tenant who has a Section 8 Voucl1er, you lla\'c additional rights to contin\le to occupy the property. i11 order to confinn yonr
&lotus as Tenant, you must provide this finn with a copy of yot1r Lease Agreement or other e\'idence of your tenancy including
C\>idcnce of your Section & Voucher {if tbal apJllies) within ten (1 0) days from the dale· of this notice. . If we do not receive
evidence of your lemmcy wiU1in ten (10) days, our fim\ hns been authorized to tile n forcible detaiuer suit against you for
possession of the property, If suit is brought agninst you, you may be liable for the attomey 's fees nnd costs of court incm:rccl ·
Your failure to confirm your status as a Tc~aot witWn ten (10) nays will not m:t as a wnh•cr 11f your rights under· the Act.
EV)IIDliceTo\ljteateManual.l!'l (12113f20ll) I Vcr. 33 0000000336698G
Exhibit "E"
Judgment Awarding Posession
CAUSE NO. C-l-CV-14-010108 FILED FOR RECPi'C
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., § ~~~~f_RJJu~~~c~URT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§
MARY RUST AND ALL OTHER § ATLAWNO.l
OCCUPANTS OF 2623 ALCOTT §
LANE UNIT A, AUSTIN, TEXAS §
78748 §
~
Defendant(s). § TRAVIS COU~TY, TEXAS
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Bank of America, N.A. ("Plaintiff'), appeared through its attorney of record.
Defendants, Mary Rust (''Defendant") and all other occupants of 2623 Alcott Lane, Unit A,
Austin, Texas 78748, appeared through counsel. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and
considered the testimony, exhibits and all other relevant evidence, is of the opinion that Plaintiff
is entitled to the relief sought.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the premises described in
Plaintiffs Original Petition for Forcible Detainer, and have restitution, for which let writ issue, of
the premises commonly known as 2623 Alcott Lane, Unit A, Austin, Texas 78748, and legally
described, as:
LOT 2, BLOCK G, TANGELWOOD FOREST, SECTION EIGHT, A
SUBDIVISION IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE
MAP OR PLAT THEREOF, RECORDED IN VOLUME 83, PAGE 213A,
PLAT RECORDS OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff have and recover from Defendants
reasonable attorney's fees at the trial court level in the amount of $\,000.00, which may be
collected from the bond posted by defendant. if any. payable immediately by the Clerk of the
IUOGMENT
H609-12 Rust Page 1
111111111~
000956975
1111111111111111~11111 llllllllllllllllll
Court upon presentation of this order, together with reasonable attorney's fees if the case is
unsuccessfully appealed to the Courts of Appeal in the amount of $2,000.00, reasonable
attorney's fees if the case is unsuccessfully appealed on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Texas in the amount of $3,500.00, and if writ is granted by the Supreme Court but the appeal is
unsuccessful, reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $2,500.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff recover from the Defendant(s) costs of
court, for which let execution issue.
ALL RELIEF NOT EXPRESSLY GRANTED HEREIN IS DENIED.
SIGNED this _lli:_ day of t\OMk '2015.
JUDGMENT
H609·12 Rust Page 2
317