United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 31, 2006
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 05-10578
Summary Calendar
SHEILA CAPERS
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, OSCAR RODRIGUEZ,
LUIS COWLEY
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas
(USDC No. 3:03-cv-1305)
_________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*1
Reviewing the summary judgment order de novo, we affirm the district court’s
decision for the following reasons:
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Capers must show (1) that she
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment
action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647,
655 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. Capers did not demonstrate an adverse employment action and she therefore failed
to make out her prima facie case. On August 9, 1999, Capers entered into a three-
year term contract with the Dallas Independent School District. Capers is
therefore mistaken in her argument that she was a continuous contract employee
when the school board put her on a term of “probation.” To be demoted from a term
contract to a probationary contract requires the written consent of the teacher.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN § 21.106 (Vernon 2006). Since no such written consent
was ever requested or given, Capers was not demoted to a probationary contract.
There is no indication that her employment status as a term contract employee was
otherwise affected by the decision of the school board to place her on probation.
Affirmed.