Ward, Derek Clinton

PD-1573-15 PD-1573-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 12/4/2015 12:56:15 PM Accepted 12/4/2015 1:45:27 PM ABEL ACOSTA NO.  __________________   CLERK   IN  THE     COURT  OF  CRIMINAL   APPEALS    OF  TEXAS   _________________________________________________________     DEREK  CLINTON  WARD,  Appellant     V.     THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS,  Appellee   _________________________________________________________     APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW   __________________________________________________________     On  Review  from  Cause  No.  06-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR   In  the  Court  of  Appeals  For  the  Sixth  District  at  Texarkana   __________________________________________________________     On  appeal  from  Cause  No.  42,433-­‐B   In  the  124th  District  Court   of  Gregg  County,  Texas   Honorable  Alfonso  Charles,  Judge  Presiding         HOUGH-­‐LEWIS  (“LEW”)  DUNN   ATTORNEY  AT  LAW   P.O.  BOX  2226   December 4, 2015 LONGVIEW,  TX  75606   Tel.  903-­‐757-­‐6711   Fax  903-­‐757-­‐6712   Email:  dunn@texramp.net   Counsel  for  Appellant     APPELLANT  RESPECTFULLY  REQUESTS  ORAL  ARGUMENT   IDENTITIES  OF  JUDGE,  PARTIES,  AND  COUNSEL       Pursuant  to  Rule  68.4(a),  Texas  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure,  a  complete  list   of  the  names  of  the  trial  judge,  all  parties,  and  counsel  are  as  follows:     Trial  Judge:         Honorable  Alfonso  Charles             Presiding  Judge,  124th    District  Court               Gregg  County,  Texas   Attorneys  for  Appellant:     Hough-­‐Lewis  (“Lew”)  Dunn             Counsel  on  Petition  for  Discretionary  Review             P.O.  Box  2226             Longview,  TX  75606               Tim  Cone             Counsel  on  Direct  Appeal             P.O.  Box  413             Gilmer,  TX  75644               Lance  R.  Larison             Trial  Counsel             Molly  Larison             Pre-­‐Trial  Counsel             P.O.  Box  232             Longview,  TX  75606     Attorneys  for  the  State:     Carl  Dorrough,  Criminal  District  Attorney               101  East  Methvin,  Suite  333             Longview,  TX  75606               Christopher  A.  Parker             Assistant  Criminal  District  Attorney               Trial  Counsel               Zan  Colson  Brown             Assistant  Criminal  District  Attorney               State’s  Counsel  on  Appeal     ii     TABLE  OF  CONTENTS     TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  …………………….....................................................   iii   INDEX  OF  AUTHORITIES    ......................................................................   v   STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT  ……………………………………   vii   STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE....................................................................   1   STATEMENT  OF  PROCEDURAL  HISTORY...............................................     2   QUESTIONS  PRESENTED  …………….………………………………......................   2   FIRST  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW   DID   THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERR   IN   FINDING   NOTHING   FUNDAMENTALLY   ERROREOUS   IN   THE   CONDUCT   OF   THE   TRIAL   COURT  UNDER   ALMANZA,  WHEN  THE  RECORD  SHOWED  THAT  THE   TRIAL   COURT   ADOPTED   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS  CONTROLLED  THE  OUTCOME  OF  SENTENCING?       SECOND  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW     DID   THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERR   IN   FAILING   TO   FIND   THAT   THE   TRIAL   COURT   HAD,   IN   ADOPTING   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS   CONTROLLED   THE   OUTCOME   OF   SENTENCING,   ABROGATED   THE   FOURTEENTH   AMENDMENT   DUE   PROCESS  AND  EQUAL  PROTECTION  CONCERNS  FOUND  IN  BEARDEN   V.  GEORGIA?         iii                                                                Reason  for  Granting  Review     In   reaching   its   decision,   the   Court   of   Appeals   failed   to   follow   the   precedent  of  Almanza  v.  State,  686  S.W.2d  157  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1986   (op.   on   reh’g),   and   it   ignored   principles   of   Fourteenth   Amendment   Due  Process  and  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  that  underlie  the  ability   to  pay  restitution,  found  in  Bearden  v.  Georgia,  461  U.S.  660  (1983).       ARGUMENT  AND  AUTHORITIES.................................................................   3            FACTS  ………………………………………………………………………………………………..   4            LEGAL  ANALYSIS  ………………………………………………………………………………..   9     PRAYER  FOR  RELIEF...................................................................................   19     CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE.........................................................................   20     CERTIFICATE  OF  COMPLIANCE  …………………………………………………………   20        APPENDIX         Ward   v .  S tate,  N o.  0 6-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR  ( Tex.   A pp.  –   T exarkana,   delivered   N ovember   1 0,   2 015)(Mem.   O p.)(not   d esignated   f or   publication)                           iv   INDEX  OF  AUTHORITIES     CASES       Almanza  v.  State,  686  S.W.2d  157  …………………………………………..            3,  4,  10,  11   (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1984)(op.  on  reh’g)     Barton  v.  State,  21  S.W.3d  287  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2000)  ……………………………      17     Bearden  v.  Georgia,  461  U.S.  660  (1983)  ……………………              3,  4,  12,  13,  14,  15     Griffin  v.  Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956)  ……………………………………………………..            13     Lemos  v.  State,  27  S.W.3d  42  (Tex.  App.  –  San  Antonio  2000,  pet.  ref’d)  ..        17     Lively  v.  State,  338  S.W.3d  140  (Tex.  App.  –  Texarkana  2011,  no  pet.)   14   Moreno  v.  State,  900  S.W.2d  357  (Tex.  App.  –  Texarkana  1995,  no  pet.)   10   Miller  v.  State,  343  S.W.3d  499  (Tex.  App.  –  Waco  2011,  pet.  ref’d)  ……                17   Tate  v.  Short,  401  U.S.  395  (1971)  ……………………………………………………….              13   Williams  v.  Illinois,  399  U.S.  235  (1970)  ……………………………………………..                  13   OPINIONS   JM-­‐917  (1988)  ……………………………………………………………………………………                  14   STATUTES   U.  S.  CONSTITUTION   Fourteenth  Amendment  Due  Process  ……………              3,  4,  12,  13,  14,  15,  16,  18   v   STATUTES  (CONT’D)   U.  S.  CONSTITUTION   Fourteenth  Amendment  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  ….      3,  4,  12,  13,  14,  15,   16,  18     TEX.  CONST.     ART.  1,  §19  …………………………………………………………………………………………                    9   ART.  1,  §30(b)(4)  …………………………………………………………………………………                    17   CODES     ART.  42.037(k),  TEX.  CODE  CRIM.  P.  ……………………………………………………..                      17     ART.  42.12  §21(c),  TEX.  CODE  CRIM.  P.  …………………………………………………                    13     TEX.  LABOR  CODE,  §201  et.  seq.  …………………………………………………                                          11     TEX.  PENAL  CODE  §  31.03(e)(4)(A)  ………………………………………………………     1     RULES     TEX.  R.  APP.  P.  33.1(a)(1)  and  (2)  ………………………………………………………..                        9     OTHER     MAGNA  CARTA,  Article  40  (1215)  ………………………………………………………                        14                 vi   STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT       The   opinion   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   impermissibly   narrows   the   precedent   of   Almanza   on   the   concept   of   what   is   fundamentally   erroneous.   Moreover,   the   ability   to   pay   restitution,   rooted   in   concepts   of   Due   Process   and   Equal   Protection,   implicates   fundamental   rights   that   cannot   be   disregarded  and  set  aside  when  the  court  of  appeals  is  called  upon  to  review   the   actions   of   the   trial   court   in   assessing   punishment.   The   opinion   of   the   court   of   appeals   sets   a   questionable   precedent   on   the   issues   of   judicial   impartiality   and   of   restitution   in   sentencing,   something   that   affects   victims   and  defendants  statewide.     Oral  argument  will  help  delineate  those  concerns.                                 vii   NO.  __________________     IN  THE     COURT  OF  CRIMINAL   APPEALS    OF  TEXAS   _________________________________________________________     DEREK  CLINTON  WARD,  Appellant     V.     THE  STATE  OF  TEXAS,  Appellee   _________________________________________________________     APPELLANT’S  PETITION  FOR  DISCRETIONARY  REVIEW   __________________________________________________________     TO  THE  HONORABLE  JUDGES  OF  THE  COURT  OF  CRIMINAL  APPEALS:       NOW   COMES   Derek   Clinton   Ward,   Appellant   in   this   matter,   by   and   through   his   attorney   of   record,   Hough-­‐Lewis   Dunn,   and   pursuant   to   the   provisions   of   Texas   Rules   of   Appellate   Procedure   66,   et   seq,   urges   this   Court   to  grant  discretionary  review,  and  in  support  will  show  as  follows:   STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE                            Appellant   was   indicted   for   the   offense  of  theft  of  property,  valued   at   an   amount   not   less   than   $1,500   but   no   more   than   $20,000,   namely,   a   welding   machine,   a   state   jail   felony.   TEX.   PENAL   CODE   §31.03(e)(4)(A)   (West   2012)   (CR   4).     Appellant   waived   jury   trial   and   entered   a   plea   of     1   “guilty”   to   the   trial   court   on   or   about   April   9,   2015   (RR   4:   4),   and   thereafter   on   May   21,   2015,   was   sentenced   to   22   months   in   a   state   jail   facility   (RR   5:   41)(CR   50).   Appellant   timely   filed   his   pro   se   “Notice   of   Appeal”  on  or  about  June  10,  2015  (CR  37).     STATEMENT   O F   P ROCEDURAL   H ISTORY   Petitioner   perfected   appeal   to   the   Sixth   Court   of   Appeals   in   Texarkana.       The   Sixth   Court   of   Appeals   affirmed   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court,  issuing  its  Memorandum  Opinion  in  Ward  v.  State,  No.  06-­‐15-­‐ 00110-­‐CR,   (Tex.   App.   –   Texarkana,   delivered   November   10,   2015)   (Mem.   Op.)  (not  designated  for  publication).  No   Motion   for   Rehearing   was   filed.   From   that   affirmance   Appellant  now  brings  this  Petition  for  Discretionary   Review.   GROUNDS  FOR  REVIEW   QUESTIONS  PRESENTED   FIRST  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW   DID   THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERR   IN   FINDING   NOTHING   FUNDAMENTALLY   ERRONEOUS   IN   THE   CONDUCT   OF   THE   TRIAL   COURT   UNDER   ALMANZA,   WHEN   THE   RECORD   SHOWED   THAT   THE   TRIAL   COURT   ADOPTED   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS   CONTROLLED   THE   OUTCOME   OF   SENTENCING?       2   SECOND  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW     DID  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS  ERR  IN  FAILING  TO  FIND  THAT  THE   TRIAL   COURT   HAD,   IN   ADOPTING   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS   CONTROLLED   THE   OUTCOME   OF   SENTENCING,  ABROGATED  THE  FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT  DUE   PROCESS   AND   EQUAL   PROTECTION   CONCERNS   FOUND   IN   BEARDEN  V.  GEORGIA?                                                Reason  for  Granting  Review     In   reaching   its   decision,   the   Court   of   Appeals   failed   to   follow   the   precedent   of   Almanza   v.   State,   686   S.W.2d   157   (Tex.   Crim.   App.   1986   (op.   on   reh’g),   and   it   ignored   principles   of   Fourteenth   Amendment   Due   Process   and   Equal   Protection   of   the   Law   that   underlie  the  ability  to  pay  restitution,  found  in  Bearden  v.  Georgia,   461  U.S.  660  (1983).       ARGUMENT  AND  AUTHORITIES    QUESTIONS  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW   FIRST  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW   DID   THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERR   IN   FINDING   NOTHING   FUNDAMENTALLY   ERROREOUS   IN   THE   CONDUCT   OF   THE   TRIAL   COURT   UNDER   ALMANZA,   WHEN   THE   RECORD   SHOWED   THAT   THE   TRIAL   COURT   ADOPTED   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS   CONTROLLED   THE   OUTCOME   OF   SENTENCING?                   3   SECOND  QUESTION  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW     DID  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS  ERR  IN  FAILING  TO  FIND  THAT  THE   TRIAL   COURT   HAD,   IN   ADOPTING   THE   STATE’S   POSITION   THAT   ECONOMIC   CONSIDERATIONS   CONTROLLED   THE   OUTCOME   OF   SENTENCING,  ABROGATED  THE  FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT  DUE   PROCESS   AND   EQUAL   PROTECTION   CONCERNS   FOUND   IN   BEARDEN  V.  GEORGIA?                                                        Reason  for  Granting  Review     In   reaching   its   decision,   the   Court   of   Appeals   failed   to   follow   the   precedent   of   Almanza   v.   State,   686   S.W.2d   157   (Tex.   Crim.   App.   1986   (op.   on   reh’g),   and   it   ignored   principles   of   Fourteenth   Amendment   Due   Process   and   Equal   Protection   of   the   Law   that   underlie  the  ability  to  pay  restitution,  found  in  Bearden  v.  Georgia,   461  U.S.  660  (1983).       [Appellant  will  address  both  the  First  and  Second  Questions  here.]                  The  Court  of  Appeals  opinion  sets  out  the  facts  in  its  opinion.    Ward   v.   State,   No.   06-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR,   (Tex.   App.   –   Texarkana,   delivered   November  10,  2015)  (Mem.  Op.)  (not  designated  for  publication).              FACTS                            Briefly  summarizing  the  record,  however:  Appellant  pleaded  guilty   to   the   indictment   of   theft   of   a   welding   machine   (RR   4:   4).   The   controversy  was  confirmed  at  the  sentencing  hearing  where  the  victim   (Appellant’s  former  employer),  one  Newberry  (RR  5:  5),  testified  about     alleged   (but   unsubstantiated)   charges   to   credit   cards   (RR   5:   6),   and     4   Appellant’s  taking  and  pawning  of  a  welding  machine  (RR  5:  7-­‐8);  also   how   Newberry   withheld   Appellant’s   paycheck   in   connection   with   his   allegations  about  the  credit  card  abuse  (RR  5:  12).                    Appellant   testified   that,   though   he   had   worked   for   nine   months,   he   had   recently   been   laid   off   with   the   turn-­‐down   in   the   oil   industry   (RR   5,   13-­‐14);   had   filed   for   unemployment   (RR   5:   14-­‐15);   had   dependents   he  was  trying  to  support  (RR  5:  15-­‐16);  had  been  through  some  physical   as   well   as   mental   difficulties   since   the   date   of   the   offense   back   in   September   2012   (RR   5:   18-­‐19).   Appellant   stated   that   he   took   the   welding   machine   because   he   was   “sore   about”   how   Newberry   had   withheld   his   wages   in   the   controversy   over   the   alleged   credit   card   charges,   something   he   denied   doing   (RR   5:   22-­‐23).       Appellant,   with   the   help   of   his   mother,   had   brought   $1,000   to   court   that   day   to   be   paid   toward   restitution   (RR   5:   27).   Under   questioning   from   the   trial   court,   Appellant   stated   that   he   had   lost   his   job   on   April   11,   2015,   about   40   days  before  he  came  to  that  session  of  court  for  sentencing  on  May  21  ,   but  had  filed  for  unemployment  benefits  (RR  5:  28).  Age  36,  he  had  had   four  spinal  surgeries  in  his  young  life  (RR  5:  17).         5                At   that   point   the   trial   court   questioned   Appellant,   and   had   this   comment  about  Appellant’s  filing  for  unemployment:  “And  so  knowing   that   the   State’s   recommendation   is   going   to   be   two   years     State   Jail,   you   decide   instead   of   finding   a   job   to   collect   restitution,   that   you’re   going  to  take  a  vacation  for  a  month  and  a  half”  (RR  5:    28).                  Finally,   Mrs.   Linda   Lee   (Appellant’s   mother)   testified   (RR   5:   31   ff).   She  spoke  about  the  efforts  Appellant  had  made  to  turn  his  life  around   and  accept  his  responsibilities  to  his  dependents  and  to  try  to  come  up   with  restitution,  but  that  his  chances  for  employment  in  the  oil  industry   had   been   affected   by   the   downturn;   that   she   had,   through   her   employment,  the  expectation  of  having  the  entire  amount  of  restitution   available  within  the  next  month  (RR  5:  32-­‐33).                At   instances   during   the   proceedings,   the   State   made   statements   that   tied   its   recommendation   for   probation   to   a   specific   amount   of   money  to  be  paid  in  restitution.  There  is  this,  from  the  hearing  on  the   guilty   plea   of   April   9,   2015,   in   anticipation   of   the   date   set   for   sentencing:         6   STATE:      And,  Your  Honor,  in  this  case,  Mr.  Larison  and  I  have  spoken,  as   well   as   with   the   victim,   Mr.   Newberry,   there’s   an   expectation   that   a   certain  figure  will  be  brought  to  court  that  date.  And  that  is  the  basis  of   what  our  agreement  or  future  agreement  is  based  upon,  Your  Honor.   (RR  4:  12)                                See   also:   RR   5:   9,   where   State’s   counsel,   in   questioning   Newberry   says:   “…we   would   either   accept   the   restitution   and   reach   a   plea   agreement   for   probation   or   the   State   was   going   to   ask   for   two   years  in  State  Jail.”                            Then   in   cross-­‐examining   Appellant   (RR   5:   24),   there   was   this   exchange  with  State’s  counsel:   STATE:                          What  did  you  understand  the  State  was  going  to  do  at   this  hearing?     APPELLANT:          That  the  sentence  would  be  given.     STATE:                     If   you   brought   the   money,   the   restitution   owed   on   the   case,  the  State  was  going  to  agree  to  probation;  is  that  correct?     APPELLANT:            Yes,  sir.     STATE:                              If  you  didn’t  bring  the  money,  what  was  the  State  going   to  recommend?     APPELLANT:         Well,   the   Judge   –   from   my   understanding,   the   Judge   would  then  have  it  either  which  way,  probation  or  –     7   STATE:                            You  knew  the  State  would  be  asking  for  prison,  right?  I   don’t  know  if  you  remember  it  or  not?     APPELLANT:                      I  don’t.     STATE:                             You   understood   that   was   definitely   what   you   were   facing,   what   you   were   risking?   You   were   facing   jail   time   if   you   didn’t   bring  the  restitution,  you  know  that,  right?     APPELLANT:                            I  knew  that  was  a  possibility.                      At  the  guilty  plea  hearing  the  trial  court  at  first  stated  that  it  was   not  bound  by  any  such  agreements,  but  then  went  on  to  state:  “Now,  if   you   do   bring   the   restitution,   then   that   may   put   this   in   a   different   situation.”  (RR  4:  13).                        At  the  sentencing  hearing,  the  trial  court  stated  (referring  to  the   guilty   plea):   “The   plea   was   based   on   some   possibilities   including   restitution  where  the  State  would  have  a  different  offer.”  (RR  5:  4).                  When   it   came   time   to   assess   a   sentence,   the   trial   court   stated:   “When   you   pled   guilty   on   April   the   9th,   you   knew   what   the   State’s   recommendation   was.   You   knew   that   your   obligation   under   that   recommendation  was  to  come  to  Court  today  with  $3,750  and  the  State   would  recommend  a  probated  sentence.  You  personally  came  to  Court   with   zero   dollars.”   (RR   5:   39).   The   trial   court   went   on   to   say:   “I   promise     8   you  if  you  had  gone  out  and  flipped  burgers  and  showed  me  you  were   working,  I  would  make  a  different  decision  than  I’m  about  to  make.  But   you   didn’t.   No,   rest   my   back.   I’m   going   to   see   how   much   unemployment   pays   me   instead   of   going   out   and   working.   That’s   the   problem  with  today’s  society.  We  have  a  lot  of  people  who  are  willing   to  see  what  the  government  is  going  to  pay  them  instead  of  working”   (RR  5:  41).                          LEGAL  ANALYSIS   On  appeal  Appellant’s  sole  point  was  this:  that  the  trial  court  did  not   act  as  a  neutral  and  detached  fact  finder,  taking  on  the  role  of  prosecutor,   thereby   violating   Fourteenth   Amendment   Due   Process   and   Texas   Due   Course  of  the  Law,  TEX.  CONST.  ART.  1  §19.    The   Court   of   Appeals   reached   two   conclusions   essential   to   its   determination  of  the  appeal:       First,   it   determined   that   the   issue   raised   by   Appellant   was   not   preserved   by   objection   and   a   ruling   at   trial   ,   as   required   by   TEX.   R.   APP.   P.   33.1(a)(1)  and  (2)  (Opinion,  p.  6).       Second,   it   held   that   the   conduct   of   the   trial   court   was   not   such   that   it   would   have   qualified   as   “fundamentally   erroneous”   under   the   standards     9   found   in   Almanza   v.   State,   686   S.W.2d   157   (Tex.   Crim.   App.   1984)(op.   on   reh’g)  (Opinion,  pp.6-­‐7).    Elaborating  further,  the  Court  of  Appeals  cited  to   Moreno   v.   State,   900   S.W.2d   357,   359   (Tex.   App.   –   Texarkana   1995,   no   pet.)   for  the  proposition  that  the  lack  of  an  objection  (and  ruling  thereon)  is  not   necessary  for  appellate  review  if  the  alleged  conduct  of  the  trial  court  was   “so  harmful  that  the  defendant  was  denied  a  fair  trial”  (Opinion,  p.  7).  The   Court  of  Appeals,  using  that  as  a  standard,  found  that  the  comments  of  the   trial  court  in  the  case  at  bar  “were  neither  egregiously  harmful  nor  did  they   operate  to  deny  Ward  a  fair  trial”  (id.).  After  a  review  of  the  evidence  from   the  sentencing  hearing,  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the  trial  court   did  not  abandon  its  role  and  act  as  advocate  for  the  State  (Opinion,  p.  8).     However,   the   Court   of   Appeals   failed   to   delve   into   the   overriding   concerns,   both   from   the   State   and   also   the   trial   court,   with   the   economic   considerations   that   dominated   the   direction   and   outcome   of   the   sentencing   hearing.  Indeed,  the  trial  court  did,  in  fact,  abandon  its  neutral  and  detached   role,  and  justified  its  sentencing  on  the  very  economic  posture  that  the  State   had  made  its  hallmark  for  either  probation  or  jail  time.         10   Contrary   to   allowable   conduct   of   filing   for   unemployment   benefits,   something   sanctioned   and   encouraged   under   State   law   (see,   TEX.   LABOR   CODE,   201   et   seq.),     the   trial   court   viewed   that   as   somehow   akin   to   “taking   a   vacation”,   concluding   with   the   following   remark:   “That’s   the   problem   with   today’s   society.   We   have   a   lot   of   people   who   are   willing   to   see   what   the   government  is  going  to  pay  them  instead  of  working.”    The  sum  total  of  that   sort   of   rhetoric   and   its   disregard   for   a   legitimate   resource   for   those   who   are   unemployed,  the  orientation  of  the  trial  court  adopting  the  State’s  stance  on   how   the   sentencing   turned   on   the   question   of   economics:   in   its   totality   it   qualifies  as  Almanza  fundamental  error.                            Both   the   State   and   the   trial   court   based   the   possibility   of   probation   in   this   case   on   economic   considerations,   without   regard   to   the   financial   circumstances   of   Appellant.   Each   of   them   said   that   probation   was   dependent   on   restitution   being   paid   by   Appellant.   The   trial   court   denounced   Appellant   for   filing   for   unemployment   compensation,   though   such   a   step   is   certainly   approved   of   by   the   Legislature  as  an  appropriate  remedy  for  joblessness  by  the  statutes  of   our  State.  See,  TEX.  LABOR  CODE,  201  et  seq.  By  so  doing,  fundamental       11    Fourteenth   Amendment   Due   Process   and   Equal   Protection   considerations   were   ignored,   resulting   in   fundamental   error.   That   error   was  compounded  by  the  fact  that  nowhere  in  Newberry’s  testimony  did   he   offer   a   figure   on   the   amount   of   restitution,   as   promised   earlier   by   the  State.                        Economic   considerations   underlie   the   process   of   determining   whether  or  not  a  defendant  has  complied  with  the  terms  of  probation.  The   lead  case  is  Bearden  v.  Georgia,  461  U.S.  660  (1983).  There  the  U.S.  Supreme   Court   held   that,   “if   the   State   determines   a   fine   or   restitution   to   be   the   appropriate   and   adequate   penalty   for   the   crime,   it   may   not   thereafter   imprison  a  person  solely  because  he  lacked  the  resources  to  pay  it.”  Id.,  at   667-­‐68.  And  then  further:                            “Only   if   alternate   measures   are   not   adequate   to   meet   the   State’s   interests   in   punishment   and   deterrence   may   the   court   imprison   a   probationer  who  has  made  bona  fide  efforts  to  pay.  To  do  otherwise  would   deprive   the   probationer   of   his   conditional   freedom   because,   through   no   fault   of   his   own,   he   cannot   pay   the   fine.   Such   a   deprivation   would   be   contrary   to   the   fundamental   fairness   required   by   the   Fourteenth   Amendment.”  Id.,  at  672-­‐73.     12                      In  Bearden  v.  Georgia,  the  Supreme  Court  was  not  writing  on  a  blank   slate   on   the   issue   of   how   economic   considerations   can   impinge   upon   the   Due  Process  and  Equal  Protection  rights  of  a  defendant.  Precedents  included   Williams   v.   Illinois,   399   U.S.   235   (1970)   (holding:   State   cannot   subject   a   certain   class   of   convicted   defendants   to   a   period   of   imprisonment   beyond   the   statutory   maximum   solely   because   they   are   too   poor   to   pay   the   fine)   and  Tate  v.  Short,  401  U.S.  395  (1971)  (holding:  State  cannot  convert  a  fine   imposed   fine-­‐only   statute   into   a   jail   term   solely   because   the   defendant   is   indigent   and   cannot   immediately   pay   the   fine   in   full).   See   also,   Griffin   v.   Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956)  (holding:  State  could  not  deny  appellate  review  to   those   who   were   indigent   but   grant   it   to   those   who   could   afford   a   trial   transcript).   Writing   for   the   majority,   Justice   O’Connor   found   that   “Due   Process   and   equal   protection   principles   converge   in   the   Court’s   analysis   in   these  cases”  Bearden  v.  Georgia,  at  665.                      Those  constitutional  principles  are  codified  in  ART.  42.12  §21(c),  TEX.   CODE   CRIM.   P.,   where   probation   revocation   is   prohibited   for   failure   to   pay   money,  and  where  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  State  to  prove  the  ability  to   pay,  coupled    with  a  failure  to  pay.                        It   has   been   held   that   even   a   plea   of   “true”   to   an   allegation   for     13   revocation   does   not   waive   a   Bearden   v.   Georgia   violation.     See,   Lively   v.   State,  338  S.W.3d  140,  145  (Tex.  App.  –  Texarkana  2011,  no  pet.).                          Appellant   contends   that   the   Court   of   Appeals   committed   a   two-­‐fold   failure:   first   it   failed   to   see   that   the   trial   court   did   abandon   its   neutral   position   when   it   made   economic   considerations   the   overriding   basis   upon   which   it   determined   sentence   and,   second,     it   failed   to   recognize   a   nonwaivable   right   at   issue:   namely,   that   a   person’s   freedom   is   not   dependent  upon  whether  or  not  a  person  can  pay  money.  That  is  the  core   consideration  in  Bearden  v.  Georgia,  embedded  in  Fourteenth  Amendment   Due  Process  considerations,  as  well  as  in  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.   Id.,   at   665.   Going   back   for   centuries,   there   is   a   principle   of   English   law   found   in   MAGNA  CARTA,  Article  40  (2015):  “To  no  one  will  we  sell,  to  no  one  deny  or   delay  right  or  justice.”1    In  an  opinion  holding  unconstitutional  a  statute  that   imposed  a  $10  fee  for  the  dismissal  of  a  charge  of  failure  to  maintain  proof   of   financial   responsibility   for   those   who   were   innocent   of   the   offense,   Attorney  General  Mattox  cited  to  MAGNA  CARTA,  Article  40,  saying  that  the   statute  was  “contrary  to  our  notions  of  due  process  and  the  law  of  the  land   since  Magna  Carta.”  TEX.  ATT’Y  GEN.  OP.  NO.  JM-­‐917  (1988).                                                                                                                   1    “Nulli  vendemus,  nulli  negabimus  aut  differemus  rectum  aut  justiciam.”       14     Admittedly,  Bearden  v.  Georgia  was  a  case  that  focused  on  probation   revocation.  The  case  held  that,  in  determining  a  defendant’s  initial  sentence,   the  trial  court  is  not  bound  by  the  economic  status  of  a  defendant  and  may   impose  the  maximum  penalty.   Id.,  at  670.  However,  in  the  case  at  bar,  both   the   trial   court   and   the   State   made   the   payment   (and   lack   of   payment)   of   restitution,   as   well   as   the   legitimate   seeking   of   unemployment   benefits   (both   economic   factors)   the   determining   consideration   in   that   initial   sentence  of  imprisonment,  rather  than  probation.       Therein  lies  the  constitutional  issue  before  this  Honorable  Court,  the   issue  that  was  overlooked  and  disregarded  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.       As  a  corollary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  Due  Process  and  Equal   Protection   of   the   Law   issues   raised   in   Bearden   v.   Georgia,   there   is   this   additional  fundamental  concern  at  work  in  the  case  at  bar:     Where   the   trial   court   accepts   the   State’s   position   on   punishment,   deciding  to  withhold  consideration  of  probation  from  a  defendant  because   he  has  not  brought  with  him  funds  that  the  said  court  has  deemed  sufficient   for   restitution,   and   when   it   disparages   and   holds   against   a   defendant   his   reliance  upon  legitimate  economic  support  approved  by  State  law,  then       15   the  decision  has  run  afoul  of  Fourteenth  Amendment  Due  Process  and  Equal   Protection  of  the  Law.  Punishment  no  longer  is  meted  out  depending  on  the   facts   of   the   offense,   but   on   the   economic   ability   of   the   offender   to   pay   money.   That   certainly   runs   counter   to   Fourteenth   Amendment   Equal   Protection   considerations,   since   an   offender   who   can   pay   the   restitution   gets  probation,  but  one  who  does  not  -­‐-­‐  one  who  is  compelled  to  rely  upon   State   assistance   to   live   -­‐-­‐   gets   incarcerated.   It   has   all   the   earmarks   of   dispensing  justice  according  to  the  economic  circumstances  of  the  offender.       Compounding   that   error   was   the   fact   that,   nowhere   in   the   record   during   the   hearing   on   punishment   did   Newberry   testify   as   to   the   value   of   the   welding   machine.   The   trial   court   referred   to   the   sum   of   $3,750,   but   that   is   nowhere   in   the   record   from   the   sentencing   hearing,   as   promised   by   the   State  at  the  conclusion  of  the  guilty  plea  (RR  4:  12).  The  figure  of  $3,250  is   mentioned  in  a  police  report  as  the  value  of  the  welding  machine  (RR  6:  7);   and  in  that  same  report  the  figure  of  $250.00  is  placed  on  a  pair  of  cables   (RR   6:   7).   However,   at   the   low   end   of   valuation,   the   machine   was   pawned   for   $425.00   (RR   6:   9);   on   that   same   page   Newberry   gave   a   value   on   the   machine   of   $3,500.   Id.   Then   in   another   report   (Call   Sheet   Report   dated     16   12/29/2012)  Newberry  reported  (on  the  high  end  of  valuation)  that  he  had   “about  6-­‐10,000  dollars  worth  of  equipment”  stolen  (RR  6:  14).     ART.   42.037(k),   TEX.   CODE   CRIM.   P.,   places   the   burden   of   proving   the   amount   of   restitution   on   the   State.   The   statute   says,   in   relevant   part:   “The   burden  of  demonstrating  the  amount  of  the  loss  sustained  by  a  victim  as  a   result   of   the   offense   is   on   the   prosecuting   attorney.”   The   Judgment   recites   an  amount  of  restitution  as  $3,750,  payable  to  the  victim  Newberry,  but  does   not   say   how   or   when   that   amount   must   be   paid   (CR   50-­‐51).   See,   Miller   v.   State,   343   S.W.3d   499,   502   (Tex.   App.   –   Waco   2011,   pet.   ref’d),   where   the   reviewing   court   held   that   the   amount   of   restitution   must   be   just   and   supported   by   a   factual   basis   within   the   record.   The   State   did   not   elicit   testimony  from  Newberry  at  the  sentencing  hearing.  The  evidence  from  the   State’s   exhibits   was,   at   best,   ambiguous.   See   also,   Barton   v.   State,   21   S.W.3d   287  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2000);  Lemos  v.  State,  27  S.W.3d  42,  45  (Tex.  App.  –  San   Antonio  2000,  pet.  ref’d).2                                                                                                                     2  Victim’s  right  to  restitution:    see,  TEX.  CONST.  ART.  1,  §30(b)(4).       17                        Appellant,  with  the  assistance  of  his  mother,  had  brought  some  money   to  court:  $1,000.  In  the  opinion  of  the  State  and  of  the  trial  court,  it  fell  short.   So  the  principle  at  work  was  this:  either  bring  all  the  money  or  go  to  prison.       The   Court   of   Appeals   failed   to   grasp   the   fundamental,   nonwaivable,   issue  at  work  in  the  appeal  in  its  consideration  of  whether  the  trial  court  had   erred   in   its   determination   of   punishment,   namely,   that   the   trial   court   departed  from  its  neutral  and  detached  role,  adopting  instead  the  position  of   the  State  toward  punishment,  thereby  imposing  an  unconstitutional  burden   of  financial  means  upon  Appellant  in  deciding  his  sentence.  That  burden  ran   afoul   of   Fourteenth   Amendment     Due   Process   and   Equal   Protection   of   the   Law.                       18   PRAYER  FOR  RELIEF     WHEREFORE,  PREMISES  CONSIDERED,  Derek  Clinton  Ward,  Appellant,   prays   that   the   Honorable   Court   of   Criminal   Appeals   will   grant   discretionary   review   and,   after   full   briefing   on   the   merits,   issue   an   opinion   reversing   the   Court   of   Appeals’   judgment   and   remand   for   further   proceedings   consistent   with  the  Court’s  opinion.   Respectfully  submitted,             /S/  Hough-­‐Lewis  Dunn                                                             HOUGH-­‐LEWIS  (“LEW”)  DUNN                                                             TEXAS  STATE  BAR  NO.  02644600                                                                                                                    201  E.  METHVIN  STREET,  SUITE  102                                                                                                                    P.O.  BOX  2226   LONGVIEW,  TX  75606   903-­‐757-­‐6711   903-­‐757-­‐6712   dunn@texramp.net     ATTORNEY  FOR  APPELLANT                           19   CERTIFICATE  OF  COMPLIANCE     This  petition  complies  with  the  typeface  requirements  of  TEX.  R.  APP.   P.   9.4(e),   because   it   has   been   prepared   in   a   conventional   typeface   no   smaller   than   14-­‐point   for   text   and   12-­‐point   for   footnotes.   This   document   complies  with  the  word-­‐count  limitations  of  TEX.  R.  APP.  P.  9.4(i)  because  it   contains   3,702   words,   excluding   the   parts   exempted   by   TEX.   R.   APP.   P.   9.4(i)(1).               /S/  Hough-­‐Lewis  Dunn     CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE     I   certify   the   foregoing   Petition   for   Discretionary   Review   was   served   upon  the  State  of  Texas  by  sending  a  true  and  correct  copy  to  the  Criminal   District   Attorney   of   Gregg   County   and   the   State   Prosecuting   Attorney   via   mail   to:   Hon.   Zan   Colson   Brown,   Assistant   Criminal   District   Attorney   for   Gregg  County,  101  E.  Methvin  St.  Suite  333,  Longview,  TX  75601,  and  Hon.   Lisa   C.   McMinn,   State   Prosecuting   Attorney,   P.O.   Box   13046,   Austin,   TX   78711-­‐3046  on  the  4th  day  of  December  2015.               /S/  Hough-­‐Lewis  Dunn         20                           APPENDIX   In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-15-00110-CR DEREK CLINTON WARD, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 42433-B Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley MEMORANDUM OPINION After Derek Clinton Ward entered an open plea of guilty to the state jail felony of theft of property valued at $1,500.00 or more but less than $20,000.00,1 the trial court sentenced Ward to twenty-two months’ incarceration. Ward has appealed, arguing that the trial court abandoned its duty to remain impartial in the sentencing process. We reject this argument and affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence. I. Procedural Background Ward entered an open plea of guilty to the charged offense of theft April 9, 2015,2 and returned for sentencing on May 21, 2015. It appears that although Ward had entered an open plea, there was something of an informal agreement between Ward and the State wherein the State would recommend that Ward would avoid incarceration if he appeared at the sentencing hearing with $3,750.00 in restitution. However, when Ward appeared at the sentencing hearing, he did not have the $3,750.00 in restitution; the only money proffered on his behalf was $1,000.00 brought by Ward’s mother. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Ward to twenty-two months’ incarceration in a state jail facility. 1 Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, sec. 31.03, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 929–30 (amended 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2015) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (West Supp. 2015)). 2 The theft charge arose because Ward had taken an expensive welding machine from his then-employer. Initially, the employer was being reimbursed by withholding at least a portion of Ward’s paycheck. However, the employer then indicated that Ward had also committed significant credit card abuse against the employer, and the informal repayment plan was abandoned. The credit card abuse case was not thereafter pursued due to problems with the loss of evidence, and Ward denied his culpability. 2 During the hearing on punishment, Ward related that he had become unemployed in the days immediately following the early April plea hearing, his job as an oil-field drilling hand having been eliminated during the downturn in the oil market. Ward (then thirty-six years old) testified that he elected to seek unemployment benefits rather than pursue employment. He went on to relate that he had had four back surgeries over the years and told the court about the physically demanding nature of his career choice. In doing so, Ward stated, [I]t was kind of nice to just let my back have a rest for a minute anyways. Working on a drilling rig when you’re 36 years old and had as many spinal surgeries that I have had takes a toll on your body. I kind of looked at it as just taking a second off and giving my body a little rest. Ward testified that in the weeks between losing his job and the sentencing hearing, he had applied for unemployment benefits, but that a few days before the hearing, he had been notified that he failed to include certain information with his application and that he was waiting for paperwork to be sent to him. He also said that although he had obtained job applications, he had not submitted them to prospective employers. He said he only took ibuprofen for his back pain, after successfully battling addiction to prescription pain medication. As for the job from which he had been laid off, he was “absolutely” eligible to be re-hired, and he already had “the paperwork” establishing that eligibility. After the parties’ examination of Ward drew to a close, the trial court asked him several questions. During this exchange, the trial court referred to the time intervening between Ward’s plea hearing and the sentencing hearing as a “vacation.” Although Ward did not object to that characterization at the time the trial court uttered it, Ward now objects to it on appeal. For the context in which this was said, we quote some of the trial court’s statements as made during Ward’s 3 sentencing hearing. After verifying the date that Ward had been terminated from his last job, the trial court said, “And so knowing that the State’s recommendation is going to be two years state jail, you decide instead of finding a job to collect restitution, that you’re going to take a vacation for a month and a half.” Ward responded by protesting that the condition of his back had been the reason for not seeking employment.3 The trial court then asked Ward why he should receive a suspended sentence. Ward answered, “Because I’ll stick to the probation, complete the probation and give you no reason for feeling like I did anything unjust, sir.” Ward then called his mother (a loan officer for a mortgage company) to testify. She indicated that she was able and willing to pay $1,000.00 toward Ward’s restitution at that time and that she could pay the remaining portion of the restitution on June 15, less than a month away. After a short recess, the trial court accepted Ward’s guilty plea and found him guilty as charged of theft of property valued at $1,500.00 or more, but less than $20,000.00. The court then described to Ward the factors taken into account in deciding the proper sentence: I have to decide if you deserve State Jail time, or do you deserve a shot at probation? When you pled guilty on April 9th, you knew what the State’s recommendation was. You knew that your obligation under that recommendation was to come to Court today with $3,750 and the State would recommend a probated sentence. You personally came to Court with zero dollars. 3 During this exchange, it was developed that Ward’s driver’s license had been re-activated after paying “some fees from a D.W.I.” The trial court also asked Ward about a DWI charge from Shelby County, and Ward responded that that case had been dismissed. Ward admitted to the State that he had been charged with arson and assault/family violence (these charges arising from one incident with Ward’s girlfriend), but claimed that the State had dropped the arson allegation while continuing prosecution of the assault case. 4 The factors I have to consider or send somebody to prison include their criminal history, obviously. If I was to consider just your criminal history, my decision is pretty easy. I would send you to prison, but I look at other factors, also. I look at changes that they may have made, when the criminal history was. I look at several factors. Criminal history does vote against you. Your felony offense was long ago, so that helps you some. I looked at the facts and circumstances of the offense. I can’t really consider much on the credit card abuse allegations, just because of the lack of proof before me. I do consider the statements you made to Investigator Mitchell and other factors. Here’s where it really comes down to my decision that I’m going to make today. You pled guilty on April the 9th knowing that your part of the obligation was $3,750. You say you lost your job April 10th or 11th. Instead of going out and finding a new job whether it’s flipping burgers at McDonald’s for minimum wage or anything else, you testified that you wanted to take a month-and-a-half vacation to rest your back. It’s not until recently, the last few days that you’ve even filed for unemployment. You come in here today and expect me to grant you probation. You expect me to grant you probation, and, say, well, I’m hoping that my mom’s $1,000 is enough to bail me out. It’s not this time. I promise you if you had gone out and flipped burgers and showed me you were working, I would make a different decision than I’m about to make. But you didn’t. No, rest my back. I’m going to see how much unemployment pays me instead of going out and working. That’s the problem with today’s society. We have a lot of people who are willing to see what the government is going to pay them instead of working. It’s not going to work here. 22 months State Jail. I will give you credit for time served. Ward argues that the trial court abandoned its duty to remain a neutral and detached fact-finder; Ward complains of the trial court’s use of the term “vacation” to describe the period between his being laid off and the sentencing hearing. Ward further points to the trial court’s statement that he 5 would be unlikely to grant Ward much relief when the court was called upon to consider whether any of Ward’s sentence would be reduced as a result of diligent participation in applicable programs while incarcerated.4 II. Failure to Preserve Argument As previously mentioned, Ward lodged no objection to the trial court’s use of the word “vacation” or any of the court’s other statements at any time during the sentencing hearing (not while the trial court was questioning Ward, during the statement he gave in explaining his reasoning for the sentence that was announced, or during any other part of the hearing). In almost every circumstance, in order to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2). Although Ward attempts to invoke due process claims in his assertion that the trial court abandoned his role as judge for that of prosecutor, Ward offers no explanation or argument as to why we should address this unpreserved issue. In a somewhat similar situation, we observed that un-objected to “remarks and conduct of the [trial] court may not be subsequently challenged unless they are fundamentally erroneous.” Moreno v. State, 900 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no pet.) (citing Brewer v, State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978)). 4 This was apparently a reference to Article 42.12, Section 15(h)(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(h)(5) (West Supp. 2014). 6 In such a situation, we used the egregious harm standard from Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g), to determine if fundamental error had occurred. The alleged error must be “so harmful that the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” Moreno, 900 S.W.2d at 359. If we were to look at Ward’s brief in the most generous light possible, we might say that he has claimed fundamental (or plain) error, i.e., the kind that obviates the need to preserve it at the time of trial. An appellate court may, in criminal cases, “tak[e] ‘notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although they were not’ brought to the attention of the [trial] court.” Boler v. State, 177 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (quoting Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “No objection is required when the error is so egregious that it rises to constitutional dimensions.” Id. (citing Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421). The trial court’s comments were neither egregiously harmful nor did they operate to deny Ward a fair and impartial trial. Certainly, the comments did not rise to the status of a complaint of constitutional dimension. Read in context, the trial court was commenting on Ward’s behavior between the time of the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. When he took Ward’s plea of guilty, the trial court admonished him of the full range of punishment, including a probated sentence with community supervision. Based on comments by the court and the State at the two hearings, it is clear that some informal agreement had been reached to the effect that if Ward brought the full restitution amount to the sentencing hearing, the State would recommend a probated sentence. However, if there was no such restitution, then there would be no such recommendation. At the plea hearing, the trial court warned Ward that it was not bound by any 7 plea negotiations the parties might have, but also told Ward, “[I]f you do bring the restitution, then that may put this in a different situation. But right now it is an open plea, so you have certain obligations you need to meet.” When testimony developed at the sentencing hearing that Ward had worked most of his adult life in the oil-field business but made a conscious decision not to seek employment just days after the plea hearing (even after the discussions which had evidently taken place regarding leniency if Ward were to make restitution), the trial court was left to draw conclusions about Ward’s suitability for community supervision and regarding Ward’s commitment to fulfill potential obligations. The sentencing hearing occurred before the trial court, so there was no jury that could have been confused or influenced by the court’s characterization of how Ward spent his time between the hearings. See Moreno, 900 S.W.2d at 359. It also does not appear that the trial court abandoned its role and acted as an advocate for the State. See id. The trial court’s decision process should not be hindered by a constraint on its ability to explain the rationale behind its decision. The fairness of the proceedings was not impugned. Even if error had occurred, it would not have been in the nature of plain or fundamental error. Accordingly, absent such error, it was incumbent upon Ward to preserve these issues for our review. We overrule Ward’s point of error. 8 We affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence. Bailey C. Moseley Justice Date Submitted: November 9, 2015 Date Decided: November 10, 2015 Do Not Publish 9 Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas JUDGMENT Derek Clinton Ward, Appellant Appeal from the 124th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 42433-B). No. 06-15-00110-CR v. Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice The State of Texas, Appellee Burgess participating. As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We note that the appellant, Derek Clinton Ward, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs. RENDERED NOVEMBER 10, 2015 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk