J-A12002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TERRELL LARON WALKER, DAMAIRE
WALLACE, QUASHAAD RODNEY JAMES
AND MAURICE TOWNER, JR.,
Appellees No. 2299 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Family Court at No(s):
CP-09-CR-0000100-2105
CP-09-CR-0000101-2015
CP-09-CR-0000102-2015
CP-09-CR-0000103-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
The Commonwealth appeals from the consolidated order granting
suppression of physical evidence seized in the cases of four codefendants,
Terrell Laron Walker (100-2015), Damaire Wallace (101-2015), Quashaad
Rodney James (102-2015), and Maurice Towner, Jr. (103-2015) (collectively
hereinafter, “Appellees”). After careful review, we quash this appeal.
Appellees were charged at separate dockets with numerous offenses
related to an armed robbery that occurred on the morning of October 26,
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2014, at the Glen Hollow Apartments on Newportville Road in Bristol
Township, Pennsylvania. Appellees filed suppression motions on March 6,
2015, and a suppression hearing was held on March 20, 2015.1 The
Suppression Court granted Appellees’ motions to suppress by order dated
June 30, 2015. The Commonwealth filed the instant, timely appeal on July
27, 2015. The Commonwealth then filed a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement on August 20, 2015. The Suppression Court issued its
Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 28, 2015.
On August 26, 2015, this Court issued a per curiam order to show
cause why this appeal should not be quashed, as the Commonwealth failed
to file separate appeals for each Appellee. The Commonwealth filed a timely
response on September 4, 2015. By per curiam order dated October 1,
2015, in consideration of the order to show cause and the Commonwealth’s
response thereto, this Court deferred the decision whether to quash this
appeal to the argument panel.
The Commonwealth now presents the following claims for our review,
which we have reordered for ease of disposition:
[1.] Should this Honorable Court quash the instant appeal
based on the filing of the notices of appeal?
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1
The trial court does not indicate whether separate motions were filed by
each Appellee. However, the dockets of Appellees’ individual cases reveal
that separate, individual motions were filed, which were addressed at a
consolidated suppression hearing.
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[2.] Did the Suppression Court err in granting suppression
where the police possessed reasonable suspicion to stop
Appellees’ vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances?
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4.
We must first decide whether to quash the instant appeal due to the
Commonwealth’s failure to file separate notices of appeal for each Appellee.
Pa.R.A.P. 341 governs appeals from final orders. The Note to Rule 341
states, in part, as follows:
Where … one or more orders resolves issues arising on more
than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,
separate notices of appeal must be filed. Commonwealth v.
C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing
appeal taken by single notice of appeal from order on remand for
consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons' judgments
of sentence).
Pa.R.A.P. Rule 341, Note at ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
In C.M.K., codefendants C.M.K. and M.W.K. were convicted following a
jury trial “of various offenses related to their physical abuse of their child.”
C.M.K., 932 A.2d at 112. They filed separate notices of appeal, which were
later consolidated by this Court. Subsequently, “this Court vacated the
judgments of sentence and remanded for consideration of a Pa.R.Crim.P.
607 motion challenging the weight of the evidence.” Id. Following a
hearing, the trial court issued an order denying C.M.K.’s and M.W.K’s
weight-of-the-evidence claim, and then resentenced both C.M.K. and M.W.K.
C.M.K. and M.W.K. then filed one, joint notice of appeal from their
judgments of sentence. This Court deemed their joint notice of appeal “a
legal nullity” that required “quashal[.]” Id. at 113.
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In its argument against quashal, the Commonwealth contends that this
Court may, at its discretion, sua sponte “consolidate” Appellees’ cases on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 512 and 513, and urges this Court to do so as
a matter of judicial economy. The Commonwealth also attempts to
distinguish the instant matter from the circumstances at issue in C.M.K. In
their respective briefs, Appellees argue that this Court must quash the
Commonwealth’s appeal by straightforward operation of the comment to
Rule 341 and the decision in C.M.K.
The Commonwealth’s argument that we should consolidate these
matters sua sponte is unavailing. The Commonwealth only filed a single,
joint appeal from the order granting suppression in Appellees’ cases.
Therefore, there are no ‘appeals’ for this Court to consolidate, and the
Commonwealth has offered no legal authority suggesting that this Court may
sua sponte file appeals on the Commonwealth’s behalf.
Rule 512 does not afford any relief. Rule 512 states:
Parties interested jointly, severally or otherwise in any order in
the same matter or in joint matters or in matters consolidated
for the purposes of trial or argument, may join as appellants or
be joined as appellees in a single appeal where the grounds for
appeal are similar, or any one or more of them may appeal
separately or any two or more may join in an appeal.
Pa.R.A.P. 512.
Appellees in this case have not sought joinder. Furthermore, the
comment to Rule 512 advises:
This describes who may join in a single notice of appeal. The
rule does not address whether a single notice of appeal is
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adequate under the circumstances presented. Under Rule 341, a
single notice of appeal will not be adequate to take an appeal
from orders entered on more than one trial court docket. See
Rule 341, Note (“Where, however, one or more orders resolves
issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than
one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.”).
Pa.R.A.P. 512, Note (single paragraph). Rule 512, especially when read in
combination with its corresponding note, does not afford any form of relief
for the Commonwealth’s failure to file separate appeals in this matter.
It is even clearer that Rule 513 does not afford the Commonwealth
any form of relief. Rule 513 reads:
Where there is more than one appeal from the same order, or
where the same question is involved in two or more appeals in
different cases, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order
them to be argued together in all particulars as if but a single
appeal. Appeals may be consolidated by stipulation of the parties
to the several appeals.
Pa.R.A.P. 513. Rule 513 only concerns the consolidation of multiple appeals.
Again, the Commonwealth only filed a single appeal in this matter.
The Commonwealth separately argues that this matter is
distinguishable from C.M.K. In that case, we opined that there were
inherent problems with criminal codefendants filing joint appeals:
From a purely logical standpoint, the problems inherent in
criminal codefendant[’]s filing a joint appeal are readily
apparent. In most cases, they would not have been
convicted for identical actions. If, then, these codefendants
raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, as
Appellants here do, the evidence under evaluation would
be different for each defendant, necessitating
individualized arguments and analyses. The same would
be true for challenges to different sentences.
C.M.K., 932 A.2d at 113.
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The Commonwealth cites this passage from C.M.K., and argues:
The instant matter is easily distinguishable from the issues
raised in C.M.K. The present appeal involves a Commonwealth
appeal of an identical suppression order as to each Appellee. It
is not, as in C.M.K., an appeal by criminal defendants who would
have their own distinct issues related to their trial and sentence.
There was one suppression hearing held in the instant matter
where all four Appellees were challenging the vehicle stop.
There was one order filed for all four Appellees, containing
identical findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
Suppression Court also captioned that one order with the docket
number of each Appellee's case[]. The Commonwealth treated
its notices of appeal in the four cases in the same manner as the
lower court, using the same caption as the order it was
appealing.
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 28-29.
We read the passage cited from C.M.K. as dicta that was not
necessary to the holding in that case, but was offered as one possible
justification for the rule dictating quashal, not as the only possible
justification for that rule. In that passage, the C.M.K. Court was speaking
generally about the potential hazards that could arise out of the filing of a
single appeal by multiple codefendants, hazards which may or may not have
actually been a concern in C.M.K.
In any event, this Court recognizes that similar problems can arise
when the Commonwealth files a single appeal from an order granting
suppression with regard to multiple codefendants, regardless of whether the
lower court issued a single, consolidated order containing identical findings
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of fact and legal analysis for each case.2 For instance, affirming (or
reversing) the suppression order may affect each defendant differently,
depending on what evidence, if any, is still available for use by the
Commonwealth at trial. Indeed, the results of such an appeal may
ultimately affect circumstances which impact whether the codefendants
should be jointly tried at all.3 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment and/or
privacy rights of Appellees, as well as their standing to challenge the
lawfulness of a search and/or seizure, could also differ between
codefendants. Accordingly, although we agree that the specific concerns
discussed in C.M.K. cannot arise in a Commonwealth’s appeal from a
suppression order affecting multiple codefendants, sufficiently similar or
analogous hazards exist to justify the rule requiring the Commonwealth to
file separate appeals with respect to each Appellee/codefendant.
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2
Our scope and standard of review of suppression orders limits our review
of a suppression court’s findings of fact, but we are not at all constrained by
the court’s legal conclusions, as our review of such matters is plenary. See
Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating
that “[o]ur scope of review over the suppression court's factual findings is
limited in that if these findings are supported by the record we are bound by
them[,]” but that “[o]ur scope of review over the suppression court's legal
conclusions … is plenary”).
3
In this regard, we observe that an issue regarding motions to sever filed by
two of the Appellees was tabled pending the resolution of the suppression
motion. See N.T., 3/30/15, at 4-13 (discussing the pending motions to
sever); id. at 13-15 (requesting tabling of the motions by counsel pending
the outcome of suppression hearing).
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For the aforementioned reasons, we are compelled to quash the
Commonwealth’s appeal. The Commonwealth was required to file separate
appeals from the suppression order for each of Appellees’ separately
docketed criminal cases, but failed to do so. This Court lacks the authority
to manufacture a remedy for the Commonwealth, even if we were inclined to
do so. Consequently, we do not reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s
suppression claim.
Appeal quashed.
Judge Panella joins this memorandum.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/30/2016
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