Opinion issued September 29, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00455-CR
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DARRYL DWAYNE EVANS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14CR1000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Darryl Dwayne Evans, of possession of a
controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more
but less than 200 grams.1 Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement allegations,2
and the jury assessed his punishment at twenty-six years’ confinement in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In one point of error,
appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence. We reverse and remand.
Background
At the pretrial suppression hearing, Officer Martinez of the Galveston Police
Department testified that, while on patrol at 1 a.m. on March 30, 2014, he observed
a car parked in the driveway of T&T Marine. As Officer Martinez “was coming
down Avenue G about two blocks prior, [he] saw [appellant] outside of the vehicle,
then . . . walking towards the passenger side, then return back towards the driver’s
side.” Officer Martinez testified that, given the previous five alarm calls to the
business, “there would be reasonable suspicion to wonder why [appellant] was on
the property at 1:00 o’clock in the morning when the business was already closed.”
Officer Martinez stated that as appellant walked around the car, “he looked at
me and noticed me coming . . . then rapidly went back to the driver’s seat and got in
the car.” After Officer Martinez passed, appellant turned on his lights and pulled
out of the driveway. Officer Martinez then made a U-turn and, after activating his
1
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West 2009).
2
Appellant was previously convicted of the felony offense of possession of a
controlled substance in 2008 and 1999.
2
emergency lights, drove up behind appellant, who immediately pulled over. The
dash cam video from the officer’s car was admitted into evidence at the suppression
hearing.
When Officer Martinez asked appellant why he was parked in the driveway,
appellant told him that he had dropped his cell phone. Officer Martinez then detected
a strong smell of marijuana coming from appellant’s vehicle. After asking appellant
to leave his vehicle, Officer Martinez performed a pat down search of appellant. He
then searched the vehicle and discovered what appeared to be crystal
methamphetamine in a plastic bag and a crack cocaine rock on the driver’s seat.
Officer Martinez arrested appellant at the scene. A backpack containing crystal
meth, an electronic scale, and small plastic bags was later found in the trunk of
appellant’s vehicle.
Officer Martinez testified that there had been five 911 alarm calls to T & T
Marine in the previous two weeks but he did not believe that any of those 911 calls
resulted in burglary or other criminal activity. On cross-examination, Officer
Martinez testified that he did not see appellant walk towards the business, away from
the business, or leave the vicinity of the vehicle. He further testified that he was not
on patrol in the area because of a prior history of burglaries, nor was this a high-crime
area. According to Officer Martinez, he did not observe appellant commit any traffic
violations or engage in any criminal activity prior to the stop.
3
After appellant’s pretrial suppression motion was denied, the jury convicted
him of possession of a controlled substance and, with two enhancements, assessed
his punishment at twenty-six years’ confinement.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We apply a bifurcated standard of review: (1) giving almost total deference to
a trial court’s determination of historical facts and application of law to fact
questions that turn on credibility and demeanor, and (2) reviewing de novo
application of law to fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor.
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The reviewing court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Gutierrez
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). At the suppression hearing,
the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and exclusive judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. St. George v. State, 237
S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
B. Applicable Law
An investigative detention requires a police officer to have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. See Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 602–03 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). A determination of reasonable suspicion requires a review of the
totality of the circumstances, and reasonable suspicion may exist even if those
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circumstances in isolation may be just as consistent with innocent activity as with
criminal activity. York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Reasonable suspicion is present if the officer has specific, articulable facts
that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer
to reasonably conclude that a person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged
in criminal activity. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
These facts must show unusual activity, some evidence that connects the detainee to
the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime.
Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Although an
officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a[n] [investigatory] stop,
the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581,
1585 (1989)). The test for reasonable suspicion is an objective one that focuses
solely on whether an objective basis exists for the detention and disregards the
officer’s subjective intent. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883
(1968).
The State bears the burden to show that an officer had at least a reasonable
suspicion the defendant either had committed an offense, or was about to do so,
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before they made the warrantless stop. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585).
C. Analysis
We begin by determining whether the trial court’s implicit findings, which led
to the denial of the motion to suppress, are supported by the record. See State v.
Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Officer Martinez performed an
investigatory stop based on the following articulable facts: (1) there had been five
911 alarm calls to the specific address; (2) appellant was parked in the business’s
driveway at 1 a.m.; (3) the business was closed; (4) upon seeing Officer Martinez’s
vehicle driving down the street, appellant rapidly walked from his passenger side
door to his driver’s side door and left the parking lot.
In Gamble v. State, a police officer performed an investigatory stop based on
the following facts: (1) it was 3:00 a.m.; (2) the defendant was either standing in the
street near, or walking in the street toward, a residence to which the officers had
been frequently called in the past year, but at which they had never made an arrest
for illicit activity; (3) the defendant watched the marked police car and walked away
from it when it turned around; and (4) the area had a history of illicit activity. 8
S.W.3d 452, 453–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). This Court
held that the trial court had erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
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because there was insufficient evidence to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. See id.
There are marked similarities between this case and Gamble. First, Officer
Martinez testified that there were five 911 calls to the business over the past two
weeks, similar to the calls to police regarding the residence in Gamble, and in both
cases, no arrests resulted. Id. Second, the stop in this case occurred at 1:00 a.m.,
and the defendant in Gamble was stopped at 3:00 a.m. Id. Third, Officer Martinez
testified that appellant quickly left upon seeing him, and in Gamble, the defendant
saw the marked police car and walked away from it when it turned around. Id.3
Notably, unlike Gamble, there is no evidence that the location in this case was
considered a “high-crime” area.4
In Klare v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals determined that the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the truck the defendant was driving based on the
following articulable facts: (1) it was 2:30 a.m.; (2) while driving on a highway, the
officer saw a truck parked behind a shopping center; (3) the businesses in the
3
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that persons in an automobile are subject
to temporary investigative detentions in the same manner as pedestrians. See
Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
4
A “high-crime” area, although not dispositive of reasonable suspicion, is a factor to
be considered when analyzing the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (noting that, while presence
in high-crime area alone is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, fact that
incident occurs in high-crime area is relevant factor to be considered in reviewing
totality of circumstances).
7
shopping center were closed; (4) there had been burglaries at the shopping center in
the past, though the police officer did not say how recent or how many; (5) the officer
turned into the parking lot shortly afterwards and discovered that the truck was gone;
(6) the officer then turned onto an adjoining road and within fifteen to twenty
seconds came upon a truck that he believed to be the same as the one at the shopping
center; and (7) the officer wanted to identify the truck. 76 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d).
There are several similarities between this case and Klare. In Klare, the
officer testified that the above-cited reasons “raised [his] curiosity as far as suspicion
goes,” which the court described as an “inarticulate hunch.” Id. at 75 (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). Similarly, Officer Martinez testified that when
he saw appellant’s vehicle parked in front of the business, he was “[j]ust wondering
what the car was doing there at 1:00 o’clock in the morning when the business was
already closed.” Further, the stops in both cases occurred late at night, and the
vehicles were parked near closed businesses. We also note that the defendant in
Klare was parked behind a business which had been previously burglarized, whereas
here, there were no known burglaries, only alarm calls.
In Turner v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals found circumstances similar
to those present in this case did not create a reasonable suspicion warranting an
investigatory stop. See No. 05-10-01225-CR, 2011 WL 4953438, at *1–2 (Tex.
8
App.—Dallas Oct. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The police officer in Turner cited the following facts justifying the stop: (1) the stop
took place at approximately 1 a.m.; (2) the defendant’s car’s brake lights and
headlights came on when the officer turned down a street in a neighborhood; (3) the
defendant then made an immediate left turn; (4) the license plate came back
registered to a person residing in another city; and (5) four people occupied the
vehicle. Id.
Finding the facts insufficient to support reasonable suspicion, the Turner court
noted that “there is a considerable difference between an officer stopping a vehicle
seen parked in a public parking lot . . . and an officer stopping someone seen walking
from behind private property well after the business was closed.” Id. at *3 (quoting
Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852, n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citations
omitted)).5 Here, the dash cam video shows that appellant was parked in the well-
lit driveway of T&T Marine, and Officer Martinez testified he did not see appellant
leave the vicinity of his vehicle before he turned on his headlights and began to drive
away. The Turner court also noted that the police officer did not provide any
evidence that appellant was fleeing the scene. See Turner, 2011 WL 4953438, at *4
5
In Turner v State, the defendant was parked on a neighborhood street, which the
court found “more akin to being parked in a public parking lot.” 05-10-01225-CR,
2011 WL 4953438, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
9
(stating that officer “did not testify [the defendant] spun out his tires in an effort to
leave or that he sped away”). Similarly, Officer Martinez did not testify that
appellant quickly drove away; rather, he stated that appellant “rapidly went back to
the driver’s seat, got in the car. And as I passed him, his lights came on; and he
pulled out of the driveway.”
Finally, in Jones v. State, this Court held that the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant
based on (1) the lateness of the hour; (2) the vehicle was parked outside a closed
business; (3) the high incidence of crime in the vicinity; and (4) the defendant’s
attempt to flee as the police officer parked his car nearby and approached the car on
foot. See No. 01-07-00240-CR, 2008 WL 746527, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Court stated
that although flight alone may not justify a stop, it does constitute a valid factor in
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain an individual. See
id. at *3. Here, there is no evidence that appellant attempted to flee as did the
defendant in Jones, nor was he stopped in a high-crime area.
Based on our review of the record and relevant case law, we cannot conclude
that Officer Martinez had reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the
circumstances, to believe that appellant had engaged, or was about to engage, in
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criminal activity. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s
motion to suppress. We sustain appellant’s point of error.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Russell Lloyd
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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