United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the February 15, 2006
United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III
for the Fifth Circuit Clerk
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m 05-30153
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ALAN STRONG, ETC.; ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
ALAN STRONG,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
ON BEHALF OF LINDSEY STRONG ESTATE, ON BEHALF OF CHELSEY STRONG ESTATE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
B.P. EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 6:03-CV-362
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Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and unload its equipment. The only available space
SMITH, Circuit Judges. for the wireline equipment, however, was
directly underneath the crane. The crane could
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: not boom high enough to place the equipment
there. As a result, when the crane picked up
B.P. Exploration & Production, Inc. the tool boxes, the Cardinal crew had to swing
(“B.P.”), appeals the denial of summary judg- the boxes over to the empty space. Two large
ment, asserting that Alan Strong’s tort claim is tool boxes were ultimately placed near the
time-barred. Finding that federal maritime law base of the crane, close to one another.
provides the operative statute of limitations,
we reverse and remand. After unloading its equipment, the crew
waited for the electric line work to be com-
I. pleted, then performed the wireline services.
In October 1998, Amoco Production Com- When it was finished, the crew had to put its
pany (“Amoco”), B.P.’s predecessor in inter- equipment back in the boxes on the liftboat
est, employed Cardinal Wireline Services and await transportation to shore by the lift-
(“Cardinal”) to plug an oil well that had been boat or a utility boat.
drilled on the outer continental shelf, off the
coast of Louisiana but outside the state’s ter- Strong alleges that there was inadequate
ritorial limit. Strong was a member of the Car- room to load the tool boxes properly on ac-
dinal crew transported to the Amoco oil plat- count of the position of the boxes and the clut-
form by a utility boat. A liftboat was jacked ter on the liftboat deck caused by the still-pres-
up next to the platform to provide additional ent electric line equipment. Because of the
workspace for the various operations at the lack of space, Strong chose to load the equip-
well. ment by picking up the tools and swinging
them to another crewman who was standing in
When the Cardinal crew arrived, the deck between the tool boxes. When the crew was
of the liftboat was cluttered with the equip- almost finished loading its tools, Strong picked
ment of an electric line crew that had not yet up a “stuffing box” and swung it to the crew-
finished its work. Because the platform deck man standing between the tool boxes. The
was too small for the wireline equipment, crewman failed to catch the box, which swung
Strong inquired whether some of the electric back to Strong, who managed to catch it but
line equipment could be moved from the deck injured his back.
of the liftboat. An Amoco supervisor respond-
ed that the electric line equipment had to II.
remain where it was until the electric line work In February 2003, Strong, individually and
was completed. The supervisor told the Cardi- on behalf of his minor children, together with
nal crew that because the weather was deterio- his wife, sued B.P. in federal court for, inter
rating, he had to send the utility boat back to alia, lost wages, pain and suffering, and loss of
shore. Strong and his crew therefore had to consortium resulting from the injury, which
unload their equipment under existing condi- Strong contends was caused by Amoco’s neg-
tions. ligence in creating an unsafe work environ-
ment. He alleges jurisdiction under the Outer
The crew needed to use the liftboat crane to Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43
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U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq., and asserts that certain structures and devices on the
Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations on OCS, incorporates state law into federal
his tort claim, incorporated as federal law by law on the OCS, and applies the
OCSLA, was tolled while he received benefits LHWCA to certain injuries sustained by
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ persons working on the OCS.
Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), such that the
prescriptive period had not run when he sued. Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d
492, 495-96 (5th Cir. 2002). If state law, as
B.P. moved for summary judgment, arguing incorporated by OCSLA, governs Strong’s
that federal maritime law applies of its own tort claim, the one year liberative prescription
force and provides a three-year statute of period for delictual actions under Louisiana
limitations that bars Strong’s claim. The dis- law was tolled by Strong’s receipt of benefits
trict court denied B.P.’s motion without opin- under the LHWCA. See Cormier v. Clemco
ion but certified its ruling for immediate appeal Servs. Corp., 48 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir.
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted B.P. 1995). The parties do not dispute that if
leave to appeal. Louisiana law must be borrowed under
OCSLA, Strong’s complaint is timely.
III.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- Three conditions must be met before state
cedure provides that summary judgment law is adopted as surrogate federal law under
OCSLA: “(1) The controversy must arise on
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, a situs covered by OCSLA (i.e. the subsoil,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and seabed, or artificial structures permanently or
admissions on file, together with affidavits, temporarily attached thereto). (2) Federal
if any, show that there is no genuine issue maritime law must not apply of its own force.
as to any material fact and that the moving (3) The state law must not be inconsistent with
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter [f]ederal law.” Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v.
of law. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1990). By not contesting Strong’s argu-
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We review the denial of ments that (1) and (3) are satisfied, B.P. im-
summary judgment de novo using the criteria plicitly concedes that those conditions have
employed by the district court. Patterson v. been met. The sole issue is whether federal
Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. maritime law applies of its own force.
2003).
Under federal maritime law, “a suit for re-
IV. covery of damages for perso nal injury or
OCSLA death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort,
shall not be maintained unless commenced
provides comprehensive choice-of-law within three years from the date the cause of
rules and federal regulation to a wide action accrued.” 46 App. U.S.C. § 763a. If
range of act ivity occurring beyond the maritime law does apply of its own force,
territorial waters of the states on the Strong’s claim is time-barred because he sued
outer continental shelf of the United B.P. more than four years after he was injured.
States . . . . [I]t applies federal law to
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It is settled that a platform-owner supervising wireline and
other nonmaritime work, rather than its deci-
a party seeking to invoke federal admiralty sions as a time charterer of a vessel, that
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. caused the deck clutter that precipitated the
§ 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy injury.
conditions both of location and of connec-
tion with maritime activity. A court apply- B.P. counters with four independent argu-
ing the location test must determine wheth- ments why its alleged negligence is maritime in
er the tort occurred on navigable water or nature. First, B.P. asserts that failing to pro-
whether injury suffered on land was caused vide a safe workplace on a vessel is a tradi-
by a vessel on navigable water. The con- tional maritime tort. Second, B.P. contends
nection test raises two issues. A court, that Amoco’s alleged negligence (1) in calling
first, must “assess the general features of the utility boat to bring the wireline crew to
the type of incident involved,” to determine the platform while the electrical crew was still
whether the incident has “a potentially dis- working, (2) in sending the utility boat back to
ruptive impact on maritime commerce.” shore after the wireline crew had been unload-
Second, a court must determine whether ed, and (3) in failing to send the liftboat back
“the general character” of the “activity giv- to shore to unload the electric line equipment
ing rise to the incident” shows a “substan- is maritime in nature because each decision
tial relationship to traditional maritime ac- related to Amoco’s status as the charterer.
tivity.” Third, B.P. argues that loading and unloading
equipment onto and from a vessel is a tradi-
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes tional maritime activity. Finally, B.P. urges
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 that “[p]roviding compensation for shipboard
(1995) (internal citations omitted). The key injuries is a traditional function of the admi-
inquiry is whether the allegedly tortious activ- ralty laws.” Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp.,
ity is “so closely related to activity traditionally 61 F.3d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
subject to admiralty law that the reasons for
applying special admiralty rules would apply in We agree with B.P. that failing to provide
the suit at hand.” Id. at 539-40. a safe workplace aboard a vessel is a maritime
tort. The liftboat, although jacked up and not
Strong argues that federal maritime law “under sail,” qualifies as a vessel on navigable
does not apply because he was injured while waters. See Demette, 280 F.3d at 498 n.18.
performing wireline work. He contends that Thus, the location requirement of Grubart is
the requisite “maritime connection” is missing satisfied. Furthermore, a shipowner, or char-
because contracts for wireline services are terer in control of a vessel, owes a duty of care
generally considered nonmaritime in nature. to those working on the vessel “with respect
Furthermore, he alleges that although his in- to the condition of the ship’s gear, equipment,
jury occurred on the liftboat, a vessel on nav- tools, and work space.” Scindia Steam Navi-
igable water, the use of that vessel was merely gation Co. v. de los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 167
incidental to the wireline work done on the (1981). The Supreme Court has consistently
platform. Strong asserts that because the lift- applied maritime law to actions arising out of
boat was being used as additional workspace a failure adequately to satisfy that duty. See
for the platform, it was Amoco’s decisions as id.; see also Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.,
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512 U.S. 92 (1994). Thus, by asserting that
his injury was caused by the cluttered, unsafe
condition of the liftboat deck, Strong has stat-
ed a maritime tort claim.
Because Strong has alleged a traditional
maritime tort, federal maritime law applies of
its own force, precluding incorporation of
state law under OCSLA and prescribing
Strong’s claim. We thus find it unnecessary to
address B.P.’s remaining arguments regarding
the maritime nature of its alleged negligence.
The order denying B.P.’s motion for sum-
mary judgment is REVERSED. Because this
matter is before us on interlocutory appeal
rather than final judgment, it is REMANDED
so that the district court can enter summary
judgment for B.P. and can entertain any fur-
ther proceedings that may be appropriate.
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