J-A16035-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
KRASINSKI A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKI PENNSYLVANIA
A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKY LATE OF
MORRISDALE (COOPER TOWNSHIP),
CLEARFIELD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
DECEASED NOVEMBER 4, 2006,
Appellee
APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M.
KRASINSKI AND ITS EXECUTOR,
EDWARD KRASINSKI
No. 1265 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 1707-0003
IN RE: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
KRASINSKI, A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKI PENNSYLVANIA
A/K/A SOFIA KRASINSKY, LATE OF
MORRISDALE, (COOPER TOWNSHIP)
CLEARFIELD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
DECEASED ON 11/04/06,
Appellee
APPEAL OF: PATRICIA KRASINSKI-
DUNZIK
No. 1289 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 1707-0003
J-A16035-16
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
FILED: October 5, 2016
I concur in the Majority’s disposition of the Estate’s appeal. However,
because Pennsylvania case law instructs that the April 30, 2013 order
confirming the private sale of Sophia’s real estate was interlocutory, I
respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Patricia’s issues
regarding the private sale are waived. I also disagree that Patricia is
responsible for the tax implications of the private sale.
Initially, I note that Sophia did not specifically devise her real estate to
her children. Instead, she provided that the residue of the estate was to be
divided equally among her four children. Last Will and Testament, 8/18/99,
at Item II. Also, Sophia did not authorize her executor to sell her real
property.
This Court has held, “In a decedent’s estate, the confirmation of the
final account of the personal representative represents the final order,
subject to exceptions being filed and disposed of by the court.” In re
Estate of Habazin, 679 A.2d 1293, 1295 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation
omitted); In re Estate of Quinn, 804 A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(“[T]he confirmation of the final account of the personal representative
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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represents the final order.”). Here, the April 30, 2013 order, confirming the
private sale of real property of the decedent’s estate, is facially interlocutory
because it does not generate an appeal from the confirmation of the
executor’s final account.
Moreover, and contrary to the Majority’s position, the April 30, 2013
order was not appealable under subsection (a)(6)—or any subsection—of
amended Pa.R.A.P. 342.1 “Legal title to all real estate of a decedent shall
pass at his death to his heirs or devisees, subject, however, to all the
powers granted to the personal representative by this code and lawfully by
the will and to all orders of the court.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 301 (emphasis
supplied). Here, until legal title passed to the heirs pursuant to the April 30,
2013 order, the estate owned the properties; therefore, subsection (a)(6)
does not apply. Accord In re Estate of Ash, 73 A.3d 1287, 1290 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (holding that an order directing the sale of real estate not
specifically devised did not determine an interest in property because “the
estate obviously own[ed]” the property in question). The purpose of the
April 30, 2013 order was not to resolve some dispute about who had or has
an interest in the properties; the estate owned the properties. Instead, the
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1
Under Stricker, infra, the question of appealability was vested strictly in
the orphans’ court’s discretion. In re Estate of Cherry, 111 A.3d 1204,
1209 (Pa. Super. 2015). Following Stricker, Pa.R.A.P. 342 was amended,
effective February 12, 2012, to list a number of orphans’ court orders
appealable as of right. Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(1-8).
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April 30, 2013 order was about the propriety of the executor’s plan to sell
the properties through a private sale, the goal being to distribute the estate
assets in accordance with the will, i.e., to Sophia’s children. In other words,
the purpose of the order was to achieve the distribution of the estate, not to
determine an interest in real property.
Nor was the April 30, 2013 order appealable as a collateral order under
Pa.R.A.P. 313. See In re Estate of Stricker, 977 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa.
2009) (holding that an orphans’ court order directing the sale of real estate
in the process of the administration of an estate is not immediately
appealable under Rule 313 as a collateral order); Ash, 73 A.3d at 1289
(concluding that an order authorizing the sale of real property of the
decedent’s estate was not a collateral order under Rule 313). Here, the real
estate at issue is central to the estate. “Consequently, its eventual
disposition will serve directly the final account and distribution of the estate.
Accordingly, it is central to the main cause of action and it does not qualify
as a collateral order subject to immediate appeal.” In re Estate of Cherry,
111 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the foregoing, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusions that
the April 30, 2013 order was final, that Patricia should have filed an appeal
from the April 30, 2013 order and that, because she did not appeal that
order, her issues regarding the private sale are waived. Therefore, I would
address those issues on the merits.
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I also disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Patricia was
responsible for the tax implications of the private sale. The decedent
expressly directed, “[A]ll taxes that may be assessed in consequence of my
death, of whatever nature and by whatever jurisdiction imposed, shall be
paid from my residuary estate as a part of the expense of the administration
of my estate.” Last Will and Testament, 8/18/99, at Item III. Therefore,
the Estate was responsible for the tax implications of the private sale.
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