J-S59005-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMIR CHAVOUS,
Appellant No. 3672 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-23-CR-0003651-2002
CP-23-CR-0003652-2002
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2016
Appellant, Jamir Chavous, appeals pro se from the PCRA court’s
November 4, 2015 order denying, as untimely, his petition filed under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We need not set forth, in significant detail, the factual or procedural
history of Appellant’s case. We only note that Appellant entered negotiated
guilty pleas, in two separate cases, to sexual assault and conspiracy to
commit sexual assault. Following Appellant’s sentencing for those offenses
in 2003, he did not file a direct appeal. Between 2003 and 2009, Appellant
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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filed and litigated two PCRA petitions, both of which were denied with no
subsequent appeal by Appellant.
On September 25, 2015, Appellant filed a third, pro se PCRA petition,
which underlies the present appeal. The PCRA court subsequently issued a
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition as being
untimely-filed. Appellant filed a pro se response, but the PCRA court
dismissed his petition by order entered on November 5, 2015. Appellant
filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal.1 The court did not direct Appellant to
file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but it filed an opinion on January 7,
2016.
In Appellant’s pro se brief to this Court, he raises 14 issues for our
review. Before we may address any of those claims, however, we must
examine the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time
limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded
in order to address the merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v.
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1
Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was filed on December 7, 2015. The
Delaware County Clerk of Courts properly included, in the certified record,
the envelope in which Appellant’s notice was mailed, and the postage stamp
on that envelope bears a date of December 1, 2015. Therefore, Appellant’s
pro se notice of appeal was timely filed under the ‘prisoner mailbox rule.’
See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (stating that
under the ‘prisoner mailbox rule’ an appeal will “be deemed ‘filed’ on the
date that the appellant deposits the appeal with prison authorities and/or
places it in the prison mailbox”).
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Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition
for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final,
unless one of the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of
these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s 2015 petition is clearly untimely, as his judgment of
sentence became final in 2003. In his pro se brief, Appellant asserts various
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and challenges to the validity
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of his guilty pleas. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-14. At no point does
Appellant make any attempt to plead and prove the applicability of a
timeliness exception. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to assess the
merits of his underlying claims.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/11/2016
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