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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF: C.M.-G, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER : No. 569 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree January 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): AP# CP-51-AP-0000596-2015, DP# CP-51-DP-
0000124-2011, FID# 51-FN-466048-2009
IN THE MATTER OF R.O.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER : No. 570 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree January 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): AP# CP-51-AP-0000597-2015, DP# CP-51-DP-
0000126-2011, FID# 51-FN-466048-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2016
J.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the January 19, 2016 decrees
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor sons, R.O.G., born
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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in April of 2004, and C.M.-G., born in June of 2006.1 In addition, Mother
appeals from the orders entered that same day, which changed the
permanency goals of R.O.G. and C.M.-G. to adoption. After careful review,
we affirm.
The record reveals that the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services (“DHS”) first became involved with R.O.G. and C.M.-G. in 2011,
due to allegations that Mother was homeless and engaging in substance
abuse. DHS obtained orders of protective custody on January 21, 2011, and
shelter care orders on January 24, 2011. However, R.O.G. and C.M.-G. were
not adjudicated dependent, and court supervision ended on February 11,
2011. DHS renewed its involvement with R.O.G. and C.M.-G. in January of
2014, due again to concerns that Mother was abusing substances. DHS filed
dependency petitions on January 6, 2014, and the trial court adjudicated
R.O.G. and C.M.-G. dependent following a hearing on January 10, 2014.
The court placed R.O.G. and C.M.-G. in foster care, and set their initial
permanency goals as “return to parent or guardian.”
For approximately the next year and a half, Mother participated
intermittently in drug and alcohol treatment at the Wedge Medical Center,
and through Casa de Consejeria y Salud. Mother failed to maintain
consistent sobriety. Finally, Mother entered inpatient treatment at
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1
The trial court entered a separate decree involuntarily terminating the
parental rights of R.O.G.’s father, R.M. C.M.-G.’s father, C.M., is deceased.
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Fairmount in late July of 2015, which she completed in August of 2015.
Mother progressed to outpatient treatment, and currently resides in a
recovery home at Stop and Surrender.
On September 2, 2015, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to R.O.G. and C.M.-G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), as well as petitions to change the
permanency goals of R.O.G. and C.M.-G. to adoption. The trial court held a
termination and goal change hearing on January 19, 2016, during which the
court heard the testimony of Jeffrey Wysinger, the former Northeast
Treatment Centers case manager; Amanda Fernandez, the current Northeast
Treatment Centers case manager; and Mother. Following the hearing, the
court entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights and orders
changing the permanency goals to adoption. Mother timely filed notices of
appeal on February 18, 2016, along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal.
Mother now raises the following issues for our review.
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of Appellant, Mother, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and § 2511(a)(8)?
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by finding, under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), that termination of [Mother’s] parental
rights best serves the Children’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare?
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Mother’s brief at 5.2
We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
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2
While Mother purports to appeal from the trial court’s goal change orders,
she does not raise any claim regarding these orders in her statement of
questions involved. The argument section of her brief includes no
substantive discussion of the goal change orders, nor does it contain any
citation to relevant authority. Accordingly, Mother has failed to preserve any
challenge to the goal change orders for our review. See Krebs v. United
Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“We will not
ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by
an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved[.]”) (citations omitted);
In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d
364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010))
(“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with
citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other
meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”’).
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the
court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination
of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second
part of the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of
the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and
welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional
bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as
§ 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.
2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we
analyze the court’s decision to terminate under § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which
provides as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
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....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The
child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa.Super. 2003).
“Notably, termination under [§] 2511(a)(8) . . . does not require an
evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
511 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Instantly, the trial court found that Mother has not remedied the
conditions that brought R.O.G. and C.M.-G. into care. Trial Court Opinion,
4/29/16, at 14. The court observed that Mother failed to maintain her
sobriety and comply with services during much of the dependency of R.O.G.
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and C.M.-G., and that Mother subjected both R.O.G. and C.M.-G. to sexual
abuse. Id. at 15-16. In addition, the court found that terminating Mother’s
parental rights would be in the best interests of R.O.G. and C.M.-G. Id. at
14. The court stressed that R.O.G. and C.M.-G. have a positive relationship
with their foster father, and that they will not suffer irreparable harm if
Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 17.
In response, Mother argues that she has remedied the issues that
caused R.O.G. and C.M.-G. to be removed from her care. Mother’s brief at
15. Mother emphasizes that she completed parenting and anger
management classes, that she visits R.O.G. and C.M.-G. consistently, and
that she participates in drug and alcohol and mental health treatment. Id.
at 14-15. Mother acknowledges that she does not currently have
appropriate housing for R.O.G. and C.M.-G., but insists that she will be able
to obtain housing. Id. at 15. Mother further argues that terminating her
parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of R.O.G. and C.M.-G.
Id. Mother asserts that R.O.G. and C.M.-G. love her, and that they want to
live with her. Id. at 17.
After carefully examining the record in this matter, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights. As noted supra, DHS presented the testimony of
the case manager from Northeast Treatment Centers, Jeffrey Wysinger,
during the termination and goal change hearing on January 19, 2016. Mr.
Wysinger testified that he was the case manager for R.O.G. and C.M.-G.
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from January 10, 2014, until April of 2015. N.T., 1/19/16, at 7. Mr.
Wysinger explained that he established Single Case Plan objectives for
Mother, which required her to address her parenting, housing, mental
health, and drug addiction issues. Id. at 11. Mr. Wysinger referred Mother
to the Achieving Reunification Center for parenting, anger management,
housing, mental health, and drug and alcohol programs. Id. at 12, 45-46.
Unfortunately, Mother did not comply with any of her Single Case Plan
objectives during Mr. Wysinger’s time on the case, and she was discharged
unsuccessfully from the Achieving Reunification Center in January of 2015.
Id. at 17, 41.
With respect to Mother’s substance abuse issues, Mr. Wysinger
testified that Mother exhibits a pattern of maintaining sobriety for brief
periods of time and then relapsing. Id. at 30, 32. Mr. Wysinger explained
that Mother tested positive for marijuana on January 10, 2014, and January
28, 2014. Id. at 9. Mother then maintained her sobriety until August of
2014, when she relapsed. Id. at 49. By September of 2014, Mother was
once again sober. Id. However, Mother’s sobriety lasted only until January
or February of 2015. Id. Mother relapsed again, and continued to engage
in substance abuse until the time Mr. Wysinger departed from this case in
April of 2015. Id. Mother appeared to be under the influence during a visit
with R.O.G. and C.M.-G. on March 25, 2015, and she tested positive for
cocaine and benzodiazepines in April of 2015. Id. at 19, 22, 29, 41, 47.
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With respect to visitation, Mr. Wysinger testified that Mother was
offered two-hour visits with R.O.G. and C.M.-G. twice per week from
February of 2014 until August of 2014. Id. at 23-24. One of Mother’s visits
took place at the agency, while the other took place unsupervised at
Mother’s home. Id. at 23. Mother participated in visits consistently. Id.
However, Mother was reverted to line of sight visits in August of 2014, due
to allegations made by R.O.G. and C.M.-G. Id. at 28, 50. Specifically,
R.O.G. and C.M.-G. reported that they watched R-rated movies, and that
“[p]rior to the movies, when the children were living in the home, . . .
[while] [t]he children were peering through an opening in the wall, [M]other
was having sex with men. And then the children were asked to pop pimples
inside [M]other’s vagina.” Id. at 26-27. According to Mr. Wysinger, R.O.G.
and C.M.-G. “were quite graphic about it.” Id. at 28. As a result of these
allegations, Mother was indicated for sexual abuse. Id. at 26-28.
Concerning the needs and welfare of R.O.G. and C.M.-G., Mr. Wysinger
testified that R.O.G. and C.M.-G. reside together in a pre-adoptive foster
home. Id. at 35. R.O.G. and C.M.-G. have a positive relationship with their
foster parent, and they look up to him as a father figure. Id. at 32-36.
Based on this positive relationship, Mr. Wysinger did not believe that
terminating Mother’s parental rights would cause R.O.G. and C.M.-G. to
suffer irreparable harm. Id. at 35-36.
DHS also presented the testimony of the current Northeast Treatment
Centers case manager, Amanda Fernandez. Ms. Fernandez was assigned to
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this matter in June of 2015. Id. at 57. Ms. Fernandez testified that Mother
entered an inpatient treatment program at Fairmount in late July of 2015.
Id. at 58. At the time Mother entered inpatient treatment, she admitted
that she was using the drugs K-2 and PCP. Id. Mother completed inpatient
treatment in August of 2015, and then went on to receive outpatient
treatment. Id. Currently, Mother resides in a recovery home at Stop and
Surrender. Id. at 57-58. Ms. Fernandez reported that Mother completed
both parenting and anger management programs while at Stop and
Surrender, and that she is compliant with her drug and alcohol treatment.
Id. at 59, 72-73, 78-79. However, Ms. Fernandez expressed concern that
Mother has a pattern of participating in drug and alcohol treatment and then
relapsing. Id. at 65-66.
Concerning the needs and welfare of R.O.G. and C.M.-G., Ms.
Fernandez agreed that terminating Mother’s rights would not cause R.O.G.
and C.M.-G. to suffer irreparable harm. Id. at 64-65. Ms. Fernandez
explained that R.O.G. and C.M.-G. “have really grown and exceeded” since
being placed with their foster father. Id. at 61. R.O.G. and C.M.-G. are now
on the honor role at school, and are “doing really well[.]” Id. at 61-63. Ms.
Fernandez believed that R.O.G. and C.M.-G. share a parental bond with their
foster father. Id. at 63. They have a “great” relationship with their foster
father, and they feel safe in his home. Id. Ms. Fernandez also reported that
she discussed the possibility of terminating Mother’s parental rights with
R.O.G. and C.M.-G. Id. at 67-69. Both R.O.G. and C.M.-G. indicated that
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they understood the situation, and that they would like to remain with their
foster father. Id.
Accordingly, the record supports the finding of the trial court that
R.O.G. and C.M.-G. have been removed from Mother’s care for more than
twelve months, and that the conditions that led to the removal of R.O.G. and
C.M.-G. continue to exist. R.O.G. and C.M.-G. were removed from Mother’s
care on January 10, 2014, due primarily to Mother’s substance abuse issues.
Mother briefly was able to maintain her sobriety, but relapsed in August of
2014, and relapsed again in January or February of 2015. Admittedly,
Mother made some progress in addressing her substance abuse issues by
entering inpatient treatment in late July of 2015, and then continuing on to
outpatient treatment in August of 2015. However, by the time DHS filed its
termination petitions on September 2, 2015, Mother had only been able to
maintain her sobriety for a period of less than two months, and only while
living in the confines of a treatment facility or recovery home. As observed
by both Mr. Wysinger and Ms. Fernandez, Mother has exhibited a pattern of
relapsing, achieving sobriety, and relapsing again. Given Mother’s history of
relapses, it is clear that she has not remedied the conditions that brought
R.O.G. and C.M.-G. into care.
In addition, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of R.O.G. and C.M.-G. The children are thriving in the care of their pre-
adoptive foster father, and both children have stated that they would like to
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remain with him. Meanwhile, Mother has an unresolved history of substance
abuse, and has sexually abused both boys. As this Court has stated, “a
child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the
maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” R.J.S.,
supra at 513.
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under § 2511(b) as follows.
[§] 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [§]
2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her
child is a major aspect of the [§] 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by
the court when determining what is in the best interest of the
child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).3
As highlighted infra, the certified record confirms that terminating
Mother’s parental rights will best serve the children’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare. R.O.G. and C.M.-G. are thriving
in the pre-adoptive foster home. The children feel safe and secure with their
foster father and rely upon him to satisfy their daily needs. Indeed, as
evidenced by the certified record, the only meaningful parental bond in this
case exists between the foster father and the children. Moreover, as Ms.
Fernandez testified during the hearing, R.O.G. and C.M.-G. understand the
significance of terminating Mother’s parental rights and both stated their
desire to remain with their pre-adoptive foster father.
For all of the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to R.O.G. and
C.M.-G. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b). In addition, since Mother
abandoned her challenge to the dependency orders changing the
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3
We observe that the needs-and-welfare determinations under § 2511(a)(8)
and § 2511(b) are distinct and require separate analysis. See In re C.L.G.,
956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]hile both [§]
2511(a)(8) and [§] 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the ‘needs and welfare of
the child,’ . . . they are distinct in that we must address [§] 2511(a) before
reaching [§] 2511(b).”).
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permanency goals of R.O.G. and C.M.-G. from reunification to adoption, we
do not disturb those orders either.
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/19/2016
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