FILED
October 31, 2016
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
2016 IL App (4th) 150564WC Court, IL
No. 4-15-0564WC
Opinion filed October 31, 2016
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
SPRINGFIELD COAL COMPANY, LLC, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Sangamon County.
Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 14-MR-1323
)
THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ )
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al., )
)
(Thomas Hoff and Michael W. )
Frerichs, State Treasurer and ) Honorable
Ex Officio Custodian of the Rate ) Leslie J. Graves,
Adjustment Fund, Appellees). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Holdridge, and Justices Hoffman, Harris, and Stewart concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Respondent, Springfield Coal Company, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the circuit
court of Sangamon County, which confirmed in part and set aside in part the decision of the
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding benefits to claimant,
Thomas Hoff, pursuant to the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (820 ILCS 310/1
et seq. (West 2008)). We find that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review the
2016 IL App (4th) 150564WC
Commission’s decision where claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped after the
20-day filing period set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 2014)),
and he failed to file proof of mailing the written request for summons in the circuit court within
20 days after he received the Commission’s decision. For this reason, we vacate the decision of
the circuit court and dismiss the appeal.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The facts necessary to the resolution of this case are not in dispute. Claimant began
working as a coal miner in the late 1970s. Claimant’s last mining shift was in January 2008, at
respondent’s Crown III mine. On April 27, 2009, claimant filed an application for adjustment of
claim, seeking benefits under the Act for injuries allegedly resulting from the inhalation of coal
mine dust while working for respondent. Following a hearing, an arbitrator concluded that
claimant established that he suffers from coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and that his disablement
occurred within two years of the date of last exposure to the hazards of the disease. See 820
ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2008). Although the arbitrator rejected claimant’s request for a wage-
differential (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008); see also 820 ILCS 310/7 (West 2008)
(providing that the Act incorporates the recovery provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act
(820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), he awarded claimant 50 weeks of permanent partial
disability (PPD) benefits, representing a 10% loss of the person as a whole (820 ILCS 310/7,
8(d)(2) (West 2008)).
¶4 Both parties sought review of the arbitrator’s decision before the Commission. In a
unanimous decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. A copy of
the Commission’s decision was received in the office of claimant’s attorney on October 20,
2014. Claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of
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Sangamon County pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/19(f) (West 2014)). To
this end, on October 21, 2014, claimant mailed to the Commission a notice of intent to file for
review in the circuit court. The notice of intent was file-stamped by the Commission on October
24, 2014. Claimant also submitted a written request for summons to the clerk of the circuit court,
which was file-stamped on November 12, 2014.
¶5 On December 5, 2014, respondent filed in the circuit court a motion to quash the
summons. In the motion, respondent argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
claimant’s action for judicial review because it was filed more than 20 days after the
Commission’s decision was received by claimant’s attorney. See 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West
2014). Claimant responded to the motion, arguing that he fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement
for filing an action for judicial review of a decision of the Commission by mailing all of the
necessary documents to the clerk of the court within 20 days of his attorney’s receipt of the
decision. Claimant attached several exhibits to his response, including a cover letter executed by
claimant’s attorney and the affidavit of Amy Edwards, an administrative assistant in claimant’s
attorney’s office. The cover letter, dated November 5, 2014, is directed to the clerk of the circuit
court. In the cover letter, claimant’s attorney states that he enclosed the original and one copy of
the request for summons, the original and six copies of the summons, and payment to cover the
filing costs. Edwards’ affidavit was notarized on December 30, 2014. In the affidavit, Edwards
states that on November 5, 2014, she mailed to the clerk of the circuit court claimant’s written
request for summons and summons “with prepaid postage by placing same in the post office box
located at 101 W. Church Street, Harrisburg, IL 62946 at approximately 4:25 p.m.” Claimant
also filed with the circuit court a “Motion for Leave to File Out of Time,” in which he asked to
supplement the record with Edwards’ affidavit.
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¶6 On January 20, 2015, the parties appeared before the circuit court regarding the parties’
motions. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the circuit court entered an order denying
respondent’s motion to quash and allowing claimant’s motion for leave to file out of time. On the
merits of claimant’s action for judicial review, the circuit court set aside the Commission’s PPD
award and substituted a wage-differential in its stead, but otherwise confirmed the decision of the
Commission. Thereafter, respondent initiated the instant appeal.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, respondent first argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
review the Commission’s decision where claimant failed to file proof of mailing the written
request for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the decision. Claimant
responds that he fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement for filing an action for judicial review of
a decision of the Commission by mailing all of the necessary documents to the clerk of the
circuit court within 20 days of his attorney’s receipt of the Commission’s decision.
¶9 While Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are presumed to have subject-
matter jurisdiction, this presumption does not apply to workers’ compensation proceedings. See
Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. Kennedy, 377 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502 (2007); Sprinkman & Sons
Corp. of Illinois v. Industrial Comm’n, 160 Ill. App. 3d 599, 601 (1987). Rather, on appeal from
a decision of the Commission, the circuit court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction only if the
appellant complies with the statutorily-mandated procedures set forth in the Act. See Residential
Carpentry, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d at 502. “[T]o vest the courts with jurisdiction to review
Commission decisions, strict compliance with the provisions of the Act is necessary and must
affirmatively appear in the record.” Illinois State Treasurer v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,
2015 IL 117418, ¶ 15; see also Jones v. Industrial Comm’n, 188 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (1999).
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¶ 10 Before proceeding further, we note that the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard
of review. Respondent asserts that the inquiry regarding whether the circuit court has subject-
matter jurisdiction to review an administrative decision presents a question of law subject to de
novo review. Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13. Claimant contends that the
appropriate standard of review depends on whether the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing
as to its jurisdiction. Citing Household Finance Corp. III v. Volpert, 227 Ill. App. 3d 453, 456
(1992), claimant maintains that where an evidentiary hearing is conducted, the circuit court’s
determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Conversely, claimant asserts that when the
circuit court determines jurisdiction solely on the basis of documentary evidence, a de novo
standard of review is applied. Equity Residential Properties Management Corp. v. Nasolo, 364
Ill. App. 3d 26, 31 (2006). According to claimant, the standard of review in this case is abuse of
discretion, since the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on January 20, 2015.
¶ 11 It is well established that issues involving questions of subject-matter jurisdiction under
the Act are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13
(addressing whether Illinois State Treasurer was required to file an appeal bond to obtain judicial
review of a decision of the Commission); Farris v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,
2014 IL App (4th) 130767WC, ¶ 46 (noting that the jurisdictional requirements set forth in the
Workers’ Compensation Act are questions of law subject to de novo review). Despite this
authority, claimant insists that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies in this case. As
noted above, in support of this position, claimant directs us to two principal cases, Household
Finance Corp. III, 227 Ill. App. 3d 453, and Equity Residential Properties Management Corp.,
364 Ill. App. 3d 26.
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¶ 12 We are puzzled by claimant’s reliance on Household Finance Corp. III and Equity
Residential Properties Management Corp. for several reasons. First, neither of these cases
concerned review from an administrative decision. Second, unlike the instant case, neither case
involved whether the appellant complied with any statutorily-required prerequisites for the
circuit court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue in Household Finance Corp. III was
whether the plaintiff established “due inquiry” to personally serve the defendant before
effectuating service by publication pursuant to section 2-206 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, ¶ 2-206). Household Finance Corp. III, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 454. Equity
Residential Properties Management Corp. presented a similar issue, i.e., whether the plaintiff
conducted an adequate investigation into the defendant’s whereabouts, thereby entitling it to
forego personal service and rely on constructive service by posting pursuant to section 9-107 of
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9-107 (West 2004)). Third, and most
important, neither Household Finance Corp. III nor Equity Residential Properties Management
Corp. provide for an abuse-of-discretion standard. The standard of review employed in
Household Finance Corp. III was manifest weight of the evidence. Household Finance Corp. III,
227 Ill. App. 3d at 455-56. In Equity Residential Properties Management Corp., the court stated
that it would review the circuit court’s ruling de novo because “it was based entirely on
documentary evidence.” Equity Residential Properties Management Corp., 364 Ill. App. 3d at
31. However, the court did not indicate what standard of review it would apply if the circuit
court’s ruling had been based on more than just documentary evidence. Given that the cases cited
by claimant do not support the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard, and in light of
prior precedent from both the supreme court and this court, we find that de novo review is
appropriate in this case.
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¶ 13 Parenthetically, we point out that, even assuming the appropriate standard of review
depends on whether the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, claimant’s suggestion that the
circuit court’s ruling on the jurisdictional issue was entered following such a hearing finds no
support in the record. In the notice of hearing accompanying the motion to quash, respondent
stated that it would appear before the court to argue the motion on January 20, 2015. The
docketing order from January 20, 2015, which is the only order in the record pertaining to the
proceeding on that date, merely provides that the parties were present with their attorneys and
that the trial court denied the motion to quash and allowed the motion for leave to file out of
time. The docketing order does not indicate that the trial court considered anything more than
documentary evidence in rendering its decision. Moreover, a transcript of the January 20, 2015,
proceeding was not made a part of the record, so we do not know what evidence, if any, was
presented to the court on that date. Based on this record, de novo review would be appropriate in
this case even if the appropriate standard of review depended on whether the circuit court held an
evidentiary hearing as to its jurisdiction. See Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 296 Ill. App. 3d 520,
523 (1998) (applying de novo review where circuit court did not hear any testimony on
jurisdictional issues). With the appropriate standard of review determined, we now turn to the
merits.
¶ 14 At issue is whether claimant complied with section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS
310/19(f)(1) (West 2014)), which sets forth the requirements for seeking judicial review of a
decision of the Commission. Section 19(f)(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
“(f) The decision of the Commission acting within its powers *** shall, in the
absence of fraud, be conclusive unless reviewed in this paragraph hereinafter provided.
***
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(1) Except in cases of claims against the State of Illinois ***, the Circuit
Court of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found ***, shall by
summons to the Commission have power to review all questions of law and fact
presented by such record.
A proceeding for review shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt
of notice of the decision of the Commission. The summons shall be issued by the
clerk of such court upon written request returnable on a designated return day, not
less than 10 or more than 60 days from the date of issuance thereof, and the
written request shall contain the last known address of other parties in interest and
their attorneys of record who are to be served by summons. Service *** shall be
made upon the Commission and other parties in interest by mailing notices of the
commencement of the proceedings and the return day of the summons to the
office of the Commission and to the last known place of residence of other parties
in interest or their attorney or attorneys of record. The clerk of the court issuing
the summons shall on the day of issue mail notice of the commencement of the
proceedings which shall be done by mailing a copy of the summons to the office
of the Commission, and a copy of the summons to the other parties in interest or
their attorney or attorneys of record and the clerk of the court shall make
certificate that he has so sent such notices in pursuance of this Section, which
shall be evidence of service on the Commission and other parties in interest.” 820
ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 2014).
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Thus, in order to perfect jurisdiction in the circuit court, the appellant must file a written request
for summons within 20 days after receiving the Commission’s decision. 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1)
(West 2014); Esquivel v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 402 Ill. App. 3d 156, 159-60
(2010).
¶ 15 In this case, a copy of the Commission’s decision was received in the office of claimant’s
attorney on October 20, 2014. The twentieth day after October 20, 2014, was Sunday, November
9, 2014. Therefore, claimant had until Monday, November 10, 2014, to file a written request for
summons with the circuit court. See 820 ILCS 310/19.1 (West 2014) (noting that the time within
which any act is required to be performed under the Act shall be computed by excluding the first
day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday, Sunday or is a holiday.) Claimant’s
written request for summons was file-stamped on November 12, 2014, more than 20 days after
claimant’s attorney received the Commission’s decision. Thus, on its face, it was untimely.
However, in Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶¶ 23, 28,
the supreme court held that the request for summons filed in the circuit court to commence
review of the Commission’s decision is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and a
party may rely on the mailbox rule when it appeals the Commission’s decision to the circuit
court.
¶ 16 To determine whether the mailbox rule applies to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court, we
examine the relevant rules of our supreme court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. Sept. 19,
2014) states in relevant part:
“Unless received after the due date, the time of filing records, briefs or other
papers required to be filed within a specified time will be the date on which they are
actually received by the clerk of the reviewing court. If received after the due date, the
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time of mailing, or the time of delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to
the clerk within three business days, shall be deemed the time of filing. Proof of mailing
or delivery to a third-party commercial carrier shall be as provided in Rule 12(b)(3) ***.”
Because claimant’s written request for issuance of summons was received after the due date, we
look to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). That rule states that in case of
service by mail, service is proved “by certificate of the attorney, or affidavit of a person other
than the attorney, who deposited the document in the mail or delivered the document to a third-
party commercial carrier, stating the time and place of mailing or delivery, the complete address
which appeared on the envelope or package, and the fact that proper postage or the delivery
charge was prepaid.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). Our supreme court has noted
that without proof-of-mailing on file, there is nothing in the record to establish the date the
document was timely mailed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court. See Secura
Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 216 (2009).
¶ 17 In this case, it is undisputed that when claimant’s written request for summons was
received and filed by the circuit court on November 12, 2014, it was not accompanied by a
certificate of attorney, or affidavit of another person, stating the time and place of mailing, the
complete address which appeared on the envelope, and the fact that proper postage was prepaid.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). Thus, claimant failed to comply with the proof-
of-mailing requirement set forth in Rule 12(b)(3), and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
consider his appeal.
¶ 18 Claimant contends that because his written request for summons was accompanied by a
cover letter, it was sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(b)(3). We disagree. The cover letter was
not accompanied by any certification or affidavit and nothing is certified or sworn to. Moreover,
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the cover letter does not state the time and place of mailing, the complete addresses which
appeared on the envelopes, and the fact that proper postage was prepaid. Under similar
circumstances, a cover letter was deemed insufficient as proof of mailing under Rule 12(b)(3).
See Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 216 (explaining that “[t]he cover letter contains only a
date, which, at best, indicates that it may have been mailed on that date” (emphasis added)).
Claimant also contends that Edwards’ affidavit is sufficient to comply with the proof-of-mailing
requirement set forth in Rule 12(b)(3). Again, we are compelled to disagree. Edwards’ affidavit
was not filed with the written request for summons. Rather, it was executed on December 30,
2014, more than 50 days after the written request for summons was allegedly mailed. Hence, at
the time the written request for summons was filed, there was nothing in the record to establish
whether the document was timely filed. Therefore, we find that claimant failed to comply with
the proof-of-mailing requirement in Rule 12(b)(3) and the circuit court was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear claimant’s appeal.
¶ 19 Claimant acknowledges that, as a general rule, the failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of section 19(f)(1) deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the
appeal. See Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 15; Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 320-21. In an
attempt to salvage his claim, however, he observes that the Illinois Supreme Court has found
that, under certain circumstances, substantial compliance with the requirements of section
19(f)(1) has been found sufficient to vest the circuit court with subject-matter jurisdiction. In
support of this proposition, claimant directs us to Jones, 188 Ill. 2d 314.
¶ 20 Jones addressed an issue regarding language in section 19(f)(1) of the Workers’
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996)), which provided that “no request for a
summons may be filed and no summons shall issue” unless the party seeking judicial review
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exhibits to the clerk of the circuit court proof that the probable cost of preparing the record of
proceedings has been paid to the Commission. Proof of payment is demonstrated by filing a
receipt showing payment or an affidavit of the attorney setting forth that payment has been made.
820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996). In Jones, the claimant’s attorney received the Commission’s
decision on October 25, 1996. The claimant initiated judicial review of the Commission’s
decision on November 8, 1996, by filing a request for summons with the circuit court. The
summons was issued the same day. On November 14, 1996, the claimant’s attorney filed an
affidavit with the clerk of the circuit court stating that payment of the probable cost of preparing
the record had been made to the Commission. At issue in Jones was whether the circuit court
obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the Commission when the party
seeking review filed a request for summons in the circuit court within the required 20-day period
and exhibited proof of payment for the probable cost of the record within the same 20-day
period, but exhibited the proof of payment after filing the request for summons. Jones, 188 Ill.
2d at 316. The supreme court answered this inquiry in the affirmative. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 324-
27. Claimant maintains that, pursuant to Jones, he substantially complied with section 19(f)(1),
thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit court. However, the claimant in Jones timely
complied with the requirements of section 19(f)(1), albeit not in the correct sequence. Here, in
contrast, there was a complete failure to comply with the requirements of section 19(f)(1), since
claimant did not timely file with the circuit court his written request for summons. Thus, Jones is
distinguishable.
¶ 21 Claimant also cites to Curtis v. Perkins Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1982), and
Kimbrough v. Sullivan, 131 Ill. App. 2d 313 (1971), for the proposition that substantial or partial
compliance with Rule 12(b)(3) is sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court. In Curtis, the
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defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action. Along with the motion, the defendant
submitted a “certificate” signed by a non-attorney as proof of service. At issue in Curtis was
whether the proof of service conformed to the requirements of Rule 12(b)(3), given that it was in
the form of a “certificate” instead of an affidavit and it was not signed by an attorney. The court
noted that the plaintiff did not allege that he was prejudiced or harmed by the failure of the proof
of service to conform to the requirements of Rule 12(b)(3). Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 566. As
such, the court determined that “the deficiency in the proof of service of which plaintiff
complains had no substantial effect on the disposition of the case below” and “amount[ed] to
harmless error.” Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 566-67. In Kimbrough, the proof of service on a
motion for default judgment did not set forth the place of mailing or the fact that proper postage
was prepaid. The court found that these defects, standing alone, would not warrant reversal.
Kimbrough, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 317. Both Curtis and Kimbrough are distinguishable. In those
cases there was a defect in the form of notice, whereas in this case there was a complete failure
to comply with Rule 12(b)(3), since claimant failed to file proof of mailing the written request
for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the Commission’s decision. See
Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 217. Additionally, the supreme court has declined to apply
harmless-error analysis under circumstances such as those present here. Secura Insurance Co.,
232 Ill. 2d at 217.
¶ 22 Claimant also asserts that courts in Illinois have allowed parties to “perfect the record”
after the time for filing has passed if the defect is “minimal.” In support of this proposition,
claimant directs us to Berry v. Industrial Comm’n, 55 Ill. 2d 274 (1973), and Lee v. Industrial
Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 496 (1980).
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¶ 23 Berry, like Jones, involved the provision in section 19(f)(1) of the Workers’
Compensation Act requiring proof of payment of the probable cost of the record on appeal prior
to the issuance of summons. At the time Berry was decided, section 19(f)(1) provided that proof
of payment is shown by exhibiting to the clerk of the circuit court a receipt showing payment to
the Commission. In Berry, the claimant timely filed a praecipe for certiorari (the statutory
predecessor of the request to issue summons) with the clerk of the circuit court. Subsequently, he
forwarded to the Commission a check for the probable cost of the record on appeal. At the time
he filed the praecipe, the claimant did not physically exhibit to the clerk of the court a receipt
from the Commission showing payment of the estimated cost of the record. However, he did
tender to the clerk a copy of the transmittal letter sent to the Commission with the payment.
Moreover, prior to issuing summons, the clerk telephoned the Commission to verify that the
payment had been made in a timely fashion. The circuit court eventually received the receipt
showing payment of the probable cost of the record to the Commission, but this occurred outside
of the statutory 20-day period. Under these facts, the supreme court ruled that the requirements
of section 19(f)(1) had been satisfied. Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 277-78.
¶ 24 Lee involved the form of the bond that must be filed pursuant to section 19(f)(2) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, ¶ 138.19(f)(2)). The bond at issue in
Lee was signed by one of the two respondents as principal and by the other as surety. The
claimant moved to dismiss the respondents’ appeal to the circuit court, arguing they were
improperly acting in both capacities and that a bond in proper form was jurisdictional. The
circuit court allowed the motion to dismiss. The respondents then submitted a motion to vacate
the order quashing the writ of certiorari accompanied by a subsequent tender of bond with the
two respondents as principals and a third party as surety. The circuit court rejected the
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respondent’s motion and the accompanying bond. On appeal, the supreme court held that,
although the form of the original bond was “irregular,” the irregularity did not defeat the circuit
court’s jurisdiction. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d at 498-99. The supreme court remanded the matter to the
circuit court with directions that it determine the sufficiency of the second bond. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d
501. If the bond was found sufficient, the circuit court was ordered to consider the merits of the
appeal. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d at 501.
¶ 25 Berry and Lee are distinguishable for the same reasons as Jones, Curtis, and Kimbrough.
In both Berry and Lee, compliance with the statutory requirements was timely done even though
irregular in some aspect. In Berry, for instance, although the claimant did not exhibit proof of
payment of the probable cost of the record to the court, the clerk verified that the payment was
timely made prior to issuing summons. In Lee, the original appeal bond, although irregular, was
timely filed. As noted above, here, claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped
after the 20-day filing period set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act, and he failed to file proof of
mailing the written request for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the
Commission’s decision. Given claimant’s complete lack of compliance with both section
19(f)(1) of the Act and Rule 12(b)(3), we cannot categorize the defects in this case as “minimal.”
¶ 26 Claimant insists that this is not a case “where a party omitted an essential step in the
appeal process, thereby divesting the circuit court of notice and jurisdiction,” because the
Commission and parties were notified of the appeal by the notice of filing the appeal on October
21, 2014, and the issuance of the summons by the circuit court, which occurred on November 19,
2014. We disagree as claimant did “omit[ ] an essential step in the appeal process.” Significantly,
he did not timely tender his written request for summons, and he has not demonstrated proof of
mailing within the statutorily-mandated time frame, thereby divesting the circuit court of
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jurisdiction to consider his appeal. Claimant also insists that a finding that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction would elevate form over substance and run contrary to the principle that
“doubts as to the timeliness of appeals should be resolved so to favor review in the appellate
court.” In re Marriage of Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853 (1986). In this case, however, there is
no “doubt” as to the timeliness of claimant’s appeal. The record clearly establishes that
claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped by the circuit court more than 20 days
after his attorney received the Commission’s decision and he failed to timely comply with the
proof-of-mailing requirement in our supreme court rules. As the supreme court has admonished,
“the appellate court does not have the authority to excuse the filing requirements of the supreme
court rules governing appeals.” Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 217-18. Thus, we are
without authority to excuse claimant’s non-compliance.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 In short, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision where
claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped after the 20-day filing period set forth
in section 19(f)(1) of the Act and he failed to file proof of mailing the written request for
summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the Commission’s decision.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the circuit of Sangamon County as having been entered
in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, thereby reinstating the Commission’s decision, and
dismiss the instant appeal.
¶ 29 Circuit court judgment vacated; Appeal dismissed.
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