IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1092
Filed November 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KRISTY DANAE RATTRAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P.
McLellan (sentencing) and Peter A. Keller (guilty plea), Judges.
Kristy Danae Rattray appeals her guilty plea and sentence for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and failure to possess a tax stamp.
AFFIRMED.
Jamie L. Hunter of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jean C. Pettinger and Tyler J.
Buller, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Kristy Danae Rattray appeals her guilty plea and sentence for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and failure to possess a tax stamp.
She contends her counsel was ineffective and the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On October 31, 2014, detectives executed a search warrant on a home in
Des Moines occupied by six persons including Rattray. The search uncovered,
among other things, 14.3 grams of methamphetamine. Rattray was charged with
one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
methamphetamine, in an amount in excess of five grams, and one count of
failure to possess a tax stamp.
On February 25, 2015, the State filed a notice of additional witnesses,
having already filed a notice of additional witnesses on February 12. The State
sought a continuance of the trial that was scheduled for March 2, which the
district court granted over Rattray’s objection. Rattray also resisted the State’s
February 25 notice of additional witnesses. At the March 3 hearing on the
State’s notice, Rattray decided to accept a plea offer from the State—in which
she pled to a lesser-included offense for the possession charge and to the tax
stamp charge—and entered her guilty plea. At a sentencing hearing on May 26,
Rattray argued for a deferred judgment; the State argued for a fifteen-year prison
sentence. Rattray was sentenced to no more than ten years for the possession
charge and no more than five years on the tax stamp charge, with the sentences
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to run consecutive to each other. The sentences were suspended, and Rattray
was placed on probation for a period of three years. Rattray appeals.
II. Standard and Scope of Review
We may consider an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for the first
time on appeal, and our review is de novo. See State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481,
485 (Iowa 2005). In order to prove an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an
appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel (1) failed
to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See State v. Tompkins,
859 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 2015). We can resolve ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims under either prong. State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 556
(Iowa 2015).
“We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion or defect in the
sentencing procedure.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015).
“An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (quoting State v. Leckington,
713 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Iowa 2006)). “We give sentencing decisions by a trial
court a strong presumption in their favor.” Id.
III. Analysis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, Rattray raises three claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel: (1) counsel was ineffective for allowing Rattray to enter into a plea
without a sufficient factual basis; (2) counsel was ineffective for allowing Rattray
to enter a guilty plea that was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and
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(3) counsel was ineffective for failing to correct the district court’s mistaken belief
the parties’ plea agreement included a consecutive sentence recommendation.
As to her first argument, “[a] factual basis is required for a guilty plea.”
State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2013). “In evaluating whether a
factual basis exists to support a guilty plea, we may examine ‘the minutes of
testimony, statements made by the defendant and the prosecutor at the guilty
plea proceeding, and the presentence investigation report.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“[T]he ‘record does not need to show the totality of evidence necessary to
support a guilty conviction, but it need only demonstrate the facts that support the
offense.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29
(Iowa 2014) (noting the record need only “demonstrate[] the facts to support the
elements of the offense”).
Rattray contends there was inadequate evidence she had possession or
knowledge of the methamphetamine or that she possessed seven grams or more
of methamphetamine, as required for the tax stamp charge. However, the
minutes of testimony state one witness—who claimed to be Rattray’s
roommate—informed police Rattray lived at the residence at issue and stayed in
the bedroom where at least 7.5 grams of methamphetamine were found. This
same witness indicated he purchased methamphetamine from Rattray. The
minutes of testimony further state a purse was found in this same bedroom that
contained approximately 2.2 grams of methamphetamine. A man identified as
Rattray’s boyfriend also stated Rattray was dealing methamphetamine. This
testimony was confirmed by a third witness in the house, who informed police
she received methamphetamine from Rattray and knew Rattray was selling it to
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other people. Moreover, Rattray admitted she committed both offenses at the
hearing. She stated, “I had methamphetamine in my bedroom that I used at the
house that was raided. It was on the floor. I did put it there. And they [the
police] found it in the house.” She further admitted she had not acquired a tax
stamp, she possessed more than seven grams of methamphetamine, and had
not affixed a tax stamp to the drugs. Based on these circumstances, we
conclude there was a sufficient factual basis for Rattray’s plea; accordingly, her
counsel was not ineffective. See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa
2009) (“[C]ounsel has no duty to raise an issue that has no merit.”).
As to Rattray’s remaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, the
record lacks the necessary development of what transpired between Rattray and
her counsel at the March 3 hearing. We find the record is inadequate to address
her claims on direct appeal and thus preserve them for postconviction-relief
proceedings. See State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010).
B. Sentencing
Rattray alleges the district court improperly believed the plea agreement
provided the sentences would run consecutively; thus, the court’s mistaken
understanding could not be used as a basis for sentencing, and the sentence
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Rattray also claims the district court abused
its discretion in denying a deferred judgment, citing only the district court’s failure
to mention the possibility of a deferred judgment at the time of sentencing,
arguing this indicates the court failed to consider it as an option. When, as here,
the sentence given “falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid
and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.”
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Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 554. “To overcome the presumption [of validity], we
have required an affirmative showing the sentencing court relied on improper
evidence.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
As to the first argument, at the time Rattray entered her plea, the State
informed the court of the contents of the plea agreement, including that “the
parties will recommend consecutive sentences; however, the parties are free to
argue for any legal disposition available to the Court.” Thus, at sentencing, the
district court imposed consecutive sentences, based upon its understanding of
“the plea agreement of the parties that whatever sentence is imposed would run
consecutive.” Rattray has failed to identify any evidence in the record that would
have notified the district court that its understanding was in error, if in fact it was.
We conclude the imposition of a consecutive sentence was not an abuse of
discretion.
As to Rattray’s second argument, the district court explicitly stated it
“considered all sentencing options that are available by statute.” It concluded
that, “to render a judgment and sentence that provides the maximum opportunity
for Ms. Rattray to become rehabilitated and to protect the community from further
offenses by her,” it had two options: to send Rattray to prison or put her on
probation. The district court considered “Rattray’s age, the nature of the offenses
committed here, her employment history, her history of substance abuse, [and]
her past record of convictions.” See id. at 553 (listing relevant factors to consider
when imposing a sentence to include: “the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of [the
defendant’s] reform” (citation omitted)); see also Iowa Code § 907.5(1) (2015)
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(listing as factors “[t]he defendant’s prior record of convictions and prior record of
deferments of judgment,” “[t]he defendant’s employment circumstances,” “[t]he
defendant’s family circumstances,” “[t]he defendant’s mental health and
substance abuse history and treatment options available in the community and
the correctional system,” “[t]he nature of the offense committed,” and “[s]uch
other factors as are appropriate”). The district court explicitly considered
Rattray’s desire to see her children, her lack of an extensive criminal record, but
also the organized nature of the drug sales in which she was participating when
both imposing and suspending her sentence. The district court adequately
explained its reasoning for the sentence imposed and was not required to justify
its rejection of other sentencing options. See State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223,
225 (Iowa 1996) (“The district court must demonstrate its exercise of discretion
by stating upon the record the reasons for the particular sentence imposed. The
sentencing court, however, is generally not required to give its reasons for
rejecting particular sentencing options.” (citation omitted)). We find no abuse of
discretion.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we find there was a sufficient factual basis for Rattray’s guilty
plea and therefore her counsel was not ineffective. We further find the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rattray’s sentence. We preserve
Rattray’s remaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction-
relief proceedings.
AFFIRMED.