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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: C.F., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.B., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 609 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 15, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000075-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2016
J.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the order dated April 6, 2016, and
entered April 15, 2016,1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office
of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her dependent, male child, C.F. (“Child”), born in March of
2013, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8),
and (b).2 After review, we affirm.
1
While the order was dated April 6, 2016, notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236
was not provided until April 15, 2016. See Frazier v. City of
Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not
appealable until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that
appropriate notice has been given”).
2
In the same order, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Child’s
father, D.F. (“Father”), also pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
(b). Father has filed an appeal at Superior Court Docket No. 674 WDA 2016.
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The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history,
in part, as follows:
The family came to the attention of CYF on the
day of the child’s birth – [in] March [of] 2013 – when
Mother and the infant tested positive for cocaine and
methadone. CYF did not remove the child at that
time. The child remained with Mother until they
were discharged on April 1, 2013. Father was at the
hospital when the child was born. He was listed as
the Father on the birth certificate and acknowledged
paternity at a later time. CYF installed in-home
services in weeks after Mother’s discharge. CYF
offered similar services to Father, but soon after the
birth, Father was incarcerated. Only a couple weeks
later, on April 18, 2013, CYF removed the child after
allegations of further drug use. Following a shelter
hearing, the child was returned to Mother’s care so
long as she resided with her step-sister. The child
remained in Mother’s care until June 6, 2013, when
he was removed following another Emergency
Custody Authorization. Mother had tested positive
for cocaine, opiates, and benzodiazepines; the
caseworker had witnessed Mother “manipulate” –
i.e., tamper – with the urine screen. On June 12,
2013, the child was adjudicated dependent, and
ultimately never returned to either parent’s care.
The child has been placed in the foster home of C.D.
and R.M. R.M. is Mother’s step[-]sister.
CYF established a Family Service Plan (“FSP”)
to aid in reunification of the parents with their child.
FSPs are comprised of goals. The goals are designed
to address and resolve the conditions that led to the
child’s removal from parental care. Mother’s goals
included: address drug and alcohol concerns;
address parenting concerns; address mental health
concerns; obtain and maintain sobriety; work with
in-home services; address lack of stable housing;
participate in psychological evaluation; visit the
child. Later, after it was alleged that Mother’s
current boyfriend physically abused her, CYF added
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another goal: address domestic violence
concerns. . . .
Mother was largely noncompliant with her
goals. She has not addressed her drug
addiction, [sic] she regularly missed drug screens.
She has not addresses [sic] the ongoing domestic
violence in her home. With the exception of
approximately one month in December 2014,[3]
Mother’s visitations were never unsupervised. . . .
Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 1-3.
On April 5, 2015, CYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on April 6, 2016. At the
hearing, CYF presented the testimony of CYF caseworker, Darlene Lewis, and
Family Resources prevention services specialist (also referred to as a
parenting specialist), Mary Safrin. Father additionally testified on his own
behalf. Counsel further stipulated to the submission of the psychological
evaluations of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., clinical psychologist.4 (Notes of
testimony, 4/6/16 at 130-132.) While Mother was present, she did not
testify, and was absent from the courtroom for a lengthy portion of the
hearing.
3
Mother gave birth to another child in December of 2014. This child was
also born with drugs in his system and ultimately adjudicated dependent, as
well. (Notes of testimony, 4/6/16 at 78-79, 104, 109.)
4
Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluations, which included individual evaluations of
Mother and foster parents and interactional evaluations of Child with Mother
and foster parents, were marked as Exhibit CYF 5.
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By order dated April 6, 2016, and entered April 15, 2016, the trial
court involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child.
On April 29, 2016, Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice
of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights would serve the needs
and welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§2511(b)?
Mother’s brief at 5.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however,
should not be reversed merely because the record
would support a different result. Id. at 827. We
have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of
the child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We
have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, Mother concedes grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). (See Mother’s brief at 10.) We,
therefore, analyze the court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(b) only,
which provides as follows:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511 (b).
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With regard to Section 2511(b), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M.,
53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on
the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed
below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
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As further recognized in T.S.M.:
[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether
termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a
child who has a strong but unhealthy bond to his
biological parent, especially considering the
existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive
family. As with dependency determinations, we
emphasize that the law regarding termination of
parental rights should not be applied mechanically
but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children
involved. See, e.g., R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190 (holding
that statutory criteria of whether child has been in
care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two months
should not be viewed as a “litmus test” but rather as
merely one of many factors in considering goal
change). Obviously, attention must be paid to the
pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s
bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is
unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against
the damage that bond may cause if left intact.
Similarly, while termination of parental rights
generally should not be granted unless adoptive
parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and
loving home, termination may be necessary for the
child’s needs and welfare in cases where the child’s
parental bond is impeding the search and placement
with a permanent adoptive home.
71 A.3d at 268-269.
Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and finding sufficient grounds
for termination, the trial court reasoned:
Mother’s refusal to access available drug and
alcohol treatment is most troubling. Likewise, this
Court cannot ignore the fact that she has placed
herself in – and this would place the child in – a
physically abusive environment. These dangerous
conditions have prevented Mother from conducting
any real parenting outside of supervised visitations.
At the time of the termination hearing, child had not
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been in the parents’ care for approximately
34 months.
According to Dr. Neil Rosenblum’s
psychological evaluation, the child is thriving with his
pre-adoptive foster parents C.D. and C.D.’s mother
R.M. He calls C.D. “Mom” and R.M. “Mimi.” The
child enjoys attention from R.M.’s paramour who he
calls “poppy” as well as R.M.’s younger children. The
child’s speech and attention span [have] improved
while in the foster parent’s care. Dr. Rosenblum
found that the foster parents are strongly attached
to the child, who is the center of attention in the
home. He has lived with the family essentially his
entire life. Critically, Dr. Rosenblum found that
“removing [Child] from his present family
environment would be not only highly disruptive to
his developmental progress and attachment, but
would be traumatic and likely cause severe
emotional distress for this child.” Dr. Rosenblum
emphasized that Mother is appropriate with the child
and has demonstrated positive parenting instincts,
but he concluded that “because of [Mother’s mental
health and substance abuse concerns] there is no
way to view her as being able to provide [the child]
with a stable and secure family environment as her
own personal functioning remains so fragile and
unstable at this time.” Dr. Rosenblum further
concluded, and this Court agreed, that given the
child’s strong attachment to his foster parents,
adoption is clearly the “only permanency outcome
that would allow [the child continuity] of care and
the opportunity to remain in a stable family
environment capable of meeting his needs at this
time and in the years to come.”
. . . Because the child is placed with kin, it is this
Court’s hope that positive, healthy contact will
remain between the child and his biological parents.
But it is crystal clear that termination serves the
child’s best needs and welfare. The Court feels
strongly that the child’s pre-adoptive foster parents
are the best judges of whether future contact is in
the child’s best interests.
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Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 7-8 (citations to record omitted).
Mother, however, argues:
[n]one of the witnesses or documentary evidence
presented by CYF referred to the emotional effect
that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would
have on [Child]. Even the CYF caseworker failed to
address issues of parent-child bonds and potential
effects of termination of parental rights on [Child].
Likewise, the Opinion of the trial court in support of
its decision fails to analyze the emotional effect that
termination of parental rights would have on [Child].
Mother’s brief at 13 (citations to record omitted). We disagree.
This court finds that Mother’s argument regarding Section 2511(b)
lacks merit. Upon review, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported
by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of error of
law or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order with regard to
Subsection (b). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of
Mother’s parental rights, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2016
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