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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11575
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A088-133-061
YUEHUA LIU,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(December 6, 2016)
Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Yuehua Liu seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Liu, a native and citizen of China, claimed
past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution in China on account
of her participation in an underground Christian church. Liu’s petition challenges
the IJ’s determinations, adopted by the BIA, that Liu failed to show she suffered
past harm in China rising to the level of persecution or that there was a reasonable
possibility of future harm on account of her religion or other protected ground
given that other members of her underground church continued to reside and work
in China without harm. After review, we deny the petition for review. 1
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
To establish eligibility for asylum, the applicant must show either past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1
Where, as here, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s conclusions regarding Liu’s failure to
establish her eligibility for relief, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Ayala v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010). We review the factual determination that
an alien is statutorily ineligible for asylum under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence
test, which requires that we affirm the IJ’s and the BIA’s decision if it is “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Al Najjar,
v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). We will
reverse “only when the record compels reversal.” Mehmeti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1196,
1199 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
2
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§ 1101(a)(42)(A); Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006);
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b). Similarly, to show eligibility for withholding of removal
under the INA, an applicant must show that it is more likely than not that he has
been or will be persecuted on account of one of the five protected grounds. INA
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1126,
1232 (11th Cir. 2005). Because this standard is more stringent than the standard
for asylum, an alien who fails to establish asylum eligibility generally cannot
satisfy the higher burden for withholding of removal. Id. at 1232-33.
Although the INA does not define persecution, this Court has recognized
that it is “an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of
verbal harassment or intimidation.” Id. at 1231 (quotation marks omitted). We
evaluate the harm a petitioner suffered cumulatively and by considering the totality
of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d
1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, this Court has concluded that threats in conjunction with brief
detentions or a minor physical attack that does not result in serious physical injury
do not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
577 F.3d 1341, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2009) (four-day detention, five-hour
interrogation and beating with no evidence of physical harm, and post-
incarceration monitoring); Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171-72
3
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(11th Cir. 2008) (36-hour detention, beatings with a belt resulting in scratches and
bruises, two-day hospitalization, and threat of arrest); Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
451 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (five-day detention, during which the
alien was forced to watch anti-Falun Gong videos, stand in the sun for two hours,
and sign a statement promising to no longer practice Falun Gong). On the other
hand, we have found that longer detentions coupled with either multiple beatings
or “singularly cruel” tactics that result in the need for medical attention have
constituted persecution. See, e.g., Shi, 707 F.3d at 1235-39 (seven-day detention
and two interrogations, one involving physical abuse and the other handcuffing to a
bar overnight in the rain, resulting in illness and medical treatment); Niftaliev v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1215-17 (11th Cir. 2007) (threats, numerous
interrogation and beatings during a 15-day detention that resulted in a two-month
hospitalization, and two subsequent physical attacks); Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d
762, 766 (11th Cir. 2007) (18-day detention accompanied by threats and multiple
beatings).
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II. LIU’S PERSECUTION CLAIMS
A. Past Persecution
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that Liu failed
to show she suffered past persecution.2 Liu testified that after police arrested her
and other members of her church group, she was detained for seven days and
interrogated twice. During her second interrogation, Liu was slapped and kicked
and her hair was pulled, but she did not report any resulting injuries. Although
Liu, like the petitioner in Shi, was detained for a week, Liu was not subjected to
“singularly cruel” tactics such as being handcuffed to a bar outside overnight in the
rain. See Shi, 707 F.3d at 1238-39. Importantly, the petitioner in Shi became ill,
was released after authorities feared he would die in custody, and then sought
medical treatment. Liu, on the other hand, did not present any evidence that she
needed medical attention as a result of her treatment during detention. See id..
This Court has held that individuals who suffered similar or worse abuse did not
suffer harm rising to the level of persecution. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1353;
Djonda, 514 F.3d at 1171, 1174; Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1289-91.
2
For the first time on appeal, Liu argues that she was persecuted on account of her
imputed political opinion. We lack jurisdiction to review this issue because Liu failed to exhaust
it before the BIA. See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). Liu also argues that she established a nexus
between her mistreatment and her religion and anti-government political opinion, but the BIA
did not deny Liu relief because she failed to show a nexus to a protected ground. Thus, the issue
of a nexus is not properly before us. See Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th
Cir. 2007).
5
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As to economic persecution, Liu did not show that her economic hardship as
a result of her job loss was so severe that she was deprived of a means of earning a
living. See Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir.
2001). While Liu stated that she had no means of earning an income, she did not
provide any evidence other than her conclusory statement to that effect. Like the
petitioner in Zheng, Liu presented no evidence that she searched for another job
after she was fired; Liu merely testified that she did not have any other jobs in
China and that she did not try to get her job back because it would have been futile.
See Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1291. Further, the other members of her church group
were able to work in China.
Considering the facts of Liu’s detention, the conditions of her release, and
her economic situation, Liu’s case is more akin to Zheng, in which the petitioner
was detained for five days, suffered some mistreatment but was not harmed, was
forced to renounce Falun Gong, and lost his job, and the record in Zheng did not
compel the conclusion that he suffered past persecution. See Zheng, 451 F.3d at
1290-91. In short, the cumulative harm Liu suffered falls short of the extreme
mistreatment found in other cases where this Court was compelled to conclude that
the petitioner was persecuted.
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B. Future Persecution
The record also does not compel the conclusion that Liu has a well-founded
fear of future persecution. To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution,
the petitioner must show a reasonable possibility that he will be singled out for
persecution on account of a protected ground, and that his fear is both
“subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352
(quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, the petitioner can prove that she is a
member of, or is identified with, a group that is subjected to a “pattern or practice”
of persecution in his country of nationality.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
First, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Liu failed to show a
pattern or practice of persecuting Christians in China, as the 2013 International
Religious Freedom Report for China states that Christians are permitted to worship
in state-sanctioned churches and local authorities in some areas tacitly approve of
unregistered church groups. See Matter of A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA
2005) (explaining that a “pattern or practice” of persecution means persecution of a
group that is “systemic, pervasive, or organized” (quotation marks omitted)).
Second, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Liu did not present
“specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that [she] . . . will be singled
out for persecution.” See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1287 (11th Cir.
2001) (quotation marks and internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, the
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fact that the other members of Liu’s home church group arrested with Liu
continued to live and work in China for years supports the IJ’s and BIA’s
conclusion that there is not a reasonable possibility Liu would be singled out for
persecution based on her religion if she returned to China.
Liu submitted a 2014 letter from her brother indicating that police had raided
another home church group in October 2014 and arrested eight people, including
some of Liu’s fellow church members. However, the letter does not specify what
happened to the church members after their arrest or how many, if any, were
detained. Further, Liu presented no evidence of any arrests or mistreatment of
church members during the years between Liu’s October 2006 arrest and this
second raid in October 2014, a span of eight years. Finally, while Liu presented
evidence that police suspected Liu of mailing Christian materials to China and
continued to ask about her whereabouts, this evidence was limited to her
hometown, and there was no evidence that police would search for her elsewhere
in China, particularly since there are areas where local authorities tacitly permit
unregistered church groups. In sum, the record does not compel a conclusion that
Liu showed past persecution or a reasonable possibility of future persecution.
Because Liu failed to satisfy the less stringent standard for asylum
eligibility, she also necessarily failed to satisfy the higher standard required for
withholding of removal under the INA and CAT relief. See Zheng, 451 F.3d at
8
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1292. For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and the BIA’s
decision.
PETITION DENIED.
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