NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 7 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIAS ILYIA, No. 14-35523
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01593-RSL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MAROUN N EL KHOURY, AKA Maroun
N El-Khoury, AKA Maroun N Elkhoury,
AKA Maroun N Khoury,
Defendant-Appellee.
ELIAS ILYIA, No. 14-35770
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01593-RSL
v.
MAROUN N EL KHOURY, AKA Maroun
N El-Khoury, AKA Maroun N Elkhoury,
AKA Maroun N Khoury,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted December 5, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Elias Ilyia appeals the district court’s judgment following an adverse jury
verdict in his diversity action against Maroun El Khoury. El Khoury appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion for attorneys’ fees. We have jurisdiction
over both appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in finding that Ilyia’s expert opinion was not
reliable or helpful. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–
95 (1993). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Ilyia’s proffered expert testimony
must be based on sufficient facts and be the product of reliable methods. See Fed.
R. Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. Ilyia, however, failed to provide any
supporting material to show that the expert’s limited review of Ilyia’s psychiatric
status—based primarily on a few interviews and the recollections of a narrow
selection of people—was sufficient or that it followed accepted methodologies.
While the expert may have been qualified to diagnose Ilyia’s psychiatric status,
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Because the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not recite them except as necessary to explain our
decision.
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there is no evidence that psychiatrists routinely form reliable opinions based on
such a limited review of a patient’s mental history. Therefore, the district court did
not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Cohen, 510 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir.
2007).
The district court also did nor err in limiting Ilyia’s expert testimony after
finding that only part of it would be helpful to the jury. While “[a]n opinion is not
objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue,” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a),
Ilyia’s proffered expert testimony—that Ilyia was not competent to enter into the
contractual agreements—would not have been helpful to the jury. The opinion
simply concluded how the jury should find, see Hangarter v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004), rather than providing
evidence that would support such a conclusion. As such, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting Ilyia’s expert testimony to only those facts that
would assist the jury in resolving the competency issue.
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
Ilyia to impeach the testimony of El Khoury and El Khoury’s witnesses. See
United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009). The opening-the-
door doctrine may allow parties “to introduce evidence on the same issue to rebut
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any false impression that might have resulted from [an] earlier admission,” United
States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1285 (9th Cir. 1988)), but it does not allow Ilyia to
disregard the rules and introduce evidence that is highly prejudicial and unreliable,
see id. The challenged El Khoury testimony was limited to general family, work
history, and educational background material. It clearly did not create any false
impressions. Thus, the district court had ample justification for excluding related
impeachment evidence. United States v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2011).
2. The district court did not err in holding that there was no contractual
basis to award attorneys’ fees and costs to El Khoury under Washington law.
While the underlying action may involve a number of contracts, see Dayton v.
Farmer Ins. Grp., 876 P.2d 896, 897–98 (Wash. 1994) (noting that Washington
courts cannot award attorneys’ fees in absence of a contract, statute, or recognized
ground of equity), the attorneys’ fees provisions in the Stock Pledge Agreements
and the Promissory Note only apply in limited circumstances.
Under both the Stock Pledge Agreements and the Promissory Note, fees and
costs are to be awarded in the case of default or in relation to a party’s attempt to
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enforce payment. The underlying action here, however, involves an attempt to
unwind the business transaction on the ground of incompetence to contract. Thus,
the fee provisions do not apply, and the district did not err in denying attorneys’
fees and costs to El Khoury.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED.
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