Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 603
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-16-48
Opinion Delivered December 14, 2016
JUDITH L. ARNOLD APPEAL FROM THE NEWTON
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-2013-018-4]
V.
HONORABLE GORDON WEBB,
JERRY K. ASHWORTH JUDGE
APPELLEE
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
This appeal was spawned by a dispute between Jerry Ashworth and Judith Arnold
over an A-frame cabin in Newton County. On 19 March 2015, after a bench trial, the
circuit court entered a judgment in Ashworth’s favor. Arnold filed a postjudgment motion
on 3 April 2015. In that motion, Arnold argued that the circuit court’s decision was clearly
contrary to the preponderance of the evidence under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a). She asked the
court to vacate the judgment, or in the alternative, to modify the judgment and allow her
to keep her life estate in the A-frame cabin and award her some money.
On 15 June 2015, the circuit court denied Arnold’s motion as untimely under Rule
59(a). It also denied the motion under Rule 60(a), reasoning that “[i]t is not necessary to
modify the Judgment previously entered herein to correct errors or mistakes or to prevent
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the miscarriage of justice.” On June 29, Arnold filed a notice of appeal from the June 15
order.
This appeal has a jurisdictional problem. Rule 4(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate
Procedure–Civil provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the
entry of judgment. Rule 4(b) allows the thirty-day period to be extended in certain
circumstances, one of which is the timely filing of a motion for a new trial under Rule
59(a). Ark. R. App. P–Civ. 4(b) (2015); Virgil v. Morgan, 2013 Ark. App. 675. Arkansas
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) states that motions for a new trial must be filed no later than
ten days after judgment is entered. Because the time period prescribed is less than fourteen
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the
computation. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
Motions should be liberally construed, but courts should not be blinded by titles. To
this end, we must determine the substance of a motion when asking what relief it actually
seeks and what rule may apply to it. Slaton v. Slaton, 330 Ark. 287, 293, 956 S.W.2d 150,
153 (1997). One example of this principle at work is our supreme court’s statement that
“Rule 60 may not be used to breathe life into an otherwise defunct Rule 59 motion.”
United S. Assur. Co. v. Beard, 320 Ark. 115, 119, 894 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1995). In Jackson
v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 309 Ark. 572, 832 S.W.2d 224 (1992), our supreme court held
that the appeal was untimely because Jackson’s “Motion to Vacate Judgment” was in the
nature of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, not a motion “to prevent a miscarriage
of justice” under Rule 60, concluding “[w]ere we to interpret the term ‘miscarriage of
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justice’ expansively to embrace all grounds under Rule 59, Rule 59 would have no
independent meaning.” Id. at 573–74, 832 S.W.2d at 225.
Arnold’s postjudgment motion is one for a new trial under Rule 59. Because the
judgment was entered March 19, the last day Arnold could have timely filed a motion for
new trial and therefore extended the original thirty-day deadline to appeal the judgment,
was April 2. Benedict v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 329 Ark. 590, 951 S.W.2d 562 (1997). But
her notice of appeal was filed on 29 June 2015, which was more than thirty days after the
judgment was entered. Given the untimely notice of appeal, we must dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed with prejudice.
GLADWIN, C.J., and VAUGHT, J., agree.
Judith L. Arnold, pro se appellant.
Davis Law Firm, by: Steven B. Davis and Nancy L. Mathis, for appellee.
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