FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 19 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARGARET MIRANDA; CLARA No. 15-55245
MIRANDA; CINDY GRIEGO;
ROSANNA MIRANDA; HELEN D.C. No.
HERRERA; ROSE ANN HERRERA; 5:14-cv-00312-VAP-SP
MONICA HERRERA; MICKI
HERRERA; INEZ ALVAREZ; BELINDA
MIRANDA, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the
Interior; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2016**
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: CALLAHAN, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Margaret Miranda and members of her family (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) are
the daughters, granddaughters, and great-granddaughter of Rosa Pace, an enrolled
member of the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians (the “Band”). Those
Plaintiffs who are not already enrolled in the Band applied for enrollment, and those
who are already enrolled applied to have their recorded degree of Santa Ynez blood
increased.
Under Santa Ynez law, for enrollment in the Band, a person is required to have
one-quarter or more Santa Ynez blood. Whether the Plaintiffs who seek enrollment
have the requisite one-quarter Santa Ynez blood (and whether the remaining Plaintiffs
are entitled to blood-degree increases) depends on whether Rosa Pace, their common
ancestor, was a full-blooded or half-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. The parties point to
conflicting sources of evidence on this issue: A roll of the Band’s members prepared
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the “Bureau”) in 1940 (the “1940 Census Roll”) lists
Pace as a full-blooded Santa Ynez Indian. On the other hand, a membership roll
prepared by the Band in 1965 (the “1965 Membership Roll”) lists Pace’s blood degree
as one-half.
Relying on the 1965 Membership Roll, the Band denied the Plaintiffs’
applications, and the Plaintiffs appealed to the Bureau. See generally 25 C.F.R. §§
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62.1–62.12 (providing “procedures for the filing and processing of appeals from
adverse enrollment actions by [the Bureau]”). The Bureau sustained the Band’s
decision to reject the Plaintiffs’ applications.
The Plaintiffs then filed this suit against Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell
and the Department of the Interior (collectively, the “Defendants”) challenging the
Bureau’s action on the Plaintiffs’ appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 500–596. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Bureau’s action was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. The Plaintiffs
timely appealed.
Regulations appearing in Part 62 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations
provide that the Bureau “shall” hear an appeal from an Indian tribe’s denial of an
enrollment application where the tribe’s “governing document” so provides. See 25
C.F.R. §§ 62.2, 62.10. In disposing of such an appeal, the Bureau does not abuse its
discretion where it defers to an Indian tribe’s “reasonable interpretation[] of [its] own
laws.” Cahto Tribe v. Dutschke, 715 F.3d 1225, 1230 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013). The
reasonableness of a tribe’s interpretation of its law is evaluated “based on the language
of the [tribe’s] governing documents[] and the past practice of the [tribe].” Aguayo v.
Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Here, Article III of the Band’s Articles of Organization provides that a person
is eligible for enrollment in the Band if she is the “living descendant[]” of a “person[]
whose name[] appear[s] on the [Band’s] January 1, 1940 Census Roll” and if she has
“one-fourth [] or more degree of Indian blood of the Band.” Ordinance 2, passed by
the Band’s General Council in 1965, defines “Indian blood of the Band” to mean “the
total percentage of Indian blood derived from an ancestor . . . who [was] listed on the
[] 1940 Census Roll.” Ordinance 2 also permits an applicant to appeal an adverse
enrollment decision to the Bureau.
The Plaintiffs urge that Article III requires the Band to look only to the 1940
Census Roll—and no other documents—to determine an applicant’s degree of Santa
Ynez blood. Under Ordinance 2, however, the Band may consider “tribal records,
information presented in the application[,] or other sources of information” when
evaluating an enrollment application. Thus, the Band has interpreted Article III as not
forbidding the Band to review documents other than the 1940 Census Roll in
determining an applicant’s “degree of Indian blood of the Band.”
This interpretation is “reasonable” given “the language of the [Band’s]
governing documents[] and the past practice of the [Band].” Aguayo, 827 F.3d at
1228. Article III does not define the term “Indian blood of the Band,” and although
it refers to no documents other than the 1940 Census Roll, it neither expressly nor
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impliedly prohibits the Band from considering such other documents when evaluating
an enrollment application. Because the Band’s interpretation of Article III is
“reasonable,” the Bureau did not abuse its discretion by deferring to it and sustaining
the Band’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ applications. Accordingly, the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for the Defendants is
AFFIRMED.
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