In the Missouri Court of Appea[s Eastern District DIVISION FOUR AMOSO REALTY, LLC, ) ) Piaintiff/Respondent, ) ) Vs. ) ) MONIQUE MILTON, ) ) Defendant/Respondent, ) ) and ) ) BRYCE WEATHERS, ) ) Proposed Intervenor/Appellant. ) Introduction No. ED104375 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis Honorable Paula Perld 339, 340 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (emphasis added). The requirement that a trial court denominate a writing as a “judgment” is not a mere formality; it establishes a “bright line” test to determine when a writing is a judgment. Citv of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.Zd 850, 853 (Mo. banc 199'/`). fn §Ll, a written trial-court order did not include the word “judgment,” although the docket entry stated, “Judgment Granted.” 101 S.W.3d at 340. This Court held that the written order did not constitute a final judgment because the written order was not denominated a “judgment.” I_d_. We further explained that the docket entry did not constitute a “judgment” because it lacked another requirement of Rule 74.0i(a): it was not signed or initiated by the judge. I_d_. We held that the two documents (the written order and the docket entry) could not combine to create a final appealable judgment, even though the docket entry clearly referred to the written order. §§ § We dismissed the appeal. § 5 Section 512.020, subsections (1)_(4), also allows appeals front a few specific interlocutory orders. None of those subsections are relevant here. In U, this Court followed and applied our reasoning in M on nearly identical facts. Orfv. Orf, 208 S.W.3d 306, 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). The trial court issued an order that was not denominated a “judgment.” Ld. The corresponding docket entry stated, “Judgment Entered,” but it was not signed or initialed by the judge. § After reviewing our analysis in _S_“[HJ,_J_, we held that “this case involves an order that is not properly denominated, and an unsigned docket entry, and we lackjurisdiction to consider the appeal.” igl_. Weathers appeals from the trial court’s April 28, 2016, Order denying his motion to intervene Similar to M and O_rf`, the trial court’s written order was not denominated a “judgment” and the order did not contain the word “judgment." As in §_L_.[ and _Q_r;f, we acknowledge that the corresponding docket entry stated, “SEE ORDER AND JUDGMENT.” We further note that the docket entry included the trial judge’s typewritten name However, the judge’s typewritten name is not a signature for the purposes of Rule 74.0l(a). § Rule 41 .08(a) (“Documents requiring a judgc’s or commissioner’s signature may be signed by an original signature, stamped signature or an electronic graphic representation of a signature.”); see also Kearns v. New York Cmtv. Bank‘ 389 S.W.3d 294, 297 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013] (in dicta, noting, “If` a judge’s typewritten name appears beneath the docket entry, the signing requirement is satisfied if the judge initials the entry.”),6 As in M and _Qrf, here we have an order that has not been denominated a “judglnent” and an unsigned docket entry, neither of which constituted a final judgment. B M, 101 S.W.3d at 340; _Q_t;f, 208 S.W.3d at 307. Because Weathers lacks a final appealablejudgment, we dismiss this appeal. I_d. 5 Further, this handwritten-typewritten distinction exists with regard to judicial initials constituting a “signaturc.” Cornnare Kessinger v. Kessinger. 935 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (handwrittcn initials satisfy the signature requirement) with Grissum v. Soldi 87 S.W.Sd 915, 917 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (typewrittelt initials do not). Conclusion rfhe appeal is dismissed. KufRT s. onEi~twALD, image James M. Dowd, P.J'., concurs Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., concurs.