IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JOSEPH WAYNE DAUGHERTY,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D15-3805
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed December 22, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Volusia County,
Terence R. Perkins, Judge.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
Jacqueline Rae Luker and Nancy Ryan,
Assistant Public Defenders, Daytona
Beach, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Cheesman,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
PALMER, J.
Joseph Daugherty (the defendant) appeals his conviction on the charge of leaving
the scene of a crash involving death. See § 316.027(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012). Because the
trial court erred in denying the defendant's judgment of acquittal motion, we reverse.
The defendant was charged with leaving the scene of a crash involving death. The
charges arose from a confrontation between the defendant and the victim while the
defendant was sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked in a driveway and the victim
was attempting to enter the vehicle through an open window. The defendant backed the
car out of the driveway in an attempt to avoid contact with the victim and, as he
accelerated to leave the area, the victim (who was holding on to the vehicle through the
open window) fell to the ground, sustaining a fatal head injury.
Section 316.027 provides:
316.027. Crash involving death or personal injuries
....
[2](c) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on
public or private property which results in the death of a
person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the
scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the
requirements of s. 316.062.
§ 316.027(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012).
At trial, the defendant moved for the entry of a judgment of acquittal (JOA), arguing
that the State failed to prove that a crash occurred between the defendant’s car and the
victim. The State countered, arguing that the crash was between the victim and the
pavement. The trial court determined that there was no evidence that the victim was hit
by the car, but denied the JOA motion in reliance on State v. Gaulden, 134 So. 3d 981
(Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that passenger's collision with road was a crash and, thus,
driver was subject to prosecution for failing to stop).
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gaulden v. State, 195
So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2016), reversing the district court's holding in Gaulden. That opinion
reads, in relevant part:
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The First District certified the following question as one of
great public importance:
WHEN A PASSENGER SEPARATES FROM A MOVING
VEHICLE AND COLLIDES WITH THE ROADWAY OR
ADJACENT PAVEMENT, BUT THE VEHICLE HAS NO
PHYSICAL CONTACT EITHER WITH THE PASSENGER,
AFTER THE PASSENGER'S EXIT, OR WITH ANY OTHER
VEHICLE, PERSON, OR OBJECT, IS THE VEHICLE
“INVOLVED IN A CRASH” SO THAT THE DRIVER MAY BE
HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAVING THE
SCENE?
Gaulden II, 132 So. 3d at 922.
Id. at 125. The Court answered the question as follows:
[W]e hold that the operative phrase “any vehicle involved in a
crash” means that a vehicle must collide with another vehicle,
person, or object. Plainly, under the undisputed facts of this
case, no vehicle was involved in a collision within the meaning
of the statute. Accordingly, we answer the certified question
in the negative, quash the district court's decision, and
remand the cause to the district court for application of our
decision in this case.
Id. at 1128.
Since the State opposed the JOA motion on the basis that the crash occurred when
the victim collided with the pavement, and the Supreme Court has now held that such an
occurrence does not constitute a crash under the statute, the defendant was entitled to
receive a JOA. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the defendant's JOA motion is
reversed, and this matter remanded for the entry of a JOA and discharge of the defendant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SAWAYA and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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