MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 30 2016, 9:05 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Asa Hairston, December 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1606-CR-1267
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1506-CM-22009
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Asa Hairston appeals his conviction following a bench trial for class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. His sole assertion on appeal is that the
State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Finding the
evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 18, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Sara
Didandeh and D. Wright 1 responded to a report that Hairston was in the
middle of the street, dressed only in underwear, 2 covered in blood, holding a
hammer, and yelling and screaming. In conducting a welfare check on the
situation, the officers located Hairston on a nearby porch. The officers noted
that he had blood coming from his head and cuts on his wrists that were
actively bleeding, and that he seemed a little disoriented. The officers also
observed a hammer in a bucket sitting next to him. The officers determined
that it was necessary to place Hairston in handcuffs for his own safety while
they investigated further. Officer Wright told Hairston to put his hands behind
his back. Hairston slowly put his hands behind his back, but when Officer
Wright tried to grab his hands to put the handcuffs on, Hairston pulled his
hands away. Officer Wright tried again, this time being able to get a hold of
1
The record provides only the initial of Officer Wright’s first name.
2
Officer Didandeh described Hairston’s attire as “like a leotard” or “wrestling thing.” Tr. at 11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 2 of 6
Hairston’s fingers, but Hairston “jerked away” again. Tr. at 15. On a third
attempt, Officer Wright was finally able to handcuff Hairston.
[3] Officer Wright escorted Hairston off the porch, and as he held onto the
handcuffs to try to control Hairston, Hairston kept “pulling away.” Id. at 16.
Hairston then “instantly started squirming and flailing his arms.” Id. Officer
Didandeh observed that Hairston was quickly twisting his upper body and
moving his shoulders forward in an attempt to break free of Officer Wright’s
hold and run away. Both officers repeatedly commanded Hairston to “stop
resisting.” Id. at 31. Because Officer Didandeh could see that Officer Wright
was losing his hold on Hairston, she grabbed Hairston’s arm, and the officers
took him to the ground. Hairston continued to try to get up as he was on the
ground, and he kicked at the officers and used his legs to push the officers off
him, despite the officers’ continued commands for Hairston to stop resisting.
An ambulance arrived, and Hairston was sedated, transported to the hospital,
and placed in “immediate detention” with the Marion County Sheriff’s
Department. Id. at 24.
[4] The State charged Hairston with class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement and class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. A bench trial was
held on February 9, 2016. At the conclusion of the trial, Hairston moved for a
directed verdict on the criminal mischief charge. The trial court granted
Hairston’s motion. The trial court found Hairston guilty of class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The court sentenced him to 365 days,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 3 of 6
with thirty-four days of credit time, 331 days suspended, ninety days of
probation, and twenty hours of community service. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Hairston contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495,
499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom that support the conviction, and will affirm if there is probative
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In short, if the testimony believed by the
trier of fact is enough to support the conviction, then the reviewing court will
not disturb it. Id. at 500.
[6] To convict Hairston of class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the
State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted,
obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was
lawfully engaged in his or her duties. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
Hairston first claims that the State failed to prove that he acted forcibly. Our
supreme court has explained,
In Spangler v. State, we held that the word “forcibly” is an
essential element of the crime and modifies the entire string of
verbs—resists, obstructs, or interferes—such that the State must
show forcible resistance, forcible obstruction, or forcible
interference. 607 N.E.2d 720, 722-23 (Ind. 1993). We also held
that the word meant “something more than mere action.” Id. at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 4 of 6
724. “[O]ne ‘forcibly resists’ law enforcement when strong,
powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement
official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 723. “[A]ny
action to resist must be done with force in order to violate this
statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly
resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Id. at 724.
But even so, “the statute does not demand complete passivity.”
K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). In Graham v.
State, we clarified that “[t]he force involved need not rise to the
level of mayhem.” 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). In fact, even
a very “modest level of resistance” might support the offense. Id.
at 966 (“even ‘stiffening’ of one’s arms when an officer grabs
hold to position them for cuffing would suffice”).
Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ind. 2013).
[7] The evidence most favorable to the conviction shows that although Hairston
initially complied with Officer Wright’s command to place his hands behind his
back, he repeatedly pulled and jerked his hands away from Officer Wright’s
grasp. It took Officer Wright three attempts to handcuff Hairston. Then, as
Officer Wright escorted Hairston off the porch, Hairston kept pulling away
before escalating his resistance to twisting his body and flailing his arms to try
to break Officer Wright’s hold. After the officers were forced to take Hairston
to the ground, Hairston kicked at them and used his legs to push them away.
This evidence is more than sufficient to show that Hairston exercised at the very
least a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence to impede the officers’
lawful execution of their duties.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 5 of 6
[8] Hairston also maintains that the State failed to prove that he acted knowingly or
intentionally because he “might have experienced some sort of psychotic
episode” and his behavior “might have not been because of his knowing or
intentional acts.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. We are unpersuaded. It is well settled
that the State is not required to prove intent by direct and positive evidence.
Johnson v. State, 837 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (2006).
Indeed, a defendant’s intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone,
and knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of
each case. Id. Here, although one of the responding officers described Hairston
as seeming “a little disoriented,” see Tr. at 12, the evidence indicates that
Hairston clearly understood the command to place his hands behind his back
for handcuffing, because he initially complied before beginning to resist. His
subsequent and continued efforts to break free of the officers despite their
commands to stop resisting supports a reasonable inference that he did so
knowingly or intentionally. Hairston’s alternative explanations that “might”
explain his behavior are simply requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which
we cannot do. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Hairston’s
conviction for class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and therefore
we affirm his conviction.
[9] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1606-CR-1267 | December 30, 2016 Page 6 of 6