IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1572
Filed January 11, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF B.D.,
Minor child,
T.D., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District
Associate Judge.
A father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to
Iowa Code chapter 232 (2015). AFFIRMED.
John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd (until
withdrawal) and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
John P. Jellineck of Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, guardian ad
litem for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Terry appeals from an order terminating his parental rights in his child,
B.D., pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2015). The standard of
review and controlling framework are well-established and need not be repeated
herein. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219–20 (Iowa 2016) (stating review is
de novo and setting forth the applicable “three-step analysis”); In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 110–11 (Iowa 2014) (same).
Terry concedes the statutory ground authorizing termination of his
parental rights has been met. We nonetheless seek to satisfy ourselves the
State has met its burden on this point. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
759 (1982) (“A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to
terminate his or her parental status is . . . a commanding one.”). As relevant
here, to terminate a parent’s rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f), the State
was required to prove “the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s
parents as provided in section 232.102” at the time of the termination hearing.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4). Our cases had interpreted this provision to mean
the child at issue was removed from at least one of the parents and could not be
returned to the parent at issue at the time of the termination hearing without
regard to whether the child had been removed from the parent at issue. See In
re C.L., No. 14-1973, 2015 WL 408392, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015)
(explaining the supreme court had rejected the argument the State was required
to prove the child was removed from the custody of the parent at issue as a
prerequisite to termination of parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f)); In
re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). Recently, the supreme
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court held section 232.116(1)(f) provides a basis for termination only where there
the child at issue was also removed pursuant to chapter 232 from the parent at
issue. See In re C.F.-H., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2016 WL 7321713, at *13 (Iowa
2016). On de novo review, we conclude the condition was met in this case. The
juvenile court issued a removal order on May 4, 2015, removing the child at issue
from the father. See id. at *5-7 (discussing relevant statutory provisions related
to removal). We also conclude, as will be set forth below, the State has proved
the child could not be returned to the father’s custody at the time of the
termination hearing.
Terry contends the State failed to prove termination of his parental rights
is in the best interests of the child. He also contends the juvenile court should
not have terminated of his parental rights due to the strength of the parent-child-
bond. The record does not support the father’s arguments.
The child was born in 2011. Terry has not played a significant role in the
child’s life due to Terry’s substance abuse and criminal behavior. Since the time
of the child’s birth, Terry has been convicted of theft in the fifth degree, domestic
abuse assault, and assault causing bodily injury. At the time of the termination
hearing, the father was incarcerated after being convicted of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. His
discharge date is in the year 2021. Terry testified he would be eligible for parole
in November 2016 and placed in a halfway house. He conceded he could not
have physical custody of the child in a halfway house. Prior to the time of his
incarceration, the father did not exercise any regular visitation with the child and
spent little time with her. He did not provide financial support on any regular
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basis. The child does not recognize the father as her father. Terry testified he
had not seen the child in over two years and admitted, “I probably never done my
part.”
Like the juvenile court, we find there is no parent-child bond and
termination of the father’s rights is in the best interest of the child. While the
father would like to make amends for his past once paroled, “[i]t is well-settled
law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.M.,
843 N.W.2d at 112. “What’s past is prologue.” In re K.F., No. 14–0892, 2014
WL 4635463, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014); see also In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting a parent’s past conduct is instructive in
determining future behavior).
AFFIRMED.