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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DIANE R. GOCHIN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
NORMAN ROSETSKY
No. 3798 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2007-12909
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT AND SOLANO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed January 12, 2017
Diane Gochin (“Wife”) appeals the December 11, 2015 divorce decree
that ended her marriage to Norman Rosetsky (“Husband”) and resolved all
outstanding economic claims.1 For the reasons explained infra, we dismiss
the appeal.
Husband and Wife married on August 28, 1988. Wife initiated the
divorce proceedings during 2007, and seven years of contentious equitable
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1
As it relates to the economic claims, the order directed that the marital
home be held in custodia legis pending sale or foreclosure and that any
proceeds and debts be divided equally between the parties. The marital
estate was divided equally and Wife was directed to pay Husband $5,300 for
his share of the distribution. Finally, the court denied both parties’ claims
for alimony pendente lite, alimony, counsel fees and/or costs, and health
insurance.
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distribution litigation ensued. As the trial court highlighted, “since [2007],
there have been over 500 docket entries including those from [a]
consolidated docket [number].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/16, at 3. The
matter remained open during October 2014, when a divorce master presided
over the equitable distribution hearing. The master filed its report and
recommendation on December 5, 2014, and Husband filed a timely demand
for a de novo hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3.2 The trial court
scheduled the de novo hearing for 9:00 a.m., on October 29, 2015. The
court reserved two days for the hearing in anticipation of both parties’
protracted testimony, evidence, and argument.
Wife, who was acting pro se, failed to appear at the de novo hearing.
Instead, on the morning of October 29, 2015, she telephoned the trial
court’s chambers and informed it that she would not be present. The trial
court returned Wife’s call and directed her to attend the hearing. The court
advised Wife that Husband was present and stated that it would wait for her
arrival before proceeding. However, the court warned Wife that, if she failed
to appear, it would proceed with the hearing in absentia. Rather than
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2
While the trial court referred to Husband’s demand as his “exception” to
the master’s recommendation, Montgomery County Family Division does not
employ exceptions. Instead, Montgomery County follows the alternative
procedure outlined in Rule 1920.55-3, which provides “any party may file a
written demand for a hearing de novo” within twenty days of the master’s
report. See Rule 1920.55-1 (Official Note listing Montgomery County as a
jurisdiction electing the alternative procedure under Rule 1920.55-3).
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comply with the court’s directive to attend the hearing or request a
continuance for any reason, Wife insisted upon attending only the second of
the two days that the court had reserved for the hearing. The trial court
attempted to explain that, if Wife did not attend the hearing as scheduled,
there would be no need for a second day. Wife did not relent, and the
hearing proceeded in absentia. After Husband presented his case-in-chief,
including testimony, exhibits, and argument, the trial court adjourned the de
novo hearing on October 29, 2015, without Wife’s participation. On
December 11, 2015, the trial court entered the final order that is the genesis
of this appeal.
Wife’s thirty-three page pro se brief seemingly asserts a litany of
claims for our consideration. Unfortunately for Wife, her brief is an aimless,
rambling criticism of Husband and the trial that is not only incoherent, but
utterly fails to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Wife’s brief does not contain any of the components of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1-
11) that are required to be listed separately and distinctly in the proscribed
order. Specifically, Wife failed to include: 1) a statement of jurisdiction; 2) a
copy of the order in question; 3) a statement of the scope and standard of
review; 4) a statement of the questions involved; 5) the statement of the
case; 7) a summary of the argument; or 8) the statement of errors
complained of on appeal. While we are able to decipher cryptic references to
standards of review and what Wife believes is the “relevant procedural
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history” neither of those references explains Wife’s failure to attend the de
novo hearing or to request a continuance, nor do they address the trial
court’s decision to hold the hearing in absentia.
Moreover, Wife’s brief fails to provide developed arguments in support
of any of the issues that she apparently wants us to consider. The argument
section of the brief is not divided into distinct claims as required by Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a), and while we do not doubt that Wife believes her argument makes
perfect legal sense, we cannot glean from it any legal reasoning that would
provide a basis for the relief that she requests, i.e., a remand for a second
de novo hearing before a different trial court judge, the marital home, and
restitution totaling $100,000. See Wife’s Brief at 33. Rather than justify
her absence from the de novo hearing or explain how the trial court’s
decision to proceed in her absence was tantamount to an abuse of
discretion, Wife engages in irrelevant, often personal, condemnations of
Husband, his attorney, and the various trial judges that presided over the
matter during the course of the seven-year litigation.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101 grants us the authority to dismiss an appeal where, as
here, the defects in a brief are substantial and impede our ability to perform
meaningful review. Specifically, the rule provides, “if the defects are in the
brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or
other matter may be quashed or dismissed.” Id. The fact that Wife is pro
se does not excuse her failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
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Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa.Super.
2003). While “this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a
pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an
appellant.” Id. at 251-252. Likewise, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised
and developed in briefs, [and] when the briefs are wholly inadequate to
present specific issues for review[, this] Court will not consider the merits
thereof.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa.Super.
1996).
The defects in Wife’s brief are substantial and preclude us from
engaging in meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we dismiss the
appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/12/2017
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