MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 13 2017, 9:14 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David Wemhoff Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ricky Snelling, January 13, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
25A05-1607-CR-1707
v. Appeal from the Fulton Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable A. Christopher
Appellee-Plaintiff. Lee, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
25C01-1109-FC-611
Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A05-1607-CR-1707 | January 13, 2017 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] Ricky Snelling appeals the trial court’s calculation of credit time in his
probation revocation case. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Snelling raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
calculated his credit time.
Facts
[3] In September 2011, the State charged Snelling with Class C felony criminal
recklessness, Class D felony criminal recklessness, and Class D felony battery.
Snelling pled guilty to Class D felony criminal recklessness and Class D felony
battery. On September 16, 2013, the trial court sentenced Snelling to “3 years
suspended and to be served on probation for a period of 2 years” for the
criminal recklessness conviction and “3 years to the Indiana Department of
Corrections with 2 years suspended leaving 1 year executed which shall be
served on the electronic monitoring home detention program” with two years
of probation for the battery conviction. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 211-12.
The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently but
consecutive to Snelling’s sentence in another action.
[4] In March and May 2015, the State filed petitions to revoke Snelling’s probation.
The State alleged that he tested positive for marijuana, that marijuana and a
handgun were located in his home during a home visit, that he was discharged
unsuccessfully from substance abuse treatment, and that he had been charged
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with multiple crimes in Fulton and Kosciusko Counties. Snelling admitted that
he had tested positive for marijuana, that marijuana and a handgun were found
in his home, that he had been charged with Class B misdemeanor possession of
marijuana, and that he had also been charged with possession of a controlled
substance, possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and operating
a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court found that Snelling had violated his
probation. The trial court imposed the two years of Snelling’s previously
suspended sentence with 275 days of credit for accrued time and 275 days of
good time credit. Snelling now appeals.
Analysis
[5] Snelling argues that the trial court erred when it calculated his credit time.
“Because credit time is a matter of statutory right, trial courts do not have
discretion in awarding or denying such credit.” Harding v. State, 27 N.E.3d 330,
331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The burden is on the appellant to show the trial
court erred. Id. at 332.
[6] According to Snelling, the trial court should have given him credit for his time
served on home detention. In support of his argument, Snelling cites to Indiana
Code Section 35-38-2.5-5, which provides, in part:
(e) A person confined on home detention as a
condition of probation receives one (1) day of
accrued time for each day the person is confined on
home detention.
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(f) In addition to accrued time under subsection (e), a
person confined on home detention as a condition
of probation is entitled to earn good time credit
under IC 35-50-6-3 or IC 35-50-6-3.1.
However, the State properly points out that Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.5-5
applies to home detention as a condition of probation and that Snelling was not
on home detention as a condition of probation.1
[7] The trial court here ordered Snelling to serve three years, ordered one year of
the executed sentence to be served in home detention, suspended two years,
and ordered two years of probation. Snelling, consequently, served his
executed sentence on home detention. Snelling began serving two years of
probation after serving his executed sentence on home detention. He had
already received credit for his home detention prior to the start of his two-year
probationary period. When the trial court revoked his probation, it ordered
Snelling to serve the two years of his previously-suspended sentence, not his
entire three-year sentence. The trial court then gave Snelling credit for 275 days
1
In his reply brief, Snelling argues that the State’s argument conflicts with Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-
4.5, which provides: “If a court places a person on home detention as part of a community corrections
program, the placement must comply with all applicable provisions in IC 35-38-2.5.” We rejected a similar
argument in Perry v. State, 25 N.E.3d 771, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, where we held:
Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.5-5 is entitled “Home detention as
condition of probation” and therefore on its face is inapplicable to home
detention as a direct placement in community corrections. This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that Indiana Code Section 35-
38-2.5-5 contains credit-time provisions that relate specifically to home
detention as a condition of probation and that Indiana Code Section 35-
38-2.6-6 contains credit-time provisions that relate specifically to home
detention as a direct placement in community corrections.
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of accrued time and 275 days of good time credit for other time that he was
incarcerated after the probation revocation was filed. Snelling is essentially
asking for double credit time on the home detention, which we cannot provide.
Conclusion
[8] The trial court’s order regarding credit time was proper. We affirm.
[9] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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