IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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STATE OF WASHINGTON,
) No. 74061-0-1
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Respondent,
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K.L.G. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION C30
Appellant. ) FILED: January 17, 2017
Spearman, J. — We do not review an argument raised for the first time on
appeal unless it relates to a manifest constitutional error that actually prejudices
the proceeding. Here, K.L.G. contends that he was unconstitutionally deprived of
a jury at his juvenile court adjudicatory hearing. However, he failed to raise the
issue below and, on appeal, fails to identify any prejudice from his assigned
error. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is not reviewable. And even ifwe
were to consider the argument, it would fail. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of May 5, 2015 and into early the next morning, K.L.G.,
T.N., and two other individuals gathered in T.N.'s home. All four were drinking
heavily. At some point, one person left the residence and another was intoxicated
in the bathroom. Once the others left, K.L.G. had nonconsensual intercourse with
T.N., who reported the crime to police.
No. 74061-0-1/2
K.L.G. was charged with Rape in the Second Degree under RCW
9A.44.050. Upon the stipulation of the parties, the juvenile court entered an order
retaining jurisdiction.. An adjudication hearing was held on September 14-16,
2015. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the allegation had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that K.L.G. was guilty as charged.
Disposition was held on October 5, 2015. The court adopted an agreed
recommendation of the parties for a standard range sentence of 30-40 weeks in
the custody of the Juvenile Justice and Rehabilitation Administration. K.L.G.
appeals.
DISCUSSION
K.L.G. contends that the trial court violated his federal and state
constitutional rights by not providing him with a trial by jury. He argues that article
1, section 21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution guarantee him a jury trial in juvenile court.
K.L.G. agreed to juvenile court retention and did not raise this issue at the
adjudication level. Generally, we do not consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). A defendant may appeal a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right, however, even if the issue was not raised before the trial
court. RAP 2.5(a)(3). The defendant must identify a constitutional error and show
that it had practical and identifiable consequences in the proceeding. State v.
Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 500, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). In his briefing, K.L.G. does
not explain any practical or identifiable consequence to his assigned error.
No. 74061-0-1/3
Because he fails to do so, K.L.G. is unable to show that this issue is reviewable
under RAP 2.5(a), and we decline to consider it.
But even if we were to conclude otherwise, we would reach the same
result. Our state supreme court has consistently held that the state constitution
does not require a jury trial for juvenile offenders. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1,
743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Chavez. 163 Wn.2d 262, 267, 180 P.3d 1250
(2008). K.L.G.'s argument that we should rule contrary to this precedent is
misguided because we have no authority to do so. Schaaf and Chavez are
directly on point and are binding on this court. 1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship v.
Vertecs, 158 Wn.2d 566, 578, 146 P.3d 423 (2006). ("When the Court of Appeals
fails to follow directly controlling authority by this court, it errs.")
Finally, K.L.G.'s contention that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution guarantees him the right to trial by jury is wholly unsupported. Trial
by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding is not constitutionally required.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647
(1971).
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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