Opinion issued January 12, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00791-CV
———————————
TODD DAVID ROGERS, Appellant
V.
GINA MARIE ROGERS AND JANA HUDMAN-CAVAZOS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 434th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 12-DCV-199022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Todd David Rogers, proceeding pro se, attempted to appeal from
the trial court’s two post-mandate interlocutory orders, the first one authorizing the
receiver to sell property and the second one confirming the sale of real property,
both signed on September 19, 2016. The trial court had signed the final divorce
decree on September 8, 2015, and on appeal, this Court affirmed that decree on
June 2, 2016, and issued our mandate on August 12, 2016, under appellate cause
number 01-15-00224-CV. One of the appellees, Jana Hudman-Cavazos, the
receiver, filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. We agree with
appellee, grant the motion, and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
This Court generally has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders arising
under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West Supp. 2016) (“An appeal may be
taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”); cf.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014(a)(1)–(13) (West Supp.
2016) (listing appealable interlocutory orders); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d
444, 447 (Tex. 2011) (“Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal,
appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments.”); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
On September 19, 2016, the trial court signed two orders, an “Order
Authorizing Receiver to Sell Property” (“Authorization Order”) and an “Order
Confirming Sale of Real Property” (“Sale Order”). The Sale Order noted that
Hudman-Cavazos was appointed by the trial court as receiver on April 27, 2016.
On October 3, 2016, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from the
Authorization Order and the Sale Order.
2
On November 16, 2016, appellee Hudman-Cavazos filed this motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction, contending that the September 19, 2016 orders, the
Authorization Order and the Sale Order, were both non-appealable interlocutory
orders. More than ten days has passed, but appellant filed no response to the
motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a). On November 29, 2016, the Clerk of this
Court notified appellant that this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of
jurisdiction unless he timely responded to this notice and the motion and showed
how this Court had jurisdiction. See id. 42.3(a), (c). Appellant failed to file a
timely response to the notice.
Although the April 27, 2016 order appointing the receiver would have been
an appealable interlocutory order had appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, that
order is not on appeal here. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(1). Here, neither the post-mandate Authorization Order nor the Sale
Order, both signed on September 19, 2016, appointed a receiver. Moreover,
neither the Authorization Order nor the Sale Order are final orders under the Texas
Family Code, and neither of them fall under any of the categories of orders that are
authorized as appealable. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1)-(13); see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at
200. The clerk’s record, filed in this Court on November 21, 2016, does not
include or refer to a final order or judgment that has been rendered in this new
3
case. Thus, we must dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smith
v. Robertson, No. 01-15-00538-CV, 2015 WL 9311431, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2015, no pet.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction
appeal of refusal of trial court to sign an order in SAPCR because records did not
include final order) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we grant appellee Hudman-Cavazos’s motion and dismiss this
appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); 43.2(f). We dismiss
any other pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Lloyd.
4