J-S88032-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
In the Interest of: M.A.B.-K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1686 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000688-2015
CP-51-DP-0001460-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
In the Interest of: A.M.B.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1687 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000679-2015
CP-51-DP-0001461-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
In the Interest of: A.-B.I.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1688 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000687-2015
CP-51-DP-0001458-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
In the Interest of: U.I.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1689 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000684-2015
CP-51-DP-0001462-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
J-S88032-16
In the Interest of: T.I.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1690 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): 51-FN-001454-2014
CP-51-AP-000683-2015, CP-51-DP-0001450-2014
In the Interest of: Z.B.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1691 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000682-2015
CP-51-DP-0001464-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
In the Interest of: F.-D.I.K.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1692 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000681-2015
CP-51-DP-0001463-2014
FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
In the Interest of: H.S.I.K., A Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appeal of: C.D.C., Mother : No. 1693 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000680-2015
CP-51-DP-0001459-2014, FID: 51-FN-001454-2014
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J-S88032-16
BEFORE: OLSON, RANSOM, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2017
C.D.C. (Mother) appeals from the orders entered April 26, 2016, which
terminated involuntarily her parental rights to eight of her children: A.-B.I.K.
(A.B.K., born January 2004); H.S.I.K. (H.K., born June 2005); M.A.B.-K.
(M.K., born June 2006); A.M.B.K. (A.K., born July 2007); U.I.K. (U.K., born
September 2008); F.-D.I.K.K. (F.K., born November 2009); Z.B.K. (Z.K.,
born November 2011); and T.I.K. (T.K., born November 2012) (collectively,
Children).1 We affirm.
Mother and L.D. (Father) are the biological parents of Children. On
June 15, 2014, the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services
(DHS) received a report regarding Mother and Children.2 Specifically, DHS
learned that family members were trying to locate Mother and Children, but
could not reach them. It was believed Children were no longer attending
school. It was also believed that Mother was suffering from depression and
was using drugs. Mother was known to DHS because she had previously
been involved with the agency in 2006 and 2007.3
* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
1
On June 28, 2016, this Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals.
2
At this point, Father was incarcerated.
3
In April 2006, DHS received a report alleging that Mother was a victim of
ongoing domestic violence by Father. Specifically, Mother was raped by
Father while the children were in the same room. Additionally, another child
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After spending several days attempting to locate Mother and Children,
DHS found Children at a home without adult supervision on June 18, 2014.4
Mother had been gone for two days at that point. N.K., the fourteen-year-
old child of Mother and Father, was left in charge of all of the children. The
home was dirty and contained no furniture other than three soiled
mattresses. Children were hungry and had been walking around the
neighborhood looking for food. Children’s paternal aunt, A.D., had been
trying to locate Children. She and her paramour, E.S., came immediately
once DHS called her after finding Children. A.D. agreed to care for Children
overnight; however, her home did not have enough space for all Children
permanently.
On June 19, 2014, DHS obtained an order of protective custody for
Mother’s ten children because Mother’s whereabouts were still unknown and
Father was incarcerated. Children were taken for medical care, and DHS
learned they were not up to date on their immunizations and Z.K., who was
two years old, was diagnosed with failure to thrive. Children were placed in
of Mother and Father, N.K., was reported to have been sexually abused by
an unknown family member. In October 2007, DHS received another report
that alleged Mother abandoned Father and her children in a van after Father
hit Mother. Mother went to get help and when she returned to the van, only
her then sixteen-month-old child, M.K., and her then two-month-old child,
A.K., were in the van. Father had left the van taking with him the older
children.
4
Ten children were found in the home, including, N.K., S.K. (who was
thirteen years old) and Children. At that time, Children were ages ten, nine,
eight, six, five, four, two, and a year-and-a-half.
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sibling groups with caretakers. Specifically, S.K., N.K., U.K., and F.K. were
placed with a maternal cousin. Z.K. and T.K. were placed together in a
resource home through Friendship House. M.K. and A.K. were placed with a
paternal aunt. H.K. and A.B.K. continued to live with A.D.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on June 30, 2014, and all ten
children were adjudicated dependent and remained in placements with their
respective caregivers. On August 7, 2014, DHS learned that Mother was in a
detoxification program. Mother left that program later that month without
completing it successfully. Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown until
October 2014. It was at that point Mother visited with Children for the first
time. Between October and December 2015, Mother visited Children
sporadically, but DHS did not have contact information for Mother.
Mother entered Interim House, an inpatient drug treatment program,
on January 2, 2015. She was transferred to Jefferson Psychiatric Hospital
the following week for suicidal ideations. Mother then left the program
against medical advice on February 12, 2015. Mother continued visiting
Children sporadically, although, once again, DHS did not have contact
information for her.
On May 15, 2015, Mother, now pregnant with her eleventh child,
tested positive for heroin and cocaine. Mother was then eligible for an
inpatient treatment program at My Sister’s Place, which she entered on June
4, 2015. On July 11, 2015, Mother gave birth to R.K. who was adjudicated
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dependent, but was able to reside with Mother in My Sister’s Place. 5 Mother
has been compliant with her objectives since June of 2015.
On October 6, 2015, DHS filed petitions to terminate involuntarily the
parental rights of Mother and Father to all ten children. Hearings were held
on October 22, 2015, February 3, 2016, and April 26, 2016. On April 26,
2016, the parental rights of both Mother and Father were terminated for
Children. Also on that day, the trial court granted the requests of DHS for
permanent legal custody for N.K. and S.K., the two oldest children.
Mother filed notices of appeal as well as concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal as to Children.6 The trial court filed a single opinion
addressing all Children on August 17, 2016.
On appeal, Mother contends that the trial court erred in granting DHS’s
petitions as to Children. We consider issues of the termination of parental
rights mindful of the following.
In cases involving the termination of a parent’s rights, our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the order of
the trial court is supported by competent evidence, and whether
the trial court gave adequate consideration to the effect of such
a decree on the welfare of the child.
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the
decree must stand …. We must employ a broad, comprehensive
review of the record in order to determine whether the trial
court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.
5
R.K. is not involved in the present appeal.
6
Father has not appealed these orders.
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In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Our courts apply a two-part analysis in reviewing an order terminating
parental rights. As we explained in In re L.M.,
[i]nitially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Here, the trial court determined that DHS met its burdens under
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, as well
as its subsection (b) burden. “While the trial court found that [DHS] met its
burden of proof under each section [mentioned] above, we need only agree
with its decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination
of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Here, we focus on subsection (a)(8). The following are the applicable
portions of the governing statute.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) … or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
Section 2511(a)(8) represents the determination that “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [her] … child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill … parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759-60 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (quoting In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
Instantly, there is no dispute that Children had been out of Mother’s
care over 12 months at the time of the hearing.
Once the 12–month period has been established, the court
must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
[children’s] removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable
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good faith efforts of [DHS] supplied over a realistic time period.
Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court
to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy
the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability
or efficacy of [DHS] services.
K.Z.S., supra at 759 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1133
(Pa. Super. 2007)).
Instantly, the trial court offered the following:
The record demonstrates Mother’s whereabouts were
unknown from the time [C]hildren entered care in June 2014
until August 2014, when she checked herself into a detoxification
program. Mother then left the detoxification program against
medical advice and her whereabouts were unknown again until
mid-October 2014. Mother was then escorted to another
program, where she refused to enter because she had a date
with Father. She then entered into a program in January 2015,
only to be transferred to a psychiatric facility for suicidal
ideations. Then Mother left that facility against medical advice
again. Mother’s issues with mental health and substance abuse
are substantiated on the record.
After hearing the credible testimony of the [Community
Umbrella Agency (CUA)] Case Manager, the CUA Case Aide, the
CUA Supervisor, and My Sister’s Place Counselor, the [trial
court] found by clear and convincing evidence, that their
observations and conclusions regarding Mother’s non-compliance
with [family service plan] objectives, and lack of ability to fulfill
her parental responsibilities were persuasive. Although Mother
became compliant with [Single Case Plan (SCP)] goals as of four
months prior to the filing of the petitions to terminate parental
rights, she has yet to demonstrate an ability to meet her needs
on her own. Mother clearly has no ongoing ability to provide
care or control for her eight Children or perform any parental
duties.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/2016, at 30-31 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
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The trial court’s conclusions are supported by the record. It took
Mother almost a year from the time Children entered placement to gain any
sense of stability. Moreover, the sense of stability she gained came through
her residence in My Sister’s Place, a highly structured environment which
provides Mother with housing, meals, and mental health treatment.
However, during that time, Mother gave birth to another baby, for whom she
now has to care. In addition, Mother acknowledges that she is not able to
care for Children at this juncture. N.T., 2/3/2016, at 115. Based on the
foregoing, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the “conditions
which led to the removal or placement of [Children] continue to exist.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
We now turn to the other requirement under section 2511(a)(8),
regarding the best interests of Children. Here, CUA Case Manager, Malea
Gadson, testified about the placements for Children. See N.T., 4/26/2016.
T.K. and Z.K. are placed in a resource home through Friendship House. Id.
at 9. They are safe with their needs being met and have a bond with their
resource mother. N.T., 10/22/2015, at 27. U.K., F.K., H.K. and A.B.K. are
all together and placed with their maternal cousin who is meeting their
needs.7 N.T., 4/26/2016, at 9. M.K. and A.K. are with their paternal aunt
and their needs are being met. Id. at 11, N.T., 10/22/2015, at 35. As
Children are doing well in their placements, and are even able to remain in
7
S.K. and N.K. live there as well.
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sibling groups with some of the children in kinship placements, the record
supports the trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights is
in the best interests of Children.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
DHS met its burden under section 2511(a)(8). See, e.g., In re C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]f we were to permit Mother
further opportunity to cultivate an environment where she can care for
C.L.G., we would be subjecting a child, who has been waiting for more than
two years for permanency, to a state of proverbial limbo in anticipation of a
scenario that is speculative at best.”).
We next consider whether the trial court gave adequate consideration
to the welfare of Children under section 2511(b). Mother argues that “she
loves and misses her children.” Mother’s Brief at 19. However, “[w]hile a
parent’s emotional bond with … her child is a major aspect of the subsection
2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to
be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of
the child.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child
might have with the foster parent.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Here, the trial court offered the following.
[The trial court] finds credible the testimony from [CUA]
workers that [] Children would not suffer irreparable harm if
Mother’s rights were terminated and that termination of Mother’s
parental rights would be in the best interest of [] Children. []
Children are currently in kinship care with various family
members, and they are thriving and living in nurturing and
loving homes with their caretakers, who meet all of their
emotional and physical needs.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/2016, at 32.
In addition, the trial court offered the following summary of the
situation this case presents.
I had this case from the beginning and no one knows better than
I that the parents cannot parent these other Children and that
satisfies a requirement for termination and adoption.
***
She (Mother) is only capable of parenting the most recently born
child and that was a marginal decision because we had her in the
facility where they were caring for her and the child. If she was
on her own, that would not happen.
***
And it’s in the best interest of [C]hildren to have some
permanency given the length of placement and the time that
they will enjoy until they reach adulthood. They’re entitled to
that permanency and they’re with family members who will give
them that permanency.
Id (citing N.T., 4/26/2016, at 17-25.).
The record supports the trial court’s conclusions. Children have been
in a safe and stable environment in their placements for nearly two years
and despite Mother’s professed love Children, we agree with the trial court
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that it is in Children’s best interests to remain where they are with a sense
of permanency. See, e.g., L.M., 923 A.2d at 512 (“There was absolutely no
evidence that severing the ties between Mother and L.M. would have a
negative effect on the child.”).
Therefore, because the record supports the trial court’s conclusions (1)
that the conditions that led to Children’s placement continue to exist, and
(2) that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s best
interests, we hold that the trial court committed no error or abuse of
discretion in granting DHS’s petitions under section 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/19/2017
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