J-S61003-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.N.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 505 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001113-2016
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 508 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001113-2016.
CP-51-DP-0002470-2014
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.N.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 509 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001114-2016
J-S61003-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.N.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 510 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001114-2016
CP-51-DP-0002471-2014
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 511 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001115-2016
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J., MOTHER
No. 512 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002472-2014
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J-S61003-17
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2017
T.J. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s orders, entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her three minor children, J.J.S. (born 6/12), and twins,
N.N.S. (born 2/11) and I.N.S. (born 2/11) (collectively “Children”).1 After
careful review, we affirm.
In June 2014, the Department of Human Service (DHS) became
involved with Mother and her family after reports that Children lacked
supervision and medical care, were truant from school, and that their drug
addicted maternal grandfather lived in the home. The family was monitored
over the next several months; in October 2014, DHS learned that Mother
had left Children in the care of maternal grandfather and had not returned
home. DHS obtained protective custody orders for Children and they were
placed in kinship care with maternal aunt.
Children were adjudicated dependent on November 19, 2014. Mother,
who had an admitted mental health diagnosis of bipolar disorder, depression
and anxiety, was referred to outpatient mental health therapy in January
2015 in order to help her maintain stability in her life and provide safety and
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
R.S.’s (Father) parental rights were also terminated to Children. He has
not appealed from those termination decrees.
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permanency to Children. While Mother participated in 17 therapy sessions
and was on medication management throughout 2015 and early 2016, in
August 2016 Mother indicated that she felt she had met her goals without
being medicated. On August 16, 2016, a therapist discharged Mother from
therapy with an after-care plan, prescribed medication list, and index of
resources; Mother was advised to reconnect with treatment. Following her
discharge, Mother minimally attended treatment and never resumed
medication management. Within weeks, Mother began exhibiting
threatening behavior toward a friend who was her after-care plan support
system.
On November 18, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to Children and to change the goal to adoption. On
January 19, 2017, the court held a termination hearing where DHS social
worker, Lakesha Akines, Mother and kinship caretaker, Raven Jacobs,
testified. After the hearing, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to all Children on the basis of 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act.2 Mother filed a timely notice of appeal
and court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. She
presents the following issues for our review:
____________________________________________
2
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910.
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(1) Did the trial judge rule in error that the Philadelphia City
Solicitor’s Office me[t] its burden of proof that Mother’s
parental rights to her children should be terminated?
(2) Did the trial judge rule in error that the termination of
Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the children?
(3) Did the trial judge rule in error by changing the goal to
adoption?
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the
burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.” It is well established that a court must examine the
individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence
in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants
termination.
In re adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). See also In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006) (party
seeking termination of parental rights bears burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one of eight grounds for termination under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) exists and that termination promotes emotional needs
and welfare of child set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)).
We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental
rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560,
563 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review is limited to determining
whether the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. Id.
Moreover, we can affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination
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of parental rights with regard to any singular subsection of section 2511(a).
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
After reviewing the parties’ briefs, relevant case law, and the certified
record, we affirm the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Children based on the well-reasoned opinion authored by
the Honorable Lyris Younge.
Here, Mother’s continued incapacity to perform her parental duties,
due to her significant mental health issues which she has been unable to
stabilize, causes Children to be without essential care necessary for their
physical and mental well-being. Mother consistently left Children
unsupervised, blamed others for her circumstances, and often put Children
in maternal grandfather’s care, a known drug addict. As a result, the court
properly terminated Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2). See
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) (rights of parents in regard to child may be
terminated where “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being
and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.”).
In addition, DHS caseworker Akines testified that Children would suffer
no harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. N.T. Termination
Hearing, 1/19/17, at 43. Further, Ms. Akins stated that it would be in
Children’s best interest if they were freed for adoption. Children have been
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flourishing in kinship care with their maternal aunt who provides them with
stability as well as their physical, emotional and educational needs; the bond
with maternal aunt is undeniable. See In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11-12
(strength of emotional bond between child and potential adoptive parent is
important consideration in “best interests” analysis). Moreover, maternal
aunt testified that she was open to having Mother be a part of Children’s
lives regardless of the court’s ultimate decision. N.T. Termination Hearing,
1/19/17, at 70. Accordingly, we conclude that termination was also proper
under section 2511(b).
We instruct the parties to attach a copy of Judge Younge’s opinion in
the event of further proceedings in the matter.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/2017
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Circulated 09/05/2017 11:22 AM