J-A02044-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN W. SIBLEY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
BARR & MCGOGNEY LAW FIRM, GLENN
D. MCGOGNEY, ESQUIRE, GERALD M.
BARR, ESQUIRE
No. 174 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered November 30, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division
at No(s): 2011-07256-27
BEFORE: OTT, RANSOM, AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED January 20, 2017
Appellant, John W. Sibley, appeals pro se from the order of the Bucks
County Court of Common Pleas that, inter alia, granted summary judgment
in favor of Appellee, Gerald M. Barr, Esq. Because the order appealed from
does not resolve all claims against all parties, we quash.
On August 12, 2011, Appellant, acting pro se, commenced the
underlying action by writ of summons against two attorneys, Appellee and
Glenn D. McGogney, and an alleged partnership—referred to as the Barr &
McGogney Law Firm (“Law Firm”). On September 2, 2011, McGogney
petitioned the trial court to coordinate the instant action with a Lehigh
County action. There was no indication that a court granted McGogney’s
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A02044-17
petition. Nevertheless, McGogney took no further action in the instant
matter.
On September 23, 2011, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee,
McGogney, and Law Firm. On March 3, 2014, Appellee filed an answer and
new matter. Appellee denied that he and McGogney formed Law Firm and
asserted that the two-year statute of limitations barred Appellant’s action.
The Honorable Ronald C. Nagle was specially assigned to the matter,
and the trial court thereafter considered Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment and Appellant’s motion for summary judgment against all
defendants. Following oral arguments, the court granted Appellee’s motion
and denied Appellant’s motion by the order dated November 30, 2015, but
entered on December 11, 2015. In an extended footnote accompanying the
order, the trial court intimated that McGogney remained a party in the
instant litigation but did not respond to Appellant’s motion for summary
judgment. Order, 12/11/15, at 12. However, the court suggested that the
two-year statute of limitations barred Appellant’s action against “all parties.”
Id. at 12. Appellant timely appealed.1
It is well settled that this Court may raise issues regarding our
jurisdiction sua sponte. Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d
1
The trial court did not order the submission of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. Appellant’s pro se brief contains a claim that the trial court erred
in granting McGogney relief that he did not request. See Appellant’s Brief at
32, 58-59.
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J-A02044-17
1148, 1511 (Pa. Super. 2009). An appeal generally lies from a final order
that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
The instant order granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee and
denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment as against all defendants.
Despite McGogney’s inaction in the matter, he remains a party, and the
order appealed from did not enter judgment in his favor. Therefore, the
instant order is not final. Because we discern no other basis to exercise
jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal,2 we must quash.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/20/2017
2
See Pa.R.A.P. 311 (providing for interlocutory appeals as of right), 313
(defining collateral order), 341(c) (providing for entry of final order based on
express determination that immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of
the entire case); Estate of Considine, 966 A.2d at 1511-13.
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