NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 13-50234
13-50399
Plaintiff-Appellee,
D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00993-RT-1
v.
CRISTINE DANIEL, AKA Christine Chika MEMORANDUM*
Chesman, AKA Chika Chima, AKA Chika
Christine Chima, AKA Christina Ononando
Chima, AKA Christine O Chima, AKA
Chika Christine Daniel, AKA Christine O.
Daniel,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Robert J. Timlin, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 13, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT, McKEOWN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Christine Daniel appeals her criminal jury trial conviction for eleven counts
of mail fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion, and witness tampering, as well as a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
forfeiture money judgment of $1,243,359.79. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Daniel’s motion to
discharge her counsel Banjo and Banjo’s motion to be relieved. United States v.
Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). A defendant’s right to choose
her counsel may be outweighed by “purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and
orderly administration of justice.” Id. at 979 (quoting United States v. Ensign, 491
F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)). Only where “the court is required to balance the
defendant’s reason for requesting substitution against the scheduling demands of
the court” does “[c]onflict between the defendant and his attorney enter[] the
analysis.” Id. at 980 (citations omitted).
The district court conducted multiple hearings on the counsel issue, during
which it considered all the elements of the requisite inquiry. Accordingly, any
error committed by the district court in not explicitly citing Rivera-Corona was
harmless. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The district court found that any further delay
occasioned by granting Daniel’s motion would greatly inconvenience the court, the
prosecution, and the witnesses. See United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 291
(9th Cir. 1992), recognized as overruled on other grounds in Escobar-Cuellar v.
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Lynch, 650 F. App’x 446, 447 (9th Cir. 2016). The district court also explained its
bases for finding that there was not an irreconcilable conflict between Daniel and
Banjo, including that Banjo continued to practice law and was in trial in other
cases during this period. We give substantial deference to these factual findings,
which were not “without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the
record.” See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance so
that Daniel could find another attorney. See United States v. Thompson, 587 F.3d
1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2009). A “continuance may be denied even when that denial
results in the defendant’s being unrepresented at trial,” and “a court may force a
defendant to proceed pro se if his conduct is dilatory and hinders the efficient
administration of justice.” Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). For the same reasons that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motions to remove counsel, it did not abuse its discretion in denying a
continuance. Further, Daniel advised the court that four attorneys had declined to
step in as substitute counsel.
Daniel’s Faretta waiver was not involuntary just because the district court
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denied the motions to remove counsel. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337,
1345 (9th Cir. 2015). We have held that a Faretta request can be conditional, yet
unequivocal, where a defendant requests self-representation when the court refuses
to order substitute counsel. See United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 621
(9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164
(2008).
We decline to review on direct appeal Daniel’s claim that Banjo rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his removal. “As a general rule, we do
not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal” because such
“claims usually cannot be advanced without the development of facts outside the
original record.” United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Daniel has not shown that she
meets any exception to this general rule. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1151 (9th Cir. 2015). Testimony that
patients experienced pain under Daniel’s treatment and that Daniel told some
patients that pain medication interfered with her treatments was relevant to
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Daniel’s defense at trial. Id. at 1152. Admitting the 15 minute video of Daniel’s
TBN appearance, rather than the full program, was appropriate given that her
portion of the video demonstrated the religious context of the presentation of her
treatment option. See United States v. Vallejos, 742 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2014).
The exhibit of Daniel’s clinic website was not hearsay, because it was not offered
for the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Kirk, 844 F.2d 660, 663 (9th
Cir. 1988). Even if the district court erred in any of these evidentiary rulings, the
error was harmless because the evidence of Daniel’s guilt was extensive. See
Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1157 n.9.
The district court did not err by declining to dismiss Juror 11. The district
court conducted a hearing regarding juror bias, at which Juror 11 conceded that her
actions had been improper and averred that she could put aside her feelings against
Banjo and decide the case fairly. The district court’s crediting of this testimony
was not clear error. United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 885–89 (9th Cir. 2013).
There was sufficient evidence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) to support
Daniel’s conviction under count 11 for tampering with witness Rene Ramos.
Ramos testified that prior to his grand jury testimony, Daniel instructed him to
label his treatment payments as “donations” on his checks to Daniel’s clinic.
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“[N]on-coercive attempts to persuade a witness to lie are clearly covered by” the
federal witness tampering statute. United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th
Cir. 2011).
Daniel had no constitutional or statutory right to a jury determination on the
forfeiture money judgment. United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 769–71 (9th
Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
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