NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE DANIEL, No. 15-15917
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-02426-VC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOSEPH RICHARDS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
George Daniel appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful seizure, excessive force, and
unconstitutional county policies. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Daniel’s
requests for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief and reply brief, are denied.
We review de novo. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir.
2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s unlawful
seizure claim against defendants Officer Richards and Officer Hawks because
Daniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those
defendants arrested him without probable cause. See Edgerly v. City & County of
San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2010) (probable cause exists when
facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge “were sufficient to warrant
a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an
offense,” and the offense need not be the stated reason for arrest).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s excessive
force claim against Officer Richards and Officer Hawks because Daniel failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those defendants’ actions
were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. See Hooper v.
County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating the test for
excessive force).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s excessive
force claim against defendants Sheriff Freitas and Assistant Sheriff Walker
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because Daniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those
defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, there was a
sufficient causal connection between those defendants’ conduct and the
constitutional deprivation, or those defendants implemented a constitutionally
deficient policy. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011)
(supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists if supervisor was personally
involved or there is a sufficient causal connection); Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d
1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995) (supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists
when a supervisory official implements a policy “so deficient that the policy itself
is a repudiation of constitutional rights”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s claim
related to his bail as to Sheriff Freitas and Assistant Sheriff Walker because Daniel
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether those defendants
personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or there was a sufficient
causal connection between those defendants’ conduct and the constitutional
deprivation. See Starr, 625 F.3d at 1208.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Daniel’s Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) claims because he failed to
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establish any underlying constitutional violation or demonstrate an established
custom or policy. See Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir.
1997) (municipal defendant can only be liable under § 1983 if actions were taken
pursuant to custom or policy); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (must establish underlying harm for Monell liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. See
Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth
standard of review and noting that such a motion may be denied if it would
produce an undue delay in the litigation).
We do not consider matters that have not been specifically and distinctly
raised and argued in an appellant’s opening brief or that were not raised below.
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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